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CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF IRAN’S 
NATIONAL ACCREDITATION PROGRAMME FOR HEALTHCARE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
By Ebrahim Jaafaripooyan 
The importance of focusing on performance measurement systems (PMSs) in the public 
sector has increased following the introduction of new public management (NPM) 
initiatives, which placed a greater emphasis on organisational accountability and 
performance measurement. PMSs have always been a key player in ensuring accountability 
and improvement in the practices of public sector (e.g. healthcare) organisations. Critical 
features of the health sector have particularly warranted the application of various internal 
or external PMSs in this area as well as the regular assessment of their own performance. 
This is crucial in terms of both maintaining their alignment with the initially determined 
objectives and improving their merits and capabilities to continuously detect the 
deficiencies and malpractices in healthcare organisations (HCOs). 
  Iran’s national accreditation programme for healthcare organizations (NAPH) has served 
as the sole element of macro control and regulation in the country’s health sector at 
national level. It has been set up to reflect, operationalise and guarantee the intentions of 
the government for promoting quality and safety in the local HCOs, mainly hospitals, 
across the country. Despite the NAPH’s importance and vital position in the country’s 
health system and its long-time implementation, the contextual effects of this evaluatory 
mechanism on the individual hospitals have not been empirically researched in current 
organizational context; i.e. there is a lack of empirical evidence in the literature on how 
this macro PMS impacts in practice on the hospitals at local level. Accordingly, this study 
aims to render a contextual evaluation of the performance of this evaluatory system. A 
middle-range thinking (MRT) research approach has informed the study. Drawing on this 
approach, Broadbent and Laughlin’s theoretical framework was adopted to both guide the 
empirical work and help with the analysis and interpretation of the empirical data. 
  The findings of the study showed that it was mainly the financial benefits rather than the 
quality improvement merits of the current hospital accreditation and evaluation programme 
that were apparently the main rationale behind the conformity of the hospitals. Both 
dysfunctional and beneficial consequences were associated with the NAPH by the 
hospitals’ members. In addition, the hospitals showed different reactions including 
rejection and gaming as well as absorption to achieve the beneficial gains of the 
programme. However, they also adopted some requirements of the NAPH exclusively in 
view of its perceived merits and some other contextual factors. Changes in the hospitals as 
a result of the programme occurred mostly in the early years following its introduction or 
modification. This study further provides both theoretical and practical research 
implications for policy and practice for the improvement of this evaluation mechanism.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Overview   
The public sector is argued to be both practically and politically important, given the 
criticality of its services and the cost of public service provision (Broadbent et al., 
2010a). It is distinguished by two main features (Dixit, 2002); First, public sector 
organisations are responsive and accountable to several groups (i.e. they have 
different stakeholders with whom they must comply and communicate). Some refer to 
the public sector as an area with multiple principals and tasks (Propper and Wilson, 
2003; Abernethy et al., 2007). Second, these organisations often have various ends to 
achieve. Accordingly, performance measurement has been overly crucial in this 
sector, given these particular characteristics. In addition, the inception of New Public 
Management (NPM) has reinforced the focus on performance measurement and 
accountability in this area (Hood, 1995; Lapsley, 2009).  
Healthcare, as a key player in the public sector, is also seen as specifically distinct in 
view of such peculiar features as its life-saving activities (Gauld, 2005; Broadbent et 
al., 2010a) and the information asymmetry between providers and customers (i.e. 
patients) in this sector (Montagu, 2003). The importance of health care can be more 
simply highlighted by the fact that practically everyone (or their close associates) in  
society will need health services. These features partly cast some light on the reasons 
why the public sector and health care in particular always remain within the purview 
of governments’ duties in most of the developed and developing countries (Broadbent 
and Guthrie, 1992; 2008) and why the state is always keen to be involved in the 
regulation of this sector (Walshe, 2003). They further underscore the necessity of 
applying reliable and continuously reviewed performance measurement and 
improvement mechanisms in this area to avoid irremediable harm to vulnerable                                                                                                                         
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consumers and undue costs to healthcare organisations (HCOs) operating in this 
context (McKee and Healy, 2002; Jovanovic, 2005).   
In a similar vein, the government is in charge of healthcare services in Iran, as a 
developing country. According to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s (I.R.I.) Constitution, 
the government is tasked with providing health care for every single individual in the 
country (I.R.I., 1979a). In order to fulfil this articulated law, the Ministry of Health 
and Medical Education (MOHME, in short the MoH hereafter) has been established in 
the country to plan, organise and control the provision and delivery of quality health 
care to the society (Majlis, 1985). The MoH owns a centralised fabric and applies a 
national evaluation (accreditation) programme to measure the performance of its 
HCOs (Sadaghiani and Zare, 2005).  
 
1.1.1. Statement of the problem  
This section provides a brief statement of the research problem. A formative 
evaluation of the implications of Iran’s current accreditation programme in the 
hospitals along with the results of previous scant literature concerning the 
performance of this programme revealed a fairly comprehensive unhappiness among 
most members of the hospitals with the performance and functionality of this 
accreditation programme. This issue was the main trigger for initiating the current 
research. In fact, it was important to explore why such perceptions (e.g. discontent) 
existed among a wide range of the hospitals’ members towards the NAPH. In 
addition, the considerably unchanged nature of the NAPH during a long period of 
time, despite the existing dissatisfaction and the programme’s far-reaching effect, was 
also a reason for choosing this case for further analysis, in addition to the lack of 
sufficient relevant studies. 
 
1.2. Purpose of the study 
Since its introduction in 1997, Iran’s national accreditation programme for healthcare 
organisations (NAPH) has served as an important element of macro control and 
regulation in the health sector which reflects, operationalises and guarantees the 
government’s intentions for maintaining and improving quality and safety in the                                                                                                                         
 
3 
hospitals across the country (MoH, 1997a; I.R.I., 2004). This externally imposed 
performance measurement system (PMS) - to be discussed in chapter three - evaluates 
and rates all types of hospitals (i.e. public and private) annually on the basis of their 
performance (MoH, 1997a). It is developed in a centralised fashion and is the sole 
evaluatory mechanism of all hospitals in the country.  
Despite the NAPH’s vital position in the country’s healthcare system and its long-
time existence, the contextual effects and implications of operationalising this 
evaluatory mechanism have not been empirically researched in the current 
organisational context. There is a lack of empirical evidence in the literature as to how 
this macro PMS impacts in practice on the hospitals at local level; how do the 
hospitals perceive and react to this control system, and what factors associated with 
this accreditation programme (AP) might affect the perceptions and reactions of the 
hospitals’ managerial staff towards this evaluatory mechanism? These ‘how’ and 
‘what’ research questions are invoked by the current study to render a contextual 
evaluation of the performance of this national evaluatory system.  
The scant existing literature on the performance of the NAPH has taken a rationalistic 
and instrumental approach to the evaluation of this mechanism. This approach is 
criticised for dismissing the contextual aspects (Modell, 2001). Moreover, these 
studies have not detected any significant sign of improvement in the hospitals’ 
performance as a result of this accreditation system (e.g. Baghebanian, 2001; Arab et 
al., 2005). Therefore, this study aims to pursue the following specific objectives in the 
light of its theoretical frameworks: 
1.  To examine the perceptions of the hospitals regarding the nature (merits and 
worth) of the NAPH; 
2.  To develop an understanding of the contextual (dysfunctional and beneficial) 
effects of the NAPH on the hospitals; 
3.  To investigate the reactions of the hospitals towards the NAPH; 
4.  To explore the rationales underlying the hospitals’ reactions; 
5.  To identify, in a tentative and speculative fashion, ways of improving the 
accreditation system in the light of insights from the hospitals. 
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The first two objectives are dealt with in the chapter six and answers to the remainder 
are included in chapter seven of this thesis. As such, they all are reviewed and 
discussed in the chapter eight. 
 
1.3. Theoretical frameworks 
As will be elaborated in chapter four, this study is informed by a Middle-Range 
Thinking (MRT) research approach (Laughlin, 2007). The strength of this approach in 
allowing prior theories to be utilised in a skeletal fashion for investigating the richness 
of the empirical context (Modell, 2001, Laughlin, 2004) is the main rationale for its 
usage in this study. Drawing on this approach, Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) 
theoretical frameworks are adopted to both guide the empirical investigation and help 
with the analysis and interpretation of the empirical data. The significance of these 
frameworks, informed by Habermas’s critical theory, lies in their concern with the 
critical analysis and evaluation of the phenomenon under study (e.g. the NAPH) 
(Laughlin, 2007).  
 
1.4. Significance and contribution of the study  
The relevance of this research can be briefly discussed from the following 
perspectives. First, most research on the contextual effects of macro PMSs in health 
care (e.g. the NAPH) has focused on developed countries (e.g. Broadbent et al., 2001; 
Modell, 2001; Mannion et al., 2005; Agrizzi, 2008; Chang, 2006), leaving developing 
countries largely unexplored. Chang (2006), for example, studies the hospital 
managerial responses to the NHS Performance Assessment Framework (PAF). He 
concludes that the PAF was mostly used for legitimacy-seeking, rather than for 
rational strategic performance management by the managers of the hospitals. As such, 
Mannion et al. (2005) found both perceivably positive and negative effects associated 
with the NHS Star-rating system. Therefore, given the significance of contextual 
aspects
1 in the design and effectiveness of PMSs (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009; 
                                                   
1. Societal and organisational situation in which the PMSs locate and operate (Broadbent & Laughlin, 
2009)                                                                                                                         
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Ferreira and Otley, 2009),  the studies considering these elements in investigation of 
PMSs within unexplored countries could further the debate on performance 
measurement and management (PMM) practices in the public sector. The 
organisational context of a developing country, addressed by this research, has been 
largely overlooked by the mainstream performance measurement and improvement 
literature.  
Second, accreditation is argued to be the most ubiquitous PMS used in health care 
(Heaton, 2000; Shaw, 2000). Whilst it is set up to evaluate HCOs, its performance 
also needs to be assessed to both maintain its alignment with the initially determined 
objectives (Smith et al., 2008; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009) and improve its merits 
and capabilities to continuously detect the deficiencies and malpractices in HCOs
2 
(Stufflebeam, 2001; Shaw, 2003a). The critical nature of healthcare processes and 
outcomes, as discussed earlier (Montague, 2003; Gauld, 2005), and the high cost of 
APs for both those running and being evaluated by these programmes (James and 
Hunt, 1996; Cerqueira, 2006) reinforce the necessity for assessing their performance. 
Previous research on the performance and impact of healthcare accreditation shows 
mixed and inconsistent results (Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2008; Nicklin and 
Dickson, 2009). Accordingly, there has been an extensive call in healthcare literature 
for a theoretical-based assessment of such external PMSs to produce rigorous results 
on their performance (e.g. Mannion et al., 2005; Øvretveit and Gustafson, 2003; 
Chuang and Inder, 2009; Walshe, 2007; Grol et al., 2007; Greenfield and Braithwaite, 
2009). For instance, Walshe (2007, 2009) suggests using theories from the areas with 
experience in investigating complex social interventions (e.g. education and society) 
for researching healthcare quality improvement initiatives. Similarly, Laughlin and 
Broadbent (1996) argue that, given the complexity of the public sector, particularly 
health care (Scrivens, 2007), the evaluation of accountability mechanisms (e.g. APs) 
in this sector needs a complex wide-ranging theoretical design. Ferreira and Otley 
(2009) similarly bring to the fore the importance of using a theoretical approach to 
scrutinise the impact of PMSs. Adopting relevant theoretical frameworks, the current 
study seeks to satisfy the abovementioned call. 
                                                   
2. This type of evaluation is labelled as meta-evaluation (Scriven, 2009).                                                                                                                         
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Third, this study is one of the first of its kind to investigate the perceived 
dysfunctional and beneficial consequences of the NAPH for the hospitals, and 
examines their organisational reactions and underlying rationales in relation to this 
evaluatory mechanism. In this sense, it addresses a gap in current performance 
measurement and improvement literature by providing a case-study of Iranian 
healthcare accreditation system. Moreover, the study endeavours to provide several 
practical insights for improvement of the current accreditation system. They would be 
of a high value for authorities in the MoH to tailor this programme to the local and 
organisational arrangements and complexities, given their roots in the viewpoints and 
feedback of the hospitals. Since the NAPH is a national and centralised programme, 
the results of this research could present a reflection of the hospitals’ perceptions and 
reactions towards its implementation and effectiveness to the directorate of this 
accreditation system.  
Fourth, from a theoretical perspective, this study is a modest effort to provide an 
example of how Broadbent and Laughlin’s framework could be extended from their 
mainly accounting context to analysing the changes and reactions triggered by a 
healthcare accreditation and evaluation programme (i.e. the NAPH) in the context of a 
developing country. The study identifies, synthesises and utilises the virtue of these 
frameworks, originated from Habermas’s societal development model, for critically 
analysing the merits of this evaluation system. As such, it locates the NAPH in a 
societal context.  
 
1.5. Motivation of the study 
The importance of health care in a society (i.e. the part it plays in all stages of 
people’s lives and the dependence of any and each individual on healthcare services
3) 
can never be ignored. I became interested in the topic of performance measurement 
after realising its vital position in ensuring quality and safe health care, following my 
rather lengthy involvement in the area of health care and contact with HCOs as 
student, researcher or practitioner. This is, in the best fashion, encapsulated in the 
popular adage of ‘no measurement, no improvement’ (Harbour, 1997, p. 1). On the 
                                                   
3. Health has been even referred to as a hidden wealth in Islamic religious texts.                                                                                                                          
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other hand, there have always been concerns, among both academics and 
practitioners, about how to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of evaluation and 
control mechanisms and how to maximise their intended consequences and minimise 
their unwanted and dysfunctional effects on their subject organisations. This has been 
believed to be overly critical in health care, given its peculiar features (Gauld, 2005). 
My analysis of the MoH’s policies and legislation revealed that the NAPH remained 
the only control and evaluatory mechanism for evaluating the performance of 
hospitals in Iran (MoH, 1997a). Particularly, it was understood that the NAPH is an 
entirely centralised and uniform system for all types of the hospitals, allowing no 
consideration of local and contextual elements (e.g. the reactions of the hospitals), and 
its results have a considerable impact on the survivability of the hospitals. In the light 
of the prominence of this regulatory mechanism in the country’s healthcare system, 
the current study recognised an urgent need to look into its performance and 
appropriateness from the local hospitals’ perspectives. Such an effort is expected to 
benefit both those who issue the NAPH (the MoH) and those who are assessed (the 
hospitals) by this programme. The fact that this area of research has not been explored 
by previous literature also inspired this study. Therefore, the present study is 
motivated by this opportunity to remedy the shortage of studies concerned with 
examining the nature of this macro PMS (i.e. the NAPH) by looking into its local and 
contextual effects from the perspectives of the selected hospitals.  
 
1.6. The structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised into eight chapters, each of which is 
described briefly below.  
 
￿  Chapter two - Literature review of performance measurement systems 
with reference to hospital accreditation system 
This chapter contains three main parts. The first section provides a general description 
of performance measurement and its different aspects (e.g. its definition and features). 
The second part revolves around PMSs in health care, concentrating particularly on 
accreditation as a well-known external performance evaluation system of HCOs. And                                                                                                                         
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lastly, a review of different studies on the performance analysis of APs is conducted 
in the third part of the chapter. 
￿  Chapter two - The organisation of the healthcare system and 
accreditation in Iran 
Chapter two firstly provides some introductory information about the structure of the 
healthcare system in Iran. The main focus of the chapter, nevertheless, is on the 
Iranian healthcare accreditation system. Therefore, a detailed account of the structure 
and various facets of this mechanism are presented. 
￿  Chapter four - Research paradigm and theoretical and methodological 
frameworks 
Since this study adopts two theoretical frameworks for undertaking its empirical 
investigation and analysis, a single chapter of this thesis is devoted to explaining these 
frameworks. The chapter commences by expounding the philosophical position and 
research paradigm of the study. Then, it provides a full elucidation of the applied 
theoretical and methodological frameworks. The reasons for adopting the 
corresponding paradigm and frameworks are included within this chapter. 
￿  Chapter five - Research design and methods 
This chapter elaborates on the research design, data collection methods and qualitative 
data analysis of the study.  
￿  Chapter six - The assessment of the merits of the NAPH 
This chapter encompasses the first part of the findings resulting from the study’s 
empirical investigation. It contains the relevant results on the assessment of the merits 
of the NAPH. The dysfunctional and beneficial effects of this programme for the 
hospitals are also mentioned within this chapter. 
 
￿  Chapter seven - The assessment of the reactions and the rationales of the 
hospitals towards the NAPH 
Chapter seven covers the second part of the results. It includes the reactions and 
underlying rationales of the hospitals towards Iran’s current AP. As such, it 
encompasses the changes in the various aspects of the hospitals as a result of the                                                                                                                         
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NAPH. Recommendations provided by the hospitals for making improvements in the 
performance of the NAPH are also presented in this chapter. 
  
￿  Chapter eight - Review and discussion of the findings  
This chapter comprises a review and discussion of the main findings presented in 
chapters six and seven of this study.  
 
￿  Chapter nine - Final Considerations; Concluding discussion, implications 
and limitations 
Finally, this chapter looks at the conclusions of the research including the concluding 
discussion, key findings and implications for theory and practice. It also provides the 
direction for future studies and addresses the limitations of the study. 
 
Chapter 2 - Healthcare Performance Measurement: The 
Case of Accreditation 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter includes three main sections. The main purpose of the chapter is to review the 
existing literature on the performance analysis of APs. However, there is a need initially to 
provide introductory background information on performance and performance 
measurement in health care before embarking upon this process. Therefore, the first part is 
concerned with providing a general description of performance measurement and its 
different aspects (e.g. its definition, features and real-life examples). The second part gives 
an explanation of the PMSs in health care sector, concentrating particularly on 
accreditation as a well-known external performance evaluation system of HCOs and the 
subject of the current study. A full exposition of this mechanism and its features follow. 
Finally, the different approaches to the performance analysis of APs and a review of the 
relevant studies focusing on this mechanism are discussed in the third part of the chapter. 
This chapter seeks to provide theoretical support for the concept of performance 
measurement in health care, helping the researcher develop an understanding of the 
performance evaluation of APs based on the existing body of the literature. 
 
2.2. Performance measurement: Definitions  
2.2.1. Performance  
The term ‘performance’ originally emanates from ‘perform’, which denotes fulfilling an 
obligation or requirement or accomplishing something promised or expected (Dianis and                                                                                                                               
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Cummings, 1998, p. 50). ‘Performance’ is defined as the manner in which something 
functions (Øvretveit, 1998, p. 151). Robbins and Coulter (2002, p. 554) describe 
‘performance’ as ‘the end result of an activity’. As these definitions imply, performance 
can be linked to both process and outcome. Lohman et al. (2004) believe that performance 
is usually illustrated and specified by a performance indicator (PI), a variable that 
expresses, quantitatively or sometimes qualitatively, the effectiveness or efficiency or both 
of a process or system against a given norm, target or standard. PI might also be called 
performance metric or measure (Lohman et al., 2004).  
 
2.2.2. Performance measurement 
Performance measurement (PM) has recently assumed a renewed importance in a wide 
range of organisations (Amaratunga and Baldry, 2002). It is been defined simply as the 
activity of measuring performance using PIs (Lohman et al., 2004). Similarly, Zairi (1994) 
refers to PM as a group of yardsticks that show organisations how they are performing and 
motivate them to do better. According to Moullin (2002), the most quoted definition of PM 
has been provided by Neely et al. (2002, p. xiii) as ‘the process of quantifying the 
efficiency and effectiveness of past actions’. Nevertheless, he believes this definition might 
reduce the opportunity for managers to challenge their PM processes. Therefore, he defines 
PM as ‘evaluating how well organisations are managed and the value they deliver for 
customers and other stakeholders’ (Moullin, 2007, p. 181). This definition, as Moullin 
(2007) puts it, could help managers measure the value they deliver to their customers.  
 
2.3. Significance of PM 
Assessment of operations, activities, programmes and organisations is a crucial 
prerequisite for any improvement process. This importance is largely reflected by some 
popular PM adages, such as ‘what you measure is what you obtain’ (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992, p. 71) and ‘what gets measured gets attention’ (Ridgway, 1956). Similarly, Halachmi 
(2002, p.13) emphasizes that ‘it might be somewhat impossible to understand what is not 
measurable’ or ‘if something cannot be understood, it cannot be improved’ (Harbour, 
1997). Accordingly, in order to make any improvement in the performance and quality of 
different programmes, organisations and services, the necessity of considering possibilities                                                                                                                               
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and the quality of measuring their performance is undeniable. A wide range of advantages 
are attributable to PM (to be discussed later). For instance, de Bruijn (2002; 2007) believes 
that measuring performance can result in more transparency and learning in organisations.  
Organisations usually measure their performance either systematically and thoroughly or 
on an ad hoc basis and superficially (Parker, 2000). Whatever is used for assessing or 
improving performance and quality, such as process re-engineering, Kaizen, activity-based 
costing (ABC), total quality management (TQM), continuous quality improvement (CQI) 
etc., one basic goal is shared: to do better and faster with fewer resources (i.e. in terms of 
people, time or money). Critical for achieving this goal and preceding and enabling most of 
the abovementioned strategies and models is the ability to measure the performance 
(Harbour, 1997). PM is envisaged as the central part of the management process 
(Speckbacher, 2003). It is also associated with promoting accountability, highlighting the 
strengths and weaknesses and guiding the resource usage of organisations (Kwak et al., 
1997). 
 
2.4. Performance measurement system 
Performance measurement systems (PMSs) were historically developed for monitoring and 
maintaining the control processes in organisations (Purbey et al., 2006). As Lohman et al. 
(2004, p. 268) put it, ‘a PMS is a framework (procedure, system, software) to execute PM 
in a consistent and complete way’. If designed, deployed and implemented diligently, 
PMSs could ensure that organisations deliver cost-effective and high-quality services and 
meet the needs of service users (Moullin, 2004). A sound PMS can provide the basis for an 
organisation to assess how well it is progressing towards its predetermined objectives, help 
to identify areas of strengths and weaknesses, and decide on future initiatives, with the goal 
of improving organisational performance (Purbey et al., 2006).  
It is argued that PMSs need to do the following: be sensitive to changes in the external and 
internal environment of an organisation; review and reprioritise internal objectives in terms 
of the changes; measure performance from a multi and interrelated perspective; be valid, 
reliable and easy to use and linked to the organisation’s values and strategy to attain its 
ends (Bititcti et al., 2000; Purbey et al., 2006). Kravchuk and Schuck (2001, p. 350) point 
to the following principles for designing an effective PMS:                                                                                                                               
 
12 
1.  Formulating a clear coherent mission; 
2.  Developing an explicit measurement strategy; 
3.  Involving key users in the design and development phase; 
4.  Developing a multiple set of measures for multiple users; 
5.  Considering the customers throughout the process; 
6.  Providing each user with sufficient detail; 
7.  Reviewing and revising the measures periodically. 
 
Different functions have been considered for a PMS pertaining to the nature of 
organisations being measured (either public or private).  A study by Behn (2003) has 
envisaged plurality of functions for PMSs. For instance, he indicates that public 
organisations can use performance measures to evaluate, control, budget, motivate, 
promote, celebrate, learn, and improve their activities and processes. PMSs can help 
organisations decide what programmes or projects are worth spending their budgets on, or 
what accomplishments are worthy of attention and celebration. As such, a variety of 
models and frameworks have been designed and developed for measuring performance in 
organisations.  
 
2.5. PMSs in the literature 
For many years financial measures have lain at the heart of PM in different organisations 
(Kennerley and Neely, 2002). The failure of these measures to give a valid picture of 
organisational performance has led to a revolution in measuring performance and the 
consequent introduction of non-financial measures along with previous measures (Johnson 
and Kaplan, 1987; Waggoner et al., 1999; Kanji, 2008). As such, frameworks with the 
balanced inclusion of measures were introduced (Kaplan and Norton, 2005). Different 
PMSs for measuring performance of an organisation are mentioned in the literature. Some 
of the important frameworks are briefly explained as follows (they are displayed in the 
Appendix H): 
Balanced performance measurement matrix: Keegan et al. (1989) presented a balanced PM 
matrix. It categorises the measures into cost or non-cost and internal or external categories 
(Kennerley and Neely, 2002). It was rather simple and easy to use for measuring 
performance and encompassed measures ranging from financial to non-financial indicators                                                                                                                               
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(Neely, 2002). A criticism of this framework is that the matrix does not make explicit links 
between different dimensions of business performance; in practice, this causes the PM to 
encounter certain complexities and ambiguities (Purbey et al., 2006). 
Performance pyramid system: The performance pyramid system (PPS) was originally 
developed by Judson (1990) and later improved by (Lynch and Cross, 1991). It is useful 
for describing how objectives are communicated down to subordinates and how measures 
can permeate various levels in the organisation. This system monitors performance at 
different levels of organisations. It tries to make clear-cut differences between measures 
that are related to external stakeholders’ interests, e.g. customer satisfaction and quality, 
and measures that are primarily aimed at elements within the business, such as products 
and processes (Purbey et al., 2006). The pyramid starts with quality, delivery, cycle time 
and waste and cost measures at the bottom, customer, innovation and learning and 
productivity measures at the second level, market and financial measures at the third and 
visions, missions and CSFs at the top level of the pyramid (see Appendix H). Some 
criticise that measures related to personnel have not been accommodated in this approach 
(Bond, 1999). This framework has been found to be difficult to operationalise (Kanji, 
2001). 
Results and Determinants Framework:  This PMS is composed of six dimensions. Two of 
its measures, namely competitiveness and financial success, are related to the results of 
organisational strategy. The remaining four (i.e. quality, flexibility, resource utilisation and 
innovation) are the determinants of the success of these strategies (Fitzgerald et al., 1991).  
Balanced scorecard framework: Kaplan and Norton (1992) presented the balanced 
scorecard (BSC) framework for measuring performance of an organisation. This model 
considers four main dimensions in measuring organisational performance, namely financial 
perspective, internal business perspective, innovation and growth perspective and customer 
perspective (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). However, in terms of its application in different 
organisations, the nature and number of its dimensions may be changeable and modifiable 
(Bontis et al., 1999). Kloot and Martin (2000) maintain that Kaplan and Norton (1992) 
have considered the three dimensions of quality, flexibility and resource utilization in 
Fitzgerald et al.’s (1991) model as their own internal business processes dimension. They 
have also appended that Kaplan and Norton’s dimensions can yet be classified as results                                                                                                                               
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(financial, customer) and determinants (internal business processes and innovation and 
learning). 
The BSC communicates, i.e. cascades down, organisations’ strategic plans via strategic 
maps in which the cause-and-effect relationships between the different strategic objectives 
can be visualised (Urrutia and Eriksen, 2005). In this regard, Kloot and Martin (2008) 
argue that a strong linkage between strategic plans and performance measures can be 
provided by BSC and RDF. Despite the success of this framework in measuring a 
multitude of organisations’ performance, some criticisms have also emerged in respect to 
BSC principles. Some believe that BSC is based on false estimations of the cause-and-
effect relationship (Norreklit, 2000; Johnson, 2006); furthermore, the four dimensions of 
the balanced scorecard are rather simplistic and do not take into account some key 
stakeholders’ interests, e.g. competitors, and in some cases they do not comprehensively 
cover the performance of related organisation  (Chen et al., 2006; Papalexandris et al., 
2005). Additionally, Bontis et al.(1999) argue that BSC may create circumstances 
conducive to reifying the knowledge, i.e. treating it like a physical thing. Putting BSC in 
the group of strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS), Malina and Selto (2001) 
indicate that most of the approaches taken to SPMS have a problem since they assume a 
top-down management approach to control. In addition, BSC has said to fall short of 
attending to informal control systems and organisational context in organisations (Berry et 
al., 2009). Ittner et al. (2003) indicate that BSC has been used in a different way to that 
intended by its designers because the involvement of organisations’ superiors in the choice 
of measures and weightings used in performance evaluations has led to a high level of 
subjectivity and more emphasis on financial measures.   
Brown’s input, processes, outputs and outcomes framework: This framework is 
conceptually appealing and useful, as it highlights the difference between input, process, 
output and outcome measures (Neely et al., 2001). Brown (1996) argues that each stage of 
this framework is a driver of performance for its next steps. The framework, partly likened 
to BSC, develops the concept of linking measures through cause-and-effect relationships.  
Performance prism: The performance prism is a multi-faceted framework that has been 
aimed at addressing the shortcomings of its predecessors, such as BSC (Neely et al., 2001). 
In this sense, the performance prism is arguably a second-generation performance 
management framework, designed to provide a highly flexible and broad focus on                                                                                                                               
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organisations’ performance (Neely, 2002). It consists of five interrelated perspectives: 
stakeholder satisfaction, strategies, processes, capabilities and stakeholder contributions 
(Neely et al., 2002). 
 
2.6. Downsides of PM 
Despite the aforementioned explanations concerning PM and its functions and advantages 
for different organisations, some authors have also attributed negative (dysfunctional) 
effects to this process in organisations (Ashton, 1976). As Kaplan and Norton (1992) put it, 
PMSs affect the behaviour of measured organisations’ management and employees. 
Ridgway (1956) argues that measuring performance could have motivational, behavioural 
and dysfunctional consequences for organisations. Within literature, ‘dysfunctional’ refers 
to the actions in which subordinates attempt to knowingly manipulate (violate) the 
elements (rules and procedures) of an established control (PM) system for their own 
purposes (Jaworski and Young, 1992, p. 18). Hirst (1983) provides some examples of 
dysfunctional behaviour in organisations such as rigid bureaucratic behaviour, resistance 
and invalid data reporting. He argues that the incidence of such behaviours could be 
affected by the perceptions of organisational members of the way the PMSs are used by 
their superiors. Smith (1995) and de Bruijn (2007) also recognise some unintended and 
perverse effects of PMSs.  
The following negative effects were found to be associated with PM in the literature:  
•  PM may add to internal bureaucracy in an organisation 
Although organisations with a PMS seemed to perform comparatively better, Leeuw 
(1996) found that they had invested heavily in their procedural and organisational 
provisions in order to meet the requirements of their PMS. 
•  PM may stymie innovation in an organisation 
Smith (1993) explains that PM may hamper innovation in organisations. According to de 
Bruijn (2002), innovative organisations usually seek to explore the unknown and accept 
the risk, sometimes ending up with either different or less impressive results. Conversely, 
PM is intended to reward the constant reproduction of the existing output (Behn and Kant, 
1999), discouraging any inclination to innovation.                                                                                                                                
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•  Measurement in a limited scope 
Another dysfunction of PM may be the measuring of the performance of organisations 
based on a special framework or measures which have been chosen purely for this purpose 
(de Bruijn, 2002). In other words, measurement in this way may miss some other aspects 
of the organisations’ activities, the measuring of which that framework or those measures 
cannot anticipate. This has also been echoed by Hariharan et al. (2004) who claim that it is 
overly difficult to measure the performance of healthcare services using a single method. 
To overcome this problem, they advised multidimensional PMSs or application of more 
than one PMS. 
•  Commodification of the public services  
Adcroft and Willis (2005) argue that the increased usage of PMSs in the public sector 
could cause commodification of the services and generate a highly deprofessionalised 
workforce who are mostly inclined to obey rules instead of values. As such, the basis of 
decision-making might change and the values become much less important than the rules, 
regulations and PMSs in organisations. Such outcomes are ascribed largely to the typical 
managerial and technical features of standard public PMSs and the difficulties in importing 
management practices from one context to another (e.g. from private into public sector). 
This trend began and has been reinforced primarily after the introduction of new public 
management (Hood, 1995). 
•  Control effect 
Goodhart (1984) has stated that any kind of activity is likely to collapse once pressure is 
placed on it for control purposes. This is mostly because organisational members may 
change their conduct when they know that the data they produce will be used to control 
them.  
In addition, Argyris (1999) points to some form of tension produced in organisations as a 
result of their budgetary control by authorities. Unfavourable reactions could be caused by 
such control.  
•  Measurement cost 
It should be noted that, as Parker (2000) has indicated, overall, measurement needs 
resources and it must be basically done with the likelihood of making a real impact.                                                                                                                               
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2.7. PM in health care 
The measurement of performance has become increasingly important for different 
stakeholders such as healthcare policy-makers, providers and patients/purchasers in health 
care (Øvretveit and Al Serouri, 2006; Smith et al., 2008). Growing demands to ensure 
transparency, accountability and high quality for healthcare services, controlling costs, and 
reducing variations in rendering (clinical) services have been put forward as the main 
triggers for this movement (Hilarion et al., 2008). Performance is perceived as a 
multidimensional concept in healthcare. According to JCAHO: ‘Performance in health 
care is composed of nine definable, measurable, and improvable dimensions; including, 
efficacy, appropriateness, continuity, safety, efficiency, effectiveness, availability, 
timeliness, and respect and caring’ (2002, p. 13).  
JCAHO (2002, p. 13) has defined PM as; ‘Quantifying processes and outcomes, using one 
or more of those dimensions’, and a performance measure (indicator) as a ‘Variable or 
quantitative tool that reveals an organisation’s performance in relation to a specific 
process or outcome’ (p. 13).  
Accordingly, it would seem justifiable to claim that a comprehensive and reliable 
assessment could be rendered by a PMS that encompasses and assesses more PMs 
(indicators). In fact, given the complexity of health systems owning multiple aspects, 
measuring performance through single measures has proved to be overly difficult (Smith et 
al., 2008). As such, reliance on single measures (e.g. efficiency) could provide a large 
amount of information that would still make little sense to users. Therefore, attention in 
this area has been drawn towards using composite measures, as the forgoing definition 
indicates (Jacobs et al., 2007; 2006).  
PM is receiving widespread attention in the health care sector (Dummer, 2007; Loeb, 
2004; Purbey et al., 2006). Davis (1999) and Shaw (2003b) believe that measurement is 
central to the concept of quality improvement in healthcare. Brignall (1992) has recognised 
PM as a key agent for change as well as for maintaining and managing the change in 
HCOs. The following reasons are raised in the literature to justify the necessity of PM in 
health care (see e.g. Lansky, 1998; Thompson and Harris, 2001; Behn, 2003): 
￿  Helping private and public healthcare purchasers to make wise financial choices and 
secure good value for money;                                                                                                                               
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￿  Enabling consumers to make informed decisions about where to seek and receive the 
best care available; 
￿  Allowing providers access to reliable and valid data for improving the quality of 
services; and  
￿  Enabling regulators or officials to ensure they meet minimum standards for healthcare 
provision, holding the organisations accountable, and obtaining meaningful 
information for making decisions.  
 
PMSs have assumed various functions in healthcare over time, in order to meet the 
requirements of those stakeholders (Amaratunga and Baldry, 2002; Eddy, 1998; Kanji and 
Sa, 2003a; Kanji, 2002b; Purbey et al., 2006; Sinclair and Zairi, 1995; Oakland, 1993). 
They include the following: 
￿  Highlighting quality problems and identifying areas of strengths and weaknesses which 
require priority attention; 
￿  Describing the effect of interventions on people or organisations; 
￿  Maintaining attention on changing customer requirements and competitor actions and 
ensuring customer requirements are met; 
￿  Checking progress towards the established goals and providing standards for 
comparisons; 
￿  Providing accountability mechanisms; 
￿  Justifying the use of resources and supporting future resource allocation decisions; 
￿  Communicating goals and priorities to lower levels; 
￿  Acting as a motivation tool; 
￿  Providing feedback for driving the improvement effort. 
 
In general, PM provides healthcare systems and the hospitals at their core (Kanji and Sa, 
2003) with reliable evidence regarding their existing practices and the values, beliefs, and 
assumptions of their diverse stakeholders (Lim et al., 1999). These functions enable the                                                                                                                               
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systems to develop a systematic means for identifying shortfalls and improving their future 
performance (Lim and Tang, 2000). 
  
2.7.1. History of PM in health care 
PM is not a new initiative in healthcare and has been in existence for well over a hundred 
years. A brief historical exploration shows that, by the middle of the 19th century, Florence 
Nightingale was collecting mortality data and infection rates from the principal hospitals in 
England during the Crimean War. In the 1860s, she pioneered the systematic collection, 
analysis and dissemination of comparative hospital outcomes data in order to understand 
and improve performance (Smith, 2002). However, PM began to emerge as a viable tool 
for assessing healthcare quality in the early 20
th century, when Dr Ernest A. Codman 
proposed a elaborated procedure for collecting patient records, tracking post-discharge 
follow-up, identifying the best and worst surgeons based on the actual results of their care, 
and investigating patient access to the results of various treatments including inter-hospital 
comparisons (Smith, 2005). Although operationalisation of prior principles was hampered 
because of many practical, professional and political impediments at the time, those 
principles at least acted as a trigger for further developments in the PM area. Since then, in 
the light of recent developments in health care which put large-scale data resources at 
HCOs’ disposal, more attention has been paid to PM in health care (Smith, 2002).  
 
2.7.2. Difficulties of measuring performance in health care 
Brignall and Modell (2000) argue that the successful implementation of multidimensional 
PMSs such as BSC (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) and PPS (Lynch and Cross, 1991) in the 
public sector, including health care, might prove difficult. Public sector organisations are 
characterised by multiple stakeholders including complex, heterogeneous and intangible 
services; they also operate in highly uncertain circumstances, which could make PM 
challenging (Neely et al., 2000b, Abernethy et al., 2007). West (2001) echoes the 
differences between HCOs and other organisations, such as business firms and industries, 
in researching their performance. A significant part of this challenge and difficulty in 
measuring performance in health care derives from the disparate nature and variable 
perspectives represented among the key stakeholders in this area (Blank and Valdmanis,                                                                                                                               
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2007). For example, the professional perspective - held by some physicians, nurses, and 
scientists who are trained to think critically and analytically - is that PM is simply too 
fraught with problems to be of  practical use (Loeb, 2004). According to them, what is 
being measured in HCOs as performance is usually the easiest (i.e. the cheapest) aspects of 
care which are often of least importance in improving quality (Loeb, 2004).  
Another issue relative to this challenge arises from intangible and long-lasting outcomes of 
health care, which has made the measurement process to some extent impossible and 
problematic (de Bruijn, 2002). Despite the fact that there is a preference to measure health 
outcomes, since people show more concern about them (Eddy, 1998), the results of 
interventions in this sector usually take a long time to become completely comprehensible. 
The outcomes can hardly be attributed to the interventions in a tangible way. Eddy (1998) 
also points to further problems such as probabilistic and low-frequency (hence difficult to 
measure) healthcare outcomes and inadequate and ineffective information systems in this 
sector as the  important impediments that make PM highly problematic in this area. 
Furthermore, PM is seen as a costly endeavour, particularly by those focusing on the 
operational and financial aspects of health care (Loeb, 2004).  
 
2.7.3. Unintended and dysfunctional effects of PM in health care  
As explained in section 2.6 regarding the overall downsides attributed to PM, there are 
some dysfunctional consequences in relation to PM and PMSs in health care. The 
following negative effects could be found in the existing literature (see e.g. Bevan, 2006; 
Bevan and Hood, 2006a; 2006b; Goddard et al., 2000; Mannion et al., 2005; Goddard et 
al., 2002b; Hannan et al., 1994; Keogh and Kinsman, 2004; O'Neill, 2004; Kelman and 
Friedman, 2009). 
￿  Gaming: this simply means hitting the target and missing the point, and happens 
when an organisation adopts a fabrication strategy to meet the requirements of a 
PMS in that, in some cases, data are manipulated to achieve the related grade or 
score. Alternatively, it is when the subordinate knowingly selects his activities so as 
to achieve a more favourable measure (Birnberg et al., 1983). According to 
Birnberg et al. (1983), the lower the belief in the measurability and analysability of                                                                                                                               
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performance data, the higher the possibility for gaming by those generating this 
data or are involved in data related activities. 
￿  Tunnel vision: this happens when the HCOs and professionals’ time and 
concentration are directed to achieving the measures of PMSs, while other, even 
important, clinical priorities not required by those systems are ignored. This might 
hinder the delivery of good-quality health care as professionals’ attention is drawn 
towards compliance with performance measures rather than to the needs of patients 
(Werner and Asch, 2007). In fact, attention might be drawn towards what is 
measurable rather than what is important for patients’ health. 
￿  Ossification: this indicates that HCOs mostly focus on routine and specified areas 
(by PMSs) by providing services in ordinary and conventional ways, rather than 
trying new methods, to avoid missing their chance of higher rankings. Ossification 
could hamper innovation in organisations.  
￿  Reluctance of service providers to act on difficult cases: HCOs prefer to focus on 
easy cases when reporting their performance, particularly if the measures of the 
PMSs are related to intangible measures (e.g. outcomes). This could increase the 
chance of a successful performance result for the organisations; nevertheless, they 
could run the risk of ignoring the complex and critical care delivery results. 
￿  Bullying and intimidation: this could be caused by the pressures of meeting the 
PMSs’ requirements, both by internal managers or external authorities. 
￿  Erosion of public trust: HCOs with low rankings could obviously lose the 
confidence of the public, because of their low grade and apparent poor 
performance. Mannion et al. (2005) believe that hostile media and journalistic 
approaches to medical errors nowadays play an important part in creating such a 
situation in most developed countries. 
￿  Reduced staff morale: as a result of low ranking and working in a lowly-rated 
(prestige) organisation, the morale of the organisational members might be reduced. 
￿  Ghettoisation: this points to a situation in which staff are more attracted to highly-
rated HCOs and are more reluctant to work in lowly-rated ones.                                                                                                                               
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￿  Disincentives for improvement: the perception that more resources are being 
allocated to lowly-rated hospitals by governments might act as a disincentive for 
highly-rated HCOs to strive for improvement in their services. 
 
2.8. PMSs in health care 
Overall, most of the healthcare PMSs originated and developed outside this area in the 
industrial sector and over time have been adopted into this sector (Ballantine et al., 1998; 
Brignall and Modell, 2000). As is rightly emphasised by Walshe and Smith (2006), health 
service leaders have tried to manage their organisations, measure their performance and 
search for greater efficiency by successful adoption of industrial and commercial models. 
The arrival of new public management (NPM) has seemingly accelerated this process of 
infiltration (Hood, 1991; 1995). 
Different types and classifications of performance measurement approaches, models and 
methods for health care have been discussed in the literature. Powell et al. (2009) argue 
that there has been little uniformity in nomenclature/content of these programmes. Many 
HCOs have accordingly used a combination of measurement and improvement systems 
and methods eclectically and variably over time.  
Overall, PMSs in health care could be discussed from two main perspectives; internal or 
external, based on whether they are managed by given organisations or used by an external 
body to assess the organisations’ performance.  The intention here is to briefly review 
these PMSs and their characteristics in health care. This section could guide the study to 
elaborate on the most applied and suitable PMSs for health care and make the context 
conducive to the investigation of APs. 
 
2.8.1. Internal PMSs 
HCOs may use different strategies and measurement frameworks to assess and improve 
their internal activities and processes. These systems are mainly developed and conducted 
or adopted and adapted by the organisations themselves to improve their general 
performance. Internal measurement systems might also be referred to as management 
control systems (MCSs) in the literature (e.g. Berry et al., 2009; Otley, 2003; Simons,                                                                                                                               
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2005; Tuomela, 2005). Different types in this group were explained earlier in this chapter 
(see section 3.5). Critical pathways of care (CPC), BSC (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), Kanji 
business excellence measurement system (KBEMS) (Kanji, 1998; Kanji, 2002), and 
analytic hierarchy process (AHP) (Hariharan et al., 2004) are examples of this group
4 
found to be mostly used in health care and they will be discussed here. 
 
2.8.1.1. CPC 
CPC is a tool for identifying, evaluating and then modifying processes of care delivery 
(Johnson, 1997). It represents management plans that display goals for patients and provide 
a sequence and timing of actions necessary to achieve these goals with an optimal 
efficiency (Every et al., 2000). Managers have embraced critical pathways as a method to 
reduce variation in care, decrease resource utilization, and potentially improve healthcare 
quality. This technique was first developed for use in industry as a tool to identify and 
manage the rate-limiting steps in production processes (Every et al. 2000). However, it has 
developed quickly in healthcare and seems to follow a mainly clinical approach for 
improving quality of processes. Critical pathways are also called ‘tracer methodologies’ in 
a recent study (Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2009, p.162). They are said to focus on 
processes, functions and systems that may affect patient care, and examine patients’ 
trajectory through the health system (Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2009). The following 
potential benefits are associated with this performance evaluation technique in a healthcare 
context (Johnson, 1997, p. 7): 
•  Improved patient outcomes 
•  Improved consistency in care 
•  Continuous clinical audit 
•  Continuous standard/guideline monitoring 
•  Organisation-wide involvement in a quality improvement process 
 
CPC is nevertheless criticised for not being an evidence-based mechanism, as it is argued 
that it mostly relies on the use of internal, institution-specific expert knowledge of 
healthcare professionals (Renholm et al., 2002; Bailey et al., 1998). In addition, Lim et al. 
                                                   
4. Other PMSs might be added to this group.                                                                                                                                
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(1999) argue that CPC has, to a large extent, fallen short of addressing the needs of 
organisations’ external customers. 
 
2.8.1.2. BSC 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, BSC is of an integrative and multidimensional nature 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Kaplan, 2001). It has been referred to as a strategic 
performance PMS in that it links strategy to performance measures and to other systems in 
organisations, such as human resources, information technology and customer networks, as 
well as translating strategy into a coherent set of performance measures (Chenhall, 2005; 
Berry et al., 2009). According to Inamdar et al. (2002, p.179), BSC could provide the 
following advantages for a HCO: 
￿  It can align organisations with a more market-oriented, customer-focused strategy; 
￿  It is able to facilitate, monitor, and assess the implementation of strategy; 
￿  It may act as a communication and collaboration mechanism; 
￿  It can assign accountability for performance at all levels of organisations; 
￿  It provides continuous feedback on the strategy and promotes adjustments to 
marketplace and regulatory changes. 
 
Although BSC applications in HCOs have just begun, several studies have described the 
use and potential benefits of this framework in various healthcare settings (e.g. Abasolo, 
2006; Baker and Pink, 1995; Castaneda-Mendez et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2006; Inamdar et 
al., 2002; Voelker et al., 2001; Pink et al., 2001; Curtright et al., 2000; Stewart and Bestor, 
2000). It has been concluded that BSC can be successfully applied in the health sector 
following the investigation of some important aspects of BSC in nine HCOs which were 
implementing this framework (Inamdar et al., 2002).   
 
2.8.1.3. KBEMS  
KBEMS, like BSC, supports a balanced view of performance measurement but is based on 
Critical Success Factors (CSFs). CSFs are crucial areas, characteristics, conditions or                                                                                                                               
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variables purported to be the drivers of performance (Leidecker and Bruno, 1984; 
Hariharan et al., 2004). They can have a significant impact on the successful management 
of an organisation if properly sustained, maintained or managed. KBEMS is a performance 
management system based on these factors, using pertinent indices to determine how well 
different areas of the organisation perform (Kanji and Wallace, 2000). It is de facto 
characterised by its multidisciplinary systems approach, which enables measurement of 
business excellence from various stakeholders’ perspectives (Hassan, 2006). The model is 
composed of two different frameworks, i.e. Kanji’s Business Excellence Model (Kanji, 
1998; Kanji, 2002) and Kanji’s Business Scorecard (Kanji and Sa, 2002) which are 
dedicated to the measurement of performance from organisations’ internal and external 
stakeholders’ perspective respectively (Kanji and Sa, 2003). Basically this model (see 
Appendix H) is grounded in TQM and BSC in that it has a systematic approach to 
organisations, as does TQM, and uses a multidimensional measurement approach, as does 
BSC (Kanji, 2002). This model has been used in different areas in the  public sector 
including  health care (Hassan, 2006). 
  
2.8.1.4. Surveys 
This is also another method for conducting performance assessment in the healthcare 
sector. Rising awareness levels and knowledge among customers have forced HCOs to pay 
more attention to their views in assessing and improving performance and quality in the 
process of delivering healthcare services (Kunst and Lemminc, 2000; Lin and Clausing, 
1995). The reliance on customers’ views in such a process is called client quality 
(Øvretveit, 2000). Two main approaches have been more noticeable under this method in 
health care, namely QFD
5 and SERVQUAL
6. They have helped HCOs to consider their 
customers’ needs and expectations as their priorities in developing and assessing their 
                                                   
5. Quality function deployment (QFD) started in Japan in 1972 and is used widely by Japanese and Western 
manufacturing companies to ensure the quality of their products (Lim et al. 1999). QFD is described ‘as a 
procedure or technique for converting the customers’ demands into ‘quality characteristics’' and developing a 
design quality for the finished product by systematically deploying the relationship between the demands and 
the characteristics, starting with the quality of each functional component and extending the deployment to 
the quality of each part and process (Akao, 2004, p.5). 
6. Service Quality (SERVQUAL) is considered the most popular framework for measuring service quality, 
founded on the view that the customers’ assessment of service quality is paramount (Buttle, 1996; Caruana et 
al., 2000). Parasuraman et al. (1988) have also defined service quality as ‘global judgment, or attitude, 
relating to the superiority of the service’ (p. 16).                                                                                                                               
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performance and services (Zabada et al., 1998; Parasuraman et al., 1994; Akao, 2004). 
QFD has been extensively applied to health care (e.g. Mazur et al., 1995; Radharamanan 
and Godoy, 1996; Dijkstra and van der Bij, 2002). SERVQUAL, developed by 
Parasuraman et al. (1988), has been recognised in the literature as a valuable tool for 
measuring stakeholders’ perceptions and expectations of organisations’ services (e.g. 
Buttle, 1996; Caruana, 2002; Caruana et al., 2000). It has also been widely used in 
healthcare sectors across different countries (e.g. Babakus and Mangold, 1992; Lam, 1997; 
Rose et al., 2004; Taner and Antony, 2006). In health care, as Shaw (2003b) has pointed 
out, standardised surveys of patients and relatives can reliably measure hospital 
performance against explicit standards. The identification of what is valued by patients and 
general public and the measurement of specific domains of experience and satisfaction can 
be mentioned as advantages to be gained from the application of these methods for 
measuring and assessing healthcare performance. Nevertheless, the main disadvantage of 
this method is that surveys only provide opinions and cannot always be relied upon. In 
other words, they may suffer from lack of reliability or validity (Sitzia, 1999). In 
healthcare in particular,  patients may give a relatively superficial overview of the care 
they receive as a result of their lack of awareness and limited knowledge of treatment 
processes (Walburg et al., 2006). Standardized, systematic and sound methodology and the 
use of  qualitative methods may make this measurement tool more reliable and valid, as 
there is some evidence in this case (Bechel et al., 2000; Fremont et al., 2001). 
 
2.8.1.5. AHP  
AHP is of a quantitative nature and, like KBEMS, it is grounded in CSFs. It was originally 
developed by Saaty (1980) in the 1970s as a flexible multi-criteria decision-making 
procedure. It helps to set priorities and to make the best decision when both qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of a decision need to be considered (Ahsan and Bartlema, 2004). In 
addition, it provides a comprehensive and rational framework for structuring a problem, 
representing and quantifying its elements, relating those elements to overall goals, and 
evaluating alternative solutions. However, given its functions, AHP is recommended as a 
valuable tool to measure the process-based performance HCOs. For this purpose, it briefly 
involves the following steps (Hariharan et al., 2004):  
￿  Identifying CSFs, sub-factors and the way of rating them                                                                                                                               
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￿  Constructing hierarchical model 
￿  Comparing CSFs and sub-factors in pair-wise mode to derive their importance and 
assigning weights to the individual ratings  
￿  Deriving the weights of ratings  
￿  Gap analysis by comparing the ratings individually and cumulatively  
 
Hariharan et al. (2004, p. 310) indicate that HCOs would gain the following benefits by 
using AHP to measure their performance: 
￿  The healthcare service is multi-factorial, the factors are both objective and 
subjective in nature and measurement of the performance of such a system can be 
easily modelled using AHP; 
￿  Performance measurement is also a group decision-making process, and AHP 
allows the same; 
￿  This model enables identification of the deficiencies in  specific areas of the 
organisation; 
￿  It allows a sensitivity analysis to be conducted that may help the organisations’ 
managers to understand the effect of their decisions and prioritise the areas 
requiring improvement. 
 
There have been many applications of AHP in health care: for instance, an application for 
monitoring healthcare performance (Ahsan and Bartlema, 2004), and specifically 
measuring process-based performance of hospitals (Hariharan et al., 2005; Hariharan et al., 
2004). Furthermore, this model has been also used for decision-making through patient 
involvement (Dolan, 2000) and for human resource planning (Kwak et al., 1997).  
As such, Powell et al. (2009) have also found initiatives such as Business Process Re-
engineering, rapid cycle change, lean thinking and Six Sigma in their review of quality 
improvement programmes used in health care. 
Ibrahim (2002) also identifies PMSs such as performance measurement matrix (Malloch, 
1999) and multidimensional performance measurement model (Popovich, 1998) in his 
study of measurement systems in health care.                                                                                                                               
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Overall, a review of these models shows some strong commonalities among these systems. 
Although they have different emphases, many share similar underlying objectives and the 
distinctions between them are sometimes blurred in practice. In addition, given the nature 
of healthcare, multidimensional and composite measurement systems are more prevalent in 
this area. However, caution should be attached to an over-reliance on performance 
measures and indicators. Carter et al. (1995, p.49) argue that performance indicators are 
mostly ‘tin-openers’ rather than ‘dials’; thus, they only prompt more investigation and, by 
themselves, provide incomplete pictures of performance. 
 
2.8.2. External PMSs 
This group of measurement systems/approaches is mostly executed by external bodies (i.e. 
government or independent organisations). Health care has been considered a realm of 
governments and they invest a considerable amount of money in this area in most 
countries, either directly or indirectly, and in return expect high-quality services from this 
sector (Smith et al., 2008; Broadbent et al., 2010a). As such, they employ a wide range of 
mechanisms/programmes to assess and improve the performance and quality in HCOs.  
In some cases, governments have used the internal PMSs to develop their own 
measurement system; for example, NHS Performance Assessment framework (PAF) which 
was based on a BSC approach (Chang, 2007). Governments might also take advantage of 
the results of external PMSs run by independent (e.g. JCAHO in the USA and Care Quality 
Commission
7 and Monitor
8 in the England). Two main forms of external measurement 
approaches include:  
•  Regulatory inspection 
•  External (third-party) assessments 
 
2.8.2.1. Regulatory inspection  
This method of assessment usually comes in the form of compulsory registration and 
licensure of HCOs, mostly by governments (Shaw, 2004c). People or organisations can be 
                                                   
7. The Care Quality Commission (CQC) is the independent regulator of health and adult social care services. 
8. Independent regulator of NHS Foundation trusts.                                                                                                                               
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registered or licensed after meeting inspectorates’ minimum standards. In fact, these 
statutory programmes ensure that professional staff or provider organisations have 
achieved the minimum standards of competence. There are also function-specific 
inspectorates for public health and safety (e.g. fire, radiation and infection controls). For 
example, most countries have statutory inspectorates to monitor compliance of HCOs with 
published licensing regulations. Inspection standards are transparent, have legal authority, 
induce conformity and address the minimal legal requirements for a HCO to provide care 
for patients. However, since they are similar to legal regulations in the public domain 
(Shaw, 2003b) the standards are not easily updated. Moreover, in terms of addressing 
minimum standards of structure and capacity to protect basic public health and safety, 
inspection does not de facto assess hospital performance, foster innovation or provide 
information for consumers or providers (Shaw, 2004b).  
 
2.8.2.2. External (third-party) assessment 
External review systems/programmes run by third-party organisations are affecting the 
delivery of health care around the world and the application of these methods is becoming 
more commonplace worldwide (Shaw, 2003b). This is believed to be mainly because 
governments, consumers, professionals, managers and third parties are trying, separately, 
to set up or find  reliable schemes to ensure public accountability, transparency, self-
regulation, quality improvement and value for money in the services (Shaw, 2001; Smith et 
al., 2008). Heaton (2000) argues that the following changes and developments have played 
an important role in pressing health services providers to employ external review systems 
to bring trust and a measure of comparability to their services and meet the rising demands 
for accountability from consumers and healthcare funders. 
￿  Rising quality consciousness; 
￿  Separation of providers and purchasers; 
￿  Changes in the way health services are financed; and  
￿  Consumers’ growing expectations of better healthcare. 
 
These external evaluation systems (EESs) used in health care have been placed into four 
main categories by Bohigas and Heaton (2000) (see Table 3.1):                                                                                                                               
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1.  Certification by ISO 
2.  Business excellence award (MBNQA, EFQM) 
3.  Professional peer review (Visitation/Vasitatie in Dutch) 
4.  Accreditation 
 
Of  those, the first two are industry-based and the others are healthcare-based (Shaw, 
2004b). These external PMSs are usually voluntary and independent; they link national or 
international standards to local practices of private or public HCOs, and use explicit 
standards to combine internal self-assessment with external review by conducting visits, 
surveys, assessments or audits (Shaw, 2000, 2001). Bohigas et al. (1996) and Bohigas and 
Heaton (2000) have mentioned three main stages for EESs, consisting of the following: 
1.  The development of standards; developing, testing and finalising related criteria and 
standards  
2.  The selection, training and monitoring of evaluators; all the activities undertaken to 
prepare reviewers to gather information about the performance and quality of the 
organisation to be evaluated 
3.  The evaluation process;  what the evaluator performs to give an informed opinion 
about the quality and the performance of the reviewed organisation 
The evaluation process, on its own, encompasses the following phases (Bohigas and 
Heaton, 2000): 
Survey: the primary fact-finding phase which takes the form of a team of professionals 
visiting the institution and writing a report of their findings. This can be divided into three 
sub-phases: 
￿  Preparation; all activities carried out by the evaluating body and the organisation to 
prepare for the survey evaluation, including self-assessment and audit plan 
￿  Survey; the intention is to gather information in order to write the report   
￿  Report;  prepared to form a basis for evaluation 
 
Evaluation phase: it is contingent on the survey; that is, the evaluators use the criteria and 
scores to grade and eventually give an award/certificate to the evaluated organisation. The 
report may be examined by an individual or a committee that applies explicit rules and 
implicit judgement when making the decision on whether or not to accredit/certify the                                                                                                                               
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institution. This phase may comprise an evaluation committee, rules for making a decision, 
a certificate or award, an appeal, and publication of results. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Models of external assessment methods for healthcare organisations (Source: developed by the 
author) 
External 
Evaluation 
Systems (EESs) 
Description 
Accreditation 
 
A public recognition of the achievement of accreditation standards by a 
healthcare organisation, demonstrated through an independent external peer 
assessment of the organisation’s level of performance in relation to the standards. 
These programmes, which began with a focus on training, have developed into 
multi-disciplinary assessments of healthcare functions, organisations and 
networks. They began in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but spread into Latin 
America, Africa and South East Asia during the 1990s and onwards. 
Peer review 
(Dutch 
visitatie): 
 
This uses a collegial approach, usually within a single discipline. It is mostly 
applied to the assessment and formal accreditation of training programmes, but 
can be extended to accredit clinical services (Weert, 2000). 
 
The Malcolm 
Baldrige model 
for quality 
management 
And 
EFQM 
 
The Baldrige criteria for management systems have devolved from the USA into 
national and international assessment programs such as those found in Australia 
and Europe (Nabitz et al., 2000). Healthcare providers who seek voluntary 
development may assess themselves, or be assessed by others, against explicit 
performance standards. These were designed for application to service industries, 
but the revised 1999 European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) 
model identifies specific domains of results applicable to clinical outcome, and 
patient and staff satisfaction, and offers a transparent framework on which 
organisational standards may be mapped. 
ISO: the 
International 
Organisation 
for 
Standardization 
 
This system provides standards against which organisations or functions may be 
certificated by accredited certification bodies or organisations. Although 
originally designed for the manufacturing industry (e.g. for medicines and 
medical devices), these standards are now applied to healthcare – in particular, to 
radiology and laboratory systems – and more generally, to quality systems in 
hospitals and clinical departments (Sweeney and Heaton, 2000).   
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Between surveys: this phase involves activities that prevent the evaluated organisations 
from dropping their standard of performance between surveys, such as agreed quality 
action plan, an interim visit, unannounced surveys.  
Briefly, the evaluation process of the four above-mentioned models share the following 
common steps (Bohigas, 2000): 
•  Voluntary initiation by a HCO 
•  Self-assessment by the organisation 
•  Agenda or audit plan 
•  Evaluative on-site visit by trained reviewer or evaluation team 
•  Written or verbal report 
•  Evaluation of findings and final award 
 
These elements are, as Bohigas (2000) argues, essential for a structured approach to the 
external evaluation of HCOs.  
 
2.8.3. The EESs: Similarities and Differences 
A number of similarities and differences are mentioned in relation to the foregoing models 
of EESs (see Appendix G, Table 1). Despite these similarities, the accreditation system has 
some special characteristics that make it more suitable for external quality evaluation of 
HCOs. Accreditation is initially originated from health care and has been developed 
specifically for this sector; therefore, the standards are more specific to HCOs than ISO or 
EFQM (ACSQHC, 2003b). In addition, having been set up in 1917 as a hospital 
standardization programme and modified in 1947 for evaluating the competence of HCOs, 
it has been the longest-established programme in this regard (Shaw, 2000; Heaton, 2000). 
As such, accreditation has been developed for whole organisation assessment, whereas 
other models do not cover all parts together; ISO is more related to administrative activities 
and has been mainly used for individual departments and quality systems (e.g., laboratory 
and radiology); EFQM covers such areas as clinical results, patient satisfaction, 
administration, and staff management (Shaw, 2001; Heaton, 2000; Bohigas and Heaton, 
2000); and Visitation usually focuses on the individuals’ or clinical teams’ competencies, 
i.e. knowledge, skills and attitude (ACSQHC, 2003b). It has traditionally considered                                                                                                                               
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examining the functions and skills of a group of people as a starting point rather than 
looking at the organisation as a whole (Klazinga, 2000).  
In contrast, the revised version of the ISO 9000 series (issued in 2000) is more like EFQM 
and accreditation and has an increased emphasis on management and organisational 
development (Heaton, 2000); the strengths of EQFM, as Klazinga (2000) has explained, 
are its simplicity, fairly low implementation cost and internationally empirical validation. 
The Visitation has also been expanded to focus on clinical practice, professional 
development and service quality (ACSQHC, 2003b). Applicability of the ISO system to 
the health sector has been questioned. Heaton (2000) has argued that ISO 9000’s 
appropriateness for the healthcare sector is not universally accepted. For example, in 1996 
a number of German medical associations and insurers criticized certification of hospitals 
by ISO standards because ISO did not have sufficient emphasis on staff, clinical (or health-
related) outcomes and the population impact of health services (Heaton, 2000). Shaw 
(2003) states that ISO measures hospital performance in terms of compliance with 
international standards for quality systems, rather than in terms of HCOs’ functions and 
objectives, and its popularity may be mainly due to its international recognition. ISO is 
mainly suitable for individual departments such as radiology and laboratories, as noted 
earlier, and few entire hospitals have applied its standards in many countries (Heaton, 
2000). Another cited weakness of Visitation is that, unlike the three other models, it does 
not award any certificate of achievement. As regards accreditation, Heaton (2000) 
indicates that, with some specialty-specific exceptions, for example clinical and pathology 
accreditation (CPA) in the UK, accreditation has had a significant uptake in those countries 
where the EESs are entirely operational. For example, in the UK more than 30% of NHS 
Trusts and more than 80% of clinical pathology laboratories use accreditation, as compared 
to around 20% of the Trusts achieving ISO in part (for some functions of healthcare 
provision) and only around 1% implementing ISO thoroughly. This rate is around 4% of 
the Trusts for EFQM implementation. Visitation is gradually gaining popularity (Heaton, 
2000). In USA, around 80% of hospitals are being evaluated by APs (Walshe and Shortell, 
2004). de Walcque et al. (2008) also point to an increase in the number of countries 
engaging in healthcare accreditation.  
Some commentators have considered the following features to be highly influential for the 
success of accreditation (e.g. Scrivens and Lodge, 1997; Donahue and Vanostenberg, 
2000; Heaton, 2000):                                                                                                                               
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•  Performing a comprehensive, multidisciplinary assessment of HCOs; 
•  Suiting the peculiarities of health care (because of originating from this sector); 
•  Pursuing improvement along with assessment;  
•  Evaluating by trained and healthcare-oriented surveyors. 
  
Donahue and Vanostenberg (2000) particularly stress that accreditation by employing a 
systems’ approach, quality monitoring, management framework and, finally, a total quality 
evaluation, could serve as the best tool to facilitate the convergence of the strengths of 
other quality evaluation models into a common multipurpose model. In other words, they 
stipulate that APs can provide a comprehensive framework within which quality 
management from EFQM, quality control from ISO and peer assessment from visitation 
would be integrated.  
In the light of this importance, superiority and suitability of APs for evaluating HCOs, this 
study intends to focus on this evaluatory mechanism by conducting a theoretical and 
empirical evaluation and analysis of its performance. To this end, the study has drawn 
insights from different theoretical and conceptual models (explained in chapter four).  
 
2.8.4. Accreditation 
Efforts to find effective mechanisms which both evaluate the performance of HCOs and 
meet their stakeholders’ expectations have never stopped thus far (Roa and Rooney, 1999). 
Although these functions seem imperative for any assessment framework, there is less 
agreement as to which evaluation approach can best fulfil them (i.e. meeting expectations 
of relevant stakeholders such as the providers, regulatory agencies, third parties, and 
patients). Selecting the right evaluation approach or combination thereof requires a careful 
analysis and prioritisation of users’ needs. In the meantime, there has been a rapid growth, 
in both developing and developed countries, in the application of quality assessment 
methods by governments (Montagu, 2003). These methods were expected to improve the 
quality of services provided by HCOs and bring a measure of accountability and 
comparability to service standards (Heaton, 2000). In light of its various properties and 
capabilities, as mentioned earlier, such as ensuring public accountability, increasing                                                                                                                               
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transparency, promoting self-assessment and quality improvement and suiting the 
peculiarities of health care (Scriven, 1997; Donahue and Vanostenberg, 2000; Shaw, 2001, 
2003; Dickson and Nicklin, 2008; Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2009), accreditation could 
satisfy the stakeholders’ preferences and attract the attention of different groups seeking an 
effective evaluation method. Accreditation has reportedly received more attention than 
other external assessment mechanisms (Paccioni et al., 2008; Lombarts et al., 2009). 
 
2.8.4.1. History of accreditation 
Historically, the first attempts to use accreditation date back to Dr Ernest Codman’s efforts 
in the United States in 1910 that led to the founding of the American College of Surgeons 
(ACS) in 1913 by Franklin Martin, Codman’s colleague, and then the establishing of the 
Hospital Standardization Programme (HSP) in 1917 (McIntyre et al., 2001; Rawlins, 
2001). Thereafter, and following the interest in the standard-based assessment of hospital 
performance, the ACS joined with other professional associations of doctors and hospitals 
as corporate members to form the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals in 1947. 
During the mid-1960s, accrediting activity was extended to long-term care and since then 
to other types of healthcare centres. As such, in 1986 its name was changed to the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of HCOs (JCAHO). In essence, the Joint Commission has 
focused its efforts on where most people get their care, i.e. hospitals (Bohigas et al., 1996). 
The Joint Commission’s model, JCAHO, spread first to other English-speaking countries, 
that is Anglophone countries such as Canada (in 1958) and Australia (1974), and then into 
Europe (Shaw and Brooks, 1991; Giraud, 2001), Latin America (Arce, 1999), Africa 
(Whittaker et al., 1998) and South East Asia (Ito et al., 1998; Huang et al., 2000) during 
the 1990s. In addition to voluntary programmes, mandatory programmes have also recently 
been adopted in France, Italy and Scotland. At least 28 countries now have an operational 
AP (WHO, 2003).  
 
2.8.4.2. Accreditation: Definition and Importance 
The term ‘accreditation’, applied to organisations rather than specialty clinical training, 
reflects the origins of systematic assessment of hospitals against explicit standards (WHO, 
2003). Accreditation is defined as follows:                                                                                                                               
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‘Initiatives to externally assess hospital against pre-defined explicit published 
[written] standards in order to encourage continuous improvement of the health 
care quality’ (de Walcque et al., 2008, p. i). 
 
Accreditation could be generally considered as an external evaluation system (EES), 
mechanism, programme or scheme, which assesses the performance of HCOs (mainly 
hospitals) by investigating their compliance with the pre-established standards aiming at 
continuous improvement of quality rather than simply maintaining minimal standards 
(Shaw, 2004; Pomey et al., 2005; Braithwaite et al., 2010). Analysis of the related 
literature has revealed that accreditation also has the following important features (e.g. 
WHO, 2003; Shaw, 2004c; Shaw, 2004b; Scrivens and Lodge, 1997; Heaton, 2000; 
Donahue and Vanostenberg, 2000): 
￿  The longest-established and most widely-known process for the external evaluation 
of healthcare services; 
￿  A formal process to ensure delivery of safe and quality health care; 
￿  Accreditation standards and processes are devised and developed by healthcare 
professionals for healthcare services; 
￿  A developmental process using the skills of an external, multidisciplinary and 
trained team of assessors. 
 
Accreditation de facto;  
￿  Is the public recognition of the achievement of accreditation standards by a HCO, 
demonstrated through an independent external peer assessment of that organisation’s 
level of performance in relation to the standards; 
￿  Is generally voluntary (with the exception of some mandatory programmes, e.g. in 
France) and available to public and private sectors; 
￿  Is mostly implemented by independent organisations, e.g. JCAHO in the USA; 
￿  Covers a range of healthcare environments from local community-based care through 
to tertiary-level providers and healthcare systems, but mainly hospitals;  
￿  May have specialised healthcare services as a particular focus;                                                                                                                                
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￿  Is awarded based on achievement of quality standards and the independent external 
survey by peers of an organisation’s level of performance in relation to the standards. 
 
Central to accreditation are two important features: the principle of external review and the 
use of standards (Scrivens, 1995a); the survey team evaluates hospitals’ degree of 
compliance with a series of previously-determined standards and, if the compliance is 
achieved, the hospital receives a certificate of accreditation which is valid for a specific 
period of time, from one to three years. Zende (2006) argues that accreditation can prove to 
be a performance management system, because it is able to both improve incrementally the 
standards of care and provide salient recommendations for enhancing the compliance with 
standards and consequently improving the HCOs’ performance. Furthermore, this 
programme has proved that it can provide educational guidance for the staff  to improve 
their organisations’ performance (Gifford and Garcieri, 2007). Accreditation has tried to 
incorporate IIP
9 strategy in its programme. Further elaboration of accreditation reveals the 
following  (Jovanovic, 2005): 
￿  Achieving accreditation standards means ensuring a safe environment, preventing or 
reducing risk to patients and staff, and helping healthcare providers to identify their 
own organisations’ strengths and weaknesses. 
￿  In a rapidly and daily changing healthcare industry, accreditation standards can be a 
reliable platform that helps healthcare providers to sustain their system and address 
quality and safety of healthcare services. 
￿  Considering health care’s high level of information asymmetry, an AP can make 
markets more efficient by allowing payers to better assess what they are paying for.  
 
2.8.4.3. Accreditation Standards  
Standards are the core of an accreditation system against which HCOs are assessed. 
Therefore, choice of standards, their focus and the level at which they are set is crucially 
important in determining the tone, acceptability and nature of the system (Scrivens, 
1997b). The primary objective of these standards is to improve safety, effectiveness, cost 
                                                   
9. ‘Investors in people’ target training and development of staff.                                                                                                                               
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and efficiency for the benefit of the whole community (Scrivens, 1995b). de Walcque et al. 
(2008) believe that the use of standards could guarantee the systematic reviewing of a 
complex system and measuring improvements in the processes of delivering health 
services. Therefore, it is important that the standards are concomitantly reviewed and kept 
aligned with advances in health care and relevant to the services or organisations under 
evaluation. This also warrants and reinforces the importance of evaluation of AP. The 
standards need to be both firm and credible to be applicable to varying health service 
environments. The credibility of standards used is a significant factor in the credibility of 
the accreditation process and the willingness of stakeholders, be they consumers, funders, 
owners, regulators, practitioners or health service providers, to accept an accreditation 
decision. Unlike minimal standards that are used in licensure, accreditation makes use of 
optimal but achievable standards (Scrivens, 1995a).  
Different accreditation organisations may assume slightly varying approaches to 
accreditation standards. Examples from three main accreditation bodies, i.e. JCAHO, 
Accreditation Canada Institution (ACI), and the Australian Council on Health Care 
Standards (ACHS), are presented below (Scrivens, 1995a):  
•  ACHS insists on contemporary, professional, surveyable (i.e. a measurable and 
tangible way of demonstrating compliance), reasonable, consensual and optimal 
standards.  
•  ACI believes in optimal but achievable (within the current state of the art) and 
surveyable standards within the confines of resource constraints. In ACI, standards 
are reviewed every two years, not annually (rate of revision).    
•  In JCAHO, standards are reviewed every year for hospitals and every two years for 
other types of organisation.  
 
2.8.4.4. Accreditation: Purposes and Steps 
The main objectives of accreditation are as follows (Nadzam and Loeb, 1998; Rooney and 
van Ostenberg, 1999; Daucourt and Michel, 2003): 
￿  Evaluating quality and safety of health care;                                                                                                                               
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￿  Assessing and discerning hospitals’ ability to ensure continuous improvement in 
quality of overall patient care; 
￿  Involving professionals at all stages of the quality initiative;  
￿  Formulating and providing explicit recommendations, education and consultation 
to HCOs, managers, and health professionals on quality improvement strategies and 
best practices in health care; 
￿  Providing both internal and external recognition of the quality of care in hospitals;  
￿  Strengthening public confidence in the quality of health care; and 
￿  Reducing health care costs by focusing on increased efficiency and effectiveness of 
services. 
Bohigas and Heaton (2000) have indicated the main steps of accreditation scheme as 
follows:  
•  Voluntary initiation by a HCO 
•  Self-assessment by the organisation (preparation) 
•  Audit plan (preparation phase for accrediting body) 
•  On-site visit by trained surveyors 
￿  Review of documentation 
￿  Interviews 
￿  Observation  
￿  Sampling in clinical departments  
•  Final report (award) 
 
2.8.4.5. Approaches to Accreditation 
Three different approaches to accreditation are mentioned, based on the focus of its 
standards on structure, process and outcome of HCOs (Zende, 2006). The first approach 
gives priority to the accreditation of available facilities such as equipment, human 
resources, physical and space specifications (i.e. hardware) in hospitals. The second 
approach considers the quality assurance activities (i.e. process indicators) and sets its 
standards for assessing the processes of care. Accreditation in this case is contingent on 
meeting some basic indicators of quality and involves ranking based on levels of quality, 
(i.e. software of hospitals). The third approach relies on customers’ charter (i.e. client                                                                                                                               
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quality). It emphasises the fact that health systems should be accessible and acceptable to 
health care seekers. Therefore, it is basically inclined to using indicators such as providing 
accurate and relevant information to the users, including information about acceptability, 
accessibility, accountability and affordability of health services. It stresses the outcome 
indicators in the accreditation of HCOs. Zende (2006) points out that the most relevant 
model of accreditation for a health system is the people-centric model. The following 
pieces of advice are valuable for accreditations’ sustainability and viability in the long run 
(Zende, 2006): 
￿  Emphasis on involvement of stakeholders in the accreditation process right from its 
inception;  
￿  Assistance with evolution of standards from minimum to evidence-based; 
￿  Attention to activities, aimed at boosting consumers’ awareness. 
 
As with these approaches, the general trend is a movement from structure and process 
towards outcome in accreditation standards. For example, JCAHO has started to change its 
approach from checking whether HCOs have the capability for producing quality care, 
reflecting structure and process, to checking whether they provide quality care, 
concentrating on outcome indicators (Scrivens, 1995a, 1997b). Lack of evidence 
supporting the assumption that appropriately organised inputs could certainly lead to good 
outcomes in health care has accelerated the move towards using outcome indicators in 
accrediting hospitals (Hadley and McGurrin, 1988; Hurst, 1997; Griffith et al., 2002). 
Bartlett (1993) argues that high capacity (advanced structures) might not guarantee their 
use for providing good outcomes. According to Griffith et al. (2002), the possible reason 
why structural and process measures have been mostly utilised for the evaluation of HCOs 
might be because they are generally more accessible and tangible than outcomes measures. 
Scrivens (1997b) notes that the impact of an accreditation system seeking to improve 
quality of care in hospitals would be contained within the outcome measures. de Walcque 
et al. (2008) recognise outcome measures as determinants of the ultimate impact of an AP. 
Therefore, attempts to incorporate quality and outcome indicators in accreditation have 
recently begun. For instance, in the USA since 1997, JCAHO has linked clinical outcomes                                                                                                                               
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indicators to the accreditation process through ORYX
10 (JCAHO, 2005; de Walcque et al., 
2008). The ACHS has developed the performance and outcome service (POS) to increase 
the clinical components and indicators in its new AP, e.g. evaluation and quality 
improvement programme (Luderus, 1996; Scrivens, 1996).  
Even so, Collopy (1995) has reasoned that, if the goal of HCOs is to provide the optimum 
environment for treating patients, it is appropriate to address the environment in 
developing an accreditation process, and then move to the assessment of outcomes. 
 
2.8.4.6. Accreditation: dysfunctional consequences 
Some of the problems that can be attributed to APs are same as those mentioned earlier for 
PMSs in general. Some problems have been linked to accreditation schemes in the 
literature. Despite the high popularity of accreditation in health care and similar areas such 
as education, some problems might be related to this programme or its ill-conducted 
activities. For example, Giraud (2001) and de Walcque et al. (2008) have noted that, while 
accreditation is mainly destined to encourage quality monitoring processes in hospitals, a 
common fear is that unsatisfactory scores may encourage authorities to close down 
hospitals. Alternatively, it might disappoint the hospitals and discourage them from 
attempting to improve their functions. Accreditation, as Walshe and Walsh (2000) note, 
may not fit well with other quality improvement activities already under way in a HCO. 
Some believe that accreditation can potentially divert resources from strategies aimed at 
directly addressing quality and safety concerns (ACSQHC, 2003a) or divert attention from 
other important concerns of a HCO (e.g. dealing with patients), as argued under tunnel 
vision (section 2.7.3) (Walshe et al., 2001; Touati and Pomey, 2009). Therefore, it is 
generally recommended that those designing external review interventions try to prevent or 
minimise the adverse effects of APs that may arise, as well as maximising and sustaining 
their positive effects. Over-reliance on value judgement of surveyors in allocating scores to 
standards in the process of accreditation is another problem that has been noticed in the 
literature (Scrivens, 1997a; de Walcque et al., 2008). 
                                                   
10. Introduced in February 1997, The Joint Commission’s ORYX initiative integrates outcomes and other 
performance  measurement  data  into  the  accreditation  process.  ORYX  measurement  requirements  are 
intended to support Joint Commission accredited organisations in their quality improvement efforts (JCAHO, 
2005).                                                                                                                               
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2.8.4.7. Accreditation, Licensure and Certification 
There has been always some confusion surrounding the terms accreditation, licensure and 
certification (Shaw, 2004c). Accreditation and certification focus on continuous 
improvement strategies and achievement of optimal quality standards, unlike licensure 
which adheres to minimal standards to assure public safety (Rooney and van Ostenberg, 
1999). Licensure standards serve to define the quality level required for the safe delivery of 
patient care or health services, such as drug dispensing by a pharmacy. They also define 
the capabilities required for a HCO to be entitled to advertise to its public that it is a 
hospital or health centre. For example, the licensure standards of a particular jurisdiction 
might require a healthcare facility to provide surgery, radiology testing, pharmacy services, 
laboratory services and round-the-clock nursing care for patients in order for it to be 
classified as a hospital. On the other hand, unlike accreditation and certification, which 
tend to be voluntary forms of external evaluation, licensure is mandatory. When the 
government grants a license to an organisation, that licence signifies its permission for the 
organisation to operate and provide care or services to patients. Licensure is always 
conferred by a governmental entity or its designated agent, such as a licensing or 
regulatory board (e.g. a state, provincial, or national medical or nursing board), and 
addresses the minimal legal requirements for a HCO or practitioner to operate or care for 
its patients (Rooney and van Ostenberg, 1999). Certification is formal recognition of 
compliance with set standards (e.g. ISO 9000 series for quality systems) validated by 
external evaluation by an authorized auditor. Shaw (2004a) argues that, although these 
systems are all being adapted to meet the changing demands for public accountability and 
clinical effectiveness and improvement in health care, the most rapid development has 
been in accreditation. See Appendix G (Table 2) for further amplification of these 
variations of quality control and improvement. 
 
2.9. Performance analysis of APs 
EESs in health care including accreditation are being developed and employed largely in 
response to growing concerns about and interest in the quality of health services (Paccioni 
et al., 2008). As explained before, given governments’ responsibility for improving the 
quality of health care in most countries, they have used these systems to assess and 
improve quality in their HCOs (e.g. Annual Health Check in the UK NHS). Similarly, APs                                                                                                                               
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have been used by some governments to fulfil their evaluation intentions (Scrivens, 2002). 
The development of government-owned accreditation systems (Scrivens, 2002) or 
adaptation of traditional models of voluntary and independent accreditations to use as a 
government-sponsored or statutory tool for control and public accountability in health care 
(Shaw, 2003a; Shaw et al., 2010) has been seen in various countries, such as France 
(Giraud, 2001) and Iran (Sadaghiani and Zare, 2005). Scrivens (2002) argues that such 
systems are linked with the regulatory tasks of governments.  
Performance analysis of these macro PMSs has been widely addressed in the literature in 
developed countries. The NHS star-rating system (replaced by Annual Health Check) has 
been the subject of a number of studies exploring its effects at local hospitals. For example, 
Mannion et al. (2005) have studied the impact of the NHS star-rating system on acute care 
trusts (hospitals) in England. Some studies have looked into the dysfunctional effects of 
this regulatory system in the trusts (e.g. Barker et al. 2004; Jacobs et al. 2006; Bevan and 
Hood 2006; Kelman and Freidman 2009; Bevan and Hamblin 2009). Chang (2006) and 
Agrizzi (2008) have adopted a theoretical lens to investigate local effects of the NHS star-
rating system by adopting different theoretical perspectives. Chang (2006) looks into the 
managerial responses to the NHS PAF in the trusts. He concludes that the framework is 
used for legitimacy-seeking, rather than for rational strategic performance management by 
the trusts. 
Accreditation as a well-known, external and macro PMS in health care has also been 
widely adopted and used for assessing and improving healthcare quality (Nandraj et al., 
2001; Hirose et al., 2003; ACHS, 2008). However, research into its performance and 
effectiveness is still at an embryonic stage and the empirical evidence base for APs is 
substantially undeveloped (Braithwaite et al., 2006; Øvretveit, 2003; Greenfield and 
Braithwaite, 2008a; Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2009; Marie-Pascale et al., 2010). 
According to de Walcque et al. (2008), despite a large amount of money being spent on 
hospital accreditation, there is a paucity of evidence about their effectiveness. Walshe and 
Walsh (2000, p. 17) similarly point out that the rise in ‘evidence-based’ health care in 
recent years has warranted a need for rigorous examination of new or existing healthcare 
interventions and evaluation systems such as accreditation. They claim that adoption and 
application of these evaluatory programmes should be informed by the findings from such 
research (Walshe and Walsh, 2000). A large number of studies have called for research 
into accreditation effectiveness and its impact on quality of HCOs (e.g. Pomey et al., 2004;                                                                                                                               
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Shaw, 2001; Shaw, 2003a; Walshe et al., 2001; Fernandopulle et al., 2003; Mays, 2004; 
ACHS, 2008; Braithwaite et al., 2006).   
 
2.9.1. Review of existing literature  
Previous research on the performance and impact of healthcare accreditation on HCOs has 
shown mixed and inconsistent results (Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2008; Nicklin and 
Dickson, 2009). Existing literature abounds with various studies showing either 
confirmatory (e.g. Devers et al., 2004; Rooney and vanOstenberg, 2004; El-Jardali et al., 
2008; Sekimoto et al., 2008) or neutral (e.g. Miller et al., 2005; Salmon et al., 2003; Snyder 
and Anderson, 2005; DeBritz and Pollak, 2006) evidence regarding the effects of 
accreditation on HCOs, with no consistent results. Sunol et al. (2009, p. 27) have located 
the prior literature on the impact and performance of APs in three distinct areas: 
￿  The impact of accreditation on the quality and safety of healthcare delivery, which 
could include organisational and managerial changes due to accreditation, 
professional involvement and satisfaction with the accreditation, and changes in 
organisational culture 
￿  The efficiency of accreditation tools and systems (structure and process) for 
providing feedback with reliable information both to the accreditation organisations 
and to all key stakeholders 
￿  The impact on the capacity development of systems 
 
Further analysis of the literature shows that different approaches have been adopted by 
researchers to look into the performance of APs in health care. Some studies have 
investigated possible outcomes and impact of these programmes on accredited 
organisations (e.g. Pomey et al., 2004; Heuer, 2004). A wide range of outcomes have been 
associated with accreditation in this approach, such as providers’ or patients’ satisfaction, 
change and overall improvement in quality. Other studies have tried to analyse APs’ 
performance by looking into their structure and process (i.e. the main components) such as 
survey or standards (e.g. Greenfield et al., 2008; Greenfield et al., 2009). Scrivens (1996) 
argues that each of the individual components of accreditation can be scrutinised to see 
whether they have any effect upon the processes of delivery and outcomes of health care.                                                                                                                               
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These approaches are claimed to make use of two general methodologies, i.e. ‘objective 
indicator’ and ‘people’s experiences/perceptions’ (Scrivens, 1997a, p.6). The former, 
which is an outcome-based analysis, requires that tangible measures of success (in the form 
of performance indicators) be developed or extracted from evaluated organisations. A 
rationalistic relationship is then envisaged between APs’ functioning and the indicators and 
quantitatively examined. In other words, any change, improvement and increase in 
particular qualitative or quantitative indicators of accredited HCOs is investigated and the 
positive results are attributed to the effectiveness of APs and seen as a confirmatory sign of 
the programmes’ impact on the organisations. According to the ‘people’s experience or 
perception’ methodology, the perceptions of different groups such as providers (e.g. 
nurses, managers) surveyors and patients are elicited regarding the programmes’ overall 
performance or components (Scrivens, 1997a, p.6). This mode of evaluation allows 
individuals to suggest their own interpretation of improvements in the quality of service. 
This methodology has been used by both approaches to performance analysis of APs.  
Although the methodologies could be used in complementary fashion, they have their own 
strengths and weaknesses. The perception approach is accused of being mostly superficial 
and judgemental (Scrivens, 1997a), whilst criticisms of objective indicator are mostly in 
connection with difficulties of measuring outcomes in health care. Eddy (1998) points out 
that measuring outcomes in health care is a complicated process because healthcare 
outcomes are highly probabilistic. They may not always occur when an intervention, such 
as accreditation, does the right thing, and they may even occur when it does the wrong 
thing. As such, conclusions about the results of any intervention (in the form of 
measurement or improvement) might require a large number of observations and statistical 
analyses. Another issue concerns the long delays in achieving healthcare outcomes. 
Control over the outcomes is another challenge indicating that the outcomes in health care 
may be determined by other factors beyond the control of a given evaluation programme 
(Eddy, 1998; Kessner and Kalk, 1973). Therefore, impact on healthcare outcomes may not 
be related merely to the actions of an AP. Another difficulty of using objective indicator, 
as de Walcque et al. (2008) put it, is that standards of APs are mostly concerned with 
structure and process-related performance indicators rather than outcome indicators. 
Moreover, they argue that stakeholders seldom concur on the intended outcomes (de 
Walcque et al., 2008).                                                                                                                               
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In view of these problems, researchers are inclined to utilise perceptions and experiences 
of different groups in analyzing the performance of APs. Some studies have tried to 
overcome these difficulties by using intermediate (outputs) or proxy measures reflecting 
long-lasting healthcare outcomes such as enhanced compliance of HCOs with external 
PMSs or patient satisfaction along with or after evaluation by these programmes (e.g. 
Salmon et al., 2003). The ideal and comprehensive evaluation might result from using a 
combination of these two methodologies. The following section provides a rather extensive 
review of existing literature in the light of the aforementioned approaches (outcome and 
process-based) to the performance analysis of APs, drawing from Braithwaite et al. (2006) 
and Greenfield and Braithwaite (2009). More details on the studies are presented in the 
table 3.1. 
 
2.9.2. Outcome-based approach 
This type of analysis encompasses differing ways of looking at the effectiveness and 
impact of APs. For example, some studies have investigated accreditation’s effect in 
promoting change in the reviewed organisations (e.g. Pomey et al., 2004). The effects of 
APs in organising and ordering the practices of organisations have also been investigated. 
The cost of accreditation is the subject of another group of studies with regard to 
effectiveness of accreditation. This group has sought to discover whether this external 
evaluation system is suitable for assessing the quality of health services by looking into its 
cost (e.g. Rockwell et al., 1993) and any promotion and enhancement in the quality 
indicators of accredited organisations (de Walcque et al., 2008). Moreover, some studies 
have tested an assumed relationship between accreditation and patient satisfaction (e.g. 
Heuer, 2004; Dickison et al., 2006; Al-Tehewy et al., 2009).  
 
2.9.2.1. Promoting change  
Some research demonstrates that preparing for and undergoing accreditation by HCOs may 
promote change in these organisations (e.g. Duckett, 1983; Scrivens et al., 1995; Pomey et 
al., 2004; Juul et al., 2005). Duckett (1983) found that accredited hospitals showed 
significant changes in the organisation of nursing and its physical facilities and safety after 
undertaking accreditation. Pomey et al. (2004) speak about the changes instigated by the                                                                                                                               
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preparation stage of accreditation which provide a climate conducive to fostering better 
treatment of patients in hospitals. This was conducted by giving the professionals an 
opportunity to reflect more on their organisational practices and exchange their views with 
others. Pomey et al. (2010) also emphasised the role of the accreditation process for the 
introduction of change in organisations. They indicated that most of the changes happened 
while organisations were preparing for the accreditation (Pomey et al., 2010).  
 
2.9.2.2. Organisational impact 
Research on the organising effects of APs has remained largely unexplored. Sheahan 
(1999) found that participation in an AP could instigate improvements in the organisation 
of patient care through the coordination of a patient communication strategy, an evaluation 
strategy and a quality improvement. Greenfield and Braithwaite (2008) have claimed that 
the organisational impact of accreditations is fairly unclear. 
 
2.9.2.3. Patient satisfaction 
The existing studies could find no relationships between accreditation and patient 
satisfaction (Greco et al., 2001; Heuer, 2004). For example, an examination of the 
relationship between 41 New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania acute care not-for-profit 
hospitals’ accreditation scores and patient satisfaction ratings revealed no association 
between them (Heuer, 2004). Similarly, patient-reported measures of quality and 
satisfaction of both accredited and non-accredited health plans could not be differentiated 
(Beaulieu and Epstein, 2002). However, Al-Tehewy et al. (2009), who examined the effect 
of accreditation of the NGO’s health units on patients and providers’
 satisfaction, found a 
short-term positive
 effect. What is clear is that there is an urgent need for further research 
to uncover more evidence regarding accreditation’s impact on patient satisfaction.  
 
2.9.2.4. Cost of accreditation  
Øvretveit and Gustafson (2003) contend that quality programmes consume more resources 
than most  treatments. Accreditation is not a costless process (James and Hunt, 1996) and a 
variety of costs are attributed to this evaluation system, such as cost of survey related to                                                                                                                               
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accrediting body, or preparation phase cost of accreditation incurred by accredited 
organisation (Montague, 2003; de Walcque et al, 2008). Accordingly, another section of 
the literature, looking at accreditation effectiveness, has scrutinized the financial costs of 
accreditation for the aspirant accredited organisations (Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2007).  
Stressing the costs of accreditation, Øvretveit and Ham (2002) state that evaluations should 
be used effectively, because they take time and money away from other activities of 
organisations. 
Contrasting assessments have been observed in the studies in this regard. Two studies 
judged the costs too high for an individual organisation and questioned whether 
accreditation was an appropriate use of resources for high-quality patient care delivery 
(Rockwell et al., 1993; Fairbrother and Gleeson, 2000). Examining an AP in a developing 
country, Bukonda et al. (2003) have stated that individual HCOs were partly stifled by the 
costs of AP. Mihalik et al. (2003), on the contrary, have emphasised that meeting 
reasonable accreditation standards should be viewed as an substantial investment in 
maintaining quality and ensuring accountability, although the authors echoed the high costs 
of accreditation.  
Doyle and Doran (2007) sought to identify the cost of operating an acute hospital 
accreditation scheme (AHAS) in terms of human, financial and physical resources and to 
undertake a cost-benefit analysis of this scheme. Rooney and Barnes (2001) have also 
assessed the costs and effectiveness of implementing accreditation in two developing 
countries, South Africa and Zambia. Their research revealed that, despite this cost, the 
accreditation can be beneficial in areas such as improved communication, compliance with 
organisational standards, better leadership and management of the facilities and improved 
staff and patient safety. Øvretveit and Gustafson (2003) nevertheless indicate that there is a 
shortage of evidence to show that APs are the best use of resources for improving quality 
of services. Mays (2004) states his concerns about the high costs incurred by HCOs that 
undergo accreditation and warns that this might create significant barriers to accreditation 
for those HCOs serving disadvantaged and under-resourced communities. He argues that 
accreditation costs must be weighed against the potential benefits to determine feasibility 
and value.  
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2.9.2.5. Quality improvement 
Quality improvement as an ‘outcome’ is defined as any positive change in measures such 
as clinical indicators and tangible improvement in healthcare processes as a result of APs, 
such as low incidence of infection, improved continuity of care, and accuracy of diagnosis 
(de Walcque et al., 2008). Greenfield and Braithwaite (2007) have described the 
relationship between quality measures (i.e. outcomes) and accreditation as a complex issue 
with no apparent direct and clear-cut relationship between them. Griffith et al. (2002) have 
reported a potential disconnection between JCAHO accreditation and outcome measures. 
Grasso et al. (2005) expressed similar ideas in connection with accreditation and low rate 
of medication errors. Beaulieu and Epstein (2002) have noted that, while NCQA
11 was 
positively associated with increased enrolment in the AP and higher accreditation scores, it 
does not ensure high-quality care or a minimal level of performance. Miller et al. (2005) 
have arrived at rather similar results in their research investigating the relationship between 
performance measurement and accreditation. They have demonstrated that, despite high 
scoring on JCAHO measures, no significant relationship between JCAHO categorical 
accreditation decisions and quality and safety indicators in the accredited hospitals was 
detected. Accordingly, they have expressed a need to continuously re-evaluate all 
measurement tools to ensure that they are providing the public with reliable, consistent 
information about healthcare quality and safety. As such, Salmon et al. (2003), similar to 
Snyder and Anderson (2005), have stated that accreditation had little or no effect on 
clinical indicator performance, in spite of improved compliance of accredited organisations 
with the standards instigated after accreditation. They have called for additional work to 
determine whether improvements in the accreditation structure and process standards result 
in improved outcomes. A weak relationship between accreditation and quality measures 
was also identified by Hadley and McGurrin (1988), even though the accredited or 
certified hospitals were more likely to have higher values on specific indicators than 
hospitals without accreditation. In a more recent study, DeBritz and Pollak (2006) looked 
into the effect of accreditation of trauma centres on patient outcomes, defined as mortality 
rate. They found hardly any convincing evidence to support the benefit of trauma 
accreditation on patient outcomes, apart from a little improvement in survival rate. 
Similarly, Barker et al.’s (2002) study of medication errors in 36 hospitals comprising 
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JCAHO accredited hospitals, non-accredited hospitals and skilled nursing facilities, 
exhibited no significant difference between error rates across those three settings. A 
research initiative, known as Quest for Quality and Improved Performance (QQIP), with a 
focus on the quality of health care in the UK and USA, demonstrated mixed results 
regarding the effects of APs (Sutherland and Leatherman, 2006). It concludes that, despite 
the evidence of an association between quality of care and accreditation status, there was 
no evidence of causality between them. The association could therefore be a result of the 
high-performing organisations choosing to participate in accreditation, rather than 
accreditation processes leading to better performance or higher-quality health care. As 
such, the following findings have been achieved by this initiative in relation to 
accreditation (de Walcque et al., 2008; Sutherland and Leatherman, 2006; Mays, 2004): 
•  No correlation between JCAHO scores and alternative, evidence-based measures of 
healthcare quality and safety 
•  No difference in the medical error rates between accredited and non-accredited 
hospitals 
•  No correlation between patient satisfaction scores and JCAHO survey scores 
•  No evidence of patient impact, although JCAHO has acted as a key driver in the 
development of hospitals’ patient-safety initiatives  
•  Disjunction between outcomes measures and JCAHO evaluations 
 
Nonetheless, the literature also abounds with examples supporting the positive impact of 
accreditation on the quality of accredited organisations (Dearinger et al., 2010). de 
Walcque et al. (2008) refer to the experience of the last decade in health care showing that 
accreditation has been a valuable means of quality improvement dynamics in many 
hospital settings. Sunol et al. (2009a) argue that those involved in the accreditation projects 
are likely to believe accreditation can contribute to the improvement of health care and 
service quality. Chen et al. (2003) found that accredited hospitals performed better than 
non-accredited hospitals on a range of quality indicators; for example, non-surveyed 
hospitals had higher mortality rates than surveyed ones, albeit with considerable variation 
in their performance. Devers et al. (2004) found that a quasi-regulatory organisation (e.g., 
JCAHO) can be a primary driver for hospitals’ patient-safety initiatives. Rooney and van                                                                                                                               
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Ostenberg (2004) stated that patient records defined by accreditation standards have 
greatly contributed to the improvement and monitoring of quality patient care. They also 
commented that accreditation could often serve as a comprehensive and powerful tool for 
quality improvement in cultures and countries with very different systems of healthcare 
delivery. Simons et al. (2002) found that hospitals owning a trauma programme consistent 
with accreditation criteria were statistically better than the other centres. El-Jardali et al. 
(2008) found perceived improvement in the quality of care in hospitals after accreditation 
and considered the accreditation as a valuable tool for improving quality of care. Hospital 
accreditation had a significant impact on hospitals’ infection control infrastructure and 
performance (Sekimoto et al., 2008). It has been argued that accreditation could 
predominantly promote compliance with the published standards in the months prior to the 
external assessment (Salmon et al., 2003; Piskorz, 2002) and/or increase the number of 
HCOs interested in taking part in the accreditation scheme (Sutherland and Leatherman, 
2006). However, there is little evidence that this high compliance and participation will 
bring any benefits in terms of clinical process and outcome or quality and safety in the 
accredited organisations (Sierpinska and Ksykiewicz-Dorota, 2002).  
In view of the above-mentioned confusion and alleged failure of accreditation to enhance 
quality of care, some efforts have been made to improve accreditation’s impact. For 
instance, Scrivens (1997b) argues that, in order to make accreditation more acceptable to 
HCOs, accreditation systems have to become more relevant to clinical activity. Thus, a 
handful of accreditation bodies have been introducing, developing, incorporating and 
monitoring clinical quality indicators in HCOs (Collopy, 2000; Fairbrother and Gleeson, 
2000). As a result, some improvements have apparently occurred in care outcomes of these 
organisations (Collopy, 2000; Collopy et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2005).  
 
2.9.3. Process-based approach 
As the analysis of the literature shows, the evidence on accreditation’s effectiveness and 
impact is to a large extent inconsistent and variant in different studies and settings. 
Therefore, given the difficulty of performance measurement in health care (Eddy, 1998; 
Loeb, 2004) which might stem from the peculiarities of health care, as explained earlier, 
the outcome-based approach to the performance analysis of accreditation (i.e. evaluation of 
accreditation based on its impact on quality care) seems to be a prolonged and somewhat                                                                                                                               
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impractical process. Therefore, the process-based (perception and experience analysis) 
approach might have relative ascendancy over outcome-related ones for evaluating 
healthcare accreditation systems in this regard (Scrivens, 1997a). Walshe et al. (2001) also 
confirm that it is consistently difficult to evaluate EESs by analyzing their impact on target 
organisations, even though this might seem a fairly reasonable method of testing. Shaw 
(2003b) indicates that EESs are complex interventions that cannot be easily isolated and 
measured, and the existing evidence to support these strategies is mostly based on 
descriptive studies or expert reports. He further comments that ‘endpoints’ of an AP are 
hard to define and they may change according to the expectations of users and observers 
(Shaw, 2003a, p. 455). Accordingly, he argues that evaluation of accreditation systems is 
more difficult than, for example, a clinical technology (Shaw, 2003a).  
Øvretveit and Gustafson (2002) point to methodological challenges in measuring outcomes 
and determining causality between accreditation and possible outcomes. de Walcque et al. 
(2008, p. iii) mention some reasons why this causality has been difficult to demonstrate. 
They argue that the standards applied by most APs are not associated with outcome-related 
performance indicators, but with ‘process indicators’. Possible disagreement between the 
programmes’ stakeholders on the intended outcomes and inconsistency in the definitions of 
an AP are considered as other possible reasons (Boaden, 2008). Øvretveit and Gustafson 
(2002) note that, since evaluative interventions are complex, changing and long-term 
processes, they are difficult to evaluate using experimental methods. Furthermore, they 
indicate that changing and complex targets and contexts make them difficult to evaluate by 
conventional medical (quantitative) research evaluation methods. They advise instead 
quasi-experimental evaluation and social science methods utilising qualitative means and 
perceptions for evaluation and investigation of these programmes. According to Øvretveit 
and Gustafson (2002, 2003), the validity of these methods can also be increased by 
interviewing a cross-section of informants and triangulating data from different sources. 
Exploratory (qualitative) studies are also favoured for investigation of the relationship 
between accreditation systems and performance of HCOs (Joly et al., 2007). 
In the process-based approach to the assessment of EESs, the focus is directly on the 
performance of APs without inferring their performance based on their impacts on 
reviewed organisations. It should be remembered that assuming a clear-cut distinction 
between these two approaches might be fairly ambitious, yet useful, for the purposes of 
expounding the impacts of APs. This approach to accreditation performance analysis has                                                                                                                               
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also been seen differently in the literature. The assessment of accreditation validity and 
reliability and the analysis of different groups’ perceptions and attitudes towards these 
programmes are the two main forms of process-based analysis found in the literature (e.g. 
Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2008; El-Jardali et al., 2008).  
 
2.9.3.1. Accreditation validity and reliability  
Findings from various research concerning accreditation validity are mostly based on 
anecdotal evidence and are to some extent inconsistent (Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2007; 
Dickson and Nicklin, 2008). Some studies have deemed accreditation to a credible process 
for assessing quality of care (e.g. Gillon et al., 2003; Kreig, 1996; Gough and Reynolds, 
2000; Hurst, 1997; Dickson and Nicklin, 2008). On the other hand, this validity has been 
questioned by others and there have been calls for more clarification in monitoring 
standards and assimilation of outcome measures in the standards (McAlary, 1981; Grasso 
et al., 2005; Essex, 2000). McAlary (1981) has argued that too much reliance on surveyors’ 
judgements might endanger the validity of accreditation. He advises a movement towards 
and combination with an outcome evaluation approach to enhance credibility and 
reliability of the accreditation process. Grasso et al. (2005) have linked validity of an 
accreditation system to its surveyors’ ability to detect medication usage errors.  Stressing 
the importance of reliability for healthcare accreditation, Greenfield et al. (2009) 
recommend employing a structured report format for evaluation, a detailed training 
programme with mentoring for new surveyors, and defined surveyor selection criteria to 
enhance the reliability of AP. In the study by Greenfield et al. (2009, p. 105), stakeholders 
of the accreditation system identified six interrelated factors including dynamics of 
accreditation survey, management of surveyor workforce, organisational documentation 
and survey team conduct that both promoted and challenged simultaneously the reliability 
of accreditation. 
 
2.9.3.2. Professionals’ perspectives  
The most common way to examine the performance of APs is said to be based on attitudes 
and perceptions (Scrivens, 1997a). Many of the studies conducted in this regard are 
concerned with the application of accreditation in the education sector (e.g. Baker and                                                                                                                               
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Dunn, 2006; Casamassimo and Wilson, 1999; MacFarlane et al., 2003; Reznich and Mavis, 
2000). However, health care has also been the subject of a number of studies in which 
various groups of APs’ stakeholders are asked for their perceptions of how an accreditation 
scheme is functioning or how it should assess HCOs. Table 3.2 outlines a summary of 
related studies in this regard. As in the table, Hurst (1997) has tried to evaluate Trent Small 
Hospital Accreditation Scheme (TSHAS) in the UK by surveying and interviewing the 
programme’s managers and surveyors.  
The ACHS’s accreditation is a pioneering and successful healthcare evaluation scheme 
established in 1974. This programme has been subject to different evaluations by 
researchers. Krieg (1996) has examined ACHS’s programme with the purpose of 
investigating its usefulness in assisting any movement towards best practice, its impact on 
the reviewed HCOs’ outcomes and performance, and the benefit of the programme. To this 
end, he conducted a questionnaire survey of HCOs due for accreditation by ACHS. In 
another case, Fairbrother and Gleeson (2000) have investigated the attitudes of  the senior 
clinical and managerial staff of a teaching hospital towards ACHS accreditation, in terms 
of the programme preparation phase, on-site survey and the groups’ overall impressions of 
accreditation. They have utilised the questionnaire as a tool for gathering data.  
Another group of studies has tested different groups’ opinions concerning the accreditation 
scheme before and while launching the programme (Bukonda et al., 2003; Nandraj et al., 
2001). Nandraj et al. (2001) have elicited the views of a newly established AP’s 
stakeholders (hospital owners and/or administrators, representatives from professional 
associations, consumer organisations, government officials, insurance companies and 
health financers) on the introduction of that scheme and on what form it should take in the 
future. They have applied a mixed-method research strategy for this purpose. After 
conducting a questionnaire survey, they have interviewed a selected group of stakeholders 
to confirm resulted data and increase response rate and validity of results. Another study 
by Pongpirul et al. (2006) has explored the opinions of hospital staff and accreditation 
surveyors about selected items of the national hospital accreditation (HA) standards in 
order to establish crucial issues in the standards, as well as problems and major obstacles to 
hospitals’ implementation of quality improvement (QI) activities. Their research showed 
that employees were facing many problems with multidisciplinary process-related issues of 
the accreditation standards, whereas the surveyors’ difficulties were mainly in terms of 
conveying the quality improvement concepts to them. In the most recent study, El-Jardali                                                                                                                               
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et al. (2008) have assessed the perceived impact of accreditation on quality of care through 
the lens of healthcare professionals, specifically nurses.  
Two important points should be made in closing this section. Firstly, the distinction 
between these two approaches to performance analysis of APs has been heuristic and may 
not be fully clear-cut in practice. Being inspired by the literature, this research has made 
such a distinction to obtain more clarification and better explanation. Secondly, it is worth 
noting that a combination of these two approaches is inevitable and may render even more 
comprehensive and valid results.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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Table 3.2 Characteristics of various studies on APs across different countries (Adapted from Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2007)- continued next pages 
Author  Year  Country and 
setting  Purpose  Respondent 
groups 
 
Study design, collection 
and analysis 
 
Main results 
 
Pongpirul et 
al. 
 
 
2006 
Thailand; 
Hospitals 
 
To explore the opinions of 
health care professionals 
(hospital staff) and 
accreditation surveyors 
toward selected items in the 
national hospital 
accreditation 
(HA) standards, in order to 
establish major issues in the 
standards, as well as 
problems and major 
obstacles of hospitals in 
implementing quality 
improvement (QI) activities 
  
 
Hospital staff 
and accreditation 
surveyors 
 
A self-administered 
questionnaire by hospital 
(different departments) staff 
(response rate 94.9%) and 
surveyors of the national 
AP (response rate of 
73.2%).  
Analysis: descriptive 
statistics and comparison of 
views by statistical 
Spearman’s rank 
correlation test. 
 
Health care professionals 
have been facing many 
problems with 
multidisciplinary process-
related issues of the HA 
standards, whereas surveyors 
might have had some 
difficulties in conveying the 
core QI concepts to them. 
Baker,  
et al. 
2004 
USA;  
Health  
education 
To explore the perspectives 
of selected allied health 
deans and programme 
directors regarding the 
specialised accreditation 
effectiveness and reform 
Allied health 
programme deans 
and programme 
directors 
Quantitative study; 
questionnaire; responses 
rate 55%; 
Analysis: sum means; 
Cronbach’s alpha; 
multivariate analysis; 
ANOVAs; independent t 
tests. 
Findings affirmed the role of 
accreditation as an effective 
system for measuring quality 
in higher education.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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Stoelwinder 
 
2004 
Australia; 
Medical 
clinicians. 
To explore what doctors 
working in hospitals want 
from hospital accreditation 
Doctors   Qualitative data collected 
from 12 focus groups in 6 
hospitals across Australia 
involving consultants, 
registrars and senior 
medical officers. Total 
number of participants was 
72.  
Analysis: thematic analysis 
conducted 
Doctors are unaware or 
sceptical of accreditation; 
doctors hold concerns about 
how safety and quality of care 
should be measured; and 
doctors perceive themselves 
to be accountable within a 
professional framework (self/ 
patient/colleagues) not to the 
organisations in which they 
work. 
    
    Grenade 
and 
Boldy 
 
 
2002 
Australia; 
Health 
professionals 
To review the 
implementation of the 
accreditation process in 
Western Australia from the 
perspective of service 
providers 
Health services   
providers 
In-depth interviews were 
conducted with thirty 
participants.  
Analysis: themes and 
descriptive analysis 
presented 
The accreditation system is 
generally supported by 
service providers 
 
Nandraj 
  et al. 
 
 
 
 
2001 
India;  
Hospital 
To elicit the view of 
stakeholders (hospital 
owners/ administrators, 
representatives from 
professional associations, 
consumer organisations, 
government officials, 
insurance companies and 
health financers) on the 
introduction of accreditation 
and what form it should take 
Hospital owners/ 
administrators, 
representatives 
from professional 
associations, 
consumer 
organisations, 
government 
officials, 
insurance 
companies and 
health financers 
A structured questionnaire; 
An 8% response rate.  
A sub-sample of 25 (drawn 
from the 725 hospitals that 
identified their bed size) – 
purposively selected to 
represent broad 
geographical distribution, 
ownership and range of 
size;  
A semi-structured interview 
(RR: 76%)  
A high level of support for a 
programme (voluntary, 
standards based approach, 
periodic external assessment 
and quality assurance 
measures).  
The biggest obstacle 
identified was how to finance 
the programme.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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Analysis: frequency tables 
and cross tabulations 
computed; content analysis 
of qualitative data 
 
Greco,  
et al. 
2001 
Australia;  
General  
practices 
To survey patient views on 
standards as part of the AP  
Patients  A 27 item questionnaire 
was completed by over 
53,000 patients from 449 
general practices. 
Analysis: percentages and 
statistical analysis 
presented. 
Patients considered that  
doctors need to improve 
interpersonal skills, access, 
availability and patient 
information 
Gough and 
Reynolds  2000 
UK; Pathology 
laboratories 
 
 
To examine laboratories 
managers’ and clinicians’ 
opinions about Clinical 
Pathology Accreditation 
(CPA) and whether it had 
produced any significant 
benefits to pathology 
services 
Laboratories  
managers and 
clinicians 
An unsolicited 
questionnaire (15 items) 
mailed after accreditation 
survey, to 145 laboratories 
(mangers and clinicians);  
5 point Likert scale and free 
text questions used;  
64 % response rate 
Most laboratories felt 
accreditation by CPA had 
resulted in better laboratory 
performance with more 
documentation and better 
health and safety training 
procedures. A significant 
proportion considered 
accreditation to be over 
bureaucratic, inefficient and 
expensive. A concern that 
accreditation covered the 
domains of other regulatory 
bodies was also expressed 
Fairbrother 
and Gleeson  2000  Australia; 
Hospital 
To examine attitudes of 
hospital senior clinical and 
managerial staff to the 
accreditation (regarding 
preparation phase, on-site 
survey and overall 
impressions of accreditation)  
Hospital senior 
clinical and 
managerial staff 
A case study of a 
metropolitan teaching 
hospital. Survey of 20 
items, closed and open 
questions, to all department 
heads; 44% response rate 
Analysis: content analysis 
Significant levels of negative 
feedback received; principal 
concerns related to 
perceptions that the process is 
unwieldy and it offers little 
value in terms of patient care 
delivery for the resources 
required                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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Casamassion 
and 
Wilson 
1999 
USA; 
Dentistry 
education   
To assess the opinions of 
programme directors and 
practitioners about the 
importance and necessary 
amounts of experiences 
required by current 
accreditation standards for 
training of paediatric dentists 
Dentistry 
programme   
directors and 
practitioner 
A 32-item questionnaire 
was sent to all programme 
directors of ADA-
accredited postdoctoral 
paediatric dentistry training 
programmes and to a 
random sample of 10% of 
the fellow/active 
membership of the 
American Academy of 
Paediatric Dentistry. An 
over-all response rate of 
56%. 
Analysis: comparisons 
using statistical tests. 
Practitioners and programme 
directors agreed on the 
importance of most 
experiences and activities 
required by current 
accreditation standards. 
 
Scanlon 
and 
Hendrix 
 
 
1998 
USA; 
Purchaser 
organisations 
and 
representatives 
from other 
health 
organisations. 
To capture the views of the 
purchaser representatives 
who attended a two-day 
programme, explaining the 
APs of NCQA and JCAHO  
Health care 
purchaser  
representatives 
Two surveys (N = 20) 
administered to 
representatives.  
First survey at the start of 
day one and the second at 
the end of day two. The 
surveys examined 
understanding and attitudes 
to the APs.  
Analysis: response 
percentage for questions.  
Purchasers have a keen 
interest in health plan 
accreditation and rely heavily 
on accreditation decisions 
when choosing which plans to 
offer their beneficiaries. 
Purchasers also desire to 
understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of the 
accreditation process for their 
own contracting purposes. 
 
 
Hurst 
1997 
UK; 
 Hospital   
To examine the 
characteristics of health care 
accreditation schemes, in 
particular the Trent small 
hospital accreditation 
scheme (TSHAS) from the 
Accreditation 
manager and 
surveyors 
Data collected through 
document analysis/ 
literature review, 
questionnaires (79% 
response rate) and 
Results confirmed to-date 
(1997) published 
understanding of 
accreditation. The programme 
is valued by stakeholders, 
who are also keen to see it                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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perspective of the scheme 
manager and surveyors 
interviews   
Analysis: descriptive and 
statistical analysis 
presented 
continue to evolve. 
 
 
Kreig 
1996 
Australia; 
Health care 
organisations 
To examine the AP of 
ACHS focusing on the 
usefulness of the programme 
to assist movement towards 
best practice, its impact on 
outcomes and performance, 
the benefit of the 
programme, and how it 
could be of greater 
assistance. 
HCOs  Questionnaire survey.  
A 56% response rate  
A large majority of 
respondents agreed that the 
AP had been of significant 
benefit to their organisation.  
The benefits covered 
improving communication, 
commitment to best practice, 
information available for 
evaluation activities and 
quality care activities, 
improved structure for 
quality, greater focus on 
consumers, supporting 
planned change, and, staff 
management and 
development. 
Borenstein et 
al. 
 
2004 
USA; 
Managed care 
organisations 
An analysis that assessed the 
differences in performance 
of HCOs with and without 
quality improvement 
activities 
HCOs  Processes or outcomes from 
quality activities, identified 
from 399 organisational 
self-reports linked to 
measures in the 
effectiveness-of-care 
database of HEDIS 
Analysis: cross-sectional 
analysis undertaken (79 
activities from 50 
organisations, covering 12 
measures) 
The effects of self-reported 
quality improvement activities 
were often small and 
inconsistent, and in some 
instances contrary to 
expectations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
  
61 
Chen,         et 
al.  2003 
USA; 
Hospitals  
To examine similarities and 
differences in health 
outcomes for accredited and 
non-accredited hospitals  
Hospitals   The study cohort was 
134,579 patients from 
4,221 hospitals. The 
association between quality 
of care, and survival for 
acute myocardial infarction 
was examined. 
Analysis: statistical tests 
(including chi-square tests, 
analysis of variance, logic 
regression and the 
Cohcrane-Armitage test), 
and a disease specific 
mortality prediction model 
for elderly patients was 
used. Risk adjustments 
were undertaken. 
Non-accredited hospitals 
displayed lower quality than 
accredited hospitals. However 
there was considerable 
variation in performance 
amongst accredited hospitals. 
 
Salmon,     et 
al. 
 
 
2003 
South Africa; 
Hospitals 
To conduct a prospective 
randomised control trail of 
an AP in a developing 
country 
Public hospitals  A random sample of 20 
public hospitals stratified 
by size; ten participated in 
the AP and ten not as the 
control group. Data were 
from the Council for Health 
Services Accreditation of 
Southern Africa. Data 
comprised measures of 
hospital structure and 
processes and 8 quality 
indicators (independently 
collected). Qualitative and 
quantitative comparison of 
data from the two groups 
was undertaken. 
Those hospitals participating 
in the programme improved 
their compliance with 
accreditation standards; non-
participating hospitals did not. 
However, there was no 
observed improvement on the 
quality indicators.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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Bukonda 
et al. 
2003  Zambia; 
Hospital  
To describe the experience 
of the development of the 
Zambian hospital 
accreditation program 
Hospital  Qualitative data from 
interviews with 
stakeholders; 
Review of documents. 
Serious resource constraints, 
both financial and expertise 
have undermined the ongoing 
viability of the program 
Brasure,     et 
al.  2000  USA; Hospital 
To explore why rural 
hospitals are not 
participating in the 
accreditation process 
Hospitals   Random sample survey of 
299 non-accredited rural 
hospitals. 
Mail survey with telephone 
follow-up. 92% response 
rate.  
Analysis: multivariate 
Probit analysis and 
predicted marginal 
probabilities. 
The main reason of the rural 
hospitals for not seeking the 
accreditation was cost 
Casey 
and Klingner 
2000 
USA;  
Health 
maintenance 
organisations 
(HMOs). 
To explore why two groups 
of HMOs that serve rural 
areas have chosen to apply 
or not to apply for National 
Committee for Quality 
Assurance accreditation, and 
their future plans regarding 
accreditation 
HMOs  HMOs drawn from 1997 
inter study HMO census; 
identified 182 rural HMOs, 
75 accredited and 105 non-
accredited; random samples 
of 21 accredited and 10 
non-accredited HMOs;  
Phone interviews with 
managers or directors, 
ratings using a 5 point 
scale. 
Challenges of complying with 
standards and information 
requirements identified. 
Accredited HMOs cited 
positive benefits of 
accreditation process; most to 
reapply. 
Bohigas 
et al. 
 
1998 
International 
level; 
Surveyors 
To explore how different 
accreditation bodies manage 
surveyors 
Accreditation  
bodies 
Comparative study; 
Questionnaire  
Surveyors around the world 
share many common features 
in terms of careers, training, 
work history and expectations 
Verstraete, et  1998  Belgium and  Assessing the attitude of  Laboratory   Multiple choice  A large majority of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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al. 
 
Netherlands; 
medical 
laboratories. 
laboratory personnel towards 
accreditation 
 
 
personnel  questionnaires administered 
to medical technologists in 
three medical laboratories 
at varying times after 
obtaining an accreditation 
award; two private in 
Belgium, 29 and 20 
responses; one hospital in 
Netherlands, 28 responses. 
Follow-up with the first 
laboratory one year later 
received 24 responses. 
Analysis: percentages and 
comparisons by chi-square 
analysis. 
representatives considered 
that accreditation increased 
their workload. Two 
laboratories did not think 
accreditation improved the 
quality of results. A small 
majority preferred working in 
an accredited laboratory. 
Advantages: the improved 
traceability of work, better 
knowledge of their activities 
Disadvantages: increased 
paperwork, the discrepancies 
between the accreditation 
procedures and the reality 
which directs attention mainly 
to formalities rather than 
quality. 
However, A small majority of 
the technologists preferred 
working in an accredited 
laboratory than in a non 
accredited one. 
 
Hampel and 
Hastings 
1993 
USA; 
Nursing 
homes 
To evaluate a protocol 
developed by JCAHO to 
assess the capability of 
special care units to provide 
quality care 
Nursing homes  Comparison by testing two 
separate surveys at two 
independent sites; 
Analysis: correlation 
analysis  
The standards used, their 
intent, and the survey process 
were considered sound by 
those who tested the protocol 
and by those who were 
evaluated                                                                                                                                                                     
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2.9.4. Further frameworks and designs for assessing EESs  
In addition to the foregoing approaches and studies regarding different methods of 
evaluating EESs, some generic guidelines, suggestions, anecdotal designs, and conceptual 
models, which are mostly descriptive and grounded in the literature, have been identified 
in the literature. They were invoked during the different stages of this study to both 
formulate the research objectives and help enrich the data analysis and interpretation.  
1. Øvretveit and Gustafson (2002, p. 272) have mentioned the following designs and 
methods which have been used for assessing EESs. They have argued that these methods 
may provide decision-makers with workable guidance on how to plan and implement these 
evaluation programmes.  
•  Descriptive case design: this design simply describes the EES as implemented, 
within which there is no attempt to gather data about outcomes. 
•  Audit design: this is a quick and low-cost evaluation method which usually takes 
the form of a written statement, such as a protocol, as to what any external 
programme should do and what it is actually doing. According to Øvretveit and 
Gustafson (2002), audit research of accreditation or other review systems may help 
managers to develop more cost-effective reviews.  
•  Prospective before-after designs: this design gathers specific data about the effect 
of evaluative intervention before and after the intervention.  
•  Retrospective or concurrent evaluation designs: in this case, a researcher 
investigates previous theories or empirical research to identify critical success 
factors and then tests them to find out which are associated with successful and 
unsuccessful programmes.  
 
2. Harvey and Wensing (2003, p. 211) have outlined four types of evaluations for small-
scale projects (such as quality assessment or improvement initiatives), including: 
•  Focused audit studies which monitor impact of the project activities over time. This 
design mainly centres on a single project and the evaluation is a component of the 
project quality improvement phase.                                                                                                                                                                    
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•  Developmental studies that identify problems and intervene when necessary, and 
develop hypotheses for testing raised issues. This method mostly functions in a similar 
manner to action research design. 
•  Multiple case-studies draw up case reports and comparisons across a number of local 
projects. Key steps here are as follows: 
￿  Select individual cases relevant to the issues to be studied. 
￿  Collect data within individual sites using a range of quantitative and 
qualitative methods. 
￿  Analyse the data within individual sites using appropriate quantitative 
and qualitative methods of analysis- for example, descriptive statistics, 
and thematic analysis of qualitative data. 
￿  Compare data analyses across sites to draw more general conclusions 
and/or generate hypotheses for further testing. 
•  Process evaluations explain the findings of a bigger research project via in-depth 
analyses of the project. They also provide important insights into how and why 
programmes work in practice. 
 
3. Walshe et al. (2001, p. 368) have developed an evaluative framework which requires 
consideration of the following items for assessing and analysing EESs:  
•  Purpose: objectives of the system for external review 
•  Organisation: those who undertake the organisation and implementation of the 
system 
•  Overall approach: when and how they are initiated - either universally or targeted, 
voluntary or mandatory 
•  Methods: homogeneity or heterogeneity of methods 
•  Results: what is done with the results? How are they used to effect change or 
improvement? 
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4. de Walcque et al. (2008, p. 7) put forward a conceptual structure grounded in the 
literature comprising five main building blocks which allow a comprehensive analysis of 
an AP, including: 
•  Policy: includes AP’s intentions, supporting structure, incentives  for stimulating 
hospitals’ participation and coverage 
•  Governance: comprises stakeholders’ participation level in accrediting bodies and 
their internal organisation 
•  Methods: composed of accreditation standards, measurement, surveyors’ training 
and recruitment, change management, decision and appeal, and results diffusion 
•  Funding mechanism and sources: encompasses income and expenses related to AP 
•  Evaluation: refers to programme evaluation and outcomes, outcome measurement 
and related key indicators  
 
2.9.5. International efforts 
Agenda for Leadership in Programs for Healthcare Accreditation (ALPHA) 
At international level efforts have also been made to provide a springboard for accrediting 
APs and accrediting bodies in health care (Heidemann, 2000). The International Society 
for Quality in Healthcare (ISQua) established its International Accreditation Programme 
(IAP), which is called ALPHA, in 1999 (Heidemann, 1999). The ALPHA has been set up 
to achieve the following main objectives (Heidemann, 1999, p. 275): 
￿  to demonstrate internationally that accreditation is a credible evaluation 
process;  
￿  to show that external and objective evaluation of a national 
accreditation organisation is possible and that there is a means of doing 
this;  
￿  to respond to the growing and ongoing need for an international 
accreditation forum and organisation through which knowledge and 
experience about accreditation can be shared; and                                                                                                                                                                     
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￿  to make standards-based assessment systems more reliable, valid and 
compatible within and among countries 
 
The tasks for ALPHA were as follow (Shaw, 2004c, p. 38): 
•  begin harmonization of national programmes 
•  define principles of standards and programme operation 
•  evaluate accreditation agencies 
•  support new programmes 
•  accredit training programs for training surveyors 
 
ISQua has published a set of generic standards and principles for accrediting the APs and 
the healthcare standards of different countries at international level (Shaw, 2007; 
Anonymous, 2007b; 2007a). Its aim has been to provide pertinent guidelines for 
developing new APs and to assist accreditation systems to be superior to other EESs 
(Shaw, 2004c). 
In summary, this chapter has laid out the general context for PM in health care with a 
special focus on healthcare accreditation as a widely-used/known macro PMS/MCS in 
health care sector. Next chapter is to concentrate on the specific context of chosen case for 
current study. Providing descriptive information, the chapter continues to discuss the 
related studies and establish the gaps in the overall and specific (in relation to the context 
under study) literature.  
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Chapter 3 - Iranian Hospital Accreditation and Evaluation 
System 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter an exposition of performance measurement and various PMSs at a 
general level was presented. The aim of this chapter is to introduce Iran’s national AP for 
hospitals (at a more specific level), whose performance is examined in this study. Detailed 
scrutiny of its performance requires a basic understanding of the different aspects of the 
health system in Iran. Therefore, the first section provides some general information about 
the Iranian healthcare structure. In the second section, a short history of hospital evaluation 
and accreditation in Iran is given, including the current AP. Then, the studies conducted on 
this programme are reviewed in the third section. Following this literature review, the 
research establishes the gaps in the literature as the final section of this chapter.  
This chapter gives useful background information on the different aspects of the NAPH 
and reports on its modifications over time. It enables a better understanding of the findings 
of the study upon the impact of the programme on the hospitals. The information given in 
this chapter is the result of primary data collection and documentary analysis by the 
researcher.   
 
3.2. The Healthcare system in Iran 
Iran
12 is a member state of the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO) of the 
World Health Organisation (WHO). EMRO includes countries from the Middle East and
                                                   
12. Brief introductory information is provided in the Appendix A about the country. the northeast of Africa, such as Yemen, Lebanon and Morocco
13. The Iranian healthcare 
system has been restructured and steadily improved during the past three decades (Mohit, 
2000).  
The constitution of I.R.I. guarantees all citizens a right of access to health care (I.R.I., 
1979b). To this end, the MoH
14, as the ultimate authority of the country’s health care, is 
responsible for the aspects of planning, policy-making, leading, supervising, funding and 
evaluating the health services and medical education in the country
15 (Mohit, 2000). 
However, the executive responsibility has been put on the shoulders of the Universities of 
Medical Sciences and Health Services (UMSHSs, the UMSs hereafter) at provincial level. 
These duties include the tasks of providing healthcare services and training the required 
human resources at all levels of education (Majlis, 1985; 1987; 1988a). While the MoH is 
essentially concerned with questions of policy-making and financing, the UMSs are 
responsible for management, organisation and delivery of health services at provincial 
levels. The UMSs, at least one in each province, play an important role both in medical 
education and provision of health services. The chancellors of the universities, who are 
also apparently the deputies of the health minister in their respective province, are the 
executive directors of the provincial health services and in charge of all hospitals and 
health centres. Provision of  healthcare services in the country at provincial level is 
undertaken at three levels; primary, secondary and tertiary (Anonymous, 2008). Primary 
health care, the most accessible services geographically, are provided in rural areas by 
some basic health centres called Health Houses (HHs) as well as on a limited scale in 
urban areas, especially in small cities, by Health Bases (HBs), the equivalent of Health 
Houses in urban areas. These are under the supervision of Rural and Urban Healthcare 
centres respectively. The secondary level includes the more advanced services and initial 
access to district hospitals is made possible at this level (Shadpour, 2000). The first and 
second levels are included in a District Healthcare Network (DHN) and the hospital at this 
level is the first point of referral from the lower level. The district, in Iran’s healthcare 
system, is the smallest autonomous region and the most natural administrative level 
promoted by the WHO for healthcare delivery (Mohit, 2000). The DHN provides support 
                                                   
13. WHO Member States are grouped into the six regions and each region has a regional office; such as 
EMRO, SEARO (Regional Office for South-East Asia) and PAHO (Pan American Health Organization). 
14. Since 1985, health and medical education was separated from the country’s Higher Education Ministry 
and merged into the MoH. 
15. A full list of the MoH’s tasks is presented in Appendix F.                                                                                 H s    l A              
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and supervision for the centres at primary and secondary levels. The services delivered in 
all the DHNs are called ‘primary health care (PHC)’, which was accepted by the member 
states of the WHO as the key to achieving the goal of health for all (WHO, 1978). A 
primary healthcare centre is the basic structural and functional unit of the public health 
services in developing countries and was established to provide accessible, affordable and 
available primary health care to people, in accordance with the Alma-Ata Declaration 
(Tarimo, 1991). As for the importance of district level health care, Tarimo (1991) has 
indicated that each district covers not only a small enough area that staff are able to 
understand the major problems and constraints of its socio-economic and health 
development, but also large enough units for them to develop the technical and managerial 
skills central to its planning and management. Figure 3.1 displays the organisational layout 
of all health centres at district level. Tertiary level includes the UMSs and hospitals which 
provide the most advanced healthcare services in the country. This level is the final referral 
point of service for lower levels of health service delivery process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Organisational Chart of Iran’s Healthcare System Organisation (Source: developed by the 
author) 
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3.2.1. Tertiary level of healthcare delivery- Hospitals  
General and specialty hospitals are positioned at this level of the healthcare system. These 
HCOs are the main bodies providing and delivering advanced medical and clinical services 
in the country, mainly in the cities. There are two main categories of hospitals in the 
Iranian healthcare system, namely public and private, according to the way they are 
governed and funded (Figure 3.2). The public hospitals are owned by the government 
whereas private ones are owned by non-governmental organisations, bodies or individuals. 
These two categories can be further subdivided into more classes. For example, private 
hospitals are placed into for-profit and not-for-profit (charity) categories and the public 
hospitals are subdivided into university and institutional hospitals. Some organisations in 
Iran such as the Petroleum Ministry, the Military and Welfare organisations have their own 
hospitals that only serve their staff and their families, although some of them are currently 
open to the general public, too. The university hospitals are those which are governed and 
operated under direct control and supervision of the UMSs. These are also divided into two 
groups: teaching hospitals which provide clinical services and undertake medical training, 
education and research, and the clinical hospitals that are responsible only for delivering 
clinical services. The former, unlike the latter, are mostly located in the big cities of the 
provinces.  
The main financial resource of all the hospitals is determined through their income from 
the services they provide. In addition, the public hospitals are also partly funded by the 
state through a central budget scheme. The services of the hospitals are priced based on the 
accreditation grade (explained below) of the hospitals. That is, the hospitals must fulfil a 
number of regulatory requirements, set by the MoH and checked by the UMSs, to be 
allowed to charge the highest rate for their (hotel-type) services. 
Since the evaluation and accreditation of HCOs in Iran currently only involves the 
hospitals, despite a later and so far unrealised intention to spread that to other health 
centres (Sadaghiani and Zare, 2005), this research will concern itself only with the 
hospitals to maintain its relevancy to the main objective of the research, which is 
performance analysis of the accreditation and evaluation system of the hospitals. In this 
research, the hospitals will be mostly referred to as teaching and non-teaching hospitals 
(NTHs), the hospitals not owned by the UMSs. 
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Public Hospitals 
 
 
Private Hospitals 
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 Figure 3.2 Classification of Hospitals in Iran’s Health System (Source: developed by the author) 
 
 
3.3. Evaluation of hospitals in Iran  
3.3.1. Brief History  
The first serious attempts to evaluate the hospitals in Iran could be seen during the 
institution of the third development plan of the country between the years 1962-1967. The 
main focus of these efforts was on the evaluation and accreditation of public and private 
hospitals. The evaluation checklists at the time were allegedly developed on the basis of 
successful international experiences (Sadaghiani, 1997; Shaw, 2004c). Following attempts 
to cover all departments of the hospitals such as management, medical and paramedical 
services, the main focus of these checklists was on nursing activities in view of their 
importance and volume in hospitals (Srinivasan, 2008). That scheme underwent some 
important modifications in 1986, especially in regard to the distribution of the scores 
allocated to the activities of accredited hospitals, even though these changes, as Sadaghiani                                                                                 H s    l A              
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and Zare (2005) argue, could not make much improvement in the process of accreditation. 
Iran’s current accreditation system basically started in 1997 and is, in turn, an upgraded 
version of the year 1986 programme (MoH, 1997a). Prior to year 1997, as indicated by a 
senior member of the surveyors, only one surveyor assessed all activities of each hospital, 
but since then the system has been specialised and different surveyors have been deployed 
to assess different areas of activities in the hospitals.  
 
3.3.2. Accreditation of hospitals  
Accreditation in Iran is a compulsory, government-sponsored, state-run initiative similar to 
a few other countries such as France and Egypt (Giraud, 2001; MoH, 1997a; USAID, 
2005). As Scrivens (2002) puts it, government-owned accreditations are growing and are 
mostly being used to accomplish governments’ regulatory tasks in monitoring and 
evaluating HCOs. Canada is also thinking of making some elements of its AP compulsory 
(Touati and Pomey, 2009). In developing countries, accreditation is increasingly being 
used as a tool for government regulation to guarantee quality of care in HCOs (El-Jardali 
et al., 2008). Shaw (2003a) also points to the adaptation of traditional models of voluntary 
and independent accreditation to use as a government-sponsored or statutory tool for 
control and public accountability in health care. de Walcque et al. (2008) show that most 
APs are embedded in a strong supportive structure by means of legislation and/or 
government policy. They realised that there is a clear trend of increasing government 
involvement in  hospital accreditation and more programmes are being managed within 
Ministries of Health or by a separate government agency (de Walcque et al., 2008).  
The NAPH might not be referred to as an AP in its conventional sense, given the generic 
features (i.e. voluntary and independent) of traditional accreditation (Scrivens, 1995a; 
1997a). However, in accord with the foregoing discussion on governments’ involvements 
and the relevant features of the NAPH (e.g. conducting an external assessment and ranking 
the hospitals based on the published standards), it might be considered as an AP. The 
NAPH has a national standard-setting and local monitoring status (Scrivens, 1996). 
Awarding of the highest accreditation grade, as Braithwaite et al. (2006) put it, is deemed a 
valid indicator of high organisational performance and it is central to safety and quality in 
HCOs.                                                                                 H s    l A              
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Overall, Iran’s evaluatory programme could be conceptualised as mandated, punitive, 
quasi-confidential, announced, standard-based, prescriptive and structure-oriented with a 
minimum requirement, absolute-measurement and multi-level award accreditation system, 
on the basis of the typology of APs, developed by Joint Commission International and 
displayed in figure 3.3 (Van Ostenberg, 2005).  
 
 
Mandated ------------------------ Voluntary 
Punitive ---------------------- Improvement-oriented 
Cyclical --------------------------- Continuous 
Prescriptive --------------------- Non-prescriptive 
Confidential ------------------------- Publicly disclosed 
Minimum requirements ----------------- Cutting edge requirements 
Reactive ------------------------- Proactive 
Announced ------------------------------ Unannounced 
Retrospective ------------------------ Prospective 
Standards-based ------------------------------- Performance measured-based 
Process-oriented ---------------------------- Outcomes-oriented 
Absolute measurement --------------------------- Comparative measurement 
One-level award -------------------------- Multi-level award 
 
 
   Figure 3.3 Philosophy of Accreditation- Source: de Walcque et al. (2008, p. 6) 
 
 
3.3.3. Governance of the NAPH 
The governance structure of accreditation and evaluation of the HCOs in Iran can be 
explained on two levels, that is, macro and micro.                                                                                 H s    l A              
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3.3.3.1. Macro level 
The MoH is responsible for evaluating and assessing the HCOs, according to the Iranian 
constitution (Majlis, 1985; 1987). The Centre for Healthcare Accreditation and 
Supervision (CHAS), itself a division of the MoH’s Health Under-secretary, is the main 
authority for undertaking policy-making, planning and direction of hospital accreditation 
and evaluation activities in the country. A specific task group within this centre called 
Healthcare Organisations Evaluation Group (HOEG) deals directly with these activities in 
the MoH. According to the official documents and formal guidelines (MoH, 1997a, p. 4), 
the following tasks are conducted at macro level, in the CHAS, in relation to the issuing of 
hospital accreditation (Moghimi, 2004, p. 6): 
1.  Policy-making, planning, coordinating accreditation activities in the country; 
2.  Designing, developing and updating the accreditation standards and checklists;  
3.  Supervising and monitoring the accreditation operations of the UMSs 
4.  Final control and approval of accreditation report and awarded certificates sent up 
from the UMSs; 
5.  Supporting the UMSs in their hospital evaluation activities (e.g. training 
programmes for surveyors); 
6.  Random and unannounced visits of HCOs across the country in the case of 
unresolved complaints by the HCOs that are not solved at provincial level. 
 
3.3.3.2. Micro level 
At micro (local) level, the UMSs are responsible for operationalising and implementing the 
accreditation and evaluation of hospitals. Except for the capital city, Tehran, where there is 
more than one UMS and the hospitals are divided among them for evaluation, the hospitals 
in each province are evaluated by relevant provincial UMS (Raisi, 2006). As the official 
documents showed, the following hierarchical levels were in place at micro level for 
evaluating the hospitals: 
 
1.  The UMSs’ council for evaluation and supervision                                                                                  H s    l A              
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2.  Treatment deputy of the UMSs 
3.  Treatment manager of the UMSs 
4.  HOEGs of the UMSs 
 
Although these hierarchical groups have their own duties in regard to the evaluation of the 
hospitals, the main tasks of hospital evaluation in context rest on the shoulders of the last 
group, i.e. the HOEGs at the UMSs. The council is only involved in major policies with 
regard to the evaluation in the UMSs. As such, coordination with the MoH for approving 
the accreditation certificates, communication with third-party organisations (e.g. insurance 
companies), selecting the members of the UMS’s HOEG and supporting the evaluation 
activities at provincial level are expected to be carried out by the authorities at second and 
third levels.  
The HOEGs, including a number of surveyors, annually undertake the surveying of 
hospitals located in a province under the scope of corresponding UMS. In fact, the HOEGs 
operationalise the evaluation intentions of the MoH in related hospitals at micro level. 
They are further supposed to make sure the hospitals stick to the standards over a period of 
one year before the next evaluation (MoH, 1997a). However, the extent to which this 
ongoing monitoring of the hospitals by the HOEGs is happening in practice has been 
contentious and disputed by the hospitals. According to the relevant policy documents for 
hospital evaluation, the members of a HOEG in the UMSs should be as follows (Moghimi, 
2004, p. 8):  
 
￿  Two consultants from different disciplines such as internal medicine and 
paediatrics  
￿  Two paramedics including one radiologist and one laboratory technician  
￿  One nurse  
￿  One medical equipment engineer 
￿  One establishment and construction expert 
￿  One administrative and personnel expert 
￿  One financial and budget expert 
￿  Team coordinator  
￿  Healthcare management expert 
￿  Other experts if required                                                                                 H s    l A              
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A representative from insurance (purchasing) organisations is also a permanent member of 
this surveying group.  
 
3.4.4. Main features of the NAPH 
Overall, this AP has the following features: 
 
•  It is developed and supervised by the MoH, but implemented by the UMSs; 
•  All types of hospitals are obliged to participate in this programme;  
•  There is no participation fee for the hospitals; 
•  It is conducted annually and the rankings (grades) are valid for one year; 
•  The surveyors are from a varied range of disciplines such as healthcare 
management, general practice, nursing, and laboratory.  
•  The hospitals have the right to complain about their accreditation grade 
 
3.4.5. The standards of the NAPH 
The apparent aim of the accreditation standards was to establish and ensure the hospitals’ 
ability to deliver quality and safe care (Moghimi, 2004; MoH, 2008). These standards were 
entirely similar for all types of hospitals (public and private) across the country, as 
explored earlier (see Figure 3.2). They have been developed at macro level in the MoH and 
officially dispatched to the UMSs at micro level to be used for the evaluation of the 
hospitals. The main objective of these standards is, as asserted in the policy documents, 
‘continuous quality improvement’ at all levels of ‘general’ hospitals’ activities (Moghimi, 
2004, p. 5). The standards, exhibited in table 3.1, have not changed since the year 1997, 
apart from the addition of a handful of new qualitative standards (explained later in this 
chapter) a few years ago, in a bid to make the programme more ‘quality-oriented’ (MoH, 
2004).  
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Table 3.1 The distribution of the NAPH’s standards and corresponding scores for different  
categories of the hospitals’ activities- Adapted from Moghimi (2004, p. 26) 
Proportioanal 
score (%)  Range of the scores  Categories of the standards 
 
 
 
R
o
w
 
10.1  1400- 2000  Religious and humane values  1 
6.8  700- 1600  Management  2 
17  2160- 3600  Medical staff  3 
7.3  880- 1600  Nursing staff  4 
5.5  680- 1200  Other personnel  5 
9.2  1100-2000  Estabilishment and physical structure  6 
3.2  480- 600  Safety equipment  7 
3.5  400- 800  Non-medical equipment  8 
8.3  990- 1800  Medical equipment  9 
4.7  600- 1000  Patient satisfaction  10 
4.7  600- 1000  Information system and medical 
records 
11 
4.2  640- 800  Sanitation and cleanliness  12 
4.8  640- 1000  Hospital committes  13 
6.9  467-1873  ED  14 
2.96  198 - 795  Quality indicators  15 
100  11935-21668  Total   
  2000  Other items
*   
* This score can be added equally to the final score for the teaching activities (education and research), 
ICU and CCU
16, other special departments (e.g. Dialysis) and etc. based on the surveyors’ judgments. 
 
 
As the table displays, overall 16 general domains of activity are covered by the standards 
of the NAPH. Each domain poses a number of questions and statements in the form of 
checklists to cover all aspects of the domains (MoH, 1997a). The number of questions 
might vary slightly in terms of a NTH or teaching hospital. In some cases the MoH has 
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provided guidelines to assist the surveyors to allocate related scores to the activities of the 
hospitals (e.g. for the quality-oriented indicators). However, in most cases there were no 
criteria and the surveyors’ judgement, observation and interviewing would take the place 
of the criteria.  
 
3.4.6. The evaluation process of the NAPH 
Accreditation of the hospitals is conducted annually and a hospital’s next accreditation is 
expected to take place prior to the expiry of its current accreditation. Alternatively, a 
hospital might request the evaluation of its activities on a specific date before the next due 
evaluation. The former procedure was more dominant in the case-study of this research. 
The hospitals are notified and a date for an on-site survey is arranged.  
The process begins with a pre-arranged (announced) site visit by the team of surveyors. 
The evaluation usually takes no more than one week depending on the size of hospitals and 
the number of in-patient beds. During the evaluation process the surveyors pertaining to 
their own specialties investigate different aspects of hospitals’ activities including medical 
equipment, and clinical and paramedical spaces; they interview medical staff (mainly 
nurses) and sometimes patients, and finally review the related documents.  
The evaluation starts with the emergency department (ED) of the hospital. The evaluation 
of ED is conducted entirely independent of the rest of the hospitals and has important 
implications for their assessment. That is, if a hospital does not obtain acceptable scores 
for its ED, the evaluation of the hospital will be suspended until the ED gains a satisfactory 
score. Furthermore, the overall grade of the hospital can never exceed the grade of its ED 
(MoH, 1997a). In this situation, the hospital will be given at most three months to rectify 
the problems and prepare for re-evaluation of its ED. This emphasis on the EDs, given the 
nature (i.e. vitality) of the activities in this department, is understandable. However, it 
might also force the hospitals to unwittingly neglect their main activities to obtain higher 
grades for their EDs’ accreditation. Successful evaluation of EDs is a departure point for 
the evaluation of entire hospitals. At the end of the accreditation visit the surveyors are 
expected to hold a meeting with managers of the hospital to discuss the problems and to 
brief them on existing non-compliances with pre-announced standards. The result of the 
assessment is usually sent to the hospitals within a month of the site visit and, if any                                                                                 H s    l A              
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hospital is non-compliant, namely achieving grade 4 (see Table 3.2), it is given three 
months to improve its deficiencies and solve its identified problems
17. 
  
Table 3.2 The scoring system of the NAPH for hospitals - Source: Moghimi (2004, p. 12) 
 
Explanation  Grade  Score 
Excellent  +1  21669 and more 
Good  1  18369 - 21668 
Intermediate  2  15869 - 18368 
Poor  3  13219 - 15868 
Substandard (Non-
compliant)  4  10869 - 13218 
Unauthorised
18  -  10868 and less 
 
 
A second visit will be paid to substandard hospitals and a final decision is made after this 
stage. Those showing no improvement after this time are not allowed to function as a 
hospital and are downgraded to minor surgery centre/clinic. Different types of decisions 
(i.e. grades) are taken based on the reviewed performance of the hospitals. Table 3.2 
displays the range of scores and corresponding grades granted to the hospitals by the 
NAPH. The hospitals have one week to complain about the grade they are awarded. The 
formal grade is then announced by the MoH, through the UMSs, to the hospitals and 
insurance organisations (see Figure 3.4). The performance grade is intended to give an 
overview of how a particular hospital is performing in addressing and meeting the quality 
and safety requirements of the MoH. The rating status of hospitals is used as a threshold 
for their eligibility to raise their tariffs for hotel-type services (MoH, 1997a). This is the 
main source of the hospitals’ income. Insurance organisations reimburse the hospitals 
according to their grade in accreditation. The hospitals recognised as ‘substandard’ by this 
programme will not be able to provide services for society under their current status. All 
                                                   
17. During this period the hospital can only charge at 50 percent of the tariffs for a grade 3 hospital.  
18. These hospitals are not authorised to work as a hospital. They could work as a limited-surgery clinic 
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this shows how crucial this accreditation is for the hospitals in the country. Accordingly, it 
is vital to study the performance of this AP, since the outcome of the accreditation is 
overly influential for different groups including mainly patients.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 The typical process of hospital evaluation system in Iranian Healthcare System-Adapted 
from (Anonymous, 2004) 
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3.4.7. Modification of the NAPH 
The MoH has instituted the introduction of new standards and made some alterations to the 
structure of the scoring system and prioritisation of the standards in order to improve the 
functioning of this evaluatory mechanism (e.g. MoH, 2004; 2006; 2008). The major 
modifications are explained below. 
 
1. Introduction of quality indicators 
The major change in the NAPH was the introduction of a new series of standards from 
2004, in order to increase the capability of the programme to focus on and measure quality 
in the hospitals (MoH, 2004). This effort came after the MoH’s stated intention at the 
inception of the NAPH to replace and update its standards gradually by more quality-
oriented standards, something that was not fulfilled until this change (Moghimi, 2004). It 
is argued by Moghimi (2004) that only five percent of the NAPH standards have been, in 
practice, related to quality indicators in the hospitals. Therefore, considering the NAPH’s 
defects, a fact recognised by the authorities (Moghimi, 2004), the MoH decided to add a 
new element to this programme in a bid to increase its capability of measuring and 
improving quality vis-à-vis quantity in the hospitals (MoH, 2004). 
The MoH launched this supplementary programme called the ‘Practical instruction for the 
quality evaluation of hospitals’ as a pilot scheme from 2003, and formally and in a 
compulsory fashion from 2004 (MoH, 2004). As Moghimi (2004) points out, during the 
pilot phase, which was voluntary for hospitals, there were a few problems such as the 
hospitals’ reluctance to disclose their information and their low awareness about 
implementing these guidelines. However, overall assessment manifested their tendency to 
apply this new addition. These guidelines were expected to accomplish three important 
goals as follows (MoH, 2004, p. 2):  
1.  To assist with improving quality in hospitals; 
2.  To provide necessary information for decision-makers (possibility of informed 
decision-making); and  
3.  To enhance the level of accountability and regulation of HCOs. 
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The indicators of this new part, similarly to the main standards of the NAPH, were both 
concerned with activities of the EDs and whole hospitals. The intention was initially to 
develop more quality-oriented standards every year (MoH, 2004). However, so far only the 
indicators demonstrated in table 3.3 have been developed. They are the result of 
international experience and consultancy with different professional associations 
(Moghimi, 2004).  
 
 Table 3.3 Quality-oriented indicators of the NAPH- adapted from MoH (2004) 
Scope  Indicators 
EDs 
 
 
￿  The average length of time after which a physician visits the patient when 
s/he arrives at a ED 
￿  The average length of time after which nursing services are delivered to a 
patient in ED 
￿  The rate of customers’ satisfaction of services provided in ED 
 
Hospitals 
 
 
￿  The rate of Nosocomial infections in the hospitals 
￿  Safe and sound injections 
￿  Necessary assessments before any operation on elective patients  
￿  The ratio of C-Section to whole natural births in a hospital 
￿  Prescription of prophylactic antibiotics before operation 
￿  Sedation of pains caused by scald (burning) and operations 
 
 
Hospitals are given the relevant forms to record their information in relation to the above 
indicators during two six-month periods, forwarding them to the surveyors when required. 
The surveyors will decide and score on the basis of the information provided in the related 
documents of the hospitals. Although these indicators reflect a positive step towards 
measuring quality in the hospitals, as is the main mission of this AP, they constitute only a 
small proportion of the previous standards. They represent only around three per cent of 
the overall score of the NAPH for a hospital (see Table 3.1).  
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2. New prioritisation for the areas of evaluation 
In addition to the EDs, which had a critical importance from the beginning of the NAPH, 
as discussed earlier, the evaluation of the areas of Medical Records, Sanitation and 
Cleanliness, Hospital Committees and Quality Indicators were similarly mandated by the 
NAPH from 2006 as prerequisites for the evaluation of the whole hospitals (MoH, 2006). 
The hospitals were required to obtain adequate scores in these four domains, while the EDs 
had to be evaluated first, before the awarding of a final accreditation grade. ‘The 
authorities of the NAPH have made these changes to thereby accentuate the importance of 
these areas to the hospitals (quoted from a surveyor)’. If the scores in any of these areas 
fall below the acceptable range of score, the hospitals need to improve them and provide 
the authorities with new confirmation of improvement within six months. Otherwise, their 
grade will be reduced. 
With this alteration, the MoH has shown its intention to induce continuous quality 
improvement and remind the hospitals of the main areas of importance, as articulated in 
the policy documents (MoH, 2006). 
 
3. Changes in the grading procedure 
In line with this mandate, as of year 2009 those hospitals that obtained a grade lower than 
grade two (see table 3.2) would be considered and treated by the surveyors as 
‘substandard’. The intention of the MoH with this alteration has been to raise the bar for 
quality improvement in the hospitals and press them for greater efforts to earn higher 
grades (MoH, 2008).  
 
3.4. Literature on Iran’s Healthcare Accreditation 
The NAPH has been the subject of a number of studies inside the country. Some have 
investigated the programme’s impact on the performance of the reviewed hospitals (e.g. 
Baghebanian, 2001; Arab et al., 2005). Examining the impacts of the NAPH on the state of 
performance indicators in a number of teaching hospitals, Arab et al., (2005) could hardly 
find any significant association between higher grades in accredited hospitals and the                                                                                 H s    l A              
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improved outcomes in the hospital performance indicators, such as length of stay (LOS) 
and bed occupancy rate (BOR).  
Another group of studies has conducted comparative research exploring and developing a 
model for the accreditation of hospitals in Iran (e.g. Amerioun, 2001; Sadaghiani and Zare, 
2005; Raisi, 2006). Raisi (2006) has undertaken a comparative study to present a model for 
formulating an accreditation system in Iran through investigating accreditation systems in 
a range of selected countries. His study points out that the standards of the NAPH would 
not have the capability of improving the quality and safety of the hospitals’ services, even 
though the first and foremost objective of accreditation is to ascertain quality and safety of 
delivered health care (Jovanovic, 2005; Daucourt and Michel, 2003). He further adds that 
these standards are different from those of the JCAHO (Raisi, 2006). 
Some studies have addressed the NAPH’s focus on accrediting the hospitals (Amerioun, 
2001; Mosadeghrad and Ansarian, 2005). They express that this programme mainly 
assesses physical structures and processes of a hospital as compared to its outcomes. 
Recently, the NAPH has started to deal with this problem by introducing some clinical 
outcome-related standards into its assessment process (MoH, 2004). 
Another aspect approached in the literature is concerned with the planning and 
implementation processes of the NAPH. Some have noted that the programme has mostly 
a one-sided and centralized approach that is directed only by its governing body (i.e. 
government) without any representatives from other stakeholder groups (Mosadeghrad and 
Ansarian, 2005). Moreover, as explained in chapter two, the evaluation checklists are 
developed directly in the MoH and delivered to the UMSs for implementation (MoH, 
1997a). The problem here, as the studies indicate, is that the accreditees have been 
prevented from playing any part in this programme; this gives rise to their dissatisfaction 
with and negative attitudes towards this way of evaluating the hospitals (Amerioun, 2001; 
Jaafaripooyan et al., 2004). Research by Lekakul (2000) has found that the negative 
attitudes towards the hospital accreditation process by the accreditees could cause 
difficulties in the implementation process of accreditation.  
The credibility of the NAPH’s surveyors has been questioned by Jaafaripooyan et al. 
(2004). The hospitals researched by their study have mostly claimed that the surveyors are 
not thoroughly familiar with hospitals’ activities and practices. This may overshadow the 
programme’s progress in the future. Scrivens (1997a) argues that the success of an AP can                                                                                 H s    l A              
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be affected by the credibility of its surveyors. Conducting a questionnaire survey of 53 
hospital managers and 30 surveyors in one province, Mosadeghrad and Ansarian (2005) 
found that the surveyors had more negative attitudes towards the AP than the hospitals’ 
managers. They attributed this to greater awareness among this group of the NAPH’s 
weaknesses. Whatever the reasons for this, such feelings towards the accreditation may 
damage their willingness to pursue the programme’s objectives (Lekakul, 2000). In other 
words, their role has been viewed as very important for the effective functioning of an AP 
by some studies; O'Leary (2000) expresses that the contribution of staff in assessing and 
improving services can enhance their safety and quality, and Scrivens (1997a) has also 
considered staff members’ satisfaction with the programme an influential criterion 
indicative of its effectiveness. 
Amerioun and Khalesi (2007) in a recent study examined the NAPH in terms of its process 
and possible effect. They surveyed 70 senior managers in the MoH and in Tehran’s 
hospitals asking their views on the system and its possible effects. The conclusion of their 
study showed that the respondents did not approve of the current grading system and 
believed that it should be changed (Amerioun and Khalesi, 2007). 
In summary, the forgoing studies have concentrated on different aspects of this AP (i.e. the 
NAPH). They have partly examined the NAPH’s impact on hospitals’ performance 
quantitatively, provided practical insights for the NAPH on the basis of a comparative 
study of a few other countries’ APs, and also explored some hospital managers’ and 
surveyors’ views on this programme.  
 
3.5. The gap in the literature  
The fairly comprehensive review of the related studies, as explained earlier, revealed the 
following gaps in the literature. These gaps are explained at two levels- i.e. macro (in 
relation to general agenda of PM and literature about the EESs including APs) and micro 
level (specifically related to Iran’s healthcare context and AP). 
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3.5.1. Macro level 
￿  A majority of the studies on the performance of macro PMSs/EESs (e.g. accreditation) 
have been conducted in developed countries and empirical evidence on the 
programmes of developing countries is to a large degree lacking in the existing 
literature. Very few studies have focused on the performance analysis of this 
programme in these countries (e.g. El-Jardali et al., 2008; Al-Tehewy et al., 2009). In 
addition, most of the existing studies (specifically in developing countries) have 
assumed a rationalistic (functionalist) approach to the performance of APs. Applying 
quantitative methods (e.g. surveys), this approach is arguably prone to ignoring 
contextual aspects and their effects on the programmes’ effectiveness which are more 
likely to be addressed through qualitative and in-depth studies (Modell, 2001; Chang, 
2006). Therefore, given the significance of contextual aspects in the effectiveness and 
implementation of macro PMSs (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009; Ferreira and Otley, 
2009),  studies concentrating on the contextual effects of PMSs (i.e. societal and 
organisational situation in which the PMSs are located and operate) in developing 
countries could add to the existing knowledge on performance measurement in the 
public sector. 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2009, p. 290) describe the context as ‘… the nature of an 
organisation or the part of the organisation which a PMS attempts to control. It also 
refers to the channels through which the PMS attempts to achieve its aspirations...’ The 
importance of context is widely and variously emphasised in the literature. According 
to Whetten (1989) empirical observations and investigations are grounded and 
understood within a context. Modell (2009) argues that there are other factors (e.g. 
contextual, political and social), besides technical and instrumental aspects, which 
impinge on the influence of PMSs on organisations that are not addressed by 
functionalist approaches. Similarly, the effects of contextual factors on the design and 
implementation of PMSs are acknowledged by different studies (e.g. Bond, 1999; 
Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009; Abdullatif, 2007). In particular, Laughlin and 
Broadbent (1996) point out that regulatory systems lacking a focus on contextual 
aspects such as organisational culture and complexities might not necessarily be 
effective in controlling organisational practices in health care. Therefore, the 
organisational context in a developing country, focused on in this research, is one 
which has been overlooked by the mainstream performance measurement and                                                                                 H s    l A              
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improvement literature. The context in this study mainly points to the hospitals under 
study and the way they are controlled by the NAPH. Therefore, a contextual evaluation 
of the NAPH is one based on the perspectives of the hospitals and their reactions to the 
nature and merits of the NAPH. Such an approach to evaluation sides with Laughlin 
(2007, p. 281), who argues: ‘a meaningful evaluation of external PMSs can only be 
undertaken by judging their merit, worth and quality in a particular context to which 
they are targeted.’ In addition, the concept of context in this study also implies the 
attributes attached to the NAPH which might influence its performance. 
￿  The studies on APs in developing countries are to a large extent based on a simple 
empiricism and quantitative assumptions, and are not backed by theoretical 
underpinnings (e.g. El-Jardali et al., 2008; Al Tehewy et al., 2009). This is in the midst 
of an extensive call in the literature for application of theoretical and societal models in 
the evaluation and study of macro PMSs/EESs, including accreditation (e.g. Horton, 
2004; Mannion et al., 2005; Øvretveit, 2005; Øvretveit and Gustafson, 2003; Chuang 
and Inder, 2009; Walshe, 2007; Grol et al., 2007; Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2009). 
These studies have maintained that theoretical models could produce more justifiable 
and grounded understanding of the PMSs’ effects on their subject organisations. 
Existing research on APs in health care, as Nicklin and Dickson (2009) have stressed, 
lacks rigorous and theoretical depth. Walshe (2007; 2009) suggests using theories from 
the areas more experienced in investigating complex social interventions, such as 
education and society, for researching healthcare quality improvement. He stresses that 
the theories could aid an understanding of when, how and why an evaluatory 
programme works and unpick the complex relationship between context and outcomes 
of the programmes (Walshe, 2007). Healthcare quality improvement programmes are 
complex social interventions that can only be properly evaluated if their interconnected 
context, content, application and outcomes are understood. Øvretveit and Gustafson 
(2002) indicate that, given their complex, changing nature and their contextual effects, 
evaluative interventions are difficult to evaluate using experimental methods or 
conventional medical –quantitative- research evaluation methods. They advocate 
instead the use of quasi-experimental evaluation and social science methods utilising 
qualitative means for evaluation and investigation of these programmes. Attree (2006) 
argues that theories could explain how interventions cause specific outcomes and 
which conditions/factors are critical in creating an effect. They could also provide                                                                                 H s    l A              
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direction for programme improvement (Stufflebeam, 2001). Ferreira and Otley (2009), 
similarly to Chenhall (2003) and Covaleski et al. (2003), highlight a need for 
theoretical foundations in researching PMSs and MCSs. Otley (1999) argues that there 
is a paucity of studies examining PMSs in an integrated and theoretical way. Similar 
concerns are expressed by Stringer (2007). Hopwood (1983, p. 302) has also 
accentuated the urgency of theoretically informed studies of both the use and design of 
PMSs. Such a massive call for application of theoretical assumptions and the paucity 
of similar studies in developing countries has provided convincing motivation for the 
current study. 
￿  This study further satisfies a call for research on the dysfunctional and unintended and 
beneficial effects of PMSs in health care, drawing on systematic and theoretical 
underpinnings (Oliver, 1991; Goddard et al., 2000; Horton, 2004; Mannion et al., 
2005), and also on the attitudes of frontline managers (Modell, 2001).  
￿  The reactions of HCOs towards externally imposed PMSs (i.e. EESs) have not been 
addressed in developing countries, as in the developed ones (Modell, 2009). These 
reactions are argued to be influential in looking into the nature of the PMSs (Laughlin, 
2007). 
 
In summary, my analysis of the literature showed that there is a paucity of theoretical 
approaches adopted to evaluate macro PMSs, including healthcare accreditation, and their 
contextual implications in the context of developing countries. Adopting a theoretical 
approach to the performance analysis of the NAPH, the current study intends to fill this 
gap in the literature. The study could be described as an ‘alternative’ approach, in the light 
of the specific features attributed to this approach by Broadbent and Guthrie (1992, 2008), 
as follow: 
￿  It accepts the importance of context;  
￿  It seeks to question and understand; 
￿  It embraces a theoretical orientation; 
￿  It moves towards a critical evaluation of processes which are implemented.   
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This approach takes the context as its primary focus and seeks to examine control 
mechanisms in the context in which they are introduced. In this sense, as Agrizzi (2003) 
argues, it perceives that the context can impact on the processes of evaluation and change. 
As such, it takes a critical view on whether a macro PMS (e.g. accreditation), when 
introduced and implemented in organisations, inspires them to an improved performance. 
Therefore, such characteristics make this approach suitable for the intentions of the current 
research which seeks to focus on the contextual aspects in which the NAPH is 
implemented in a number of hospitals in Iran.  
 
3.5.2. Micro level 
The following gaps could also be discussed with regard to the current accreditation 
programme in Iran:  
•  Similar to other developing countries, the studies on the NAPH and its performance 
inside the country have taken a positivistic approach and used quantitative methods, 
failing to utilise relevant theoretical frameworks and assumptions in their investigation.  
•  Very little research (mostly quantitative) has been conducted on the performance of the 
NAPH, despite its long-time existence in the country (e.g. Baghebanian 2001; Arab et 
al., 2005; Mosadeghrad and Ansarian, 2005). 
•  No theoretical and systematic evaluation of NAPH’s performance could be found in 
the related literature. 
•  Existing scant literature also shows poor evidence of improvement brought about by 
the NAPH in the hospitals (e.g. Baghebanian 2001, Arab et al., 2005) 
•  The NAPH has shown little attention to local context, e.g. hospitals’ reactions, because 
it has become a highly centralized evaluation programme in its development 
(Amerioon, 2001; Sadaghiani and Zare, 2005). 
•  Most of the studies have considered only hospital managers and surveyors as their 
target group (e.g. Mosadeghrad and Ansarian, 2005). Jaafaripooyan et al. (2004) have 
tried to assimilate other hospital personnel and users, yet their study has been 
conducted quantitatively. This study has considered more diversity in choosing its 
respondents from the hospitals to obtain rounded and comprehensive perspectives.                                                                                  H s    l A              
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Accordingly, this research has adopted a qualitative approach inspired by theoretical 
grounds and perceptual and attitudinal assumptions (Scrivens, 1997a) for the evaluation of 
NAPH’s performance. Parasuraman et al. (1991) have attributed the inclination to 
application of perception measures in evaluating quality and performance to the absence 
and rarity of objective measures in service industries such as health care.  
The research has been formulated in a way that addresses the shortcomings identified in 
preceding studies in relation to this AP. It has utilised some theoretical models, to be 
discussed in chapter four, which, for the first time in relation to Iran’s AP, i.e. NAPH, give 
a theoretically grounded evaluation of this programme. From a theoretical perspective, this 
research aims to examine the relationship between a macro PMS and a micro context in a 
developing country. It intends to investigate the perceived effects of the NAPH (as a macro 
mechanism) on the hospitals (micro context) and examine the hospitals’ reactions and the 
related underlying rationales for this national PMS. The main objective is to render an 
evaluation of the performance of Iran’s national AP through a focus on its local and 
contextual effects and provide valuable insights for improving the system. 
The theoretical model adopted is expected to give a workable language and guideline for 
analysis of contextual effects of this national PMS. It is expected to provide a language for 
exploring the hospitals’ interpretations and responses to this steering mechanism. 
Chapter 4 - Philosophical Perspective and Theoretical 
Frameworks 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter addresses the study’s paradigm, clarifying its ontological and epistemological 
foundations. It further explains its theoretical and methodological framework for 
conducting its empirical investigation.  
  
4.2. Research approach 
A paradigm has been defined as ‘the basic belief system or worldview that guides 
[research] investigators’ [action]…’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 105). Multiple research 
paradigms such as positivism and constructivism are argued to exist for exploring reality 
(Guba and Lincoln, 2008). It is believed that no single truth exists; no single approach can 
claim to discover absolute truth, and all understanding gained by these approaches is 
inevitably partial (Laughlin, 2004; Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). Therefore, making choices 
about suitable research approaches prior to undertaking any empirical research becomes 
unavoidable. In this regard, Laughlin (2004) speaks of the mutually exclusive nature of 
research approaches and warns about their simple synthesis (Laughlin, 1995; 2004; 2007). 
This interpretation was considered as a clear basis for elaborating on the paradigmatic 
approach of the current study.  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) have most notably recommended a seminal framework for 
understanding and analysing broad streams of social science approaches to empirical 
research. As shown in figure 4.1, they presented a classification of approaches including 
four research paradigms for analysis of social theory. The subjective-objective continuum 
is conceptualised based on four sets of assumptions related to ontology (nature of reality;                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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external or internal), epistemology (nature of knowledge; tangible or intangible), human 
nature (role of investigator; passive or active) and methodology (ways to investigate; 
quantitative or qualitative). The regulation-social change continuum is related to the nature 
of society and formulated according to the dimension of regulation or radical change. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) have posited two different stances for a society; regulation 
emphasises social order, consensus and solidarity whilst radical change assumes structural 
conflict, contradiction and emancipation central to a society. Four paradigms are 
developed on the basis of the foregoing assumptions (see Figure 4.1).  
 
 
Radical change 
Radical 
humanist 
Radical 
structuralist 
     Subjective  
Interpretive  Functionalist 
 
Objective  
 
Regulation 
 
Figure 4.1 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory- Adapted from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 
29) 
 
Despite being an influential step in understanding research approaches, Burrell and 
Morgan’s framework has been criticised for the incommensurability of its paradigms 
(Deetz, 1996). Alvesson and Deetz (2000) contend that this classification of the 
perspectives mostly favours past traditions and its incommensurability discourages the 
possibility of investigating cross-paradigm similarities and differences. Moreover, this 
framework has been accused of having a simplistic approach to research methods                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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(Laughlin, 1995; Willmott, 1993). Laughlin (1995) has further argued that this framework 
has isolated key domains for change. 
Laughlin (1995) has integrated change and the dimensions of Burrell and Morgan’s model 
in three different broad bands, namely ‘theory’, ‘methodology’ and ‘change’, to propose a 
new typology of research approaches (p. 66). According to Laughlin (2004), choices 
should be made before starting research. Therefore, choices on the theory could be likened 
to decisions about ontology and epistemology in Burrell and Morgan’s model; choices in 
relation to methodology signify a position on the nature of methods and role of the 
observer (i.e. human nature in Burrell and Morgan’s model); and finally, choices in 
relation to the change are concerned with whether the investigation is purposefully geared 
to achieve change in the phenomenon under investigation, equating to Burrell and 
Morgan’s assumption of regulation/change (Lowe, 2004). Laughlin (1995) considers these 
three pillars as continuums that varying research approaches could be seen based on their 
positions on the different points of these continuums (Figure 4.2).  
In elaboration of the pillars, by ‘theory’ Laughlin (1995) means utilisation of prior theories 
for undertaking empirical research. He ascribes prior theorising to ontological assumptions 
about the nature of the world in that previous theoretical endeavours can help form our 
representation of materiality and generality of the world under investigation. In his 
argument, high levels of prior theorisation are indicative of an assumed material world, 
which exists distinct from observers’ projections and has been well researched through 
previous studies (Laughlin, 1995). Conversely, low levels assume that the world is not 
material, but a projection of our mind; hence, generalities are impossible. Therefore, 
reliance on previous studies is inappropriate and potentially misguiding for the details of 
the present study.  
The methodology dimension of Laughlin’s model represents a theoretical definition of the 
means which form the nature of methods for the empirical investigation and which also 
have implications for the role of the researcher. High levels of theorisation for methods, 
i.e. quantitative nature, means the researcher has no subjectivity in conducting the 
research. At the other extreme, the researcher is free to become thoroughly involved 
(permitted and encouraged, as Laughlin (1995) claims) in the investigation process and 
there are fewer rules and regulations on how the investigation should proceed.  
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The final dimension refers to change. According to Laughlin (1995; 2004), change is 
concerned with researchers’ attitudes in relation to the value of keeping or discarding the 
current situation as well as views on the necessity of doing something about status quo. 
According to this dimension, those who believe in high levels of change have the 
perspective that everything in the current situation should change, even if they are not in a 
position to engender this change. By contrast, those who have faith in low-level change see 
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Figure 4.2 Characteristics of alternative schools of thoughts based on Laughlin’s 
assumptions (Source: Laughlin, 2004, p. 273) 
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little problem in the status quo. Laughlin indicates that those in the middle of this 
continuum are strategic in their attitudes to change - open to maintaining certain aspects of 
current workings, but also open to challenging the status quo.   
Figure 4.2 depicts the different schools of thought based on their position on the 
continuums of theory, methodology and change. For instance, according to this schematic 
guide, positivism is completely dependent on the prior theories and uses quantitative 
methods to investigate any phenomenon, while not taking a critical stand on the status quo. 
Laughlin (1995; 2004; 2007) assumes a mid-point in all three pillars to develop an 
alternative approach, called ‘middle-range thinking’ (MRT), for understanding and 
analysing different aspects of empirical research.  
 
4.3. Middle Range Thinking (MRT) 
Middle-range thinking is seen as a third alternative symbolically in the middle in terms of 
three choices of prior theorisation, theoretical nature of the methods and change (Figure 
4.2.). This approach takes some aspects from both high/high and low/low positions, while 
enjoying a different and less dismissive perspective on critique and change. In his more 
recent work, Laughlin (2004) also stresses the importance of observing a ‘sequence’ in 
approaching an empirical context, which needs to start by clarifying ontological 
assumptions. Figure 4.3 displays this sequencing through arrow flows highlighting the 
implications of previous stages on the next steps.  
According to Laughlin (1995): 
 
‘…MRT recognises a material reality distinct from our interpretations while at the 
same time does not dismiss the inevitable perceptive bias in models of 
understanding’ (p. 81). 
 
This approach leaves room for researchers’ perception in the research process. In line with 
the MRT, as in figure 4.3, general empirical patterns (i.e. reality) are partial, and not 
certain or random, and then empirical detail is always important (Laughlin, 2007).  
Following on this ontological assumption, Laughlin (2004, p. 268) argues that existing 
generalisations are explained by ‘skeletal’, rather than ‘full’ or ‘no’, theories.                                                        s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
  
98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Contrasting MRT with other research perspectives (Source: Laughlin, 2007, p. 275) 
 
 
These ‘skeletal’ theories are not all defined and need the richness of the empirical detail to 
make them meaningful in particular situations (Laughlin, 2004). In fact, skeletal means 
there are structures that underlie social situations, but not ones which fully capture the 
diversity and detail of these situations. The ‘skeleton’ metaphor mostly signifies a picture 
of an incomplete, albeit reasonably stable, framework that stresses the importance of 
metaphorical ‘flesh’ as an addition to make definable and noticeable differences in the 
structure of ultimate ‘whole-being’ (Laughlin, 1995, p. 81). It is incomplete in order to 
encapsulate the perceptions of researcher and the researched. Skeletal theories are 
conceptual guides for exploring empirical situations (Laughlin, 2004). The important point 
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to note is that where the empirical details do not fit the theoretical ‘skeleton’, as Laughlin 
(2004) puts it, they provide a basis for extending or reforming these skeletal frameworks, 
although he believes the expansion of the skeleton is not always guaranteed. Given the 
skeletal structure of theories, empirical detail is of vital significance to complement and 
enrich them in particular contexts. Just as the skeleton needs flesh to encapsulate the nature 
of a human being, the ‘skeletal theory’ requires diverse empirical flesh to arrive at 
meaningful whole beings. To MRT, the empirical detail is as important as the ‘skeletal’ 
theory which renders the ‘skeletons’ alive and meaningful.  
Skeletal theories also have implications for the role of observer (researcher) in empirical 
engagement. MRT advises a ‘structured’, rather than minimised or complete, subjectivity 
for the researcher (Laughlin, 2004, p. 273). This is because the skeletal patterns (theories) 
are unable to capture every aspect of empirical situations, requiring researchers’ 
subjectivity. ‘Structured’ subjectivity de facto specifies precisely what is contained in the 
engagement process, involving simultaneously the intuitive and imaginative properties of 
individual researchers. Accordingly, Laughlin (2004, p. 273) emphasises that, in MRT, the 
‘fleshing’ out of the ‘skeleton’ is a key purpose of empirical engagement.  
As with methodology for conducting empirical work, structured subjectivity provides a 
meaningful way to draw from skeletal theories to engage with empirical situations 
(Laughlin, 2007). Different frameworks can be considered, of which Laughlin (2004, 
2007) sees those (e.g. discursive analysis) originating from German Critical Theory, which 
is placed in mid-point positions in the MRT approach (see Figure 4.2.), as the most 
consistent. Laughlin further explains that: 
 
‘ … the intention is to design a methodology which sets “skeletal” rules for 
processes of discovery which still allows for variety and diversity in observational 
practice’ (1995, p. 82). 
 
Research methods should be in line with data narratives which are, in turn, informed and 
guided by the theories and methodology. Given the fact that MRT looks for richness and 
depth of detail in the empirical context, it is more consistent with qualitative narrative.  
As far as change is concerned, Laughlin (2007) argues that the researcher should consider 
going beyond mere understanding to strategies for policy and practical change in the 
phenomena under study. A mid-position of MRT on change means that change is not an                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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inevitable outcome, but MRT requires the undertaking of a separate user-led, but 
researcher-informed, process to consider change possibilities (Laughlin, 2007). 
 
4.3.1. The limitations of MRT 
As growing attention has been paid to ‘middle-range thinking’, some critiques targeting 
this approach have also appeared in the literature (e.g. Dey, 2002; Lowe, 2001; 2004). Dey 
(2002) argues that MRT falls short of grounding the theory appropriately in the research 
and empirical data, because the choice of theory is made beforehand. However, as 
discussed earlier, despite adopting a prior strict theoretical framework, MRT remains 
flexible to allow more elaboration of the theory on the basis of empirical data collected, 
due to its skeletal nature. Therefore, this is seen not as a failure, but as an opportunity to 
both enrich and critically evaluate the theoretical assumptions in the light of the 
understanding gained from the related contexts. MRT is also criticised by Lowe (2004) for 
being mostly dependent on an arbitrarily structured and simplified diagrammatic 
misrepresentation of different schools of thought, and which has used a rhetorical language 
to convince readers that MRT and German Critical Theory are superior to other 
approaches. Nevertheless, Laughlin (1995; 2004), while discussing the nature of other 
approaches, uses the word ‘choice’ to indicate that there are different research alternatives 
including MRT. He also advocates making a choice before undertaking empirical research. 
Laughlin (2004), specifically in response to Lowe (2004), explains that researchers can 
adopt any of the alternatives outlined in Figure 4.2 provided that they defend their choice 
of approach and justify its superiority. Trying to distance himself from the conviction that 
MRT can provide the most meaningful understanding of the empirical world, Laughlin 
(2004) further stresses that the conceptual patterns in MRT will always be partial and 
incomplete.  
 
4.3.2. MRT in the literature 
Laughlin (2004, p. 270) has made it plain that ‘middle range’ can be used as a ‘third way’ 
research approach for investigation of events in different settings. Since its introduction in 
1995, a wide range of studies have utilised this approach (e.g. Broadbent et al., 2001; 
Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997a; Modell, 2001; Agrizzi, 2008; Gurd, 2008; Hassan, 2008; 
Broadbent et al., 2010a). The excellence of this approach in providing a possibility of                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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discovering the empirical events in an organised way has been repeatedly stated. Parker 
and Roffey (1997) have indicated that Laughlin (1995) locates major research paradigms 
and offers a significant vehicle for comparing the theoretical and methodological 
implications of various theorists. Modell (2001) has adopted Oliver’s (1991) institutional 
theory framework in the context of this approach to examine the responses of senior 
management and staff specialists to recent reforms in the public healthcare sector in 
Norway. In the light of MRT, Agrizzi (2008) looks into the organisational effects of 
performance measures introduced by central government in England to control hospitals. 
Broadbent et al. (2001) have synthesised two distinctive theories, i.e. Habermas and 
institutional theories, in the context of the ‘middle-range’ approach to examine 
organisational resistance in general medical practice in the UK. Mail et al. (2009) found 
MRT practical for understanding and explaining accounting change processes in 
organisations. 
In summary, as shown in some of the examples discussed above, a rather wide range of 
studies has used MRT as a language to approach the phenomena under investigation and 
examine various events. These authors accepted that this method could provide a sound 
approach to both properly undertake empirical research and add to the existing knowledge 
in different strands of research. In fact, the ‘skeletal’ focus of this approach has the benefit 
of enabling the empirical data, as the core of research, to inform as well as be informed by 
theory and vice versa.  
 
4.4. Justification for the adoption of MRT 
The current study has relied upon the strengths of the MRT approach to pursue its research 
objectives. MRT assumes a clear and coherent trend from its ontological assumptions to a 
detailed choice of data collection methods; thus, it is considered a rigorous and transparent 
research approach. As elaborated earlier, MRT both preserves the possibility of learning 
from previous knowledge and other situations throughout the research process from the 
outset and enjoys engaging in empirical details. This advantage helped this study to draw 
on prior knowledge (i.e. theories on the evaluation of macro PMSs) as a guiding 
framework to formulate its approach to the empirical field. Nevertheless, the skeletal 
nature of the theories does not confine the study, considering the richness of the empirical 
context, which is an important factor for the study. MRT opens the way for new data to                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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enrich the skeletal theory (Berry et al., 2009). It allows for a contextual approach to 
investigation and consideration of empirical variability and diversity of context, while 
equipping the researcher with an organised and rather structured focus before entering the 
research field. The latter both prevents possible confusions about the context and helps to 
take advantage of prior studies and patterns, which can guide the empirical investigation 
and analysis. The fact that there can be an interactive research process in which theory 
both informs and is informed by empirical data is a distinctive advantage of MRT, which 
intrigued the researcher; other approaches fail to achieve this objective.  
The particular approach of MRT to change is another workable feature that the current 
study intends to build upon. MRT advises researchers to go beyond their abstract 
understanding in conducting research and consider pertinent strategies for policy and 
practice change in the phenomena under analysis. Although the researcher holds the 
general view that research should contribute to pure knowledge and literature, he is at the 
same time largely in favour of a tangible impact of his academic research on relevant 
practice (Pollitt, 2006; Dumay, 2009). This is much more important in developing 
countries such as Iran, which are greatly in need of implications from systematic research. 
Practical implications offered by this research might encourage more cooperative 
behaviours from the researched, gaining tangible research insights for their organisations 
(Walburg et al., 2006). MRT, it is argued, allows the building of a bridge between theory 
and practice (Broadbent et al., 2010b). 
Overall, while not holding the view that researchers should adopt a predetermined 
theoretical framework which produces an overly ‘framed’ result, and/or believing in a 
completely subjective world projected from people’ minds, the researcher is greatly 
interested in a partially distinct world which can be understood and changed to some 
extent. In fact, MRT asserts that there are general patterns ‘out there’ (theories about 
macro PMSs and their impacts, as for the current research), but they are skeletal and need 
to be enriched by data from specific contexts (Iran’s health system). The enrichments 
could either confirm or change (extend) the patterns. This nevertheless is contingent on the 
nature of the phenomena under study. MRT is used for qualitative studies (Laughlin, 
2004); as such, the current study mostly deals with perceptions and attitudes.  
Central to the MRT are two important components, theoretical framework and empirical 
data, which are elaborated in the following sections. They are the tenets of the MRT; the                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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skeletal frameworks provide a set of theoretical spectacles through which one can interpret 
the empirical data; in turn, the empirical data enriches the theoretical model. 
 
4.5. Theoretical models of the study 
Theoretical models are utilised to provide a language and guidance for fulfilling the 
research objectives in terms of approaching and analysing the empirical context (Laughlin, 
2004). The model used in the current study is developed by Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2005), which is a recent explanation and combination of the previous theoretical 
frameworks by Broadbent et al. (1991) and Laughlin (1991). These models are an 
elaboration and refinement of Jurgen Habermas’ (1984; 1987) approach to Critical Theory. 
The refinements were made to provide a practical language and help operationalise 
Habermas’ theory of societal development, since the original model was complex and far 
from a practical framework as Broadbent et al. (1991) and Laughlin (1991) clarify. 
Habermas’ Theory
19 has been extensively discussed in the literature and is not addressed 
here in detail, except for a brief explanation below. This study instead has been largely 
informed by the practical refinements of Habermas’ theory by Broadbent and Laughlin in 
different stages of their application of this theory, relying on their most recent work in the 
year 2005 (Broadbent et al., 1991; Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993; Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2005).  
 
4.5.1. Habermas’ theory of societal development 
Habermas has argued that any society has a discursively agreed set of explicit or implicit 
values, called lifeworld, that comes from an accumulated understanding of and insights 
into our world (objective), our social relations (inter-subjective) and ourselves (subjective) 
at a point in time (Davis, 2007). He identifies the lifeworld as a driving force behind 
society and accentuates the role of human discourse in the nature and evolution of societal 
development (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). As such, tangible systems are formed to 
express and take forward different aspects of lifeworld value requirements. In complex and 
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modern societies, a new intervening element is introduced, called steering
20 media, whose 
specific purpose is to regulate the systems to reflect the shared values so that societal 
lifeworld is ultimately achieved (Lawrence and Sharma, 2002). 
 
Lifeworld represents a society’s values, culture and beliefs based on communicatively-
formed (over time) life experiences or taken-for-granted norms that guide people’s 
behaviour, attitudes and thus action. Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) state that lifeworld is 
a driving force and guide for design of particular systems of action. It is de facto the nexus 
of subjective, intangible and taken-for-granted norms of a society (Broadbent, 2002). As 
Broadbent (2002) puts it, the lifeworld alludes to the view that the things people do in a 
society are driven by what they, as a society, see as appropriate in cultural and normative 
terms. These values may differ at various levels and areas of a society in a sense that there 
could be multiple lifeworlds in modern societies in relation to disparate areas such as 
health care (Broadbent et al., 1991). For instance, according to Iran’s Constitution and  
related policies (e.g. its Fourth Plan for Economic, Social and Cultural Development), as 
far as health care is concerned, the lifeworld is conceived as such values as the eligibility 
of access to quality health care for all people (I.R.I., 1979a; 2004).  
Lifeworld values existing in a specific context might change subject to different factors 
during a period of time. For instance, given the increasing burden of health care costs, 
similar to and in the light of the experiences of developed countries, the MoH also started 
to move towards and take in some principles inspired by New Public Management (NPM) 
for governing and running its HCOs (Hood, 1995; Lapsley, 2009). For instance, some 
years ago it initiated the plan of ‘Reforming hospitals’ economic and managerial structure’ 
which mainly included the items such as performance-based management, outsourcing and 
privatisation, operational budgeting and applying information systems (MoH, 2005). The 
hospitals were required to implement these initiatives and report back to the MoH 
regularly. As the title of this policy implies (i.e. ‘economic’), it could be argued that is to a 
large degree linked with the cost-cutting/managing intentions of the MoH’s authorities. In 
other words, a movement from a conventional devaluation of financial and cost matters 
towards a clear focus on economic aspects in healthcare delivery could be witnessed 
within this policy-setting process. In addition and in line with this movement, from several 
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al., 1991).                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
  
105 
years ago the hospitals were mandated to run themselves autonomously, that is, manage 
their own incomes and expenses and think of generating higher income to cover their own 
expenditure. The latter could influence the conventional values of the hospitals’ members, 
especially managers, and might instigate the above mentioned movement inside HCOs too. 
These policies all somehow signify an incremental change in the mentality (lifeworld) of 
the high-up authorities (of the MoH and generally government) in providing health care, as 
it has been started to naturally happen in this sector mostly in developing countries, 
because of growing challenges of population rise and inappropriate use or decrease of 
resources (Shahhoseini et al., 2011).  
 
Systems are ‘expressions of the lifeworld in a functional, definable and objective fashion as 
organisations’ (Broadbent et al., 1991, p. 3). In fact, lifeworld finds its meaning in 
organisational systems, and the systems are to follow lifeworld concerns (Broadbent et al., 
2010a). For instance, in health care, hospitals are the entities that provide services in line 
with the healthcare values.  
Steering media ensure the systems continue to reflect lifeworld demands. They are distinct 
administrative and structural arrangements which mediate systems and lifeworld (Power 
and Laughlin, 1996).  
 
4.5.2. Broadbent and Laughlin’s Model 
Drawing on Habermas’ thinking on organisations, Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) 
recognise the importance of both human agency and structure simultaneously in 
organisations. They see organisations not as closed systems but rather placed and linked 
into a wider societal context. They argue that this dynamic relationship provides societally 
defined purposes for such organisations. Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) further elaborate 
on the position of organisations as societal entities steered by societal institutions (via their 
control mechanisms) and believed to have similar elements to those of a society identified 
by Habermas (i.e. lifeworld). Having such structural elements, it is argued that 
organisations might show different reactions in response to societal pressures imposed on 
them (e.g. PMSs such as the NAPH), in terms of the PMSs’ effect on their specific 
elements (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). This interpretation by the model provides a 
conceptual language for evaluating the nature of macro PMSs imposed on micro                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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organisations and looking into the reactions and changes caused by these PMSs 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997b; Laughlin, 2007). This model has made some refinements 
to Habermas’ model of societal development to make it more practical for application in 
current research practices.  
 
4.5.3. Refinements of Habermas’ model of society  
It has been claimed that Habermas’ theory is far away from being a workable framework 
(Broadbent et al., 1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005) and it needs to be refined and 
modified to be useful in practice, despite its utility in studying whole societies (Dillard and 
Smith, 1999). As a refinement, Broadbent et al. (1991) and Power and Laughlin (1996) 
reshape the abstract societal steering media into tangible institutions and societal systems 
into actual organisations (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). These institutions and 
organisations are argued to have their own lifeworlds, steering media and systems which 
are supposed to guide and direct their own behaviour (Laughlin, 2007). The logic behind 
this refinement, as Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) explain, is that within a society there 
are certain organisations (e.g. governmental and legal institutions) which are specifically 
set up to steer, guide and regulate the behaviour of societal organisations. For instance, 
analysis of the relevant policies and the principles behind the establishment of the MoH 
shows that it is tasked with planning, policy-making, and organising the healthcare 
services, and could then be envisaged as a steering institution in the country’s health 
system (Majlis, 1985; 1987; 1988).  
The steering institutions are claimed to be largely governmental, because governments 
usually act as proxies for society in the public sector (Broadbent et al., 2010b). They 
particularly issue ‘steering mechanisms’ to operationalise their regulation and steering 
intentions (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). Steering mechanisms are arguably the tangible 
evidence of steering institutions’ lifeworld, which is in turn a mirror of and linked to 
societal lifeworld (Broadbent, 1992). 
Analysis of the policy documents revealed that the NAPH is the main steering mechanism 
issued by the MoH, given its objectives and functions (MoH, 1997a). It is an important 
element of macro control in Iran’s health system which reflects, operationalises and 
ensures the government’s intentions for improving quality and safety in health care across 
the country (MoH, 1997a). As Broadbent et al. (2010a) note, these mechanisms could also                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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act as a channel for transfer of financial resources into organisations under evaluation. 
They are also said to be the societal equivalent of Simons’ (1995, p. 7) ‘organisational 
levers’ of control (Broadbent et al., 2010a). Simons (1995) has posited a framework, as 
explicated in Tuomela (2005, p. 300) , for strategic control of organisations; it consists of 
four levers of control: 
￿  Beliefs systems are used to enhance core values related to business strategy and to 
inspire the search for new opportunities in line with these values.  
￿  Boundary systems reduce risks by setting limits to strategically undesirable 
behaviours.  
￿  Diagnostic control systems help to communicate and monitor critical success 
factors.  
￿  Interactive control systems are used to discuss strategic uncertainties and to learn 
novel strategic responses to a changing environment.  
 
Broadbent et al. (2010a) argue that it is possible for steering institutions to devolve their 
steering processes to intermediary institutions, whose exclusive role is to steer 
organisational systems using their steering mechanisms. In the case of this study, it was 
understood that the MoH has delegated the tasks of evaluating the HCOs to the ‘Centre for 
Healthcare Accreditation and Supervision’. It is directly responsible for policy-making, 
developing and monitoring the evaluation of the hospitals (see chapter two for more 
information). 
Steering institutions are distinguished from actual organisations in that they are made up of 
a range of public, private and voluntary organisations, such as the hospitals in the 
healthcare system, which are directed and controlled by the institutions to express and 
reflect societal lifeworld (Broadbent et al., 1991, 2010b). In highly differentiated and 
modern societies, multiple institutions and organisations may exist with their own 
lifeworld, steering media and systems with a collective link to societal lifeworld 
(Broadbent et al., 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). This link signifies a ‘structural 
coupling’ between lifeworld and those institutions and organisations (Teubner, 1987, p. 
26). A simple diagrammatical display of this model is shown in Figure 4.4.  
Broadbent et al. (2010a) indicate that the theoretical categorisation of societal steering 
media and mechanisms is generic and applies across all situations. However, as they argue,                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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their investigation in the light of specific empirical contexts could show what constitutes 
actual steering media (institutions) and what mechanisms are used. In line with this debate, 
Iran’s healthcare system and AP are addressed by this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Figure 4.4 Adaptation of the societal development model (Laughlin, 2007, p. 276) for Iran’s healthcare 
system 
 
4.5.3.1. Internal Colonisation (IC) 
It has been argued that potential independency of institutions and organisations might lay 
the groundwork for both steering institutions and organisations to decouple from societal 
lifeworld requirements (Laughlin, 2007; Broadbent et al., 2010a). In these situations, 
steering institutions may break out of the societal lifeworld (i.e. follow their own 
lifeworld) and steer organisations into new domains, which are not locked into the societal 
lifeworld demands, and impose, instead of reflecting, the societal values (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2005). This is referred to as ‘IC’ of societal lifeworld (Habermas, 1987, p. 367) 
or ‘disintegration’ by Teubner (1987, p. 26) and is argued to generate unintended and 
dysfunctional effects at different societal and organisational levels (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2005). This interpretation of IC provides a language for developing an 
understanding of the dysfunctional consequences of IC, if any, produced by the steering 
mechanism of the NAPH at the subjected hospitals. Organisations might also venture 
beyond the confines of societal lifeworld requirements through not complying with the 
requirements of steering mechanisms which are tangible expressions of the lifeworld 
(Broadbent, 1992; Broadbent et al., 2001). However, in Habermas’ thesis, the IC is argued 
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to mostly occur in relation to the actions of steering institutions and their mechanisms 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005).  
The forgoing decoupling of steering media can be avoided if their steering mechanisms are 
proved to own specific features (Broadbent et al., 1991; Laughlin, 2007). Firstly, steering 
mechanisms should be ‘regulative’ as opposed to ‘constitutive’, as it is believed that the 
latter is more likely to cause IC (Broadbent et al., 1991, p. 6). According to White (1988, 
p. 114), cited in Broadbent et al. (1991), ‘regulative rules regulate some pre-existing, on-
going activities’. They are chosen, consensual-based frameworks of control and of a 
consultatively-driven nature, which formalise already established and accepted 
organisational processes and norms (Broadbent et al., 2010a). Regulative mechanisms are 
deemed to be ‘relevant’ (Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993, p. 341) and ‘freedom-
guaranteeing’ (Habermas, 1987, p. 367). Regulation of these mechanisms is accepted by 
organisations to stay in line with their long-term survival growth and development, and 
aligned with ownership by key stakeholders (Broadbent et al., 2010a). They moderate 
organisations’ behaviour to reflect existing lifeworld norms and values (Broadbent et al, 
1991). 
Constitutive mechanisms, on the other hand, constitute new forms of activity (Laughlin 
and Broadbent, 1993). Interests of stakeholders are far less assured by these mechanisms 
(Broadbent et al., 2010a). They are accordingly deemed to be ‘freedom-reducing’ 
(Habermas, 1987, p. 367) and constitute and direct organisations’ behaviour away from 
accepted norms and guiding lifeworld intentions (Laughlin, 2007). Broadbent et al. 
(2010a) argue that, whilst there may be situations where ‘freedom-reducing’ steering is 
needed, in the majority of situations freedom-guaranteeing steering is the ideal for 
organisations. As Broadbent et al (1991) have stated these features are both clearly 
perceptual and locked into particular timeframes.  
The steering mechanisms could be either regulative or constitutive or both, contingent on 
the way and manner in which they are conducted, the time period considered and the level 
at which the investigation is being undertaken (Broadbent et al., 1991).  
A second way of recognising the potential of steering mechanisms to result in internal 
colonisation as Broadbent et al (1991) cited from Habermas (1987, p. 365) could be 
identified through this notion that the mechanisms are either ‘amenable to substantive 
justification’ (ASJ), or are only ‘legitimised through procedure’ (LP). The ASJ                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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mechanisms are argued to be embedded in the societal lifeworld and are then more 
comprehensible and reflective of ‘informed commonsense’ (Broadbent et al., 1991, p. 7). 
These mechanisms reinforce the important consensual nature of the regulation (Broadbent 
et al., 2010a). By contrast, the LP mechanisms are claimed to be far less comprehensible 
and more questions might be raised about the appropriateness of the official bodies that 
formulate these mechanisms (Broadbent et al., 1991). According to Habermas (1987), the 
LP has a colonising potential. Laughlin and Broadbent (1993) maintain that, in the event of 
internal colonisation, steering mechanisms try to go beyond ASJ, from the perspective of 
the organisations. Teubner (1987) has referred to this as regulatory dilemma.  
Broadbent et al. (2010a, p. 508) use the terms ‘relational and transactional’ for regulative-
ASJ and constitutive-LP steering mechanisms respectively. Accordingly, as transactional 
societal steering mechanisms mostly require ‘defined and prescriptive ends’ achieved by 
‘specified means’, relational mechanisms encourage wider stakeholders’ involvement and 
agreement on ends and means and related regulatory processes (Broadbent et al., 2010a, p. 
511). 
 
4.5.3.2. The relevance of IC for the current study 
The theoretical concepts of ASJ and LP are put forward for analysis and evaluation of the 
nature of societal steering mechanisms (e.g. the NAPH). Broadbent et al. (1991) have 
argued that the analysis of particular societal steering institutions (e.g. the MoH) should be 
carried out through a specific emphasis on their mechanisms. This focus should be specific 
and time-related to particular societal steering institutions (Agrizzi, 2003; Davis, 2007). 
They state that judging the merits of the mechanisms on a societal scale and discerning 
whether any particular organisation reflects lifeworld demands, based on Habermas’ 
model, has proved to be difficult and challenging (Broadbent et al., 1991). It is suggested 
that researchers focus on the organisational participants’ views in judging the constitutive 
and regulative nature of societal steering mechanisms (Broadbent et al., 1991). The value 
of their perspective lies in the fact that the organisations include the active participants 
who are both a part of the whole societal population and are directly subject to steering 
mechanisms. Therefore, Broadbent and Laughlin (1997b) argue that an evaluation of 
macro PMSs would be more relevant based on the actual reactions from those most 
affected by those systems. Similarly, Laughlin (2007) indicates that the reaction of those                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
  
111 
micro organisations at which a particular steering mechanism is targeted is a key litmus 
test for judging whether the mechanism can be seen as regulative and ASJ.  
Therefore, this study intends to examine empirically how the externally imposed steering 
mechanism of the MoH (i.e. NAPH) impacts in practice on the hospitals under its 
evaluation from the perspectives of the hospitals’ participants, in order to evaluate the 
performance of this AP. This evaluation, as Broadbent et al (1991) have pointed out, 
considers the extent to which the MoH (a societal steering medium) is attempting to steer 
the hospitals (societal systems) in a direction which is amenable to the lifeworld of those 
systems. It is argued that steering media might seek to steer the systems in ways which are 
not commensurate with their organisational lifeworld (Broadbent et al., 1991). This allows 
the researcher to investigate whether the NAPH is constitutive and LP or regulative and 
ASJ. Accordingly, the colonising and beneficial effects of the constitutive and LP or 
regulative and ASJ respectively could be addressed. The extent to which the lifeworld of 
the MoH is in agreement with that of the organisations (e.g. hospitals) could be measured 
by establishing whether steering mechanisms (e.g. the NAPH) are seen as regulative and 
ASJ by members of the organisations. Constitutive, vis-à-vis regulative, mechanisms are 
argued to generate the intended behavioural changes in organisations with difficulty, 
because of resistance from the members of organisations (Broadbent et al., 1991). 
Therefore, steering mechanisms need to be able to demonstrate that they are regulative and 
ASJ to be legitimate for the organisation under evaluation (Habermas, 1996, cited in 
Broadbent et al., 2010a), allowing this research to explore legitimacy-seeking measures 
and efforts of the NAPH towards the hospitals.  
 
4.5.4. The model’s conceptualisation of organisations 
Drawing on Habermas’ model of society, Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) argue that 
institutions and organisations, as explained, are in turn at organisational levels composed 
of functionally definable elements that are microcosms of the elements assumed to 
constitute society as a whole. They are called interpretive schemes (ISs), design archetypes 
(DAs) and subsystems at organisational level, equal respectively to lifeworld, steering 
media and systems at societal level (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). According to 
Laughlin (1991), subsystems contain certain tangible elements about which inter-
subjective agreement is possible (e.g. in a hospital: buildings, medical equipment, people                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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and their behaviours and activities). Furthermore, two less tangible dimensions (i.e. DAs 
and ISs) give direction, meaning, significance, nature and interconnection to the other 
more tangible element of subsystems (Figure 4.5). The basic nature of these microcosms is 
akin to the societal elements (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 A model of organisations’ elements at micro level (adapted from Laughlin, 1991, p. 211) 
 
 
ISs include values and beliefs held by members of organisations, which are grouped by 
Laughlin (1991) under three main categories (i.e. metarules, mission and purpose, and 
vision, values and beliefs). Metarules have the highest level of abstraction and underpin 
and give direction to all lower levels of the ISs (Laughlin, 1991). They de facto ‘form the 
organisational paradigm which underlies and unnoticeably shapes organisational 
members’ perceptions’ (Broadbent, 1992, p. 345). The ISs are claimed to give an identity 
and direction to organisations and are given structure and coherence by DAs (Laughlin et 
al., 1994b).                                                        s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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DAs comprise decision structure, communication and overall management systems of 
organisations, which seek to control and ensure that organisations’ workings, i.e. 
subsystems, are reflective of their ISs (Laughlin, 1991). They are likened to organisational 
management control systems (MCSs) by Broadbent et al. (2010a). MCSs also serve to 
ascertain that organisational members’ behaviour is based on pre-established rules and 
plans (Tuomela, 2005). The following definition of MCSs by Simon accentuates this 
similarity.  
 
‘… the formal, information-based routines and procedures, managers use to 
maintain or alter patterns in organisational activities’ (1991, p. 5). 
 
Subsystems represent the workings and tangible ways in which organisations operate 
(Laughlin, 1991). They are guided by DAs in ways that are commensurate with values of 
ISs (Lawrence and Sharma, 2002). These are claimed to be visible hallmarks of 
organisations, such as buildings, people, activities and services (Laughlin et al., 1994b). 
 
4.5.4.1. The utility of the model’s conceptualisation 
The overall assumption behind this interpretation of organisations is that an organisation 
can contain and be represented and viewed through its ISs, DAs and subsystems and, as 
such, the organisational reactions and changes could be seen as the result of an interaction 
among these three elements (Laughlin, 1991; Richardson et al., 1996). Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2005) explain that an ideal situation for organisations could exist when there is a 
balance among their elements and the DAs monitor the reflection of the ISs by the 
subsystems. A disturbance (external or internal) could force an organisation to move away 
from this balance (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997b), triggering alternative transitions and 
transformations in organisations (Laughlin, 1991; Pettigrew, 1995). Aside from other 
disturbances, an improvement initiative (e.g. the NAPH), as Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2005, p. 16) put it, could also be considered as a disturbance: 
 
 ‘…societal steering [regulatory] mechanisms aimed to “correct” or “mould” 
organisational behaviour would be an obvious environmental disturbance’.  
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Therefore, with such an interpretation, also echoed by Gary et al., (1995) and Greenwood 
et al. (2002), the NAPH, aiming to correct and improve the performance of Iranian 
hospitals (MoH, 1997a), could be envisaged as an external disturbance to these 
organisations and might lead to specific reactions (as a result of possible internal changes) 
from the hospitals, depending on the nature of the disturbance.  
In the analysis of the reactions and changes prompted by a disturbance, Laughlin (1991, p. 
213) posits possible routes, calling them ‘pathways’ metaphorically, through which the 
disturbances travel in an organisation. The pathways are not predetermined activity and are 
not necessarily linear. Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) indicate that the analysis of these 
pathways could describe the developments in given organisations over time. Therefore, 
this can provide a skeletal language to categorise organisational reactions/change 
processes based on the extent of involving or influencing any of the three main 
organisational elements by the disturbance. Building on a wide range of studies, such as 
Smith (1982), Levy (1986), Habermas (1987), Greenwood and Hinings (1988) and 
Laughlin (1991), Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) postulate four possible pathways of 
change in organisations resulting from the effects of disturbances. They categorised them 
into two main types of changes, i.e. first and second order. As argued, when the external 
pressure leads to a change in ISs and is rather long-lasting, it is assumed to be a second-
order type (Laughlin, 2007). First-order change may only lead to slight, short-scale 
changes in DAs or subsystems (Laughlin, 1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) explain that, due to the dynamic state of ISs, the boundary 
between first- and second-order changes may be empirically less clear when the change is 
seen as incremental. However, they maintain that, when the nature of requested attempts 
for change is contested, the pathways might be more recognisable (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2005).  
Two second-order pathways in organisations, according to Laughlin (1991) and Broadbent 
and Laughlin (2005, p. 16), are ‘colonisation’ and ‘evolution’. The former describes a 
situation in which an external disturbance is imposed on the structures and systems of 
organisations’ DAs, aiming to make changes in their ISs. Organisations in this situation 
are not able to resist the disturbance, leading to their colonisation, i.e. lasting changes in 
the ISs (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005).  The change could be exerted by a piece of 
legislation or regulation external to organisations, which has power over DAs and its 
resources (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). This change is not one which, as Broadbent                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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(1992) argued, would have necessarily been chosen by organisations. Colonisation might 
also occur through the activities and actions of powerful groups of participants inside 
organisations (Richardson et al., 1996). The changes in ISs of an organisation by 
colonisation might even result in a totally new underlying ethos for the organisation as a 
whole. 
The second pathway is ‘evolution’, which happens when the disturbance is a chosen 
change and is amenable to substantive justification, thus being less contentious from 
organisations’ perspectives (Laughlin, 2007). Evolution implies that given changes 
‘facilitate a common organisational vision based on shared values’ (Dunphy and Stace, 
1988, p. 323), because they are assumed to be accepted by organisational participants 
freely and with no coercion (Laughlin, 2007). Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) maintain 
that the external drivers will lead to a process of discourse among organisations’ 
participants. This triggers change in the organisations’ ISs, which is made up of their 
members’ values and beliefs, in turn, and will drive change in the organisational DAs and 
ultimately in subsystems to reflect that change. ‘Evolution’ is envisaged as a normal and 
positive type of change process (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997a, 2005). However, 
colonisation is argued to be more frequent than the evolution track (Campanale et al., 
2010). 
The second group of pathways are in relation to first-order change, i.e. rebuttal and 
reorientation, in organisations (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). These types solely affect 
the DAs (including internal control mechanisms) and subsystems (Laughlin, 1991). 
Rebuttal involves active boundary control by organisations, preventing the disturbance 
entering in the first place and leading to a rejection of the disturbance after a temporary 
alteration of DAs, without any influence on the other two dimensions of organisations, i.e. 
ISs and subsystem (Laughlin, 2007). As regards reorientation, organisations try to find and 
create structures to absorb disturbances in a way that avoids and prevents second-order 
changes from occurring (see e.g. Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998; Broadbent et al., 2001). 
In fact, as Laughlin (2007, p. 283) articulates, organisations might assume reactive or 
proactive strategies, e.g. absorption, to prevent their ISs, also called ‘sacred core’, from 
being colonised by disturbances. These four change tracks are argued to provide ‘a 
powerful heuristic device for clarifying the nature of any change pathway’ (Laughlin, 
1991, p. 222).                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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In practical terms, these change pathways represent the efforts of organisations to meet the 
requirements of imposed disturbances (Broadbent et al., 2001; Agrizzi, 2008). It has been 
argued that there can be multiple amalgams of these dynamic change pathways in different 
situations (Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993). These pathways have formed a theoretical 
language for exploring empirical situations. Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) explain that 
the pathways are not predictive and encompassing but, as a skeletal framework, they need 
empirical data to be meaningful. 
 
4.5.4.2. Practical implications for the study 
This theoretical framework is adopted to provide an understanding of the reactions (change 
implications) by the hospitals in conjunction with their efforts to meet the NAPH’s 
requirements. That is, the pathways of rebuttal, reorientation, colonisation and evolution 
could be respectively symbolised by the reactions of rejection, absorption, submission and 
adoption.  
Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) have associated the internal shifts and transformations in 
different elements of organisations with a specific external driver (e.g. the NAPH). This 
interpretation creates the possibility of investigating the nature of the disturbance through 
their change effects in the reactions of given organisations. Drawing on this reasoning, the 
researcher has looked into the performance of the NAPH based on the hospitals’ reactions, 
which also point to its effects on different elements of the hospitals. The aim is to 
investigate which reaction is mostly displayed by the hospitals in response to the 
requirements of the NAPH. For instance, Laughlin (2007) points out that the constant 
presence of the reactions such as rejection and absorption (rebuttal/reorientation pathways) 
might raise serious questions concerning the merit and worth of the imposed steering 
mechanisms. Similarly, the evolution pathway is seen as an ideal type of change in 
organisations as it is the outcome of agreed-upon changes and shifts in ISs of organisations 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005; Zakus and Skinner, 2008). 
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4.5.5. Significance of Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) framework for the 
study 
This model, as mentioned earlier, is a mixture of two theoretical framworks by Broadbent 
et al. (1991) and Laughlin (1991). The combination of those models had two main 
implications for the current study: First, locating the NAPH as a societal steering 
mechanism in the country’s health system to assess its merits from an organisational 
perspevtive. Second, identifying their change implications for the hospitals and, as such, 
the hospitals’ reactions. The following advantages, discussed implicitly in this chapter, 
have inspired the researcher to adopt this framework to look into the performance of the 
NAPH through the perceptions of the hospitals’ members and its impact on the hospitals. 
First, the important ascendancy of the Habermarsian approach - the underpinning of the 
model - is that it highlights and advoctes an evaluatory and critical stand in the analysis of 
different phonomena (e.g. societal regulations) in its research worldview (Lawrence, 
1999). Such a stance was found to largely satisfy the evaluative intentions of the current 
research. It further adopts a societal (macro) view in the investigation of organisational 
issues, without being ignorant of micro aspects. Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) indicate 
that: 
‘… this approach sets organisations in a dynamic societal context, whilst 
maintaining the role and importance of human actors...’ (p. 13) 
 
As such, this model locates macro PMSs (e.g. the NAPH) in a wider societal context and 
interlinks their critical analysis with the responses and reactions of organisations, triggered 
by the mechanisms, and people’s perceptions at micro level (Hassan, 2008). The relevance 
of considering these reactions and perceptions is, as Hassan (2008) puts it, because (macro 
governmental) regulatory agencies may make policies and decisions that lack rationality 
from the perspective of those involved in the original processes. On the other hand, thanks 
to this model, the re/actions of organisations towards these mechanisms can be measured 
based on societal perspectives and values. This could help ensure the interests of societies 
in organisations’ actions and reduce the possibility of organisations decoupling from the 
societal values. As such, the reasons for organisations showing such reactions to societal 
steering mechanisms could be judged based on the good of the society, and not merely on 
the organisational grounds. This is overly prominent in the public sector which provides 
critical services in a society (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). This perceived relationship                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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permits a dynamic connection between societal and organisational levels, which helps this 
study approach the local level in a theoretically sound way and with a comprehensive 
focus. Accordingly, this study locates the case of Iran’s healthcare accreditation around 
Habermas’ societal development model refined and advocated by Broadbent and Laughlin 
(Broadbent et al., 1991; Laughlin, 1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005).  
Second, the manner in which this model conceptualises institutional pressures toward 
organisations could be envisaged as another advantage of the Habermasian approach, 
which is of critical importance for the current study. While the instititional perspective 
sees organisations under various parallel institutional forces from regulative, normative 
and cognitive elements (Scott, 2008b), this model renders a different conceptualisation. It 
conceives the regulative institutional pillar - equated with steering media (and their 
mechanisms) - to be reflective of institutional normative elements, which is, in turn, 
likened to the lifeworld in societal context (Broadbent et al., 2001). This interpretation 
allows the current study to look into the merits of the NAPH as an institutional regulative 
mechanism, based on its reflection of the societal lifeworld demands (normative elements). 
Therefore, it gives a relative superiority to Habermas’ model over institutional theory, as 
far as this study is concerned. Moreover, as Hassan (2008) argues, this model’s recognition 
of human actors is not underscored under the institutional theory framework.  
 
Third, the approach of the model to organisations and organisational change processes, as 
elaborated earlier, provided the researcher with a language to look into the effects of the 
NAPH at organisational level in the hospitals. From an organisational perspective this 
model relates the change processes inside organisations specifically to an external driver 
(i.e. kick/disturbance). This allows the researcher to look at the nature of the driver on the 
basis of its change implications and respective triggered organisational reactions. The 
reactions of the hospitals’ members towards the NAPH constitute a valuable base for 
evaluating this mechanism (Laughlin et al., 1994b). This model de facto authorises the 
evaluation of the nature of the NAPH based on the perspectives of those directly affected 
by this control system. Emphasising the importance of the reactions, Laughlin (2007) 
argues that a meaningful evaluation of external PMSs can only be undertaken by judging 
their merit, worth and quality in a particular context to which they are targeted. 
Furthermore, the model makes researchers identify the ISs, DAs and subsystems of their                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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organisation (Soin, 1996). Identification of these elements could ease the analysis of the 
hospitals’ functioning and the change effects of the NAPH in these organisations. It also 
guides the researcher to explore distinctively the NAPH’s effects on the hospitals’ tangible 
and intangible elements (i.e. values, their internal PMSs and workings). More importantly, 
the significance and merits (intended or unwanted) of the changes are distinguishable 
through the use of this model (Shanikat, 2008).  
Therefore, overall, these advantages allow a societally justifed and encompassing 
assessment of the NAPH as a steering mechanism which is set up to monitor the reflection 
of the societal healthcare values in the country by the hospitals. 
 
4.5.6. Theoretical frameworks in literature 
In addition to Habermas’ theory, following the refinements by Broadbent and Laughlin of 
this theory (e.g. Broadbent et al., 1991; Laughlin, 1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005), 
the derived frameworks have been extensively used in the public sector literature.  
Broadbent and Laughlin (1998) applied the change pathways of the model to examine the 
effects of NPM on GP surgeries and public schools in the UK. They concluded that 
accounting features associated with NPM showed colonising features towards the two 
groups, precipitating their resistence. Drawing on the theory, Lawrence (1999) critically 
analysed the macro issues arising from the reforms in the New Zealand health sector. He 
found that accounting aspects of the reform were seen as constitutive and legitimised only 
by procedure and were not introduced to solve healthcare problems, but to reflect market-
driven (not health care) ideological commitments. Dillard and Smith (1999) showed that 
the rural healthcare discourse was heavily affected and colonised by managerialist policies 
operationalised in the form of Medicare’s diagnostic-related groups-prospective payment 
systems (DRG-PPS). Broadbent et al. (2001) investigate the resistance of GPs in the NHS 
to institutional pressures, using the assumptions of this theory in conjunction with 
institutional theory (Scott, 2008).  
Lawrence and Sharma (2002) utilised Habermas’ critical theory to evaluate the incidence 
of TQM and BSC implementation in corporate universities in Fiji. Their study showed 
that, despite the usefulness of these performance measurement and improvement initiatives 
in promoting efficiency and effectiveness in the universities, their application endangered 
the very essence of education through commodification of education services. Dillard and                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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Yuthas (2006) studied the use of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems in 
organisations and suggested that they could lead to colonisation of their lifeworld since 
they are replacing consensual-based systems and activities. Broadbent et al. (2010a) drew 
on Habermas’ notion of ‘steering’ to analyse the nature of the societal regulatory systems 
in English Higher Education. They argue that these systems use financing as a key tool for 
steering the organisations in this area of the public sector.  
Although several studies have adopted Habermas’ notions, mostly in the light of 
Broadbent and Laughlin’s refinements, they have largely explored the role of accounting 
and financial reforms in public sector organisations in developed countries such as the UK 
(Dumay and Guthrie, 2007). Habermas’ theory is rarely applied in the developing and 
under-developed countries, for instance Al-Angari and Sherer (2002) and Hassan (2008). 
Al-Angari and Sherer (2002) used this model to explore the changes that occurred within 
auditing firms in Saudi Arabia following the implementation of audit quality review 
programmes. They reported the signs of different types of changes in the audit firms. 
Hassan (2008) used the notions of regulative and constitutive steering mechanisms in order 
to analyse the merits of financial accounting regulations in Egypt transforming towards a 
market-based economy. He found the regulations showed a constitutive tendency during 
the period of transformation. No study has applied this theory and its associated models in 
healthcare systems in developing countries.  
 
4.5.7. Criticisms of the models 
Along with the extensive application of these frameworks (i.e. Broadbent et al., 1991; 
Laughlin, 1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005), as explained, they have also encountered 
some criticisms in the literature. Given the skeletal nature of the model, as asserted by its 
developers, these criticisms could be conceived as their limitations.  
Some studies have scrutinised the macro societal assumptions of Broadbent and Laughlin’s 
framework. For instance, Hassan (2008) has argued that defining and fully differentiating 
the lifeworld, steering media and systems is a challenging task in a real situation due to 
them sliding and overlapping one another. This issue has been also echoed at 
organisational level with regard to splitting organisations’ ISs into meta-rules, mission and 
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However, most of the criticisms in the literature have pointed to the organisational change 
assumptions of the framework. Gray et al. (1995) see this model as rigid and of limited 
ability for fully explaining the shifting processes of organisational change in practice. 
Particularly, they maintain that it is silent on recognising a priori disturbances (i.e. 
occurring in advance of the event) and establishing the legitimate right (or even the need) 
to colonise. From a different perspective, Skinner et al. (2008, p. 189) indicate that this 
model ‘has a tendency to become a simplistic and compartmentalised representation of 
complex phenomena’ simplifying complex organisational change processes. They point to 
the failure of this model to address other reactions, including resistance, of organisations in 
different functional levels of organisations. Broadbent et al. (2001), nevertheless, have up 
to a point elaborated the ability of this model to attend to the resistance surfacing in 
organisations.  
The model’s discussion of inertia and equilibrium in organisations has been also criticised 
by Zakus and Skinner (2008). They indicate that inertia and equilibrium may not exist in 
all organisations, as they are continually adapting to minor changes in their internal and 
external environment. They also maintain that the model fails to notice the strength and 
impact of external opposing forces on organisational change and varying needs and 
interests inside changing organisations. As such, its ability is argued to be limited for 
addressing possible conflicts and their ramifications inside organisations during a change 
process. Accordingly, this model is criticised for taking a convenient approach to 
organisational change (Zakus and Skinner, 2008). Finally Gurd (2008), as previously has 
been reflected by Soin (1996), also shows his concerns about the failure of this model in 
attending to the role of power in changing processes at social and organisational levels.  
 
4.6. Methodological approach to data collection 
In accord with the research approach of this study, i.e. the MRT, besides the theoretical 
model another vital element is also required to fulfil the objectives of any research - 
empirical data. This complementary element has been thought to be even more important 
than the former, since the skeletal theories will not be meaningful unless they are enriched 
by relevant empirical data. These data might either be in conformity with the assumptions 
underlying the theories or contradict and, hence, ultimately extend those models 
(Laughlin, 2004). The theoretical models are not supposed to predict the exact                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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configuration of empirical contexts; they could rather provide important pointers to and 
insight into their reinterpretation (Laughlin, 2007). However, as mentioned earlier, 
‘empirical surprises’ are still possible, which are de facto argued to reshape the conceptual 
languages where they fail to provide meaningful ‘placeholders’ for the analysis of the 
empirical data (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009, p. 293).  
In light of the importance of empirical data and in line with the implications of MRT 
approach, a methodological language was required as a basis for guiding empirical 
investigation of the study (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997; Laughlin 2007). Laughlin’s 
discursive process has provided such a language for this research (Laughlin, 1987; 
Broadband and Laughlin, 1997; Agrizzi, 2008). This methodology, which is developed 
from Habermas’ critical theory (Habermas, 1974), outlines a three-stage process for 
collecting empirical data including formulation of critical theorems, process of 
enlightenment and selection of change strategies. The involvement of the researcher and 
the researched varies in different stages of this methodology. It is argued that the stages 
are not necessarily distinct and might have overlaps with one another (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 1997a). These steps are required in order to build an understanding of the 
empirical data.  
 
4.6.1. Stage one - Formulation of critical theorems 
At this stage, the researcher has the prime role in collecting data. Following the collection 
of related data, they should be subjected to a discourse among researchers to reach a 
consensual understanding of the subject under study. The quality of this discourse, as 
Broadbent and Laughlin (1997, p. 628) point out, will be determined through the 
underlying principle of ‘Habermasian ideal speech situation’ in that each participant has 
the same right to participate in the discourse and express his/her ideas freely. In this stage, 
the analysis of the MoH’s relevant documents about hospital evaluation and accreditation 
as well as the hospitals’ overall profile was conducted. In addition, the interviews with the 
NAPH’s surveyors and the hospitals’ members regarding the impact of the NAPH on their 
organisations and also on their mutual reactions were conducted, in the light of the ideal 
speech principle (Broadbent, 1998). The results were subjected to a discourse between 
researchers in a sense that there was an equal opportunity for expressing ideas from both 
sides (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997a; Baker, 2008). Since there was only one researcher                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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for this study, this stage was carried out with the participation of the researcher and his 
supervisor. This stage culminated in the development of the critical theorems from their 
common understanding on these issues.  
 
4.6.2. Stage two - Process of enlightenment  
In this research both the researcher and researched develop some common understanding 
about the issue under study (Campanale et al., 2010). The theorems from the previous 
stage were put to the respondents for further discussion and discourse in a similar way to 
the first stage between the researcher and the researched (i.e. enlightenment). In this stage, 
the researcher looked for deeper understanding and interaction with the hospitals’ 
members and sought further insights on the impact of the NAPH on the hospitals. 
Moreover, another aim was to corroborate the data gathered from the first stage. This step 
was undertaken by re-interviewing some of the respondents of the previous stage.  
 
4.6.3. Stage three - Selection of strategies  
In the final stage of this process, as the methodology requires, the researched play the 
main part (Broadband and Laughlin, 1997). This stage includes a process of suggesting, 
evaluating and acting upon alternative strategies for change, on the basis of the outcomes 
from the enlightenment stage (Laughlin, 1987). The overall understandings of the issue 
under discourse should be given to the respondents based on what action they decide 
should follow in order to make possible changes to the status quo. According to Broadbent 
and Laughlin (1997), in this stage there is an intention to challenge the status quo, but it 
does not necessarily desire change in all situations. The resultant conclusions are intended 
to raise fundamental questions about the particular issue being investigated. As MRT 
implies, it is a researcher-informed, researched-led change (Laughlin, 2007). Laughlin 
(1987) argues that this is the most problematic part of any research project, as it is where 
the researcher cannot take the lead and does not have control.  
 
In the current study, however, since the participants did not have the authority and power 
to make any change in the situation of hospital evaluation, the end products of this stage 
were merely policy recommendations and implications for the improvement in the NAPH. 
As such, given the position of the researcher, there was no possibility of tracking the                                                       s      P      m     T         l F  m     s 
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implementation of the suggestions, only the opportunity to propose them as policy 
implications at the end of this research. Figure 4.6 displays the main steps of the current 
research in the light of Laughlin’s methodology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Three stages of my data collection methodology in the light of Laughlin’s discursive process 
(adapted from Laughlin, 1987, p. 488) 
 
 
The strength of this methodological language is that it gives a possibility (opportunity) and 
thus motivates organisational actors to acquire a stronger voice in developing their own 
strategies, while using the knowledge base of researchers (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997). 
Despite this strength, it needs more time and high levels of devotion and desire for 
involvement from both the researchers and the researched. The circumstances of the 
hospitals (busy sites), the participants’ time constraints, and the nature of their activity 
(dealing with people’s lives), created some limitations for fulfilling all stages of the 
methodology, as explained. Accordingly, the stages, particularly the second and third 
ones, were mostly integrated and tended to overlap one another. 
 
1. Searching for general 
profile of the NAPH and 
the hospitals  
2. Searching for an 
understanding of impact 
of the NAPH on the 
hospitals and hospitals’ 
reactions and responses to 
this mechanism through 
interviewing relevant 
respondents  
1. Deeper interaction 
with hospitals’ actors and 
surveyors mainly via 
interviews (discourse), in 
order to confirm the 
theorems developed in 
first stage  
 
2. Seeking for more 
details to enrich, extend 
and reflect on them 
1. Returning to the 
hospitals to ensure that 
the final interpretation of 
the impact of the NAPH 
and hospitals’ reactions 
was aligned with 
perspectives of their 
members 
2. Exploring possibility of 
change in the NAPH in 
line with members’ views 
 
1. Critical 
theorems 
3. Developing 
strategies  
2. 
Enlightenment  
  
Chapter 5 - Research Design and Data Collection and 
Analysis Methods 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
Following on from chapter four, various aspects of the research design and data collection 
and analysis methods are explained and discussed in this chapter.  
 
5.2. Research design  
In seeking to understand whether and how the NAPH impacts on the hospitals at local 
level as well as the reactions and responses of the latter to this institutional regulative 
mechanism, there is a need for a richer understanding of the perceptions of the hospitals’ 
members (Broadbent et al., 1991; Laughlin, 2007). A rich case-study is argued to allow for 
gaining an understanding and providing pertinent answers to ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
about the phenomenon under study (Pettigrew, 1995; Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2008). 
Furthermore, due to the complexity and subtleties of the issue targeted, and due to the 
research’s association with intangible perceptions, as Yin (2003) advises, case-study is a 
suitable research design, which provides an in-depth approach to data collection and 
analysis. It not only allowed the researcher to examine the tangible organisational aspects 
of the hospitals, but also provided an understanding of their intangible interpretive 
schemes (Broadbent, 1992). The adopted theoretical framework (i.e. Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2005) also informs case-study research (Hassan, 2010). 
Similar views are expressed regarding the study of internal control systems (i.e. design 
archetypes) by case-study in particular settings in which they are used (Berry et al., 2009;                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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Arah et al., 2003). The importance of a case-study design is also accentuated for the 
evaluation of various programmes (Stufflebeam, 2001). Accordingly, this design is 
selected for operationalising the objectives of the current study. 
 
5.3. Case-study 
Case-studies have been extensively used in social research, especially for small-scale 
studies (Denscombe, 2005). As Creswell (2007) puts it, a case-study tries to understand an 
issue or a problem using ‘case’ as a specific illustration. It de facto involves the extensive 
study of a phenomenon through one or more cases within a bounded system (i.e. a setting, 
a context). Yin (2008) indicates that a sound research strategy should be chosen, bearing in 
mind the following three key factors: 
1.  type of research question 
2.  extent of researcher control over events 
3.  level of focus on contemporary rather than historical events 
 
Building on these questions, he proposes the table 5.1 as a framework for the choice of an 
appropriate research strategy. 
 
Table 5.1 Criteria for choosing different research strategies - Source: Yin (2008, p.8) 
Research 
Strategy 
Form of research 
question 
Control over 
behavioural 
events 
Focus on 
contemporary 
events 
Experiment  How, why, who, 
what, where 
Yes  Yes 
Survey  How many/much  No  Yes 
Case study  How, why  No  Yes/No 
History  How, why  No  No 
Archival 
analysis 
who, what, where, 
how many/much 
No  Yes 
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As in the table, experiments can provide an answer to five types of questions, i.e. how, 
why, who, what and where, provided that there is control over the current event to be 
investigated. Yin (2008) posits that, when there is no control over events, both histories 
and case-studies are the preferred strategies (Table 5.1). The focus on contemporary events 
makes a distinction between case-studies and history strategies as, unlike history, a case-
study is able to examine contemporary events. Therefore, in case-studies, ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
questions are asked about a contemporary set of events over which the researcher has little 
or no control (Yin, 2008; Denscombe, 2005). However, there may be some situations 
where more than one research strategy can be relevant. Furthermore, multiple strategies 
might be considered equally attractive in any given study (Yin, 2008). On this 
interpretation and given the research questions addressed, the case-study seems to be the 
most appropriate research strategy for the current study. 
 
5.3.1. Definitions, features and functions 
Yin (2008, p. 18) defines the case-study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident….’ Creswell (2007, p. 73) 
similarly considers case-study as an ‘exploration of a bounded system (case) over time 
through a detailed and in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of data rich in 
content’. The following features shed further light on the nature of this research design: 
•  In-depth data collection with multiple rich sources of information 
•  Contemporary phenomenon study within its real-life (natural) context 
•  Investigating of interplay between phenomena and contexts 
•  A holistic focus on subject under study 
•  Multiple methods for collecting data  
Case-study design is argued to have different types, varying based on their different 
purposes and functions. The following cases were found most often in the literature (Yin, 
2003; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Denscombe, 2007; Creswell, 2007): 
•  Exploratory case-studies are used in areas where there are few theories or a deficient 
body of knowledge; the aim is to guide the development of relevant research 
questions and hypotheses.                                                                                         s      D s        M     s 
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•  Descriptive case-studies describe the current practice. 
•  Explanatory case-studies use existing theories to explain the causes of events and 
processes and explore causal relationships. 
•  Illustrative case-studies use a case-study as an illustration of how a particular theory 
applies in a real-life setting. 
•  Experimental case-studies examine the difficulties of implementing new procedures 
and techniques in an organisation and evaluating the benefits. 
It has been argued that the aforementioned types are not completely delineated and they 
may be used in combination in different studies (Collis and Hussey, 2003). In the current 
study, the focus is mostly on explanatory and illustrative case-studies.  
 
5.3.2. Multiple case-study design 
A unit of analysis in case-study is the kind of case to which the variables or subjects under 
study as well as the research problem refer and about which data are collected. It can be an 
individual, a role, a programme or scheme (such as the NAPH), a small group, an event, a 
process, an organisation (e.g. a hospital), a community, or even a nation (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003; Huberman and Miles, 2002; Kumar, 2005). There might be single case or a 
number of cases (multiple case-study design) in case-study research (Collis and Hussey, 
2003; Yin, 2003). Yin (2003, 2008) believes that evidence from multiple cases is often 
considered more compelling.  It can provide more insights and raise the validity of the 
research (Stake, 1999; Stufflebeam, 2001). This study has adopted a multiple (collective) 
design to gain more insights and robust understanding of the perceptions of the hospitals 
towards the current accreditation system of Iran.  
 
5.3.3. Typical criticisms of case-study 
Grbich (1999) criticises case-study in a sense that the bounded nature of cases may imply 
that a case-study approach favours containment and covers small scopes. However, as Yin 
(2008) puts it, case-study permits the generation of theoretical propositions that might be 
generalisable to other groups. In fact, in case-study the purpose is mainly to generalise to 
theoretical propositions not to population (Bassett, 2004; Yin, 2008).                                                                                        s      D s        M     s 
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Another criticism of case-studies addresses the point that this design lacks a systematic 
handling of the data. In response, its advocates indicate the systematic reporting of all 
evidence by case-study (Yin, 2003).  
 
5.4. Data collection 
5.4.1. Data collection practicalities 
5.4.1.1. Access to the sites 
Prior to collection of the empirical data, the following steps were taken. It was important to 
clarify them as the ‘research governance aspects’ of this study. For any Iranian student 
studying abroad and wishing to collect data about health care from inside Iran, there is a 
‘Bursary committee’ in the MoH which has to approve the student’s request for this 
purpose.  
In line with this process, the researcher provided the committee with a range of different 
documents regarding his research along with an introductory letter from his university and 
supervisor. After a few months, the committee granted its permission and assigned the 
researcher to the given field, which was Hamedan University of Medical Sciences 
(HUMS), to collect the data. In the next step, and within the university, the request for 
data collection was again considered and agreed through a bureaucratic process consisting 
of two stages. First, the university itself had to give approval and the hospitals needed to 
endorse the request and issue permission for the interviews to be conducted, at second 
stage. All these steps took a number of months before the researcher could embark on his 
empirical work. The researcher spent six months - three continuous and three 
discontinuous months - collecting data from the empirical field. 
  
5.4.1.2. Difficulties of data collection 
The researcher encountered some difficulties during the data collection process. The 
interviewees were mostly cautious about giving data to someone studying abroad. This 
problem was to some extent solved by explaining the main objective of this research to 
interviewees and reassuring them that the data were being collected only for academic                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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purposes and would be treated anonymously and with full confidentiality and privacy. 
However, in this regard, a difficulty remained about giving the researcher permission to 
attend the normal meetings of hospitals’ senior managerial members. 
Another problem was related to the nature of the research field and interviewees’ work. 
The interviewees were mostly the staff of hospitals and most of the time they were busy 
with their work and patients. They were less amenable to spending their time on things 
other than their own affairs. This created some problems for the researcher in terms of 
finding enough time and right time to interview the staff. However, by pre-booking and 
arranging the interviews for times when they were free and when it was convenient for 
them, interviews were, to a large extent, successfully conducted, although most of the 
interview sessions overran because the staff had to deal with other matters. Moreover, at 
the beginning of the process, the researcher had to convince people from different 
hierarchical levels, who would not be directly involved in the data collection, of the 
benefits this research might bring to their organisation. As such, given the less developed 
information systems of the hospitals, the availability and accessibility of soft information 
was highly limited.  
 
5.4.1.3. Ethical considerations 
In terms of ethical considerations, certain arrangements were also considered. The 
hospitals and interviewees were free to withhold their cooperation or opt out of the 
research despite the tacit order from the MoH indicating that they should cooperate with 
the researcher. Any of the interviewees could decide not to allocate his/her time for the 
research and, in a very few cases, some were very busy with their own work and could not 
cooperate with the researcher. The main reason why most of the hospitals were interested 
in cooperating was apparently that they were expecting to see changes to the system as a 
result of this research, and some of them hoped this research would reflect the existing 
problems to the main authorities and make the situation conducive to positive changes in 
the system. Therefore, before initiating the data collection, a consent form and a 
participant information sheet (See Appendices C and D for translated version) were 
distributed among the potential interviewees. They were given at most one week to decide 
whether to participate. In addition, at the beginning of each interview their consent was 
sought.                                                                                        s      D s        M     s 
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The participant information sheet included mainly the following information: 
￿  An introduction to the research project;  
￿  The reasons for selecting a particular interviewee; 
￿  Emphasis on their voluntary participation and the right to withdraw at any stage of the 
study; 
￿  The amount of time the participants would be required to spend on the project; 
￿  The possible benefits of the research for the participants; 
￿  Potential risks involved; 
￿  Confidentiality and ethical procedures. 
 
 
5.4.2. Organisational context of the case 
5.4.2.1. Research environment  
As explained in chapter two, hierarchically lower than the MoH which plans, makes 
policies, funds and directs health care at macro level for the whole country, the UMSs are 
responsible for managing, delivering and monitoring healthcare services at provincial 
level. They act as the executive arm of the MoH in different provinces and perform two 
main dual tasks of delivering quality health care to local areas through their HCOs 
(including mainly hospitals) and providing medical and healthcare education (Majlis, 
1985; 1987). The UMSs hold hospitals and other HCOs to account for their performance 
by implementing annual evaluation of the hospitals. As such, the UMSs are in turn held to 
account by the MoH to ensure they are implementing government health policies at 
provincial level (Majlis, 1988b). In fact, the programme of accreditation is developed in 
the MoH and is implemented by the UMSs (MoH, 1997a). The research environment 
chosen for this study was the HUMS which is geographically located in Iran’s western 
province of Hamedan. The related justification for choosing this field and the existing 
hospitals is given as follows. 
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5.4.2.1.1. Justification for selecting the HUMS 
The most common justification offered for the selection of a particular case is that it is 
typical (Denscombe, 2007). That is, the particular case is similar in crucial aspects to the 
others that might have been chosen. With this method, since the case-study is supposed to 
be similar to most (typical) of the rest, the findings from the case-study are hence likely to 
apply elsewhere and be transferable to the whole class of cases (Kumar, 2005). 
Denscombe (2007) articulates that the convenience factor could come to the fore when 
deciding on equally suitable alternatives. 
The NAPH is a national programme and its accrediting processes and standards and the 
overall structure of the UMSs (in terms of their hospital evaluation mechanisms and types 
of the hospitals) were entirely similar in all provinces of the country (MoH, 1997a). 
Therefore, all UMSs had similar merits for possible selection as the research environment 
for the investigation of the programme’s impact at this stage, without the need to carry out 
any similar study in the other provinces. Accordingly, other inclusion criteria were 
considered as relevant and important (priority) for selecting current UMS, which included 
the following: 
￿  Familiarity of the researcher with the HUMS and corresponding province; 
￿  The ease of access to the field; and  
￿  Less time and cost associated with collecting data within this university as compared to the 
others. 
These all lead the researcher to the selection of ‘HUMS’ as the overall research field for 
the data collection.  
 
5.4.2.2. The cases for study 
After selection of the appropriate research field (i.e. HUMS), the second stage was to 
identify the corresponding hospitals as the cases of study (see Table 5.2). A ‘purposive 
sampling technique’ was used at this stage for choosing the hospitals (Yin, 2008). As 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003) emphasise, qualitative research uses non-probability sampling 
techniques for selecting the population for its study, within which the units of study are 
intentionally selected to reflect particular features of groups or organisations within the 
sampled population.                                                                                        s      D s        M     s 
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Since there were different types of hospitals under the HUMS, a multiple case-study 
design was found to be more relevant for this stage. Yin (2008) believes that a multiple-
case design is much stronger than a single-case design. In fact, while qualitative research 
tends to be based on the intensive study of a relatively small number of cases and the 
uniqueness of the different empirical cases should be recognised (Denscombe, 2007), the 
inclusion of more cases is argued to uncover the role of different contextual features in 
investigation of the phenomena under study (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997a). Therefore, 
the researcher sought to deliberately include different types of hospitals (at least one of 
each type) to capture a more diverse yet complete picture of their members’ attitudes 
towards the NAPH’s impact at local level, and maximise the lessons learnt (Larrinaga-
González et al., 2001; Creswell, 2003). In addition, this allowed the researcher to obtain 
contrasting results from the various hospitals. Such a process is called ‘theoretical 
replication’ in multiple-case-study design (Yin, 2008, p. 54). Other hospitals, similar to the 
main cases as far as possible, were also approached to enhance the validity of the data 
gathered. This is called ‘literal replication’ (Yin, 2008, p. 54). In practice, given the busy 
work schedule of those working in the hospitals, choosing more hospitals would expand 
the range of options and save some time for the researcher, considering his limited access 
to the field. The data collection process was carried out in the selected research 
environment until no new data in both similar and contrasting hospitals emerged and data 
saturation was reached (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). However, it should be noted that such a 
process would mostly apply to the teaching hospitals, firstly, in view of their majority in 
the field and, secondly, because of the limited access of the researcher to the other 
hospitals.  
 
Table 5.2 Number and type of the hospitals selected for the case-studies 
Type of hospital  Number of 
hospitals 
Public (teaching)  5 
Private  2 
Institutional  1 
Total  8                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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The teaching hospitals were advanced and referral HCOs and the hub of the country’s 
healthcare system; they provided the majority of the services in the country. 
Notwithstanding their quasi-autonomous status from a financial perspective, they were 
ultimately owned by the UMSs and the MoH.  
The institutional hospital was also ultimately related to the government (Ministry of 
Welfare and Social Security). Given this link, it was in a stable financial position. Another 
feature of these hospitals was their fairly standard physical layout, since they were all of a 
new and purpose-built structure.  
The private hospitals were not as advanced as the other two types, as they did not have 
government support. Instead, they could charge higher tariffs for their services. Given their 
nature, they had a different mission including both quality improvement and profit-
generation. The table 5.3 provides more descriptive details of these hospitals. 
  
 
  Table 5.3 Descriptive information of the hospitals under current study 
R
o
w
  Hospitals 
(Pseudonym
21)  Nature  Type 
Last 
grade 
(2009) 
Number 
of active 
beds 
Bed 
occupancy 
rate % 
1  A  Private  General  4  50  36 
2  B  Teaching  Single-
specialty 
1  110  84 
3  C  Teaching  General  1  261  70 
4  D  Teaching  General  1  225  73 
5  E  Private  General  2  99  38 
6  F  Teaching  General  1  382  52 
7  G  Clinical
22  Single-
specialty 
2  90  65 
8  H  Institutional  General  1  116  88 
 
 
                                                   
21. The name of the hospitals is anonymised on confidentiality grounds. 
22. University non-teaching hospital                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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5.4.2.3. Selection of participants  
The final stage before conducting data collection was to choose the main participants for 
interviews within each hospital. Green and Thorogood (2004) explain that, in qualitative 
work, there are typically other considerations as compared to quantitative studies, and the 
sample size mostly depends on the aims of study and elements such as data saturation 
while the process is ongoing.  
For this stage, a purposive sampling technique was applied with the aim of explicitly 
selecting interviewees who might generate appropriate data (Mack et al., 2005). The main 
inclusion criterion for this stage was ‘familiarity with and involvement in’ the 
accreditation and evaluation processes in the hospitals. Analysis and review of the MoH 
and HUMSs’ formal documents and an informal formative evaluation showed that the 
senior, middle and junior administrative and clinical managers of each hospital are the 
most knowledgeable and heavily involved in accreditation of the hospitals. Accordingly, 
all those occupying such positions from different hierarchical levels in selected hospitals 
were interviewed for the study. However, a few frontline staff members (including 
consultants) were also interviewed, where required, in a bid to provide a more balanced 
and rounded understanding of NAPH’s impact on the hospitals (see Table 5.4). Different 
factors, such as the complexity of the phenomenon under study, the size of the hospitals 
based on number of their beds and departments, and the plan to interview people from 
diverse groups and departments, played an important role in deciding how many staff to 
interview. Furthermore, in order to corroborate information provided by the hospitals’ 
interviewees and minimise the potential for bias, it was suggested that data also be  
gathered from outsiders and cross-checked with relevant documents (Mellahi and 
Wilkinson, 2004). Accordingly, accreditation surveyors were also interviewed in an effort 
to increase the validity of the data (Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.4 The number of interviews conducted in terms of different hospitals 
Position/Role  Teaching 
hospital 
Private 
hospital 
Institutional 
Hospital 
Hospital director  1  -   
Hospital manager  3  2  1 
Consultant  2  -  - 
Matron  5  2  1 
Supervisor  2  2  1 
Head of Para-Clinic 
Dept. 
10  2  1 
Head Nurse (Sister)  4  1  1 
Head of ED  5  2  1 
Head of Nutrition and 
Food services 
1  1  - 
Quality improvement 
office 
4  -  1 
Staff   2  -  1 
Total  39  12  8 
 
 
 
Table 5.5 The number of interviews conducted in terms of different hospitals 
Position/Role  Number of 
interviews 
Head surveyor  1 
Third party surveyor  1 
Surveyor  4 
Total  6 
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5.4.3. Data collection methods 
Various methods were utilised under the purview of case-study design in line with 
theoretical models and the research objectives. Denscombe (2007) indicates that a case-
study allows for the use of a variety of methods depending on the circumstances and the 
specific needs of the situation (strength of case-study design). Even so, it is argued that it 
relies heavily on qualitative data collection techniques (Jayawickramarajah, 1992). 
Drawing on this strength of the case-study, a range of formal and informal interviews, 
documentary analysis and non-participant observation were used to collect the required 
data. The combination of the qualitative methods allowed the methods to rectify one 
another’s deficiencies. In fact, the flaws of one method could be the strengths of the other 
method. As the methods imply, only qualitative data were collected for this research, 
because the intention was to capture people’s perceptions and understandings, which 
include complexity, richness and depth (Burton and Steane, 2004). Moreover, the adopted 
theoretical model and the methodological language of the study also required mainly 
qualitative methods including in-depth and semi-structured interviews and documentary 
analysis (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). The noteworthy 
point is that the research methods were applied in complementary and corroborative 
fashion, to both complement one another in addressing all aspects of the data and improve 
the validity of the data by providing evidence from different perspectives. 
 
5.4.3.1. Interviews  
The principal data collection method for this study was semi-structured interview 
(Creswell, 2007). Interviews are said to be the most commonly-used qualitative techniques 
in healthcare settings (Pope and Mays, 2006). Tellis (1997) states that this method is one 
of the important sources of information in case-study design. In the present study, the 
researcher undertook face-to-face interviews with both the individuals in the hospitals and 
the accreditation surveyors. Semi-structured interviews were particularly used to elicit 
their perceptions of the NAPH and uncover their reasons for having a specific reaction and 
response to this accreditation scheme (Modell, 2001; Oliver, 1991; Chang, 2006). 
Although these types of interviews were mainly employed for data collection, in practice 
the in-depth interview was also employed as long as the interviewee could give new data. 
For example, to understand the intangible interpretive schemes, in-depth interviews with                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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the members from different levels and positions in the hospitals seemed necessary. In the 
interview process, interviewees have time to reflect on the issues before other issues are 
mentioned.  
An ‘interview topic guide’ was developed based mainly on the prior theoretical 
frameworks informing the study (Stufflebeam, 2001) and partly on the review of the 
related literature (e.g. Mannion et al., 2005). Durocher (2009) points out that using an 
interview guide as a tool for conducting semi-structured interviews is consistent with 
MRT approach. The interview guide gives some structure to the interview process, 
drawing on prior research and theories, yet leaves space for human subjectivity by 
allowing the observer to focus on the respondent’s experience (Durocher, 2009). The 
interview topic guide was tried initially with a fellow student and then with a hospital 
manager from a different research environment than the one selected for this research. The 
results of this small pilot were then used to modify, logically order and add more questions 
to the interview guide, allowing the researcher to obtain more focused information. In 
addition, the guide was to some extent refined during the first few interviews with the 
participants (See Appendix B for the interview topic guide). 
 
5.4.3.2. Documentary analysis 
Analysis of the related documents (Table 5.6) was conducted in order to identify the 
societal steering institution in the country’s healthcare system and the steering 
mechanisms of the institution. This method was further used to elaborate on the profile, 
objectives and descriptions of the MoH’s steering mechanism, i.e. NAPH (chapter two). 
Two groups of internal (related to hospitals) and external (related to the MoH) documents 
were studied. Firstly, the policy documents of the MoH in relation to its evaluatory 
intentions and actions were investigated. As the table shows, more documentation was 
seen in order to establish the main intention of the MoH for introducing current AP. At 
local level, in order to identify the ISs and DAs of the hospitals the pertaining documents 
were analysed.  
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          Table 5.6 List of the documents used for data collection of research 
Type  Reviewed documents 
 
I.R.I’s Constitution  
Regulations of establishing the MoH 
The act of the establishments and duties of the MoH 
National document of healthcare sector development  
The MoH’s Roadmap 
I.R.I Fourth plan of economic, social, cultural development 
The instruction of standards and principles of evaluation of the general 
hospitals 
The instruction of standards and principles of evaluation of the general 
hospitals: Emergency department 
The NAPH’ checklists 
Standard regulations for the assistance, treatment and recovery of 
accident and emergency patients 
External 
Practical instruction for the quality evaluation of hospitals 
 
 
The guidelines for establishing hospitals  
Hospital evaluation result checklist 
Hospital internal review checklists 
Hospitals’ strategic plan 
Patients’ right charter 
Hospitals’ rules and regulations 
Administrative development guidelines and checklist 
Internal 
Hospitals’ ISO 9001 standards  
 
 
Another reason for reviewing documents was to corroborate the information gathered at 
the interview stage (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2003). Mellahi et al. (2002) note that, as the 
interviews generally reveal people’s insights rather than presenting deeper realities                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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relating to the phenomenon under study, the stress is on the confirmatory role of the 
reviewed documentation.  
 
5.4.3.3. Observation 
Observations offer an opportunity to record and analyse behaviour and interactions as they 
occur, allowing events and actions to be seen through the eyes of the researcher (Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2003).  
Non-participant observation was used to look for the signs and indications of the 
performance measurement practices in the hospitals. It, for example, allowed the 
researcher to see whether the accreditation grade is installed in the hospitals. Furthermore, 
the hospitals’ efforts to publicise their regulations and ISO information could be seen 
through observation inside the hospitals.  It also acted as a validating method for the data 
collected through the interviews. The researcher had the chance to participate once in the 
evaluation of the hospitals to see in practice the hospitals’ reactions to the NAPH’s 
surveyors and their interactions. This was expected to provide further understanding of the 
participants’ actions and substantiate the data collected from the hospitals’ personnel in 
the absence of the surveyors.  
 
5.4.4. Assuring quality of the data 
There has always been some contention on the issue of quality (i.e. validity and reliability) 
of qualitative data and whether it should be measured in the same ways as the positivistic 
approach and criteria (Bowling and Ebrahim, 2005). Qualitative researchers broadly argue 
that, because of the different paradigms and traditions of qualitative data, the quality and 
rigour of qualitative research must be judged on its own terms (Popay et al., 1998; Lincoln 
and Guba, 1999; Pope and Mays, 2006). Therefore, the focus should be, for example, on 
credibility and transferability of qualitative data in the investigation of validity and 
reliability of qualitative data (Pope and Mays, 2006; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005). 
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5.4.4.1. Validity 
The validity of qualitative data is traditionally understood to refer to the 'correctness' or 
'precision' of a research reading (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p. 273). It is argued that the 
notion of validity in qualitative research can be problematic, because the truths in this 
stream of research are socially situated, rejecting a positivist idea of one fixed and essential 
truth (Green and Thorogood, 2004). As such, Lincoln and Guba (1999) argue that it is not 
possible for qualitative researchers to prove in any absolute way that they have got it right. 
However, this does not mean that qualitative researchers can dispense with all 
considerations of validity. There have been some attempts in the qualitative literature to 
move away from the concept of validity and to use instead other terms which are more 
appropriately related to the correctness of qualitative evidence. For example, it is 
suggested that ‘credibility’ and ‘transferability’ translate more appropriately for 
naturalistic (qualitative) enquiry than internal or external validity (Guba and Lincoln, 
1999; Lincoln and Guba, 1999). Glaser and Strauss (1967) referred to the credibility and 
plausibility of qualitative research data and findings. Triangulation (Seale, 1999; 
Silverman, 2010), respondent validation (Denscombe, 2007) and disconfirmatory evidence 
(Green and Thorogood, 2005) are extensively advised for improving validity and proving 
that the data are likely to be accurate and appropriate and that the qualitative data have 
been produced and checked in line with good practice. These strategies are used in current 
study and discussed below. 
 
5.4.4.1.1. Triangulation 
Triangulation is one of the strategies advised for substantiating the validity of research 
findings in qualitative research (Pope and Mays, 2006). Denzin (2009, p. 301) points to 
different types of triangulation for assessing the validity of qualitative data, including the 
following: 
•  Data sources triangulation: This refers to the collection and comparison of data 
from the members of various interest groups (i.e. different stakeholders). This type 
could vary in terms of time (different time), person and space.  
•  Method triangulation: This denotes the comparison of the results from two or more 
different methods of data collection (e.g. interviews and observation)                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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•  Investigator triangulation: This includes using several researchers (e.g. a research 
team) studying the same phenomenon using the same method (e. g. observation or 
interviews). 
•  Theory triangulation: This refers to the strategy used when different investigators 
with different perspectives (multidisciplinary research team) interpret the same 
data/results. 
 
In all of the aforementioned categories of triangulation, researchers look for patterns of 
convergence to develop or corroborate an overall interpretation. Pope and Mays (2006) 
argue that triangulation is mostly seen as a way of making a study more comprehensive, or 
of encouraging a more reflexive analysis of the data than as a pure test of validity. 
Nevertheless, if conducted properly, triangulation can provide contrasting data sources to 
bolster confidence that the data are ‘on the right lines’ (Denscombe, 2007, p. 297). 
 
Application of triangulation for validating current research data 
For validating the qualitative data, this study has utilised the following two categories of 
triangulation. 
1.  Data sources triangulation: the data were collected from different groups of 
respondents to increase the confidence in the data. Hospital staff members from 
different professions and hierarchical levels and accreditation surveyors were 
interviewed in order to provide a comprehensive view on the current AP. 
Moreover, the data was also cross-checked in a few cases with a handful of 
hospital staff from other UMSs for more confidence (e.g. a hospital manager from 
another university was interviewed) 
2.  Method triangulation: interviews, observation and documentary analysis were used 
for collecting data for the current study. Observation was only used to validate data 
generated through interviews with the participants.  
 
Consequently, a number of follow-up interviews and further review of related formal 
documents were conducted to clarify the ambiguities and mismatches among data                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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collected by these three different methods. Of course, the principal data collection method 
was semi-structured interviews.   
Since the research was conducted by one PhD student, investigator triangulation and 
theoretical triangulation were not possible. 
 
5.4.4.1.2. Respondent validation 
Another strategy to enhance the validity of qualitative research is ‘respondent validation’. 
This validation method, which is sometimes called member checking, includes a range of 
techniques in which the investigator’s account is compared with the accounts of those who 
have been investigated to establish the level of correspondence between the two sets (Pope 
and Mays, 2006). Similarly, respondent validation implies that the researcher can return to 
the participants with the data and findings as a means of checking the validity of the 
findings (Denscombe, 2007). This allows a check on factual accuracy and allows the 
researcher’s understandings to be confirmed (or amended) by those whose opinions, views 
or experiences are being studied. Lincoln and Guba (1999) regarded respondent validation 
as the strongest available check on the credibility of a research project. However, some 
limitations are attributed to this validation technique. For example, Pope and Mays (2006) 
have maintained that the account produced by the researcher is designed for a wider 
audience and might be different from the account of an individual informant because of 
their different and limited role in the research process. As such, the analysis of the data 
might take the explanation beyond something that would be immediately recognisable to 
the respondent (Denscombe, 2007). Bloor (1997) has advised respondent validation as part 
of a process of error reduction rather than as a straightforward check on validity. 
 
￿  How was respondent validation used in the current research? 
Following on from the data collection and primary analysis of data, and in accord with the 
methodological approach of the study (in its third stage, see figure 4.6), the researcher 
discussed the initial themes with a few respondents based on their availability for this 
purpose, in order to check whether they could confirm that the resultant data are in line 
with their views. This process was complex, since the generated themes were slightly 
different from the data collected through semi-structured interviews and sometimes not                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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exclusively related to the person interviewed at this stage. Therefore, the researcher spent 
some time clarifying this for the respondents.     
 
5.4.4.1.3. Disconfirmatory evidence  
Qualitative researchers should look for disconfirming evidence (such as deviant cases) and 
account for them rather than searching only for the points they want to make (Green and 
Thorogood, 2005). Popper (1959) in Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) has suggested that 
researchers should always consider both confirmatory evidence as well as disconfirmatory 
evidence to resist the temptation of collecting data that solely confirm whatever aim or 
stance the researcher is pursuing. As indicated earlier, to avoid the temptation of 
considering only the confirmatory evidence and missing the disconfirmatory evidence, the 
researcher also interviewed the accreditation surveyors as they belonged to another side of 
the accreditation process. This was done because the views of the managers in the 
hospitals might be seen as partial and one-sided (Paton and Mordaunt, 2004).  
 
5.4.3.2 Reliability 
Reliability is generally concerned with the replicability of research findings using the same 
or similar methods (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). However, in qualitative research, because of 
the different arguments on reality and the effects of context on the phenomenon under 
study, it seems hardly applicable in this sense. Instead, those concepts that are felt to have 
greater resonance with the goals and values of qualitative research have been used; for 
example, confirmability (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003), consistency (Guba and Lincoln, 2008) 
or dependability (Marshall and Rossman, 2011) of qualitative findings. Ritchie and Lewis 
(2003) expalin that, to ensure these qualities exist, one should conduct internal checks on 
the quality of data and their interpretation, and provide information about the whole 
research process. It has been argued that this could be achieved by conducting an audit 
trial, i.e. carefully documenting the research process from conception; e.g. who collected 
and analysed the data and in what ways. The process of analysis and coding can also be 
described clearly and applied methodically and systematically (Bowling and Ebrahim, 
2005; Green and Thorogood, 2004). To address reliability concerns, this study has given a                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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detailed explanation of the different steps of its data collection and analysis in the current 
chapter, besides having the data checked by the research supervisor. 
 
5.5. Data analysis 
Qualitative data analysis is referred to as the process of bringing order, structure, and 
interpretation to a mass of collected data (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). Given the nature 
of qualitative data (i.e. subjective and messy), the analysis process is argued to be difficult 
and time-consuming (Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Yin, 2008). Unlike the quantitative 
research process, qualitative data collection and analysis processes are not completely 
separate and sequential. As Figure 6.1 displays, the following trend can often be seen 
between data collection and analysis processes in qualitative research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Model of research process in qualitative approach (Pope and Mays, 2006, p. 65) 
 
 
In view of this ambiguity and difficulty of qualitative data analysis, Yin (2008) maintains 
that a general analytic strategy is required to clarify the data used and to define the 
priorities for the analysis. Pope and Mays (2006) mention three broad analytical 
approaches for the analysis of qualitative data, including thematic analysis, grounded 
theory and framework approach. They argue that these approaches range from a broadly 
inductive approach to a more deductive approach. In line with the MRT which stresses the 
role of skeletal theories both in collecting and analysing the data (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2009), the framework approach (Pope and Mays, 2006; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Adams et 
 
     Data collection  
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al., 2007) is found to be more suitable for the data analysis of this study. The main reason 
is that it permits the consideration of previous theories and frameworks, which are vital, 
according to the MRT, in the analysis of data. The other two approaches seek a more 
inductive orientation and rarely envisage prior theories in data analysis.  
A computerised qualitative data analysis package, i.e. NVivo (version 8), was used in 
some stages of this approach, to operationalise the framework approach. NVivo is a 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), which helped the 
researcher manage larger amounts of data and reduce the apparent ambiguity attached to 
the qualitative data analysis (Pope and Mays, 2006). It was used to manage and code 
interview transcripts and electronic documents. The software also allowed for electronic 
storage of all transcribed material, and provided methods for coding data and relatively 
easy data search and retrieval functions. However, the cautious point should be made that 
CAQDAS could not replace general analytic strategies in the analysis process.  
 
5.5.1. Framework approach  
The framework approach was developed by the National Centre for Social Research in the 
UK (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). It is seen as a more deductive form of qualitative analysis, 
which is increasingly being used in healthcare research (Pope and Mays, 2006). It mostly 
begins the analysis from the aims and objectives already set for the study, whilst being 
grounded in original accounts and observations of the people studied (i.e. inductive). The 
framework approach tends to be more explicit and informed by a priori reasoning in 
comparison with thematic analysis and grounded theory (Guba and Lincoln, 1999). It has 
five main stages, as follows (Pope and Mays, 2006, p. 73): 
 
1. Familiarisation starts by reading through transcripts and studying notes and so forth for 
some time to initially list the key ideas and recurrent themes. Familiarisation might not 
include entire data sets because of time constraints (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). A pragmatic 
selection of the data is advised for this purpose (Pope et al., 2000).  
Before this stage, preparation of the data, i.e. transcribing the data during and along with 
the data collection, translating them from Farsi to the English language, and anonymising 
the respondents by giving them pseudonyms for the rest of the analysis, was undertaken.                                                                                       s      D s        M     s 
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At the beginning of this stage, back-up copies were made of all original materials, given 
that qualitative data tend to be irreplaceable (Denscombe, 2007). The original copies were 
stored separately from the back-ups, which were used for the rest of the analysis. 
Following the preparation stage, in order to familiarise himself with the data the researcher 
selected and reviewed a range of transcriptions related to diverse respondents. 
 
2. Identifying a thematic framework involves identifying all the key issues, concepts and 
themes by which the data can be examined and referenced. This could be conducted by 
drawing on a priori assumptions, the aims and objectives of the study and respondents’ 
views or experiences that recur in the data. This is where prior skeletal theories are used 
for the analysis process in the current study. The thematic framework was used to label the 
data into manageable chunks for subsequent retrieval and exploration. The thematic 
framework was developed and refined during subsequent stages.  
 
3. Indexing, which is mostly referred to as coding in other qualitative analysis approaches 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1999), points to applying the thematic framework systematically to an 
entire data set to identify relevant pieces of the data with different themes and labelling 
them by both numerical and/or textual codes. In this stage, the themes (the thematic 
framework) identified and developed in the previous stage were imported to NVivo. 
During this stage and as the data were being coded, new themes emerged which led to the 
refinement of the conceptual themes developed in the second stage. The examples of 
NVivo ‘free and tree nodes’ are displayed in Appendix I.  
 
4. Charting is for more clarification of the analysis and themes by using headings from the 
thematic framework to create charts of data until they can be easily read across the whole 
dataset. Charts can be either thematic for each theme across all respondents (cases) or by 
case for each respondent across all themes as follows: 
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Thematic chart  
  Case 1 (members or hospitals)  Case 2  etc. 
Theme       
 
 
Case chart 
  Theme 1  Theme 2  etc. 
Case       
 
 
In the current study, the thematic chart was used, because the themes were firstly identified 
and imported into NVivo. They then were applied to all data gathered from the 
respondents.  
 
5. Mapping and interpretation is the final stage of the framework approach. In this step the 
charts are used to define concepts, search for patterns, create typologies and find 
associations between themes with a view to providing explanations for the findings. The 
research objectives, theoretical assumptions and the themes emerging from the data affect 
the process of mapping and interpretation. Ritchie and Spencer (1994, p. 186) have 
indicated that ‘this part of the analytical process is the most difficult to describe’. This 
stage is reflected in the findings and discussion chapters of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 6 - Assessing the Merits of the NAPH 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter includes the empirical findings resulting from the analysis of data collected 
from selected Iranian hospitals, with regard to the healthcare accreditation of the country. 
The findings are achieved in the light of the objectives and theoretical models of the study 
and are meant to render a contextual evaluation of the performance of this programme. The 
themes are de facto derived from the analysis of the transcripts and a review of internal 
and external documents of the hospitals and the MoH. The most relevant quotes are 
provided to support the debate, where they help with interpretation. However, more than 
one respondent made a similar comment in a majority of cases (some quotations are placed 
in the Appendix I). The chapter will present and discuss the findings related to the 
examination of the hospitals’ perceptions and attitudes towards the merits and contextual 
effects (unintended, dysfunctional and beneficial) of this NAPH.  
 
6.2. Steering in the country’s health sector: Locating the steering 
medium (institution) and mechanism 
6.2.1. Societal steering institution in Iran’s health system 
As explained in chapter four, according to Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), in any 
modernised and complex society there are specific bodies called societal steering 
institutions, which steer and guide societal organisations to reflect societal relevant values, 
called lifeworld. In practice, the steering mechanisms issued by these institutions 
operationalise the intentions of these institutions and ensure that the societal organisations 
reflect societal lifeworld in their activities (Broadbent et al., 1991).                                                                                Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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Analysis of the related formal policy documents illustrated that the MoH is the current 
steering institution designated by the Iranian constitution and government to steer (guide 
and monitor) the HCOs to reflect the relevant healthcare lifeworld of society (Majlis, 
1985; 1987; 1988a). The analysis also revealed that the NAPH is the main steering 
mechanism (macro PMS) issued by the MoH in the current health system. It monitors, 
regulates and evaluates the behaviour and performance of the hospitals (i.e. the main 
societal systems in the current health sector) to make sure they deliver their services in line 
with the related societal lifeworld for health care. The NAPH represents an important 
element of the macro control, regulation and evaluation in the country’s healthcare system, 
also called a societal MCS (Broadbent et al. 2010a). It reflects, operationalises and ensures 
the government’s intentions for improving quality and safety in health care across the 
country (MoH, 1997a). 
 
6.2.2. Nature of the steering mechanism 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) and Laughlin (2007) have argued that, as discussed in 
chapter four, the reactions of societal organisations targeted by steering mechanisms and 
the perceptions of their participants is a key litmus test for judging the nature of the 
mechanisms and can render valuable information for evaluating the performance of these 
mechanisms in a specific context. Accordingly, the empirical data to assess the merits and 
worth (Stufflebeam, 2001; Scriven, 2009) of the NAPH was gathered from selected Iranian  
hospitals using Broadbent and Laughlin’s (1997) three-stage methodological language and 
in the light of Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) theoretical model. According to Broadbent 
et al. (1991) and Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), steering mechanisms externally imposed 
on organisations (e.g. the NAPH) could be categorised into either of the following two 
groups, on the basis of their nature. 
1.  Regulative and amenable to substantive justification (ASJ)  
2.  Constitutive and legitimised by procedure (LP) 
 
Constitutive and LP, unlike regulative and ASJ, steering mechanisms have specific 
features which might create serious unintended consequences in subject organisations. 
They are more likely to impose new values and norms on organisations and reduce their                                                                                Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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freedom and independence. Broadbent et al. (2010a) indicate that constitutive mechanisms 
are not formulated consultatively and with the participation of organisational stakeholders. 
Conversely, regulative and ASJ evaluatory systems are argued to be the chosen framework 
of control, consensually-based and relevant to the activities of the target organisations 
(Lawrence and Sharma, 2002). They are subject to open discussion and questioning, of a 
consultatively-driven nature and embedded in the internal lifeworld, i.e. ISs, of the 
organisations (Dillard and Smith, 1999). Moreover, regulative and ASJ steering media are 
understandable to organisations’ members and accepted by them as in line with their long-
term survival growth and development (Laughlin, 2007). 
 
6.3. Theoretical themes on the nature of the NAPH 
The NAPH: A constitutive and LP or regulative and ASJ mechanism? 
Drawing on the aforesaid assumptions and considering the key role of the subject 
organisations’ perspectives in testing the nature of steering mechanisms (Broadbent et al., 
1991), the perceptions of the selected hospitals’ participants were examined to explore 
their views on the merits of the NAPH in the light of the adopted theoretical framework. 
The results are as follow: 
   
6.3.1. Consultatively-driven  
Analysis of the data revealed that the NAPH was not developed in a ‘consensually-based’ 
fashion. The existing documentation on the initiation of the NAPH, as explained in chapter 
two, shows that in 1997 the formal guidelines for the evaluation of the hospitals were 
developed under the Treatment and Medication Undersecretary of the MoH, put once to 
the convention of the UMSs’ Chancellors and their Deputies for Treatment, and sent down 
to these hospitals to be observed in their practices (Moghimi, 2004; Sadaghiani and Zare, 
2005). The UMSs at provincial level monitor the implementation of these standards by the 
hospitals. Although it was stated by a senior member of the surveyors that the NAPH was 
piloted at the beginning, no feedback was utilised to tailor the system to the new 
circumstances at later stages. The members of the hospitals claimed that they had not been 
asked at any time for their feedback or views at different stages of development, 
implementation or improvement of the NAPH.                                                                                 Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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 ‘No feedback is asked from this hospital to improve the NAPH; we reflect the 
problems though, but nothing has changed based on our views so far. What we say 
is mostly in an informal way and to the surveyors because there is no formal 
process in place for asking our feedback.’ (Head of ED: Hospital H) 
 
This comment was frequently repeated by an array of different hospital members. The 
hospitals did not feel, in a way, that their views and feedback were valued by the 
authorities of the NAPH. 
 
6.3.2. Chosen framework 
What was clear from the analysis of the MoH and the hospitals’ policy documents was that 
the NAPH was a compulsory programme and not a chosen evaluation system for the 
hospitals. Consistently, the analysis of the data demonstrated that most of the interviewees 
did not perceive the NAPH as a ‘chosen framework’, but a top-down oversight system. 
They believed that the NAPH is a basic evaluation system that annually requires them to 
review their activities and serves as a reminder for a number of static standards. 
  
6.3.3. Understandable  
It was claimed by the hospitals’ members that some standards of the NAPH, as is indicated 
in the following comment, were judgmental, too general and vague
23 and not specifically 
‘understandable’ to the hospitals.  
‘In the case of Nosocomial infection, they insist that we find more cases of the 
patients with this infection and if we report fewer cases, they will assume that our 
case-finding system is not working properly, while we think the less should be 
better.’ (Manager: Hospital C) 
 
In addition to the members of the hospitals, this issue was even raised by some members of 
the surveyors.  
‘Since the questions of the checklists are too general and somewhat vague, we 
ourselves try to make them more specific and clear for the hospitals.’ (Head 
Surveyor) 
                                                   
23. It was indicated that, because of this vagueness, the hospitals’ authorities needed sometimes to negotiate 
to justify the surveyors and raise their chance of attaining higher grades.  
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Similar concerns were shared about the ‘scoring’ method of the NAPH. The hospitals 
contended that they were not aware of the way the scores are allocated and of the varying 
importance given to their different practices.  
 
‘Scoring process is not clear for us. It is totally up to the surveyors’ judgements 
what score to give the hospital. Therefore, we do not know how to perform to get 
the full score for an activity or process.’ (Member of quality improvement office: 
Hospital F) 
 
6.3.4. Freedom guaranteeing/reducing 
A majority of the members of the hospitals did not think of the NAPH as constraining their 
‘freedom’ in their daily activities.  
 
‘I don’t suppose the NAPH limits my freedom and independence, because it is only 
an annual checking system which stays just for a few days with us in the hospital.’ 
(Head of ED: Hospital E) 
 
The physicians, as the most powerful and influential group in the hospitals, were mostly 
unaware of the functionality of the NAPH. It was claimed by the hospitals’ members that 
the mechanism mostly addressed the structural, not processual, facets of the hospitals. 
Therefore, it was not directly related to their activities. In addition, they also tended to 
judge this attribute of the NAPH (i.e. freedom reducing) based on the surveyors’ actions, 
stating that the process of the evaluation was interactive and proceeded in a friendly and 
informal mode.  
 ‘Their behaviour is interactive and cooperative and we don’t feel that they (the 
surveyors) restrain our freedom or discretion.’ (Head of ED: Hospital B) 
‘We do not feel they (the surveyors) are constraining our freedom and 
independence. They even try sometimes to help, but they are just performer of the 
evaluation and real decision maker about the programme is the MoH.’ (Matron: 
Hospital C) 
 
Therefore, these views might not be totally reflecting the nature of the whole accreditation 
system in terms of constraining their independence. For instance, since the hospitals 
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setting, according to Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) this might be seen as a freedom-
restraining feature of this mechanism.   
 
6.2.8. Relevancy 
As for ‘relevancy’ of the NAPH’s standards to the hospitals’ activities, the participants 
apparently approved that the standards were related to the different aspects of their 
hospitals. However, due to the lack of an updating system for the standards of the NAPH, 
they perceived them as too old and deficient to assess their current actions. They claimed 
that if any change was to happen in the activities of their hospitals or a new service was 
added, it may not have been covered by the current standards. In fact, the initial relevancy 
could be because APs are originally developed based on healthcare norms, as compared to 
other external PMSs which are transposed from the industrial sector (Shaw, 2000). They 
have the advantage of being directly linked with the activities of HCOs. Furthermore, the 
participants claimed that the activities of the hospitals were not covered by the standards, 
implying that the NAPH was not a ‘comprehensive’ mechanism. 
 
‘This evaluation system has been without any significant change from the 
beginning, and any new activity we added to our hospital is not covered by that.’ 
(Manager: Hospital E) 
 
6.2.9. Position of the NAPH  
In terms of the position of the official body performing the evaluations and developing the 
standards, most of the hospitals, especially NTH
24 contested the ‘appropriateness’ of the 
NAPH’s position for assessing all types of the hospitals. The NTHs especially argued that 
the surveyors are only the representatives of the MoH and the UMSs and that using similar 
surveyors for all types of hospitals is biased. This is clear from the following comment by 
a member of private hospital: 
‘We think it is biased, when the university both assesses its own hospitals and 
others; even if nothing occurs in practice, which I believe there is… other hospitals 
might feel in this way.’ (Manager: Hospital A) 
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Members of the teaching (public) hospitals were also aware of and concerned about this 
situation, for instance: 
‘Since the university is beneficiary of teaching hospitals, a bias can happen when 
its surveyors evaluate hospitals.’ (Head of Para-clinic Dept: Hospital F) 
 
Although the MoH’s interventions are alleged to be in the name of public interest, it might 
be argued that standard-setting efforts by the MoH are not passing the litmus test of being 
regulative and ASJ due to its active rejection of a wider stakeholders’ (hospitals) 
commitment and feedback (Laughlin, 2007).  
 
6.4. Empirical themes on the nature of the NAPH 
The following themes also emerged from the data, in conjunction with and as a result of 
the abovementioned characteristics of the NAPH, in addition to what was explained above 
on the basis of prior theories and models (i.e. Broadbent and Laughlin’s theoretical 
framework). These themes reflect further grounds on which the hospitals’ members did not 
consider the NAPH as rendering a ‘valid assessment’ of the performance of their 
organisation: 
￿  Coverage of the measures 
￿  Focus on structure rather than process 
￿  Biased approach to the hospitals’ performance  
￿  Disproportionate evaluation of the hospitals 
￿  Low sensitivity to local (organisational) factors  
￿  Static, repetitive vs. dynamic structure  
￿  Cross-sectional vs. continuous evaluation 
￿  Predictability 
￿  Judgemental vs. evidence-based standards 
￿  Time lag between field survey and scoring 
￿  Turning into an informal evaluation process 
￿  No reward and punishment system                                                                                 Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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￿  Surveyors’ issues 
 
6.4.1. Coverage of the measures 
There was a general view among the hospitals’ members that the NAPH in its current 
status did not represent a rounded picture of their hospitals’ performance (i.e. a non-
representative consideration of different domains). Although the NAPH was meant to 
assess all the activities of the hospitals, they felt that many areas of their best-performing 
activities were either undervalued or missed by this grading system. In particular, this was 
clearly stated by the single-specialty hospitals and the NTHs. Since the standards of the 
NAPH were static, it might not cover hospitals’ new services, initiatives and strengths as 
indicated by these hospitals. For example, the manager of a single-specialty hospital 
indicated that: 
 
‘This evaluation system has been without any change from its start, and any new 
activity we added to our hospital is not covered by that.’ (Manager: Hospital E) 
 
Some surveyors also believed that this programme is useful for hospitals only to a limited 
extent.  
‘I think this programme is only assessing the service quality of hospitals, insofar as 
it is within the confines of evaluation checklists.’ (Head Surveyor) 
 
For example, the evidence from this case-study showed that some managers and hospital 
decision-makers, since they thought that the NAPH was not giving a comprehensive 
assessment of their activities, were drawn towards deploying other quality improvement 
initiatives, such as productivity-enhancing practices, in their hospitals.  
 
‘We are initiating productivity measures in this hospital, because we feel the 
NAPH does not cover some areas which are important and of priority for us.’ 
(Manager: Hospital B) 
 
Pomey et al. (2010) reports a similar tendency among hospitals towards adopting other 
quality improvement procedures because of routinisation of APs. 
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6.4.2. Focus on structures over processes 
Some hospitals claimed that this programme put more focus on the hospitals’ physical and 
structural aspects and less on processes and outcomes. The following comments are 
reflective of this issue.  
‘It (the NAPH) mainly focuses on physical structures and not […] processes. So 
those hospitals with good structural appearance, such as advanced teaching 
hospitals automatically get better evaluation results, irrespective of their 
outcomes.’ (Third party surveyor) 
‘Checklists are mostly concerned with physical and structural matters and not with 
hospitals’ processes, whilst they both should be covered by the NAPH.’ (Matrons: 
Hospital F and B) 
 
As the documentary analysis of the evaluation checklists showed, they mostly checked the 
capacity of the hospitals for providing care. It has also been acknowledged by the 
authorities of the NAPH that the main focus of the NAPH is mostly on the quantitative 
elements (i.e. physical structures) of the hospitals (Moghimi, 2004). A fairly obvious 
problem in relation to this issue was that, in a few cases, there was some unused equipment 
in the hospitals, as mentioned by their members, bought only because of the requirements 
of the NAPH.  
 
‘The surveyors only check the existence of equipment; they have never checked 
whether we can use it or …’ (Head of Para-clinic Dept.: Hospital F) 
 
In addition, the emphasis on the structural aspects also caused the hospitals’ authorities to 
spend more money on preparing their hospital for the evaluation. Consequently, other 
high-priority activities could have been ignored or neglected.  
 
6.4.3. Biased approach to the hospitals’ performance 
This problem was voiced by the all hospitals, albeit largely by the NTHs. As mentioned 
earlier, varying types of hospitals were addressed by the research (e.g. teaching, private 
and institutional). The institutional hospital investigated was related to the Welfare and 
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standing in terms of financial position and quality of services as opposed to the other 
groups of hospitals studied in the whole research, as also stated by the surveyors.  
 
‘Social security hospitals have been good from the beginning; they have better 
financial situation and organised physical structure, supposedly better service 
quality.’ (Surveyor) 
 
The findings showed that the institutional hospital was always examining its grade in 
comparison with that of the teaching hospitals. Consequently, this hospital was expecting 
to achieve a high grade given its excellence and the structural focus of the NAPH. This 
hospital had negative perceptions of this evaluation programme overall and believed that, 
since the surveyors were related to the UMS, they were more lenient with the university 
hospitals and stricter with them. In addition, they claimed that the score allocated to their 
activities is not commensurate with the quality of their services in comparison with those 
of the teaching hospitals. The following comment is expressed by a member of the 
institutional hospital:  
‘Surveyors assess this hospital more strictly than the teaching hospitals. They 
normally carry a negative view towards this hospital in evaluation process… I 
know the requirements of the programme are not properly observed in the teaching 
hospitals, as I have worked there. However, they normally get better grade than us 
very easily.’ (Head of ED: Hospital H) 
‘In my experience, the university hospitals are being assessed by more ignorance 
as compared to other ones.’ (Manger: Hospital A) 
 
Private hospitals also raised similar issues with respect to the NAPH. The main problem 
cited by the private hospitals was that they were being assessed by similar standards used 
for the university hospitals, which were highly advanced and supported by the 
government. The private hospitals in this study were two small hospitals in contrast to the 
other two groups. These concerns were reflected in the comments of different members of 
a private hospital: 
‘… I feel they [surveyors] don’t give right score to us, because I don’t think it is 
fair to compare us with other advanced teaching hospitals and evaluate our work 
by the same checklists of standards for them.’ (Manager: Hospital E) 
‘They compare this hospital with publicly-funded advanced teaching hospitals 
which is not fair in my idea.’ (Supervisor: Hospital E) 
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Another important cause of the NTHs’ dissatisfaction with the NAPH resulted from not 
having their representative in the evaluation team of the NAPH. Since the evaluation was 
performed by the surveyors of the UMSs and the MoH, without any representative from 
them, the NTHs were always suspicious about the evaluation results of this evaluation 
system. Bohigas and Asenjo (1995) similarly found that the dual role of accreditor and 
owner played by the government jeopardised the credibility of the AP. 
 
6.4.4. Disproportionate evaluation of the hospitals 
Another issue regarding the evaluation of the hospitals emerging from the interviews was 
the ‘disproportionate requirements’ of the NAPH. This means that the hospitals claimed 
that some requirements of the NAPH exceeded their capabilities and facilities. They 
argued that the NAPH was asking for improvements and changes that they were unable to 
accomplish through lack of the prerequisites, which accords with Scrivens’ (1993) study. 
As they commented, the hospitals were evaluated on what they do not own or have control 
over. This issue could be against the feasibility principle of performance measures (Reiter 
et al., 2006). As Scrivens (1995a) argues, if set at an optimal level, accreditation standards 
should be achievable. 
 
‘According to our situation and capability as a single-specialty hospital, we really 
are not able to fulfil completely the requirements of the NAPH ... the standards are 
for general hospitals … some equipments or services are not necessary in this 
hospital but since the NAPH asks for them we must provide and prepare them 
because of the compulsory nature of the NAPH.’ (Manager: Hospital B)                                
 
Even the advanced teaching hospitals echoed this view:  
 
‘They (the surveyors) do not consider our out-of-hand limitations and capabilities 
in their evaluation.’ (Manager: Hospital B) 
‘The evaluation is not based on the hospital’s capability. We don’t think they 
evaluate what we have or are capable of doing.’ (Supervisor: Hospital E) 
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6.4.4.1. Human resources  
Most of the hospitals, particularly the teaching ones, were complaining about their 
shortage of staff. They claimed that their current rate of human resources in the hospitals 
was far below the rate required by the accreditation standards. They stated that the current 
standards were taken (translated) from developed countries and were not adaptable to their 
circumstances.  
 
‘We always get lower scores for our human resources, because they are not on a 
par with the standards and it is not in our hand to adjust that. We always lose 
points for this problem - it is a big inconsistency for this programme (Emphasis 
added).’ (Matron: Hospital C) 
 
The allocation of staff to the teaching hospitals, they argued, lay completely with the MoH 
(given its financial burden and the hospitals’ financial problems, they were unwilling to 
recruit temporary staff, whom they must pay themselves, to compensate for their shortage.) 
 
6.4.4.2. Physicians  
Another inconsistency was related to the activity of physicians in the hospitals. Principally, 
the hospitals’ consultants are the core of health care in Iran (it is fair to say in all 
healthcare systems). Their activities accomplish the main mission of the healthcare 
systems (Flood and Fennell, 1995). However, they are part of a system and need other 
groups’ cooperation, without which their work might not produce the intended results in 
delivering quality healthcare services, despite their prominent role. 
Most of the interviewees indicated that the quality improvement activities in the hospitals 
in relation to the consultants did not progress properly because they were reluctant to 
participate and cooperate in such activities. Pomey et al. (2010) and Touati and Pomey 
(2009) found similar evidence regarding the low tendency of the physicians to participate 
in quality improvement programmes (e.g. accreditation).  
 
 ‘Some problems that they [surveyors] refer to are because of our consultants’ 
activities (e.g. their attendance in the hospitals or the committee meetings) which 
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‘…regarding the attendance time of consultants in the hospitals, because of their 
power, the time requirements are not fulfilled by them.’ (Third-party surveyor) 
 
As to the standards of the NAPH in relation to the activities of the consultants (MoH, 
1997a), it was indicated that the surveyors mostly assessed the hospitals based on the 
hospitals’ current situation. Therefore, they might experience a loss of points in their score.   
The hospitals always sought to find an appropriate solution to push the physicians to 
comply with the requirements of the NAPH. 
  
‘We have problems with the clinicians who don’t comply with the requirements of 
NAPH (e.g. filling the patients’ record completely). We finally should make them to 
do that, IF POSSIBLE, because we lose points. I try to do this through senior 
managers [director] of the hospital.’ (Sister: Hospital E) 
 
The interviews with a few of the physicians also showed that they were either unaware of 
this programme or saw the NAPH more as a ‘formality’ than a quality improvement 
mechanism. Because of such perceptions and their tight schedules, it appeared that the 
NAPH did not have any priority for them.  
 
‘I know there is an evaluation programme, but I am not aware what it does and 
what its standards are.’ (Consultant: Hospital F)  
 
6.4.4.3. Physical structure  
Some of the hospitals, especially the teaching hospitals, were old and built a long time ago; 
thus, their physical layout and infrastructure were not suitable for a hospital. In such a 
situation the hospitals lost points in the related aspects for something that was beyond their 
control. Given the general focus of the NAPH on structural aspects of the hospitals, the 
losses could be considerable. They argued that the change of the physical structure of the 
hospitals was beyond their ability and authority. 
 
‘There are some unreasonable demands in current evaluation system, e.g. in 
relation to the physical layout of the hospitals …it is not easily changeable, but we 
must follow the checklists of standards.’ (Head surveyor) 
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6.4.4.4. Financial problems 
The most frequently cited problem was financial problems of the hospitals. Most of the 
hospitals, except for the institutional hospital to a certain extent, mentioned that they were 
experiencing financial difficulties. This problem was hampering the hospitals as they 
prepared themselves for the evaluation by the NAPH.  
 
‘The main obstacle is lack of financial resources, which prevents the hospitals from 
getting ready for evaluation ...’ (Head of Para-clinic department & Surveyor: 
Hospital C) 
 
Most of the interviewees believed that financial hardship was the origin of the majority of 
problems in the hospitals and a known obstacle to furthering quality improvement 
initiatives.  
‘Financial problem is the most important barrier in front of hospitals’ quality 
improvement initiatives.’ (Sister: Hospital E) 
 
The relating of this problem to the performance of the NAPH was important from this 
perspective in that the teaching hospitals claimed that the NAPH did not consider their 
financial ability to meet its requirements, as explained in the following problem. 
 
6.4.5. Low sensitivity to the organisational factors 
The standards of this evaluation programme were similar for all types of hospitals (MoH, 
1997a). A theme emerging from the interviews was the claim that the NAPH did not 
recognise the differences among those hospitals based on their ownership (public or 
private) and scope of activity (general or special and single specialty). That is, it did not 
have any particular standard specifically for the private or institutional hospitals. These 
NTHs believed that the NAPH was merely geared towards advanced teaching hospitals (it 
had specific bonus scores for teaching tasks). Although it was claimed by the surveyors 
that the checklists for single-specialty and general hospitals were somewhat different, as 
the interviews revealed, the hospitals did not accept or were not fully aware of this fact 
(when challenged by the researcher). 
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 ‘There are identical checklists for all types of hospitals and they are not 
proportionate with differing type of our hospitals.’ (Manager: Hospital E) 
 
As such, the hospitals claimed that the allocation of the scores (extra scores for teaching 
tasks and special departments) under a similar scoring system could raise the possibility of 
the teaching hospitals obtaining the higher grades in comparison with the NTHs (see Table 
3.1 and Table 3.2, chapter 3). Moreover, the standards’ orientation towards physical 
appearance and structures (Moghimi, 2004) similarly lessened the chances of the small or 
single-specialty hospitals achieving higher accreditation grades.  
The effect of low sensitivity is also clear in the following comments by members of the 
private and single-specialty hospitals. 
 
‘We are forced to have an active operating room in our ED; whilst because of our 
geographical location [she asserted] we do not have such patients in this hospital 
and there is a trauma centre in another hospital that patients are always referred 
to that… it is costly for us to keep it running based on the requirements of the 
NAPH.’ (Head of ED: Hospital E) 
‘… we are single-specialty hospital and it is difficult to get excellent grade one 
under this scoring procedure, because of its current allocation system of the 
scores. …only a hospital with four main wards
25 and other special departments 
have the chance to get that score.’ (Manager: Hospital B) 
 
 
6.4.6. Static and repetitive vs. dynamic structure  
This evaluation programme was stated by the interviewees to be a static assessment 
system. The standards of the NAPH have not been changed since its introduction in 1997, 
except for the addition of a small series of new standards few years ago in order to increase 
the NAPH’s focus on quality of services (MoH, 2004).  
 
‘The checklists have been static from a long time ago and we are aware of their 
content.’ (Head of Nutrition and Food services: Hospital D) 
‘Evaluation activities have been routinised in the hospital, because of being 
repetitive every year.’  (Head of ED: Hospital B) 
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The hospitals were also of the view that the static and repetitive nature of the evaluation 
process had driven them towards a ‘routinisation’ in their perceptions and reactions in 
relation to the NAPH, as they conceived of that as a routine checking system. Pomey et al. 
(2010) similarly found a decrease in the interest of hospitals in participating in APs over a 
long period. 
 
‘…seeing similar evaluation process every year with same checklists, honestly, I 
don’t bother to think of that seriously… When preparing for the evaluation, we 
sometimes even do not try to go and check the checklists of the NAPH … we have 
memorised all what they may want and therefore, just change what is important for 
the evaluation.’ (Matron: Hospital B) 
 
6.4.7. Cross-sectional vs. continuous evaluation  
The cross-sectional (rather than continuous and ongoing) nature of the NAPH was another 
problem related to this evaluation programme, according to the hospitals’ members. It was 
conducted once a year and there was no formal follow-up until the next evaluation time.  
 
‘The programme is just for a short time. We only see the surveyors for a few days 
and same again next year. The evaluation seems more like an annual routine check 
than an assessment and improvement programme.’ (Head of Nutrition and Food 
services: Hospital D) 
 
Some members believed that the NAPH should be frequently in touch with the hospitals, 
so that the hospitals, in a way, could feel its presence. 
 
6.4.8. Predictability  
The ‘predictability’ of the evaluation system has turned it into a fairly unattractive 
programme, because the hospitals mostly know what to do, when to prepare for the 
evaluation and not to worry themselves too much, as the following comments imply. 
  
‘We exactly know the content of the evaluation system. It is similar every year and 
predictable for us and so does not have any appeal and attraction for us.’ (Sister: 
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‘This programme (the NAPH) is repetitive and predictable for us. I think the 
hospitals can fix things to get ready for that.’ (Head of Nutrition and Food 
services: Hospital D) 
 
 
6.4.9. Time lag between on-site survey and scoring  
Most of the members noted that, since the scoring process is not happening in front of 
them, the scores are not what they believe they should receive for their abilities and 
services (lack of credibility for the scoring). They argued that the scoring process was not 
‘understandable’ to them. The process was that the surveyors assessed the hospitals by 
their methods but the scoring was assessed after they had left the hospitals. Therefore the 
hospitals argued that, were the scoring process to be conducted in the hospitals, they could 
justify to the surveyors the problems attributed to the hospitals, given the judgemental 
nature of some standards. In addition, as the following comment shows, the time delay 
between the day of visit and the hospitals receiving the report was long. Similar evidence 
is reflected by Scrivens (1993). 
  
‘We forgot the exact problems of the hospital some time because of a long time 
between assessment and scoring stages. Also, we feel unjustified about the given 
scores and identified problems.’ (Manager: Hospital H) 
 
 
6.4.10. Judgemental process of evaluation and standards 
The process of evaluation was argued by some interviewees in the hospitals to be 
judgemental and not evidence-based. They added that some questions in the checklists 
addressed the processual aspects of the services which needed a long period of monitoring, 
but since the surveyors were on site for only a short time they gave scores based on their 
judgement or, at most, by interviewing some of the staff. They explained that the process 
of scoring was left completely to the discretion and judgement of the surveyors, which 
could endanger the validity of the accreditation process (McAlary, 1981). The hospitals 
were claiming that they sometimes did not understand how they had received a certain 
score for a particular service. This problem was, in turn, somehow a consequence of the 
judgemental standards.  
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‘As to (evaluation) standards the surveyors might interpret them differently every 
year. For instance for a case that we even did much better than last year, we 
scored less than that year because they seem to understand things differently  year 
by year.’ (Supervisor: Hospital E) 
‘Because of judgemental nature of the standards, sometimes surveyors’ views are 
different from each other (e.g. surveyors and head surveyor). Their interpretation 
of the standards might differ.’ (Manager: Hospital B) 
 
The judgemental nature of some of the standards has also caused confusion among some 
hospitals. 
‘Some of the standards are completely judgemental and we do not know what to do 
to get the related score.’ (Head of quality office: Hospital D) 
 
Moreover, since the checklists had been left unchanged since their introduction in 1997, 
some hospitals questioned the credibility of the standards. 
 
‘They (surveyors) sometimes assess based on old procedures which are not 
currently in place in the hospitals, but since the checklists are old and they have 
not been updated, the surveyors ask about them every time.’ (Matron: Hospital F) 
‘Checklists are not up to date and they are not regularly changed based on the 
regulations.’ (Member of quality office: Hospital F) 
 
Because of this judgemental nature, it was also indicated by some members that the 
surveyors sometimes had to base their judgement solely on the claims of the hospital staff. 
Similar evidence was found by Delgoshayi and Tofighi (2005). 
 
6.4.11. Turning into an informal procedure   
One of the consequences of being static and repetitive was that hospitals got accustomed to 
this process. The same surveyors assessed the hospitals for a long time and hence the 
hospitals also knew them thoroughly and knew how to satisfy them in terms of arranging 
and meeting requirements or having a discourse with them. 
 
 ‘…in NAPH, it is going informally. We feel the surveyors as our colleagues and 
customers, because of the same surveyors for years.’ (Manager: Hospital B) 
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Hospitals had in fact got used to these surveyors. This situation worsens when the 
assessment is mostly based on the judgement of surveyors. Therefore, strong awareness by 
the hospitals about the mode and methods of evaluation by different surveyors might lay 
the groundwork for gaming. Since the surveyors also came from a similar context 
(university) to the members of those hospitals, an informal relationship could develop and 
unwittingly influence their judgement of the performance of a particular hospital. Also, it 
was found that some staff members of the hospitals were also members of the surveying 
team.  
‘Because of our shortage of expert we some times use hospital staff as surveyor, 
though it might not seem right.’ (Head of surveyors) 
 
In this situation and owing to the judgemental nature of the programme the following case 
could also arise.  
‘Because of being judgemental, surveyors sometimes factor their opposition to 
hospital management team into their assessment process: … we feel the low score 
was because the surveyors did not want to give us the right score and we have done 
our work and it is not our fault. I have heard this as a justification from some 
managers.’ (Head of quality office: Hospital D) 
 
Raising a similar issue, Scrivens (1993) indicates that different surveyors might notice all 
aspects of the hospitals whereas, if the same people are used every time, they are unlikely 
to do so. 
 
6.4.12. Limited focus on clinical performance 
The NAPH was said to have an insufficient focus on the clinical aspects of the hospitals’ 
practices. The members claimed that the mechanism was mostly related to the physical and 
non-clinical elements, while the key processes of the hospitals were clinically-oriented 
ones. 
‘This system only deals with our equipment and space in this department which are 
mostly administrative. I think it needs to investigate our activities and processes 
more.’ (Head nurse: Hospital D)  
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6.4.13. No clear reward and punishment system 
There was no tangible reward or punishment prescribed for the public hospital 
management team in the event of them not achieving the desired standards of the 
accreditation system. As such, no obvious reward was set formally for hospitals’ managers 
who obtained high grades, except being permitted to set higher tariffs for their services. In 
addition, no rewards were anticipated at an individual level for the hospitals’ members. 
  
‘There are no organised financial incentives for the departments that get higher 
score. They might get some rewarding leave or overtime hours which are very 
limited.’ (Head of quality improvement office: Hospital D) 
 
Lack of a clear reward and punishment system could remove the incentives for making 
efforts to achieve a better grade and performance (Custers et al. 2007).  
 
6.4.14. Surveyors’ issues  
There were also some comments made by the hospitals specifically regarding the skill, 
experience and familiarity of the surveyors with the hospitals’ activities, in addition to 
what has been mentioned earlier. The following statements were made by most of the 
interviewees in relation to the surveyors:  
￿  Surveyors are not quite familiar with hospital: they should be selected from among 
those with prior hospital work experience. 
￿  The surveyors are not trained regularly.  
￿  Because of nature of their work, they are somehow caught by ‘routines’, just doing 
some assessment without any creativity.  
￿  Surveyors do not have enough power to operationalise the improvements in the 
NAPH, based on the feedback of the hospitals. 
￿  The composition of the team and their skill are not comprehensive. 
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6.5. Perceived repercussions of the NAPH for the hospitals  
The aforementioned problems were, in turn, interrelated with and precipitated separate 
unwanted consequences in the hospitals in relation to the NAPH. The empirical data 
showed that the NAPH was unwittingly creating some negative effects in the hospitals. 
The intensity of these effects nevertheless varied in different hospitals. For instance, some 
consequences were more obvious in the private hospitals, such as pressure and 
intimidation. Given the financial climate in these hospitals, the members experienced more 
severe pressure from their management for obtaining better scores. As such, the level of 
distrust was higher among the managerial members of the NTHs. These repercussions 
could be placed and discussed at two following categories. The unintended effects were 
seen to somehow precipitate the dysfunctional consequences in the hospitals. In addition, 
the latter was conducted knowingly.  
￿  Unintended effects 
￿  Dysfunctional consequences 
 
6.5.1. Unintended consequences of the NAPH  
The following unwanted effects were found to be present among the members of the 
hospitals because of the NAPH: 
￿  Tunnel vision  
￿  Stress, pressure, anxiety and intimidation  
￿  Disillusionment and reduced staff morale 
￿  Distrust in the NAPH 
 
6.5.1.1. Tunnel vision 
The main duty of hospitals is to treat patients and deliver clinical services to the whole of 
society (Goyal, 2005). This is the first and foremost mission of all hospitals. Given this 
criticality and urgency of their tasks, hospitals are largely inclined to concentrate on their 
own work and are resistant to any intrusion that distracts and diverts them from this 
priority, i.e. tunnel vision (Walshe et al., 2001).                                                                                 Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
  
170 
Some members of the hospitals in this research claimed that, since this programme was 
imposing an extra burden of work on them, it had the potential to cause tunnel vision in the 
hospitals. The tunnel vision was mostly happening in busy departments such as the EDs 
(given the nature of their work and their crowded conditions), as mentioned by their 
members.  
‘In this ED I am always busy, but I should try to find time to fill the forms of triage 
(part of the evaluation process) for each patient. We can not leave them for another 
time because it should be completed at that time. Then, when we have too many 
patients or those with crucial condition, it might take our time and attention away 
from the patients. …I don’t know why this information is collected, I only know it is 
taking too much of my time, even the surveyors acknowledge that filling these 
forms will need too much time.’ (Head of ED: Hospital E) 
 
Nevertheless, in most of the cases, it was mentioned that, since the evaluation was only for 
a short time and previous arrangements by the hospitals had been made, the staff were able 
to spare some time for the on-site survey.  
 
‘Survey is just for a short time, and it does not normally take much of our time. 
Furthermore, since we know when they are coming, we put some time for them’. 
(Head of Para-clinic Dept.: Hospital B) 
 
6.5.1.2. Stress, pressure, anxiety and intimidation  
The hospitals under evaluation experienced tension and stress both from the NAPH and 
inside hospitals from their own management. Over the course of the evaluation, albeit for a 
short time, they felt stressed because they were experiencing a hectic time due to the cross-
sectional approach of the programme and also the evaluation of their performance. In some 
departments, such as the more clinically-oriented ones and EDs, this stress was more 
noticeable. 
The main source of stress, intimidation and anxiety for the staff, nonetheless, was mostly 
the pressure exerted by the managers of their hospitals. In particular, staff in the private 
hospitals expressed more serious concerns about receiving punitive actions from their 
manager in the event of gaining low scores in the evaluation of their department. 
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 ‘Stress, tension and workload is high in our ward during the evaluation time.’  
(Head of ED: Hospital B) 
 ‘We see sometimes pressures in the form of punishment from the hospital 
management because of getting low score in the evaluation for this department.’ 
(Sister: Hospital E) 
 
6.5.1.3. Disillusionment and reduced staff morale  
Another unintended consequence of the NAPH was disappointment among the staff and a 
reduction in their morale because of the effects of this evaluation programme. There were 
different grounds for the hospitals’ disappointment with the NAPH, as expressed by the 
members of the staff. The various perceived problems associated with the NAPH, as 
explained earlier, constituted the main cause of disappointment among the hospitals’ 
members. For example, the disproportionate evaluation of the NAPH was an important 
cause of disillusionment for the hospitals. They were dissatisfied because they were being 
assessed on the basis of matters beyond their control. Some of the NTHs also expressed 
their disappointment at being assessed by an evaluation team that is related to the UMS 
and is closer to the teaching hospitals. This desperation is reflected in the comments of a 
matron (Hospital H): 
 
‘I have worked in teaching hospitals before,… we are performing much better than 
some of them here in this [institutional] hospital, but so what… we hardly get 
better grades than those university-related hospitals.’ 
 
Some members referred to the static mode of the evaluation programme and its inability to 
improve their quality as another cause of their disappointment with the NAPH. In fact, 
they did not perceive any improvement in their services because of the NAPH; this 
disappointed them and reduced their morale, making them reluctant to cooperate with 
quality improvement initiatives. The participants claimed that the NAPH was mostly 
looking for the problems and not caring much about the hospitals’ strengths, which was 
another cause of disillusionment among hospital staff.  
Overall, since the hospitals saw that they were always assessed by an evaluation 
programme that was in their view problematic and unresolved over time, and that their 
feedback was either not requested or ineffective when solicited, the obvious consequence 
was disappointment and apathy towards this programme.                                                                                 Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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6.5.1.4. Distrust in the NAPH 
All the negative effects associated with the NAPH along with, more importantly, the 
perceived inability of the programme to improve quality of the hospitals’ services seemed 
to have eroded their members’ trust in this programme. The majority perceived the NAPH 
as a basic checking exercise rather than an improvement system.  
 
6.5.2. Dysfunctional consequences of the NAPH  
Another group of perceived repercussions of the NAPH for the hospitals could be referred 
to as ‘dysfunctional effects’. These effects represent those occasions when the hospitals 
had used some form of ruse to prepare themselves superficially for the evaluation by the 
NAPH. The ‘gaming and fixation’ effect was the main dysfunctional effect present in the 
hospitals. 
 
6.5.2.1. Gaming and fixation  
Gaming here refers to the attempts by organisations to conceal their non-conformity with 
the requirements of a steering mechanism (Oliver, 1991; Bevan and Hood, 2006b). 
Gaming is agued to be the most commonly discussed form of manipulation (Birnberg et 
al., 1983). The empirical investigation showed that the hospitals were involved in some 
sort of misrepresentation while making efforts to meet the demands of the current AP. As 
the following comments show, the characteristics of the gaming were mostly in the form 
of, for example, putting a piece of equipment in a medical unit just for the period of the 
on-site survey and removing it after the evaluation.  
 
‘We get prepared for the evaluation [by the NAPH] - sometimes superficially. We 
put some medical equipment such as “infusion pump or incubator” in our ED 
which we do not use, and we believe they are not necessary… …we take them away 
and return them to its previous ward after the evaluation.’ (Head of ED: Hospital 
B) 
 
Alternatively, gaming sometimes involved fabricating the pre-evaluation documents (e.g. 
those of the EDs) - mostly in private hospitals - since earning the higher grade was more 
crucial for these hospitals, as their expressions exhibited. The following comments                                                                                Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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disclose a developing conflict between the requirements of the NAPH and the interests of 
these hospitals, which seemed to make the situation conducive to gaming. 
 
‘We must prove the average time, after which a physician visits or nursing services 
are delivered to a patient arriving at the ED, has reduced during a period of six 
months to get the related evaluation score. In practice, to be honest, this might not 
always happen in this department because of our shortage of staff. In busy times 
we bring staff from other departments to keep the waiting times down, but this is 
not possible in long term.  
 
[When challenged by the researcher;] 
 
…although their score is very little, but according to the regulations they must be 
met.’ (Head of ED: Hospital E) 
 
It also emerged that a threat to the hospitals’ benefits also partly drove them towards 
gaming. For example, in the case of a cap on the rate of C-Sections conducted in the 
hospitals, the private ones seemed to see that policy clashing with their profit-making 
mission.  
‘…we have patients who for different reasons such as experiencing less pain and 
being classy, […], as I realised, tend to have C-Section in our hospital. They give 
full consent for the operation. …we are reluctant to reject their request, because 
we will lose our patients. But, the requirements do not allow us to stick to the wants 
of our customers.’ (Matron: Hospital E) 
 
Different reasons for gaming emerged in the comments of the members. For example, they 
mentioned that a particular piece of equipment, required by the NAPH, was not necessary 
for their department or they could not afford to buy it. 
 
‘…they [the surveyors] require expensive and unnecessary equipment that we 
cannot buy, so we may borrow or take from other departments only for the period 
of the survey.’ (Head of Laboratory: Hospital H) 
‘In some cases, there is no familiar specialist to work with the required equipment 
in the hospital, but they [the surveyors] just tick their checklists… (Matron: 
Hospital D) 
 
Sometimes the gaming occurred because the hospitals thought they deserved to receive 
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institutional hospital because, as mentioned earlier, their members believed they had better 
circumstances than the teaching hospitals.  
The gaming was further seen to be facilitated by the fact that the hospitals knew in 
advance when they were due to be evaluated by the NAPH, because of the limited number 
of unannounced evaluation visits; this also reflected by a member of the surveyors. 
 
‘Because the hospitals are aware of the approximate time of the evaluation, they 
could prepare superficially. I have realised this when I paid an unannounced visit 
to the hospitals.’ (Third-party surveyor) 
‘As the evaluation is pre-planned, I would imagine the occurrence of gaming …I 
have seen myself.’ (Matron: Hospital F) 
 
￿  Departmental gaming 
There were some occasions when the staff members tried to hide their non-conformity 
with the requirements of the NAPH because of their fear of facing punitive actions from 
their hospital management. This was more noticeable in the private hospitals. They were 
more concerned with obtaining the financial benefits of a high grade in accreditation, 
because of their for-profit nature and financial independence. This type of gaming was not 
a tactical reaction against the NAPH, but a defensive reaction by the staff.  
 
6.5.2.2. Rationales behind the gaming  
Both external and internal reasons were seen as being behind this reaction by the hospitals, 
as discussed above. The external rationale of the hospitals was the ‘perceivably 
unjustifiable and irrelevant requirements’ of the NAPH from the hospitals’ perspectives. 
For example, as the previous comments showed, the hospitals did not see buying or using 
specific medical equipment or preparing documents as influential in their provision of 
care; instead they saw it as a waste of their time or money. This reaction of the hospitals 
was also affected by their impressions that the NAPH is not contributing to the quality 
improvement in their hospitals overall. In fact, the perceived deficiencies associated with 
the NAPH (explained earlier in this chapter) were purported to have provoked such a 
perception among the hospitals’ members (especially in the case of the NTHs) towards the                                                                                Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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demands of the NAPH. In some cases, the threat to the hospitals’ interests by the 
evaluation requirement also seemed to precipitate the gaming in the (for-profit) hospitals. 
The internal rationale for the hospitals’ gaming was the inability of the hospitals to meet 
the demands of the NAPH. Different members of the hospitals frequently mentioned that 
some of the requirements were beyond the ability of their hospitals. This inability was 
observed in different aspects of the hospitals such as human resources, financial problems 
and physical structure, as discussed earlier under ‘disproportionate evaluation of the 
NAPH’.  
Considering these rationales, the gaming nevertheless took effect only when these 
rationales were coupled with the attributes associated with the NAPH, which are called 
‘colonising factors’, such as legal coercion (to be discussed below). The following 
comment by a manager reflects this concern: 
 
‘According to our situation and capabilities, as a single-specialty hospital, we 
really are not able to meet some requirements of the NAPH and only because of its 
compulsory nature we must comply with them.’ (Manager: Hospital B) 
 
 
6.5.3. Colonising features of the NAPH 
A causative situation for the gaming, as stated, was created particularly when the hospitals 
were not able to overtly reject those requirements of the NAPH which seemed irrational to 
them. Alternatively, this happened when the hospitals had insufficient means to fulfil the 
requirements. The reasons why the hospitals perceived the NAPH to be ‘irrelevant’ were 
explained earlier under ‘analysing the nature of the NAPH’. Further analysis of the 
empirical data revealed that there were specific attributes associated with the NAPH, 
referred to here as ‘colonising factors’, as a result of which the hospitals were drawn to the 
gaming and fixation (symbolic compliance). The term colonising is borrowed from the 
theoretical concept of ‘internal colonisation’ which represents a situation where an 
imposed measurement system or practice (e.g. the NAPH) forces an organisation to reflect 
values (e.g. gaming) which are not congruent with the societal and organisational values 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005, p. 11). These factors were thought to somehow contribute 
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empirical data indicated. They are mentioned below based on the degree of their influence 
on the hospitals’ behaviour and reaction towards the NAPH. 
1.  Legal coercion 
2.  Resource (financial) dependency  
3.  Legitimisation 
4.  Reputation 
    
6.5.3.1. Legal coercion 
Given the compulsory nature of the NAPH, legal coercion was one of the reasons noted by 
the hospitals for compliance with the requirements of the NAPH. They did not have any 
apparent option but to abide by the programme’s demands, even if these were not always 
approved of and accepted by the hospitals. All types of hospitals (i.e. public, private, 
institutional) were equally required to comply with the NAPH based on the regulations. 
  
‘Sometimes they (surveyors) for instance ask for the provision of a new service that 
is not to the benefit of the hospital, but we must comply with them in any case.’ 
(Manager: Hospital C)  
‘We are asked to buy some material or equipment that we don’t use too often and 
as a result of which the hospital incurs costs. But since it is a rule we must obey- 
e.g. buying a LP set, which is rarely used in this ward.’ (Matron: Hospital F)  
‘It has a few times happened that the surveyors have asked for some documents 
that we do not think are worth preparing, but it is obligatory and we must draw up, 
when asked.’ (Manager: Hospital C)  
 
Legal coercion was deemed an effective lever at the disposal of the MoH to maintain the 
hospitals in line with its own aspirations, since its breach could have repercussions for the 
hospitals.    
‘Few years ago, the hospitals were advised to change into breast-feeding friendly 
hospitals, but some of the hospitals did not cooperate well, because of the 
programme’s costs for them. Consequently, the MoH decided to enact the request 
and make it compulsory for all hospitals and … BINGO the problem solved!!’  
(Manager: Hospital B) 
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6.5.3.2. Resource (financial) dependency  
This factor was also of high importance in driving the hospitals towards gaming. The 
hospitals were reluctant and unable to resist perceivably irrational requirements of the 
NAPH, because they were financially dependent on this evaluatory mechanism. In fact, the 
higher the grade the hospitals received in their accreditation, the higher the tariffs they 
could charge for their hotel-type services, increasing their income. This money was 
allegedly the main financial source for the hospitals. Therefore, this kept the hospitals 
dependant on the NAPH, and even if the NAPH was a voluntary AP, they still had to 
comply with its requirements, even against their wishes. This rationale of the hospitals for 
compliance was even echoed by some members of the surveying team.  
 
 
‘Our motive to comply with this AP is to get high tariffs; because without them it is 
difficult for us to survive. In fact, they are our main financial source’ (Emphasis 
added). (Manager: Hospital C) 
 ‘The main motive of hospital for complying with NAPH is to get high tariffs, 
BECAUSE most of them are suffering from low income.’ (Third-party surveyor) 
 
The views on this attribute varied based on the type of hospital. For example, public 
hospitals were not as worried as private hospitals, because they were directly related to the 
MoH and were mostly supported by the government in any situation. Therefore, private 
hospitals were more concerned about their financial dependence on the NAPH.  
 
6.5.3.3. Legitimacy 
Legitimacy here virtually meant ‘authorisation to work as a hospital and provide services 
in society’. This permission is granted to the hospitals, once they obtain the accreditation 
grade. Therefore, conformity with the NAPH was expected to bring social legitimacy to 
the hospitals. As the documentary analysis showed, all hospitals in the country needed to 
apply for accreditation by the NAPH, and no hospital could operate unless it was 
accredited by this evaluation programme (MoH, 1997a). This shows that the hospitals 
gained their legitimacy from the MoH by complying with the requirements of the NAPH.  
 
‘…we need accreditation grade of the NAPH to CARRY ON our work [emphasis 
added].’ (Manager: Hospital B)                                                                                Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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This factor, nevertheless, was not as crucial in practice as it appears, for all the hospitals, 
but especially for teaching hospitals. Since these hospitals were linked to the MoH, their 
activity was very unlikely to be stopped by the government, as mentioned by a NTH 
manager. Investigation of the accreditation results of the last couple of years for the 
hospitals under study corroborated this argument. The high quality of services provided by 
all the teaching hospitals because of their advanced equipment and setting was raised as a 
reason for this record, although it was also doubted by some respondents. 
Currently legitimacy is only granted to the hospitals by the state through the NAPH, which 
is called regulative legitimacy (Scott, 2008b). There were other professional bodies (e.g. in 
relation to the physicians and nurses working in the hospitals) that conducted very rare 
supervision of the activities of the specific groups in the hospitals (normative legitimacy). 
However, these did not influence the accreditation grade of the hospitals. There was no 
group to regularly advocate patients’ rights. In fact these legitimacy concerns were in 
practice subsumed and reflected by the NAPH.  
 
6.5.3.4. Reputation  
Some members of the hospitals mentioned reputation as another rationale that encouraged 
the hospitals to consider compliance with the NAPH. It was important for the hospitals, as 
mentioned by a member of staff, to have a higher grade when they were compared to other 
hospitals. It gave them an internal feeling of content and prestige, she stated. However, 
there was not a consensus on the factor of reputation as a noticeable rationale from a 
managerial perspective and the managers did not consider it an effective factor in their 
decisions to comply with the NAPH. As such, no evidence was found to suggest that 
reputation encouraged the hospitals to consider gaming.  
The private hospitals also, surprisingly, did not see reputation as an influential element in 
the drive to secure higher grades. The reasons are fairly clear in following comments by 
the matron of a private hospital: 
 
‘I don’t see any reputation for this hospital coming out of our accreditation grade. 
Because the grade is not communicated publicly to patients and they are not aware 
of our grade. I am not sure patients care about our grade.  They don’t know about                                                                                Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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accreditation of hospitals. ...You can add the fact that there is no competition 
currently among the hospitals …’ 
 
Despite the fact that, according to regulations of the NAPH, the hospitals are required to 
display their last grade in the public domain during the year before the next accreditation, 
my observation did not reveal any sign of this happening in any of the hospitals. Even 
most of the managers of the hospitals were unaware of this regulation. This might indicate 
an information communication weakness between the hospitals and the NAPH. 
It seemed the hospitals also did not count on the NAPH-related reputation factor as an 
advantage to attract more patients. The results of a recent study  have affirmatively 
indicated that the accreditation grade did not have any effect on the behaviour of the 
patients in choosing their hospitals based on the grades (Aryankhesal and Sheldon, 2010). 
Meanwhile the empirical evidence shows that those PMSs inflicting reputational damage 
on poorly-performing HCOs are more likely to affect the performance of the HCOs 
(Hibbard et al., 2003; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009).  
 
6.5.4. The surveyors’ views on the rationales of the hospitals 
The surveyors also shared slightly similar views with regard to the hospitals’ rationales for 
conforming to the NAPH, which somehow approves and validates the perceptions of the 
hospitals in this regard. For example, the following comment by the head of surveying 
team outlines the main rationales of the hospitals from the surveyors’ perspectives. 
 
‘The reasons that hospitals normally conform to our programme [the NAPH], I 
think are its compulsory nature, high tariffs and improvement in their service 
quality, respectively.’  
 
6.5.5. Further rationales for hospitals’ compliance 
In addition to the above-mentioned grounds (i.e. legal coercion, economic gain, etc.) which 
constituted the dominant rationales of the hospitals, some other elements were seen to be 
effective in securing the hospitals’ compliance with the NAPH. The perceived beneficial 
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rationales. In addition, ‘religious and humanitarian values’ were also found to be playing a 
role in this conformity. These rationales were mostly seen among those in junior 
hierarchical and frontline levels of the hospitals. 
6.5.5.1. Religious values and altruism  
Some members of the hospitals, including mostly the frontline staff, also raised religious 
beliefs and humanitarian values as their grounds and motives for showing compliance with 
the demands of the NAPH. As observed, they hoped to help patients improve and heal, and 
any initiative (such as the NAPH) that could assist them for this purpose was valuable 
from their perspective and worth conforming to.  
 
 ‘…our motive for complying with the NAPH is helping patients. We hope its [the 
NAPH] guidelines could help us to do this invaluable task ...’ (Sister: Hospital E) 
 
This might be partly because they were directly dealing and concerned with the care of 
patients. In addition, there was a set of NAPH’s standards which assessed religious and 
ethical affairs in the hospitals. It was mentioned by the members that, given the nature of 
these standards, which were grounded in their religious and humane beliefs, and also 
considering the impropriety of questioning them, no-one thought of rejecting them, 
regardless even of colonising factors (e.g. legal coercion) associated with these 
requirements. The following comments somehow clarify the hospitals’ reactions towards 
these values.  
 
‘In any situation, we basically observe the religious values.’ (Manager: Hospital D) 
‘I do not remember I have seen any problem in respect to meeting the religious 
values in the hospitals. They also get comparatively high score for these 
requirements.’ (A member of surveyors) 
 
 
6.5.5.2. Scientific nature of the standards  
It was also claimed by the members of the surveying team that those standards of a more 
scientific and technical nature were better accepted by the hospitals’ staff. For example, as 
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introduced recently for prescription by the consultants in the hospitals (See table 3.3, 
chapter 3). This was also agreed upon by some members of the hospitals. 
 
 
‘…yes, we are told some of the recent standards of the NAPH are developed based 
on scientific evidence by specialist groups. As far as I am aware, our staff members 
normally show less objection to applying this type of requirements; even though, 
the manager might sometimes oppose because of their cost.’ (Matron: Hospital G) 
 
6.6. Beneficial consequences of the NAPH 
The main intention of introducing the NAPH by the MoH has been to improve the quality 
of healthcare services in the hospitals across the country and make the hospitals  safe 
places to serve patients in society (Moghimi, 2004; MoH, 1997a; 2008). With reference to 
anecdotal evidence, the head of the evaluation group of the NAPH in the HUMS 
maintained that it has made improvements in the hospitals, basing his argument on the fact 
that more hospitals are currently able to fulfil the standards as compared to the past. For 
the authorities of the NAPH, the compliance of the hospitals was the main sign of quality 
improvement; that is, the number of hospitals which obtained accreditation awards 
(grades) in evaluation by the NAPH was a way of measuring improvement in association 
with the NAPH. The following comment by a member of the NAPH’s authorities confirms 
this assumption.  
I think this programme has led to an improvement in the hospitals, because since 
the introduction of the NAPH, each year more hospitals could earn higher grades 
in their accreditation… under the guidance of the NAPH they learnt how to fulfil 
the standards.’ 
 
In addition to this comment, and regardless of the adverse effects and problems 
associated with the NAPH, the following perceived beneficial effects also emerged from 
the interviews with the hospitals’ members in connection with this evaluation 
mechanism. They seemed also to serve as other rationales for hospitals’ conformity to the 
NAPH.  
￿  Fresh pair of eyes 
￿  Lever to exert pressure on the authorities 
￿  Learning process                                                                                 Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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￿  Reminder of the rules and regulations 
￿  Financial support  
￿  Benchmark and decision support system (DDS) for the hospitals’ authorities (and 
the MoH’s policy-makers) 
￿  Quality improvement  
￿  Protection mechanism  
 
Empirical investigation of the data showed that, with reference to these beneficial 
consequences, the majority of the interviewees gave a positive answer to the question 
‘will you still participate in the NAPH if it is a voluntary programme?’  
 
6.6.1. Fresh pair of eyes 
One of the important advantages attributed to the NAPH by the hospitals was that this 
programme helped the hospitals to highlight and prioritise their problems and identify the 
areas for improvement (Pomey et al., 2010). Since the surveyors were from outside the 
hospitals and were not routinised by the daily activities of the organisations, they were 
expected to better identify their defects and faults. 
  
‘It is an external control and supervisory mechanism for the hospital which helps 
us to improve the situation. They are from outside of this organisation and could 
recognise our problems better than us.’ (Manager: Hospital D) 
 
6.6.2. Lever to exert a pressure on the higher authorities 
The NAPH served as a lever for some departments in the hospitals to force hospital 
managers to meet their needs. Heads of some departments used the preparation for 
evaluation by the NAPH to obtain budgets for buying a necessary piece of equipment, 
which the managers would otherwise have rejected. For example, the departments asked 
management to replace the old medical equipment in order to be prepared for the 
evaluation process.   
 
‘We sometimes use the NAPH as a lever for meeting and fulfilling our needs in 
our department that managers do not accept in normal situations. Managers                                                                                Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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accept them easily when we put forward our requests in this way.’ (Head of 
Nutrition and Food services: Hospital D) 
 
Moreover, some teaching hospitals also used this mechanism to put pressure on the UMS 
to obtain larger budgets, which might ordinarily take a long time or be impossible due to 
the bureaucratic processes in place. The importance attached to the NAPH evaluation by 
the managers and authorities had created this opportunity for the departments and 
hospitals. Therefore, the higher-ups were inclined to accept the requests from the hospitals 
in line with the preparation for the NAPH evaluation. Pomey et al. (2010) found similar 
reactions from the hospitals’ CEOs towards accreditation. They discovered that the 
accreditation helped the CEOs to accentuate their needs to the authorities.   
 
6.6.3. Learning process  
The NAPH was perceived to stimulate learning processes in the hospitals. Current 
accreditation checklists reflected the basic standards of healthcare practices in different 
areas for the hospital staff, as raised by the educational supervisor of one of the hospitals. 
The staff members were found to use the accreditation standards as a reference base for 
their practices. Moreover, on some occasions the suggestions given by the surveyors to 
the staff after the evaluation of the hospitals was a source of information for the hospitals.  
 
‘The recommendations given by the surveyors are a driver for knowing about 
standards and how to try to reach up to that point, specifically for our new staff.’ 
(Manager: Hospital D) 
 
In this case, the NAPH was deemed a free-of-charge consultation base, specifically for 
private hospitals, about maintaining the standards in their hospitals. Despite this learning 
assistance which mostly happened in the initial years of the programme, given the 
repetitive nature of the NAPH, the hospitals indicated that it had not provided any new 
insights for them since then (Aryankhesal, 2010). 
 
6.6.4. Reminder of the rules and regulations 
This evaluation programme also served as a reminder to the members of the hospitals of 
standards and regulations. Because of the annual evaluation of the hospitals and necessity 
of preparation for the evaluation, the standards were repeated annually for the staff.                                                                                 Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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 ‘We have this evaluation repeating every year. …it is an annual reminder of 
standards and regulations for our staff in this hospital.’ (Matron: Hospital C) 
 
The accreditation also helped clarify rules by requiring them to be documented and 
frequently implemented (Touati and Pomey, 2009). 
 
6.6.5. Financial support  
This advantage is an ambivalent feature of the NAPH. It might cause gaming inside 
hospitals, as explained earlier, but also provide, in an ideal situation, financial support for 
hospitals and their quality improvement efforts (Custers et al., 2007). This was crucial for 
the hospitals, since they all complained about the financial difficulties they faced. The staff 
members could also benefit indirectly from a high grade of accreditation in the sense that 
they could earn more overtime pay and, consequently, a higher income if their hospital 
gained a higher grade, although this was not consistently reflected by all members of the 
staff.  
 
‘There has not been any change in my salary after our higher grade. The hospital 
manager promised to give rewards for getting a better grade but it did not 
happen.’ (Para-clinic Dept.: Hospital E) 
 
However, in some hospitals, the departments with highest scores were rewarded, although 
not financially. In addition, the overall income of the hospital rose sizeably as a result of a 
higher grade. The accreditation grade is the main prerequisite for the hospitals to set 
service contracts with third-party organisations (e.g. insurance bodies
26).   
 
 
                                                   
26. Insurance bodies could also rely on the grades to arrange and regulate their efforts and decisions in their 
contractual liaisons with the hospitals. 
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6.6.6. Benchmark and DDS for the hospitals’ authorities (and the MoH’s 
policy-makers) 
Another benefit mentioned by the hospitals’ managers in relation to the NAPH was that 
this evaluation programme helped them to compare themselves against one another. This 
is consistent with the results of Scrivens’s (1993) study. Given the grade the hospitals 
were granted by the NAPH, the hospitals could gain an overall picture of their own 
performance in comparison with other hospitals, especially those with the highest grades.  
 
‘We see our grade as a benchmark sometimes to compare ourselves with other 
hospitals and even with ourselves during the different times.’ (Manager: Hospital 
C) 
 
Even though the grades of the hospitals were not officially published, the managers stated 
that they were informally aware of the grade of the other hospitals in the same area. 
The decision-makers in the MoH also used these grades to increase their knowledge and 
awareness of the performance and, consequently, the problems of the hospitals, and paid 
more attention to those with lower grades (as commented by the head of the surveying 
team). In fact, this uniform evaluatory system allowed the MoH to become informed of 
the hospitals’ capacity and functioning, without having to take notice of specific features 
of various hospitals. The NAPH also instigated a more structured and systematic 
collection of data regarding the issues of interest for the MoH and the UMS, such as 
periodical patient satisfaction or mortality rate of the hospitals. 
 
6.6.7. Quality improvement  
The contribution of the NAPH to the quality improvement efforts in the hospitals could be, 
in the main, recognised through its outputs (i.e. immediate effects). For instance, an 
obvious way in which the NAPH laid the groundwork for the improvement in the 
hospitals’ services was by triggering the senior members of the hospitals to convene to 
identify the problems and find pertinent solutions for them. These gatherings happened 
during the preparation and post-evaluation stages of the NAPH. It was claimed that such 
meetings facilitated both coordination and communication among the different members 
and departments of the hospitals (Baskind et al., 2010), even though they were only limited                                                                                Ass ss        M    s        NAPH 
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to the senior members. Scrivens (1993) also found that accreditation was used as a spur by 
managers to encourage teamwork among their staff in the hospitals. 
 
‘Before the evaluation we hold some meetings including the directors of different 
departments to identify the problems and find solutions in the hospital in order to 
get ready for main evaluation.’ (Sister: Hospital E)                                                      
 
A similar study also found that the accreditation triggered the creation of an organisational 
structure for quality improvement in the hospitals (Pomey et al., 2010).  
Similarly, the recommendations sometimes given to the hospitals by the surveyors at the 
end of the evaluation were another indirect effect by the NAPH to effect quality 
improvement in the hospitals, as raised in the interviews. The recommendations offered by 
APs for boosting quality in HCOs are argued to serve to fulfil ‘improvement-and-change’ 
intentions of these systems in organisations under evaluation (Touati and Pomey, 2009, p. 
161). The convening of the management team of the hospitals after the on-site survey to 
operationalise the requirements of the NAPH was also another way in which the NAPH 
could contribute to the quality improvement in the hospitals. 
In addition, it was claimed by some managers that higher grades served as a motivation 
and morale booster for their staff to strive to improve their services (Pomey et al., 2010). 
 
 ‘Earning grade one pushes us to make more efforts, because it raises the 
expectations from us every year.’ (Manager: Hospital D) 
 
Overall, the major effect of the NAPH in this regard, as touched upon earlier, might be the 
enhanced compliance of the hospitals over time. It was mentioned both by the members of 
surveyors and the hospitals’ members that, currently, more hospitals could earn higher 
grades than in previous years. 
 
‘Currently as a result of this programme [the NAPH] the hospitals are better off in 
terms of their physical and human resource aspects, as compared to some years 
ago.’ (Head of Para-clinic Dept.: Hospital C) 
 
Similar evidence could be found in the literature (e.g. Salmon et al., 2003; Snyder and 
Anderson, 2005), arguing that APs mostly improve the compliance rather than the quality 
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6.6.8. Protection mechanism 
The benefit of this AP could also be seen from a wider societal perspective. Health care is 
a complex area with vital outcomes which are directly related to the death and life of 
people (Gauld, 2005) and also to vulnerable costumers as a result of an information 
asymmetry between providers and patients (Montague, 2003).  
Within this situation the NAPH, as an external regulatory mechanism and under the 
control of the government as the guardian of public interest, was set up to ensure 
healthcare services are delivered safely and are of a high quality (MoH, 1997a). This was 
an important task for this AP, owing to the criticality of healthcare outcomes. Therefore, 
since the NAPH pointed to the hospitals’ deviations from the regulations (i.e. the 
accreditation standards) and warned about the breach of safety rules by the hospitals, it 
was assumed to be a protection mechanism for society. This effect was raised a few times 
by the hospital members and surveyors. 
 
‘This programme [the NAPH] is useful ultimately for patients. As they are not 
able to have control on the practices of the hospitals themselves, it monitors 
safety and quality of the services for them. (Head Surveyor) 
 
Besides the above-mentioned benefits, accreditation gave a holistic view to the managers 
in that they have to look at the entire hospitals rather than just discrete departments. 
 
Chapter 7 - Reactions and Rationales of the Hospitals 
towards the NAPH 
 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction  
Following on from chapter six, which presented the first part of the study’s finding (i.e. the 
merits and worth of the NAPH); this chapter explains the different reactions (change 
effects) of the hospitals to the NAPH and the underlying rationales for their behaviours, as 
the second and final part of the findings. The final section of this chapter comprises a 
number of empirical recommendations for improving the performance of the NAPH. 
 
7.2. The reactions and change processes in the hospitals 
In the process of analysing the hospitals’ reactions to the NAPH and its change effects in 
the hospitals, the following issues are considered: 
First, since the NAPH was a compulsory programme for all types of hospital, none of them 
could be left unaccredited and, hence, there was no possibility to compare, for example, an 
accredited with a non-accredited hospital for identification of any change, comparatively, 
resulting from the NAPH. 
Second, all the hospitals had been under the annual evaluation of the NAPH for a fairly 
long time and, in essence, the hospitals were evaluated by the NAPH immediately after 
their establishment. Therefore, there was no chance to compare the situation of pre/post-
evaluation of the hospitals in order to recognise the change effects triggered by the NAPH. 
In addition, the a priori state of the NAPH brings to mind the criticism by Gray et al. 
(1995) of Laughlin’s (1991) change framework. They argued that the model fails to 
identify a priori disturbances. Third, given the fact that the longer a hospital was under evaluation by the NAPH the 
better it might have been at handling the NAPH’s requirements (because of the repetitive 
standards of the NAPH
27), the researcher selected those hospitals that had been under the 
evaluation of the NAPH for at least five years. This would ensure that all hospitals were 
fully aware of the standards of the programme. Furthermore, with a similar set of 
evaluation standards every year, the perceptions of the hospitals’ members towards this 
programme were expected to be relevant (i.e. the variation of the perceptions at different 
points of time was thought to be low). 
Considering these points, the researcher mainly sought  evidence of change based on a 
retrospective approach (Stufflebeam, 2001), relying on the perceived reactions of the 
hospitals to the requirements of the NAPH. He also looked for the perceived change 
effects of the NAPH on the different elements of the hospitals. The members were asked 
whether they had perceived any change in different aspects of their hospitals (with a focus 
on three main theoretical elements of the model) that had been triggered by (attributed to) 
this evaluatory mechanism. The changes were de facto expected to represent the efforts 
made (actions taken) by the hospitals to meet (react to) the requirements of the NAPH. 
 
7.2.1. Real-life steps of the changes in the hospitals 
The change effects of the NAPH on the hospitals appeared to happen in different stages of 
their evaluation. The first part of the hospitals’ efforts to react to the NAPH occurred 
during the preparation stage, while they were gearing themselves up for the on-site survey 
by the NAPH. In this stage, a meeting was held of the directors of different departments of 
the hospital, chaired by the hospital’s manager, after being informed of their forthcoming 
evaluation.  
 
‘We are informed of the approximate date of the on-site survey before expiry of our 
current grade. Knowing this, we hold a meeting of the directors [the CISE] and 
within which consider how to prepare for the evaluation.’ (Head of Quality 
Improvement Office: Hospital D) 
                                                   
27. This was also indicated by one member of the NAPH’s authorities, because the hospitals could learn how 
to deal with and meet the requirements over time. 
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The checklists, which were already placed at the hospitals’ disposal by the NAPH during 
the first evaluation, were the basic framework for the preparation stage. The CISE had the 
leading role in the preparation sessions. In most of the hospitals under study (especially 
public advanced hospitals) a quality improvement office (QIO) dealt with the evaluation of 
the hospitals, along with the hospitals’ other quality improvement practices. The head of 
this office was always the secretary of the CISE. The extent of power devolved to these 
units differed across the hospitals, depending on both the value given by and the 
understanding of the hospitals’ top management of quality, as mentioned by the head of a 
QIO.  
 
‘Fortunately in this hospital the manager, because of his relevant education, 
always supports and encourages us to find innovative ways for improving quality.’ 
(Head of quality improvement office: Hospital B) 
 
The second stage of the evaluation was an on-site visit by the surveyors. During the 
process of the survey, which lasted for a short time (depending on the size of the hospitals 
in terms of the number of beds) no change perceptibly took place. In this stage, the 
hospitals were cross-checked against the evaluation standards by the surveyors through 
observing, interviewing staff and patients and reviewing the corresponding documentation. 
The analysis of the data showed that, in this stage, the hospitals concealed their non-
conformity by expressing symbolic compliance (i.e. gaming). 
Another wave of changes triggered by the NAPH occurred after the on-site assessment of 
the hospitals, when they were asked by the surveyors to rectify the existing defects in order 
to earn the required accreditation status (grade). Similarly, in this stage, the CISE also 
played a key role in communicating the requirements to the all departments. After the on-
site evaluations, a list of problems was dispatched to the hospitals, which instigated a 
convening of the members of the CISE to investigate how to meet the requirements. 
   
 
7.2.2. Change effects of the NAPH 
Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) theoretical language is invoked to help develop an 
understanding of the reactions and change processes of the hospitals over the course of 
their efforts to meet the requirements of the NAPH. The intention has been to draw on this                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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language to examine the nature of this steering mechanism through its outcome (i.e. 
triggered perceived changes) in the hospitals. These authors have argued that, when a 
disturbance such as an external PMS with the aim of change or improvement (e.g. the 
NAPH) seeks to change organisations, different outcomes and behavioural reactions might 
emerge. As they have explained, these reactions could be better understood by tracing the 
processes and routes, calling them ‘pathways’, along which the changes travel through an 
organisation (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005, p. 16). These pathways, elaborated in chapter 
four, are specifically categorised into rebuttal, reorientation, colonisation and evolution 
(Laughlin, 1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). The first two signify slight shifts and 
transitions in organisations’ tangible structures which cause them to either reject or absorb 
the imposed requirements. By showing these reactions, the organisations maintain their 
initial status (Larrinaga-González et al., 2001). The latter types, nonetheless, point to deep 
and lasting changes which transform the organisations’ values, in addition to their tangible 
aspects. In these circumstances, the organisations might submit to or adopt the 
requirements, depending on their nature. Therefore, the rejection (rebuttal), absorption 
(reorientation), submission (colonisation) and adoption (evolution) provided a heuristic 
language to look into the reactions of the hospitals to the requirements of the NAPH.  
Laughlin (2007) has argued that the rebuttal, reorientation and colonisation pathways are 
of the same nature and function. That is, if a disturbance (driver) cannot be refused 
(rebuttal), it might be absorbed (reorientation) and finally, under specific circumstances, 
result in the colonisation of an organisation
28. Therefore, as Laughlin (2007) puts it, the 
constant presence of these pathways could signify that the driver is not in congruence with 
organisations’ ISs and raise serious questions about the merits and worth of the driver. 
Such an interpretation has provided the researcher with a theoretical language for assessing 
the nature of the NAPH. That is, the evidence for this continuum of change (including 
rebuttal, reorientation and colonisation) from the hospitals might prove that the NAPH has 
diverged from its preset goals.  
The investigation of the hospitals’ reactions to the NAPH has hence been conducted in the 
light of this model. The analysis of the guidelines of the NAPH (i.e. the checklists of 
standards; see Table 3.1, chapter 3) illustrated that the majority of the standards are 
                                                   
28. Since not all organisations might pass through these pathways, it is better not to consider them as a 
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directed at the most tangible elements (i.e. subsystems) of the hospitals such as their staff, 
equipment and physical layout (Haigh and De Graaf, 2009). The development of the 
hospitals’ reactions and the processes of changes were guided through their DAs (to be 
explained later) and those who had control over these structures. This endorses the 
argument of Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) model that organisational DAs play the 
main role in guiding the external disturbances inside organisations. Modell (2001) also 
refers to the management team as the main absorber of changes in organisations. The 
hospital committees including the directors of the main departments (those virtually 
owning the power of decision-making in the hospitals), were the principal DAs in all the 
hospitals, and were the forums in which the main decisions on how to react to the NAPH 
were taken. The committees in fact acted as communication structures to convey the 
requirements of the NAPH to the hospitals’ members (MoH, 1997a). In particular, an 
internal committee was put in place, in line with the guidelines of the NAPH, to deal with 
and fulfil the requirements of the NAPH in the hospitals. This committee had a pivotal role 
in steering the accreditation process in the hospitals. Prior to the accreditation, it asked for 
reports from other specialist committees regarding the problems in their areas to be 
considered and dealt with in this committee, for preparing the hospitals. 
As the importance of DAs was highlighted in steering the effects of disturbances on 
organisations, the nature of the hospitals’ DAs was analysed to gain an understanding of 
the impact of the NAPH on the hospitals. Furthermore, the perceptions and reactions of 
hospitals’ managerial teams (who had control over the DAs) were considered towards 
these DAs.  
 
7.2.3. DAs of the hospitals 
DAs in organisations, as explained in chapter four, are intra-organisational management 
structures, procedures and programmes which seek to control the organisations and ensure 
that their workings, i.e. subsystems, are in line with their ISs. In this sense, the analysis of 
the relevant documents of the hospitals and the interviews showed that the following 
structures and mechanisms were the main DAs applied in the hospitals to control and 
improve their activities.  
￿  Internal quality improvement programmes (IQIPs) 
￿  Hospital committees                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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The DAs of the hospitals were not limited to the aforementioned and could further include 
the accounting and financial arrangements of the hospitals, as indicated by various studies 
(e.g. Laughlin, 2007). However, since the latter were not directly influenced by the NAPH, 
they are not considered or explained here. 
The core of these DAs was the role of those having control over these structures. They are 
called ‘specialised work groups’ (SWGs) who, as Broadbent and Laughlin (1998, p. 407) 
indicate, ‘have a unique position in all organisations,…filter environmental disturbances, 
…provide the direction for the full expression of the values or interpretive schemes in the 
actual and future workings of the organisation.’ In this sense and in relation to the NAPH’s 
requirements, the current study showed that the hospital managers and the directors of the 
main departments involved in the hospital committees held such a position in the hospitals. 
However, in practice the managers had the influential role in these groups.  
 
7.2.3.1. Internal quality improvement programmes 
This group of DAs included those procedures that the hospitals had adopted externally or 
developed internally to control and standardise their activities and processes to improve 
the quality of their services (i.e. ensure their subsystems were aligned with hospitals’ ISs). 
Some hospitals had adopted and adapted external quality improvement programmes such 
as ISO 9000, and others had developed their own IQIPs.  
7.2.3.1.1. ISO 
ISO was the most common external programme adapted by the hospitals to improve the 
quality of their services and organise their internal processes and activities. Analysis of the 
related formal documents showed that the written policy of the ISO in those hospitals 
encompassed two main goals: 
o  Increasing patients’ satisfaction  
o  Reducing waiting times 
These goals were written and displayed in crowded parts of the hospitals so as to be 
noticeable for both staff and patients. The reason for this was to communicate these 
principles to the whole hospital and create a situation conducive to the implementation of 
this programme. ISO was adopted voluntarily after recommendation of the HUMS,                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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specifically by those hospitals that were better placed in terms of physical and financial 
circumstances. Those hospitals that opted to deploy this programme were also helped 
financially (i.e. part of its cost) by the HUMS. However, not all hospitals were interested 
in applying ISO and only three out of eight at the time of data collection had adopted this 
IQIP. The first impression was that the hospitals did not want to create a headache for 
themselves and impose extra burdens on their staff. The following explanation was given 
by the manager of a hospital for not using this programme.  
 
‘ISO is an industry-oriented programme where all processes are certain, while in 
health care and especially hospitals, our processes are varying and might not be 
standardised easily. Also the people who are directing ISO activities are from 
industry themselves and hardly understand the healthcare environment. …There 
are other important priorities for our hospital and ISO is not a priority currently 
for us and our patients. We also do not have basic prerequisites for deploying ISO. 
I did not want to deploy ISO because I think it is imposing a large burden of work 
on my personnel and it creates only unnecessary paperwork for them.’ (Manager: 
Hospital C) 
 
￿ Motives behind ISO 
The initial intention of adopting ISO, as it turned out, was not entirely triggered from 
inside the hospitals and after consultation with the hospitals’ staff. Instead, the managers of 
the hospitals decided themselves and only asked for their subordinates’ views about ways 
of operating the ISO.  
 
‘In case of implementing ISO, firstly the senior management (the hospital manager 
and director) decided to go for that and then we brought that to the other 
departments’ notice and asked for their participation.’ (Manager: Hospital D) 
 
Motivations for deploying ISO inside the hospitals varied; for instance, it was considered a 
quality improvement system, a platform to increase the chance of obtaining a higher grade 
in the accreditation and a way of enhancing their reputation. 
 
‘We want to raise our reputation among other hospitals by implementing ISO. We 
also intend to get better grade in hospital evaluation by implementing ISO. … it 
was also because our hospital was financially in good situation, had receptive                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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human resource
29 and support and encouragement from the UMS for implementing 
ISO.’ (Manager: Hospital B) 
 
 
However, staff mostly saw reasons other than quality improvement benefits of the ISO for 
the hospitals, such as reputation of managers and hospitals among their fellow hospitals 
and recommendations of the UMS. Some also saw the hospitals’ management as a 
paramount factor in adopting this quality improvement programme. 
 
‘Although we aim to improve the quality of hospitals’ services by ISO, the real 
driver behind adopting ISO was decision of our manager and there was not any 
feedback asked from the personnel. It was a complete top-down decision.’ (Head of 
ISO office: Hospital D) 
 
￿ Stages of ISO in the hospitals 
The real-life stages of operationalising ISO in the hospitals were as follows: 
1.  Attendance by the heads of departments and the hospitals’ senior staff in the ISO-
orientation courses run by an external ISO consultancy body; 
2.  Identifying and mapping the work processes of hospitals’ departments by staff 
themselves, with the assistance of the hospitals’ ISO offices; 
3.  Developing indicators based on the processes jointly by the departments and ISO 
office; 
4.  Setting indicators as ultimate targets to improve the processes over time; 
5.  Internal and external audits for assessing the degree of achievement to and 
diversion from the desired indicators. 
These steps were taken by all hospitals deploying ISO in the selected research field.  
￿ Benefits of the ISO 
Perceived benefits of the ISO for the hospitals, according to the comments of the hospitals’ 
members, included: 
                                                   
29. A majority of this hospital’s staff members were women. The manager believed that they were less 
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•  Organising and putting the workings of departments in good order, reducing the 
amount of work done haphazardly or based on staff’s personal taste and style, 
and reducing duplications; 
•  Stipulating the main policy and procedures of the hospitals for all departments 
(the policy of the hospital in relation to ISO is communicated to different 
departments) and staff; 
•  Helping to improve the circumstances of individual departments by 
highlighting their obstacles and problems as a requirement of ISO to be noted 
and solved quickly by the managers; 
•  Defining job descriptions for staff, clarifying their tasks and setting guidelines 
for different departments; 
•  Setting standards and indicators for the hospital’s performance; 
•  Asking for feedback from patients regularly and communicating this to 
management and the UMS to improve the quality of services; 
•  Measuring patients’ satisfaction after discharge; 
•  Producing useful statistics for managers’ decision-making (a DDS for 
managers). 
These advantages were the immediate effects (outputs) of the implementation of ISO in the 
hospitals, as reflected by different members of the hospitals. However, their real 
implications (outcomes) for the quality of the care in the hospitals were not examined and 
clarified.  
 
￿ Problems with ISO 
Apart from the perceived benefits of ISO in the hospitals, staff also pointed to some 
problems they faced while applying this scheme. They included: 
￿  The obsession of ISO with paperwork which imposed a large burden on staff in 
addition to their regular tasks; 
￿  Tunnel vision because time spent by staff with patients was reduced; 
￿  Stress and pressure on staff because of heavy workload after implementation of 
ISO;                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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￿  Increasing the expectations, with no tangible effects on the quality of the services, 
as raised by the matron of a hospital:  
 
‘ISO has given a pretext to our patients to complain more than before about 
the hospitals’ services. For example, they say the hospital has ISO but it is 
not delivering pertinent services.’ (Matron: Hospital B) 
 
The reason, as she maintained, was that the improvement in the services of the hospitals as 
a result of the ISO was not noticeable and tangible for the patients. She claimed that ISO, 
in its early stages in their hospital, was mostly related to paperwork and did not have 
objective effects on quality of the services.  
 
￿ Obstacles to operationalising ISO in the hospitals 
Interviews and non-participant observation revealed the following obstacles encountered 
by the hospitals in their efforts to utilise this quality improvement programme. 
1.  Cooperation of physicians 
The first obstacle mentioned by the personnel was related to the lack of cooperation by the 
physicians with the ISO. 
 
‘Cooperation of physicians is not enough for full operationalisation of ISO in this 
hospital.’ (Head of ISO office: Hospital D) 
 ‘Our main problem with ISO is caused in relation to physicians (e.g. their 
attendance in this department); in ISO we have an indicator for the time period of 
physicians’ attendance per day in the department. The persistence of this problem 
reduces our motivation for ISO’. (Head of Para-clinic department: Hospital B) 
 
Since the physicians are the most influential group in hospitals, and their activities lie at 
the heart of hospitals’ processes (Flood and Fennell, 1995), their disconnection with 
quality improvement activities might ultimately abort the usefulness of these efforts for the 
hospitals and quality of services.  
 
2.  Financial problems  
Money was mentioned as another obstacle to operationalising ISO in the hospitals. 
Overall, most of the hospitals were complaining about their financial problems. The staff 
were anxious about the fact that ISO was requiring them to correct their processes and                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
  
199 
create internal arrangements without the necessary financial provision from the 
management.  
 
‘5Ss was one part of the UMS’s improvement programme in the hospitals which 
was not successful in this hospital because of the lack of budget.’ (Member of 
quality improvement office: Hospital F) 
 
3.  Physical structure 
The faulty and old physical structure of the hospitals was another important problem in 
furthering ISO initiatives. Some of the hospitals were old and not purpose-built. Therefore, 
it was difficult for them to meet the all standards of the ISO with regard to space allocation 
and management of the hospitals.  
 ‘… an important part of the ISO standards is related to our spaces in clinical 
departments, but you can see, this hospital is old and it is not easy to change its 
structure. There is neither budget and nor management interest in that.’ (Matron: 
Hospital D) 
 
4.  Lack of experts 
A lack of experienced experts who were adept at both health care and ISO was another 
obstacle to furthering ISO practices in the hospitals. 
 
‘We do not have access to sufficient number of health care and hospital-oriented 
external consultants for ISO.’ (Head of ISO office: Hospital D) 
 
￿ Perceptions of ISO 
Staff perceptions of ISO differed largely from their managers in that they were much more 
critical of ISO than the managers and saw different motives behind the adoption of the 
ISO, as indicated. This, as findings showed, was mostly because the managers decided to 
adopt the ISO themselves, without consulting their personnel. For instance, the head of a 
para-clinic department stated that:  
 
 ‘We only operationalise the ISO because we are asked to …. I see that 
unnecessary for us now, taking our time away from our main duties’.  (Hospital D) 
 
As such, the following comments showed that the ISO has been imposed on the hospitals, 
notwithstanding its success and effectiveness.                                                                          s            l s        H s    ls  
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‘Though it (the ISO) is a procedure for organising things and improving the 
process of reporting and presenting hospital activities …I am not justified about 
using ISO and don’t believe in that.’ (Head of nutrition and food services: Hospital 
D)  
 
￿ Impact of the NAPH on ISO  
The hospitals initially saw the ISO and NAPH in two rather separate capacities, with 
different structures and methodology, as reflected below:  
 
‘ISO is completely separate from the NAPH in this hospital. Their requirements 
and processes are different.’ (Head of ISO office: Hospital D) 
 
The standards of the NAPH were immutable for the hospitals since it was a compulsory 
external evaluation system; however, as with the ISO, its standards were originated from 
the hospitals and were more flexible. In addition, ISO was argued to render an evidence-
based assessment/improvement of the hospitals’ performance. More differences are 
reflected in the following comments: 
 
‘The NAPH’s checklists and standards are now as regulations that we cannot 
exceed or breach, but as to ISO, we ourselves set the indicators inside hospital. 
Therefore, ISO I assume is better for us because it is more hospital-oriented and 
relevant to our activities, while the NAPH is quite strict and we cannot change it at 
all. ISO is more tangible. With ISO we can appropriately identify problems and 
define solutions for them. …in ISO, since we should prepare related documents, 
you can say, it is an evidence-based programme but the NAPH is mostly 
judgemental. …and supervision in ISO, unlike the NAPH, is much stricter….’ 
(Manager: Hospital B) 
‘The NAPH does not have indicator, unlike ISO, and just checks current situation. 
It is only an assessment of the status quo. … It does not set any target and is a 
static mechanism….’  (Head of quality improvement office: Hospital D) 
 
These advantages of ISO had made this programme more desirable and helpful for the 
majority of hospitals than the NAPH, as the above comments show. It was a ‘chosen’ 
framework by the hospitals’ management, albeit not on an entirely consensual base for all 
members. Even so, the colonising features associated with the NAPH, explained earlier, 
were apparently driving the hospitals to make some changes in their ISO to comply with 
the NAPH. The following comments by the hospitals’ managers underline this impact:  
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‘We try to consult the standards of the NAPH for setting indicators of ISO.’ 
(Manager: Hospital D) 
‘We are thinking of setting the indicators of ISO somehow similar to the NAPH’s 
standards to get ready for its evaluation programme. …even sometimes we show 
the NAPH’s standards as relevant documents for our ISO activities to its 
inspectors; though they are too general and ISO focuses more on details.’ 
(Manager: Hospital B) 
 
The hospitals’ reasons for manipulating their ISO by virtue of the NAPH varied. The 
hospitals could not change any thing about the NAPH. Nevertheless, they had to comply 
with its requirements owing to its compulsory nature and the potential economic gains for 
their hospital. Moreover, they found the NAPH somewhat lacking in comprehensiveness 
(not covering all priorities of the hospital) and partly irrelevant to some of their activities 
(e.g. new developed activities). Accordingly, they tended to incorporate ISO with the 
NAPH in order to both rectify the deficiencies of NAPH and gear up for the evaluation of 
the hospital by the NAPH to earn economic gains from higher accreditation grades. This 
could also save money and time for the hospitals. 
  
7.2.3.1.2. Self-developed IQIPs 
Unlike ISO, which was limited to a few hospitals because it had certain prerequisites, most 
of the hospitals in the study had some sort of internal arrangements for regular assessment 
of their activities. They were mainly related to clinical and nursing services, since they 
make up the majority of hospitals’ activities (Srinivasan, 2008). These assessments in the 
hospitals comprised: 
•  Regular rounds by the hospitals’ supervisors;  
•  Performance report by the different departments and wards to the hospital matrons 
and managers; 
•  Self-evaluation by head nurses of their own wards 
 
These evaluations were mostly undertaken based on the standards and checklists which 
were developed and extracted from the NAPH’s checklists.  
 
‘We use a set of checklists that are extracted from the standards of the NAPH to 
evaluate different departments internally and regularly to make them ready for                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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main evaluation. We started doing these ourselves to improve and keep the quality 
high.’ (Matron: Hospital C) 
 
They intended to make the hospitals ready for the annual evaluation while assessing their 
departments internally. This, it could be argued, is causing the hospitals to become 
unwittingly routinised within the framework of the NAPH and is mandating the hospitals 
to follow similar aspects of activities (i.e. isomorphism), hence reducing the freedom of 
the hospitals. This assumption is made regardless of the NAPH’s evaluatory merits and 
beneficial consequences.  
 
7.2.3.2. Hospital committees 
The committees were an important element of the hospitals’ DAs which were set up to 
monitor the reflection of the hospitals’ ISs in their subsystems (i.e. workings). In accord 
with Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), they also played a key role in steering the 
requirements of the NAPH inside the hospitals. There were several committees in each 
hospital. As specialised entities, they covered all hospitals’ activities and specialties. In 
view of their nature and tasks, they could also be conceived as influential MCSs 
facilitating the information flow inside the hospitals. The main goals behind establishing 
the hospitals’ committees were expressed as follows (MoH, 1997a, p. 55): 
￿  To help the hospitals in their planning, organising and coordinating activities; 
￿  To create an opportunity for all personnel to participate actively in the main 
decisions of the hospitals; 
￿  To act as an important management assistant and advisor. 
   
The structure and tasks of the committees were originally set on the basis and mandate of 
the NAPH’s guidelines for the hospitals. Each hospital, as documentary analysis showed, 
should have twelve committees (see Figure 7.1). The main duties of these committees were 
as follows (MoH, 1997a): 
1.  Policy-making and target-setting for hospitals according to the guidelines of the 
MoH and the UMSs; 
2.  Planning and devising related strategies and activities for hospitals according to the 
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3.  Identifying the hospitals’ main obstacles and problems and pertinent respective 
solutions; 
4.  Continuous efforts in order to enhance quality of the services and improve the 
hospitals’ performance and customers’ satisfaction. 
 
All hospitals were obliged to form these committees; otherwise, they might lose points in 
their evaluation process, on the basis of the MoH’s evaluation regulations (i.e. the NAPH). 
In fact, a considerable part (i.e. 4.6%) of NAPH’s standards was related to the existence 
and functions of the committees in the hospitals (Moghimi, 2004). The number of these 
committees might vary on the basis of the hospitals’ size and number of beds, yet their 
associated tasks needed to be fulfilled in all hospitals. In small hospitals committees with 
similar activities could be merged. The members of each committee were assigned in 
terms of the nature of their activity; however, a physician, nurse and hospital manager or 
their representatives were permanent members of all committees.  
As mentioned, they had certain types of duties and tasks and tried to identify and 
investigate different problems in the hospitals and find appropriate solutions for those 
problems. However, they were arguably not completely operationalised in the hospitals: 
 
‘The committees could be focal players in the hospitals if they were operationalised 
according to their (written) guidelines; however, presently they mean some 
meetings in the name of committees to show their minutes to NAPH when hospitals 
are evaluated.’ (Member of quality improvement office: Hospital F) 
 
￿ Committee for Internal Supervision and Evaluation (CISE) 
All committees were partly involved in handling the requirements of the NAPH so far as 
their departments were concerned. However, the CISE was the only one directly involved 
in steering these requirements inside the hospitals.  
 
‘We have an internal evaluation committee that identifies and deals with problems. 
… It gives feedback about these problems. We use this committee … to improve the 
performance of our hospital.’ (Manager: Hospital B) 
 
This committee, according to relevant documents, was vital both for internal evaluation of 
the hospitals and cooperation with the NAPH on behalf of the hospitals. It undertook                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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various tasks in the hospitals. The main duties of the CISE according to its guidelines were 
as follows (MoH, 1997a, p. 61): 
•  Assessing the departments in an un/announced way and preparing evidence-based 
reports for the NAPH; 
•  Asking for monthly reports from all departments of the hospitals regarding their 
workings and possible problems, and looking into them and finding practical 
solutions;  
•  Holding monthly meetings and dispatching the proceedings to the higher-ups in the 
UMSs, and offering them later to the surveyors during evaluation of the hospital;  
•  Preparing the hospitals for main evaluations by formal and external bodies such as 
the NAPH and helping the surveyors, with the aim of continuous quality 
improvement in hospitals;  
•  Developing and checking the job descriptions of different departments based on the 
current formal regulations and supervising the propriety of their activities.  
 
The members of the CISE included (ibid., p. 62): 
￿  Hospital director 
￿  Teaching/research deputy (in university hospitals) 
￿  Hospital manager 
￿  Matron 
￿  2-5 physicians (with different specialties)  
￿  Head of accounting department 
￿  A senior nurse 
￿  A member of the laboratory                                                                          s            l s        H s    ls  
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Hospital top 
management 
 
Main committee (Council) 
Main committee for 
quality management  
Committee for religious 
values and medical ethics 
 
Medical record 
 
Natural birth and 
mortality of mother and 
child  
Nutrition and medical 
diets  
Medication and medical 
equipment  
 
Medical ethics  
Promoting religious 
values  
Internal supervision and 
evaluation 
 
Mortality  
Hygiene, Nosocomial 
infection, Sterilization 
 
A&E – Casualty 
 
Pathology and tissues 
Hospital nursing and 
other cadre  
 
Figure 7.1 Organisational chart of hospital committees – Source: MoH (1997a, p. 57) 
 
In addition to the normal activities of CISE (i.e. investigating the problems of the whole 
hospital) which was, in turn, in line with long-term preparation of the hospitals, the CISE                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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specifically conducted a pre-assessment of the hospitals’ activities, to prepare them for 
evaluation by the NAPH. The participants commented that the assessment is mostly done 
on the basis of the checklists developed within the framework of the NAPH’s guidelines.  
 
 
‘We have a committee specifically for “boosting hospital evaluation grade” which 
tries to prepare the hospital for the main evaluation.’ (Manager: Hospital H) 
‘It [the CISE] uses the checklists (of the NAPH) as its basic framework to perform 
its activities.’ (Manager: Hospital D)  
 
The committee also dealt with the results of the hospital evaluation and tried to rectify the 
problems after the evaluation to prepare the hospitals for re-evaluation, which happened 
within three months of the initial evaluation (Moghimi, 2004).  
 
‘We deal with the results of the evaluation of hospital in our internal committee 
[CISE] and in there we decide how to go through this programme and follow-up 
actions.’ (Manager: Hospital D) 
 
￿ Problems with the committees 
1.  Participation of physicians  
Notwithstanding the vital role of the committees in the hospitals as the main DA, there 
remained some issues about the functionality of these structures in practice. The main 
problem in relation to the committees, as stated, was linked with the participation of 
consultants. The physicians were key members of the majority of the committees (MoH, 
1997a), but they were absent from the meetings most of the time, as mentioned by other 
members. As it turned out, the physicians always tried to distance themselves from non-
clinical activities of the hospitals, both because of their time constraints and their 
reluctance. Therefore, the meetings were mostly held without them, as was mentioned by 
other members of the committees. Given the importance of clinicians in the hospitals, their 
presence is essential (Flood and Fennell, 1995). Furthermore, they could reject what was 
decided in the committees, given the strong medical professionalism in HCOs (Abernethy 
et al., 2007) and their strong position in the hospitals, as was also emphasized by other 
members.   
‘The committees are covering everything in the hospital and their guidelines are 
very comprehensive, but in practice they are not used at their full capacity. …we 
have deleted things related to consultants because they do not participate.’ (Head 
of quality improvement office: Hospital D)                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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2.  The effect of the NAPH on the committees 
Another issue in regard to the committees and their relationship with the NAPH was the 
fact that the full guidelines of the committees were set and checked by the NAPH, and any 
failure and change in this regard could reduce their scores in the assessment. The hospitals 
were satisfied with the committees’ guidelines, as the earlier comments implied. However, 
the fact that they were not able to alter these committees, as they were keen to obtain the 
corresponding evaluation score, might allude to the constraining effects of the NAPH on 
the hospitals’ independence. In other words, it was costly for the hospitals to venture into 
any change in their committees, even though it might appear necessary for their success.  
 
7.2.4. The effects of the NAPH on the hospitals’ DAs and subsystems 
The relevant reactions and changes in the hospitals as a result of their efforts to meet the 
demands of the NAPH were identified and discussed in the light of the pathways of 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2005). The reactions of the hospitals towards these requirements 
were varied and ranged from rejection, absorption and submission to adoption of the 
requirements. The classification of these reactions, according to Broadbent and Laughlin’s 
model, is conducted in terms of identifying the hospitals’ efforts to change, knowingly or 
unknowingly, their different tangible or intangible elements (i.e. ISs, DAs and subsystems) 
in response to the requirements of the NAPH.  
The effects of the requirements on the DAs and subsystems of the hospitals imply a type of 
first-order change in the hospitals. Analysis of the empirical data, focusing especially on 
the perceptions of the hospitals’ managerial teams, uncovered relevant evidence 
representing the cases of ‘rebuttal’ and ‘reorientation’ pathways (i.e. the reactions of 
rejection and absorption) in the hospitals as a result of their evaluation by the NAPH. 
 
7.2.4.1. Rejection (Rebuttal) 
In most of the cases, even if the hospitals found the requirements incompatible with their 
values, they acceded to them superficially (through gaming) and yet refused to fully 
operationalise the demands in the later stages. This reaction of the hospitals could reflect a 
case of rebuttal in the hospitals. Since there was a legal coercion behind the NAPH, the                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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hospitals were not able to obviously reject the imposed requirements of the NAPH. This 
might contradict the existence of rebuttal at first glance. However, since the time period of 
surveying was short and temporary, the hospitals could remove the perceivably unintended 
changes asked for by the NAPH and resume their previous status. That is, they sometimes 
prepared the hospital just for the evaluation and, after surveying (and earning a related 
score), they returned to the previous position (Nicholas, 1999). More examples of this 
reaction were discussed earlier under ‘gaming’; consider, for instance the following:  
 
‘We get prepared for the evaluation [by the NAPH] - sometimes superficially. We 
put some medical equipment such as “infusion pump or incubator” in our ED 
which we do not use, and we believe they are not necessary …we take them away 
and return them to its previous ward after the evaluation.’  
 
[When the researcher challenged the respondent about this behaviour] 
 
‘…well …we are working with the patients and in the hospital. I assume we better 
can decide…’ (Head of ED: Hospital B) 
 
In fact, the members of the CISE convened and considered whether to comply, albeit 
symbolically for a short period, with the requirements of the NAPH. However, this did not 
lead to a permanent change in the workings (subsystems) of the hospitals in later stages. 
For this reaction, it could be argued that the hospitals were not convinced about the 
usefulness of these specific requirements for their activities. Therefore, when such 
perceptions were coupled with the hospitals’ financial difficulty in meeting the 
requirements, a rebuttal reaction became highly likely.  
It was also seen that, in the teaching hospitals, as a hospital manager commented (below), 
they did not apply (i.e. reject) those requirements that exceeded their capability. 
Furthermore, since these hospitals were connected to the HUMS, they did not have the 
required autonomy to meet those requirements. 
 
‘In the case of some requirements, e.g. human resource and physical layout, the 
surveyors also know, we are not able to fulfil them. In fact, we do not apply them, 
and they give the score most of the times..., For instance, we always have shortage 
of nurses and cannot recruit ourselves, but by the permission of the HUMS. We 
have never been able to meet the requirements of the NAPH for this case.’  
[Hospital C]                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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The analysis showed that the hospitals did not perceive this behavioural reaction (i.e. 
rebuttal) to be to the detriment of their patients. This was rather because they thought the 
requested change was not necessary or could not be achieved in the way articulated by the 
NAPH
30. This could be a sign of a clear distinction between the views of the hospitals and 
those of the evaluatory authorities on perceiving the specific needs of patients and the 
ways of dealing with them. In line with this assumption, there were situations where 
members of the hospitals were blaming those outsiders, who had control over the hospitals 
(e.g. the NAPH), for not being aware of the real needs of the patients and internal 
circumstances of their hospitals.  
 
‘I think those working in regulative areas of the HUMS are not quite aware of our 
problems and of patients’ needs. …so their evaluation hardly addresses what we 
think, with our tangible and direct experiences [emphasis added], matters for the 
patients.’ (Matron: Hospital B) 
 
These examples signify some cases of rejection (rebuttal) of the NAPH’s demands by the 
hospitals.  
 
7.2.4.2. Absorption (Reorientation) 
This reaction arguably comes to the fore when a driver/disturbance is too strong to be 
rejected by the targeted organisations (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). The findings 
showed that the NAPH was, in the main, known by the hospitals’ members in relation to 
its effects on the financial status of the hospitals, rather than as a driver for any 
improvement in the quality of the hospitals’ services. 
 
 ‘…as far as I know our departments are trying to prepare themselves just for 
receiving the higher evaluation score, as the manager is asking from them. I don’t 
suppose it is because of the effect of the evaluation standards on the quality of their 
services.’ (Matron: Hospital B) 
 
Despite the members’ dissatisfaction with and lack of belief in the ability of this steering 
mechanism, there was no possibility of questioning or rebutting the requirements of the 
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NAPH by the hospitals, because of its colonising features
31 (e.g. the hospitals’ financial 
dependency on and the legal coercion behind the NAPH). Unlike the rebuttal reaction, the 
required changes by the NAPH in this stage were far-reaching with long-lasting and 
critical implications for the hospitals. The hospitals pointed to cases such as the creation of 
a new ward or committee (i.e. Nosocomial infection committee) or provision of a new 
service and that their regular reports and proceedings had to be sent back to the higher 
authorities as required by the NAPH (MoH, 2004). In this situation, the probability of the 
hospitals refusing them was low.  
 
‘We were asked to create an Isolation Unit inside our ED, but this hospital is small 
and if we would have any patient of that kind, we could use the unit in our main 
wards. They just act based on their rigid checklists …while it is costly for us.’ 
(Manager: Hospital A) 
 
The hospitals hinted at objecting to such requirements of the NAPH; nevertheless, they 
had to accept and accommodate (i.e. absorb/internalise) them in practice to avoid being 
downgraded from a hospital to a ‘minor surgery centre/clinic’ (Gray et al., 1995; 
Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). This demotion could bring a change in the hospital’s 
status and goals (i.e. ISs) and, ultimately, create various repercussions for the hospital’s 
financial ability and legitimacy, aside from the perceived damage to its (and its managers’) 
reputation.  
This reaction also appeared to generate a feeling of indifference among the hospitals’ 
members towards the NAPH in that, while opposing some requirements of the NAPH, 
they have yet to comply with this system, which has been unchanged for several years 
(Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993).  
The hospitals’ committees (a principal DA), especially the CISE, played a key role in 
steering the requirements of the NAPH in the hospitals. In fact, those having control over 
the DAs and called SWGs (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998) as mentioned before, gathered 
together and decided and acted on the requested changes. The analysis illustrated that the 
changes, usually in the preparation or post-survey stages, were firstly considered inside the 
various committees, depending on their scope and area of activity. The appropriate 
strategies and tactics were then developed to obtain the accreditation grade. Accordingly, 
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they might reject the perceivably unintended requirements, as mentioned in the case of the 
rebuttal, after a short period of showing symbolic compliance (i.e. gaming) with the on-site 
survey. However, in this stage, given the nature of the requirements, the tactic assumed by 
the hospitals was the application of the requirements (i.e. absorption) to avoid demotion of 
the hospital to a ‘substandard’ status signifying damage to the legitimacy of the hospital. 
The essential change under the reaction of the reorientation took place in the DAs of the 
hospitals
32 (Laughlin et al., 1994a; Gray et al., 1995). These DAs were directly influenced 
by the requirements imposed by the NAPH. In fact, the DAs of the hospitals were initially 
developed under the guidelines of the NAPH in order to earn the relevant accreditation 
status, and the possibility of any non-observance could have a bearing on the hospitals’ 
accreditation grade. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the empirical investigation revealed 
that the hospitals were using the principles and instructions of the NAPH to develop and 
make changes in their own internal PMSs (it was explained earlier that they were changing 
their ISO and IQIPs according to the guidelines of the NAPH). By doing so, they intended 
to prepare for the assessment of the NAPH. This, it could be argued, represents a change of 
reorientation because of a permanent change in their DAs. Similar evidence was reported 
by Mannion et al. (2005) in that the high-performance hospitals used the star-rating to 
align their internal performance management and reporting systems with national key 
targets.  
 
The DAs, as reported by the members, monitored the alterations in the hospitals’ workings 
(subsystems) in line with the NAPH. For instance, the hospitals reported placing required 
equipment or creating a separate isolation unit in their EDs, as indicated. The table 7.1 has 
summarised the key changes taking place in both the DAs and subsystems of the hospitals.  
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Table 7.1 Key examples of the changes in the structural elements of the hospitals over the course of 
their evaluation by the NAPH  
 
The structural 
elements  Changes as a result of the NAPH 
Subsystems 
 
•  Creation of new wards in the hospitals  
•  Introduction of new equipment 
•  Recruitment of new staff  
•  Equipping and mandating the EDs of the hospitals to admit all 
A&Es 
•  Establishing an Isolation Unit in the EDs 
•  Prescription of new medicines in the hospitals 
 
Design archetypes 
 
•  Developing the hospitals’ committees in the light of the 
instructions of the NAPH 
•  Creation of an internal evaluation committee (conventions of its 
members and informing the other departments of the changes 
requested regularly) 
•  Development of the indicators of the hospitals’ ISO programme in 
accordance with the requirements of the NAPH 
•  Aligning the hospitals’ internal control procedures with the 
guidelines of the NAPH 
 
 
 
7.2.5. The effects of the NAPH on the ISs of the hospitals 
As explained previously, the direct focus of the NAPH was on the subsystems and DAs of 
the hospitals. However, the changes in the attitudes and beliefs (i.e. ISs) of the hospitals’ 
members, as a result of the impact of the NAPH on their tangible elements, were also 
investigated. According to Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), changes in the intangible 
elements of organisations could lay the groundwork for second-order (deep and lasting) 
changes, which are called colonisation and evolution. The ISs of the hospitals play the 
determinant role in understanding this group of changes in the hospitals. 
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7.2.5.1. The ISs of the hospitals 
Given the abstract nature of ISs, it is argued that they are elusive and often difficult to 
investigate and understand (Laughlin, 1991; Broadbent, 1992’ Broadbent et al., 2010b). 
The analysis of organisational DAs and values held by those controlling the DAs 
(key/powerful groups in organisations) is believed to be critical for developing an 
understanding of organisational ISs (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). This is because the 
DAs are arguably the tangible manifestation of organisational ISs (Lawrence and Sharma, 
2002; Richardson et al., 1996).  
In the case of the hospitals in the current research, as the empirical data showed, the 
managerial team of the hospitals (the manager and directors of the main departments) 
qualified as the influential members of the hospitals. They were involved both in setting 
the hospitals’ missions, purposes and DAs and in dealing with hospitals’ accreditation. 
Therefore, they appeared to be the most relevant of the hospitals’ members to identify the 
ISs; hence, their perceptions were examined in order to explain the nature of the hospitals’ 
ISs in relation to the NAPH and understand its effects on the ISs of the hospitals’ 
members.  
Exploration of the ISs of the hospitals was conducted using both documentary analysis and 
interviews with organisational members. The answers to the questions of why (does the 
hospital exist?), what (does it do?) and how (does it do it?), as pointed out by Tyrrall and 
Parker (2005), were sought to present a picture of these ISs of organisations. Despite the 
fact that hospitals are composed of various groups, ranging from clinical to administrative 
and financial, they are conventionally recognised as organisations with a clinical 
orientation, with their main focus on the provision of care (Jacobs, 2001). The hospitals in 
the current study were not seen as exceptions to this argument. Most of the interviewees 
considered ‘serving the society as a hospital’ as the raison d’être of their organisation (i.e. 
metarules)
33. The review of the policy documents of the hospitals (e.g. strategic plan) and 
interviews showed that the core of their values and mission was ‘to deliver the high quality 
and safe services and increase the satisfaction of their internal and external costumers
34.’ 
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This was of central importance to the majority of the hospitals’ members
35. This was found 
to be aligned with the healthcare lifeworld at societal level, according to the relevant 
policy documents of the MoH
36 (e.g. MoH, 1997a; I.R.I., 2004). In fact, the lifeworld of 
the societal steering institution (i.e. the MoH) was supposedly a reflection of the healthcare 
societal lifeworld (Broadbent et al., 1991; Broadbent et al., 2001). The fact that the main 
mission of the hospitals was to deliver quality care was repeatedly raised in their 
discussion. The interviews showed that most of the members recognised the assessment of 
the hospitals’ performance as one of the vital elements for the fulfilment of their mission 
and purposes. 
 
‘I believe our main objective is to improve the quality of our services as much as 
we can. We really welcome any effort that can help us for this purpose.’ (Matron: 
Hospital B) 
 
They specifically stressed the effect of external evaluation of their performance for the 
quality improvement in their hospitals.  
 
‘We like to be evaluated externally on a regular basis […] but the current 
programme [the NAPH] has the problems.’ (Head of ED: Hospital C) 
 
This also signals  the alignment of hospitals’ ISs with the related  healthcare lifeworld 
within which the existence of an external mechanism to assess the hospitals was stipulated 
(Moghimi, 2004; I.R.I., 2004). These shared views imply that the hospitals’ ISs have 
largely remained unchanged, as a result of the imposition of the NAPH. They still believed 
in the importance of the external assessment of their performance for their success and 
survival, despite being under the evaluation of this external mechanism. Notwithstanding 
this discussion and their emphasis on the importance of external evaluation, there were 
discrepancies among the hospitals’ members as to whether the NAPH could help improve 
the quality in the hospitals (i.e. in line with their main mission) and hence whether it was 
worth conforming to. This divergence in the beliefs of the members about the NAPH was 
recognisable in both intra- and inter-hospital contexts (in the case of the NTHs as 
compared to the teaching ones), and could be argued as being associated with this AP.  
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7.2.5.2. Submission (Colonisation) 
In the following section two cases of unintended shifts in the beliefs of the hospitals’ 
members are outlined. They de facto represent what is referred to as the colonisation 
pathway by Broadbent and Laughlin (2005). 
 
7.2.5.2.1. Intra-hospital variations 
Although there was an overall dissatisfaction with the NAPH’s performance across the 
hospitals, the detailed analysis of empirical data revealed that the various groups inside the 
hospitals had somewhat different interpretations of the effectiveness and merits of the 
NAPH. The main variations were observed between clinical members (mainly physicians) 
and managers. As explained previously, the perceivably associated defects of the NAPH 
caused the majority of the hospitals’ members to conceive of this MoH-run programme as 
being incapable of giving a valid evaluation of their performance and boosting the quality 
of the hospitals. The intensity of these negative feelings was more noticeable among the 
clinical members of the hospitals. The physicians, a key group of clinical professionals, 
were the least interested in being involved in the NAPH evaluation discourse of the 
hospitals, as the analysis showed, and were largely concerned with clinical and teaching 
tasks in the hospitals. They saw the NAPH as a ‘formality’ set by the MoH to control the 
basic standards in the hospitals, signifying the lowest level of belief in the NAPH’s merits. 
This group was accountable only to the directors of the hospitals, who were consultant 
physicians themselves. The directors were a link between hospitals’ physicians and other 
groups in the hospitals. However, this position in most of the (teaching) hospitals was seen 
as a nominal role, as the following comments by a hospital manager imply, and the 
hospital managers were the main executive authority in the hospitals (Sadaghiani, 1998). 
 
‘Even though the directors are formally incumbent for the hospital, I’ve never seen 
our director even participating in the meetings with the accreditation surveyors. … 
I do everything, instead’. [Hospital D] 
 
The directors of the other wards were also consultants; however, in practice their head 
nurses (sister), and especially the matrons of the hospitals, dealt with the requirements of 
the NAPH. The head of para-clinic departments were also involved in the NAPH. Their 
views on the NAPH were mixed, although doubts about the ability of this mechanism were                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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noticeable in their views, and rationales other than the NAPH’s quality improvement 
ability were raised for their compliance.  
The managers representing, apparently, the financial and administrative activities in the 
hospitals, on the other hand, were generally inclined to be more in favour of (complying 
with) the requirements of the NAPH, as their expressions implied. It seemed the beneficial 
effects of the NAPH (discussed earlier, e.g. its financial advantages and as a DDS) were 
more constructive and in line with the objectives of the managerial groups, as raised in the 
interviews. In addition, the following comment by a hospital manager also implies this 
group’s preference for complying with the NAPH. 
 
‘…in my idea, there needs to be an external programme to ensure hospitals don’t 
get out of control, … this programme is really helping me as a manager. It is 
showing me how my different department are operating…’ (Manager: Hospital D) 
 
This reaction could be a consequence of their responsibility for entire hospitals. Thus, 
given their financial (and not clinical) mindset as well as concerns, as my discourse with 
them revealed, their inclination might seem to some extent justifiable. The fact that the 
hospital managers were appointed by the ‘Financial and Support Deputy’ of the UMSs 
might somehow accentuate their duties and concerns in the hospitals.  
A problem nevertheless arose where the NAPH was the main income source of the 
hospitals. Therefore, the financial dependence of the hospitals on the NAPH forced the 
managers to be heavily associated with financial matters in approaching the requirements 
of the NAPH. The managers were thought of as people who only cared for and were 
always concerned with financial arrangements in the hospitals. For instance, some 
managers noted that, in the case of physicians’ reluctance or opposition to the 
requirements of the NAPH, they may try to push them, through the hospital director, to 
adapt to the changes requested by the NAPH, so that the hospital could earn its grade. 
Their efforts, as stated, might not always be successful in practice, because of the strong 
professionalism and huge power of the physicians in the hospitals (Abernethy et al., 2007). 
However, the other members were influenced by the managers, as discussed earlier under 
‘departmental gaming’, and because of their fear of the management (Gray et al., 1995) 
they showed symbolic compliance, whilst originally believing that quality of care should 
not be compromised on financial grounds. The latter is a characteristic of health care in 
that those working in this sector might resist full compliance with regulatory demands,                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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even sometimes at the expense of losing the receipt of societal resources such as funding 
(Broadbent et al., 2010a). This non-conformity challenges the classic institutional theorists 
who claimed organisations always comply with the external regulatory pressures 
prescribed by law or governments in order to gain economic benefits or legitimacy as a 
result of this compliance (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 1983). This 
discussion displays a clear discrepancy in the beliefs of these groups (i.e. managers and 
clinical members) in their response to the NAPH in the hospitals. The clinical members’ 
orientation was more focused on the type of provision that was perceived as appropriate 
based on the quality norms and rather less on financial matters. This culture could be 
referred to as clinical culture - vis-à-vis business culture - and is mostly originated from a 
conventional and traditional focus of HCOs on providing care rather than making profits 
(Jacobs, 2001). Instead, the managers were more disposed to business culture because of 
the nature of their work and responsibility. Their orientation further turned out to be 
reinforced by their fear of the implications of failing to achieve the accreditation status. 
 
‘…ultimately if the hospital gets lower grade all the fingers will be pointed at the 
manager… even much more than the director of the hospital…’ (Manager: Hospital 
B) 
 
This discrepancy was also somehow reflected in the DAs of the hospitals; consider, for 
example, the managers’ decision to deploy ISO in some hospitals as a tool to organise the 
activities of their hospitals without consulting other groups, as explained earlier. The 
clinical members, unlike the managers, did not perceive the ISO to be related with the 
quality of care. This case supports the argument presented by Broadbent (1992) that 
interpretations by the same DA might vary due to the different orientations of 
organisational members. The clinical members also had their internal measurement and 
control systems for evaluating their own activities, such as what was mentioned as the 
routine clinical rounds. It could be argued that such discrepancies in the views of the 
different groups in the hospitals had made the adoption of integrated strategies difficult for 
the hospitals, as happened in the case of ISO. Yet the major problem was that, given the 
huge power of the managers in the hospitals, the other members’ decisions, except for the 
physicians, could be influenced at the discretion of the managers, as shown by the 
following comment:  
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‘The compliance with the evaluation depends on our manager’s decision.’ 
(Supervisor: Hospital D) 
 
Therefore, the power of the managers (resulting from their hierarchical position and 
responsibility, and control over the money) was seen as an influential element in the 
possible replacement of the members’ conventional culture by a business culture in the 
hospitals’ attempts to approach the requirements of the NAPH. This culture was in a way 
reflected in the discourse of the clinical members, complaining always about the financial 
problems of their hospitals and having concerns over the financial implications of their 
decisions. Consistently, the main rationale of the hospitals for compliance with the NAPH 
was, as indicated before, the economic gain for the hospitals. This could be a tentative sign 
of ‘colonisation’ of the societal healthcare lifeworld in that the financial mentality was to 
some extent promoted in a not-for-profit environment in relation to the effects of the 
NAPH. Adcroft and Willis (2005) warn of the danger that PMSs might impose compliance 
with rules and regulations instead of organisations’ original values.  
 
7.2.5.2.2. Inter-hospital variations 
In addition to the intra-hospital alteration in the members’ belief system, a similar type of 
inter-hospital change was also observed. There was a prevalent view among the members 
of the NTHs that the NAPH was biased and evaluating their hospitals more strictly, in 
comparison with the teaching hospitals. It was understood from their comments that the 
way of governing and executing the NAPH made the NTHs think in this way, reflecting a 
change in the beliefs of their members as a result of the NAPH’s impact on the hospitals. 
Such views also existed on some occasions among the teaching hospitals, some of whose 
members claimed that the MoH evaluates the university hospitals generously, because 
awarding them a low grade would create a financial burden on the MoH itself 
(Aryankhesal, 2010). Therefore, it was argued that the NAPH always evaluated them 
leniently vis-à-vis the NTHs.  
An investigation into the accreditation grades of the university (teaching and clinical) 
hospitals over the course of the last eight years may be able to substantiate this argument 
(Table 7.2). It was also claimed by some members of the teaching hospitals and the 
NAPH’s surveyors that the leniency is partly due to the teaching tasks of these hospitals. 
However, teaching hospitals were presumably capable of buying expensive equipment                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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because of their connection to the government. Given the structural focus of the NAPH, 
they hence could obtain higher scores for medical equipment. Some managers of the 
teaching hospitals also noted that the NAPH might delay the evaluation process or ignore 
those requirements of their hospitals, which they are incapable of fulfilling. This could 
rarely happen in the case of the NTHs, as they added.  
 
Table 7.2 The evaluation grade of the hospitals under study in the last eight years 
R
o
w
  Hospital  Nature  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
1  A  Private  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  4 
2  B  Teaching  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
3  C  Teaching  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
4  D  Teaching  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
5  E  Private  2  1  1  1  2  1  1  2 
6  F  Teaching
37  -  -  -  -  -  1  1  1 
7  G  Clinical
38  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
8  H  Institutional  1  1  +1  1  2  1  1  1 
 
 
The societal lifeworld in relation to the evaluation of the hospitals indicates that there 
should be a fair evaluation of all hospitals (MoH, 1997a; I.R.I., 2004). Such an impression 
among the NTHs could allegedly be a sign that the NAPH, as a societal steering 
mechanism, precipitated the values which are not in line with this lifeworld. In fact, these 
negative assumptions about the NAPH by these hospitals could signify that the values of 
these hospitals had been affected by the imposition of the NAPH over time. This might 
represent a change in the beliefs of the hospitals’ members as a result of the NAPH 
implementation. These changes have as such had their repercussions reflected in the 
workings of the hospitals. That is, these hospitals were found to be more disposed to 
symbolic compliance and gaming, which are not consistent with the societal lifeworld.  
                                                   
37. This hospital was established five years ago. 
38. This hospital has just been recently taken over by the HUMS.                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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Therefore, overall, these cases, which illustrated a type of change in the values and beliefs 
of the hospitals’ members over the years as a result of their submission to the NAPH, 
might to some extent represent the evidence of a colonisation pathway in the hospitals 
(Broadbent, 1992). In fact, values incompatible with the overall norms (lifeworld) were 
seen to be expressed in the hospitals in relation to the NAPH, which is an indication of 
internal colonisation (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). 
 
7.2.5.3. Adoption (Evolution) 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2005, p. 17) describe ‘evolution’ as the intended pathway of 
change in organisations. In accordance with this pathway, the ISs of organisations are 
transformed through a discursive process among organisational members regarding the 
required change (Gray et al., 1995). The consensual changes consequently cascade down 
to the DAs and subsystems of the organisations (Broadbent et al., 2001). The core of the 
evolution pathway is that the requirements for change should not be imposed on, but 
agreed upon, by those who are the target of these changes. That is, the change is adopted 
by the hospitals without the force of legislation and regulation. In this sense, the current 
accreditation system might seem unlikely to trigger any intended change in the hospitals, 
given its compulsory nature and non-consensual development process. As elaborated in 
chapter two, after the initial development of the NAPH in the MoH, the hospitals were 
served with the evaluation checklists to observe in their hospitals. As such, the UMSs were 
tasked to annually check the fulfilment of these standards by all hospitals in practice at 
provincial level. 
Notwithstanding the above assumption of this model, there was evidence showing that not 
all of the requirements of the NAPH were absorbed reluctantly; some were embraced and 
adapted by the hospitals (Haigh and De Graaf, 2009). The analysis of the data revealed that 
the hospitals had made some changes in their workings as well as DAs, because of the 
guidelines of the NAPH, during the years of evaluation (particularly in the early years and 
stages of introducing this mechanism and its additions, as stated by the members). These 
changes were claimed to be constructive for their practices and perceived as desirable by 
the members.  
 
‘In the early years of this programme, some standards were new and useful for us. 
For example, we were asked by the surveyors to use this transition bed for                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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transferring our patients instead of our old method. It is much more practical and 
helpful.’ (Head of ED: Hospital E) 
 
The main rationale of the hospitals for embracing this change was the merits of these 
requirements which contrasted with other change pathways. This was when the NAPH was 
an imposed (compulsory) programme and there had not been any opportunity for the 
hospitals’ members to open a discursive dialogue about its standards (Larrinaga-González 
et al., 2001). That is, the requirements were not subjected to any kind of discourse among 
the members of the hospitals.  
 
‘Since a few years ago, we are asked to prescribe only the prophylactic antibiotics 
introduced by the NAPH inside the hospitals. …I don’t feel uneasy about them 
because we are told they are based on the most recent scientific evidence.’ 
(Consultant: Hospital F) 
 
This comment highlights an example of the changes made in the hospitals’ workings as a 
result of the requirements of the NAPH. A feature which was seemingly attached to the 
adopted requirements claimed to be their ‘novel, technical and scientific’ nature. As it 
appeared from the analysis, this feature ensured the hospitals’ adaptation to these 
requirements. It could be argued that their scientific and technical nature reduced the room 
for any contention on the nature of the requirements and decreased the need for a 
discursive process. Therefore, despite the absence of discourse, the changes were made in 
the activities of the hospitals, thanks to their particular nature. The scientific base of these 
requirements (e.g. the specific antibiotics) was explicitly conveyed to the hospitals in the 
guidelines of the NAPH at the time of their introduction (MoH, 2004). The members of the 
hospitals were also found to rely on the judgement of their professional associations for the 
endorsement of the changes inside their hospitals, as shown by the following comment:  
 
‘When a specific requirement related to my work is approved by our medical 
association I am to a large extent convinced...’ (Consultant: Hospitals D) 
 
This comment also puts the accent on the apparent superiority of normative institutional 
elements over regulative ones in their effect on professionals, which should be noted. 
Another feature which apparently eased the acceptance of some requirements was their 
religious and ethical nature. The comments of the respondents (as in the one below, also 
mentioned earlier) showed that the members accepted these requirements with little                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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challenge, regardless of whether they perceived them as mandatory and beneficial or 
inefficient for their hospitals.  
  
‘In any situation, we basically observe the religious values.’ (Manager: Hospital D) 
‘I do not remember I have seen any problem in respect to meeting the religious 
values in the hospitals. They also get comparatively high score for these 
requirements.’ (A member of surveyors) 
 
In agreement with Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), the related changes were made in the 
DAs of the hospitals following the adoption of the changes. For example, the hospitals, as 
the next comment clarifies, added new members to their committees to monitor the 
changes in their subsystems. 
 
‘After the introduction of “quality-oriented” targets by the MoH in the NAPH, we 
asked two members of our consultants to attend in our committee of “Medication 
and Medical Equipment” to assess the prescription and administration of the 
antibiotics in the hospital.’ (Hospital Director: Hospital D) 
 
 
7.3. Recommendations for improvement in the NAPH  
One of the main objectives of this study has been to make a modest, albeit tentative, effort 
to identify relevant strategies for the improvement of the AP under study. The adopted 
research approach (i.e. MRT) has this ascendancy over other research paradigms, as 
explained in chapter four, which allows the researchers to consider a link between research 
and practice. The third element of this approach (i.e. change) provides a possibility for 
consideration of a researcher-informed, researched-led change to take place at the end of 
any research process (Laughlin, 2007).  
In the current case-study, however, given the centralised structure of the NAPH, it was 
observed that there was a shared feeling among the respondents (i.e. the hospitals’ 
members and even surveyors) that they would not be able to change anything, as they did 
not have the required power and authority. Therefore, rather than change strategies, the 
suggestions concerning ways to improve the NAPH were provided by the interviewees at 
the end of each interview (after prompting by the researcher). In addition, some 
suggestions were also developed in the light of the problems associated with the current                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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AP. They were also sent back to a few of the respondents to ensure they are grounded in 
the empirical data.  
 
1.  Regular feedback from the hospitals is sought and taken seriously regarding the 
functioning of the programme 
As mentioned earlier, it was widely expressed by the hospitals’ members and confirmed by 
the surveyors that the hospitals always provide feedback on the programme. However, 
over the years that the NAPH has been running, their views have not been taken into 
account. This is while the spirit of communicative action (i.e. the base of the frameworks 
adopted by this study) insists on the consensual nature of the requirements put on 
organisations (Davis, 2007). As such, the importance of taking the views of those under 
performance assessment into account has been widely echoed in the literature (e.g. 
Moullin, 2004; Barker et al., 2004). Specifically, the incorporation of the feedback in 
different stages of APs is highly stressed (Schyve, 2000) and is receiving growing 
attention among accreditation agencies (O'Connor et al., 2007). 
Given the long-time existence of the NAPH and its perceptibly routinised style, an 
ongoing review and feedback process could restore motivation to the hospitals and 
encourage them to take the NAPH more seriously (O'Leary, 2000; Quality Assurance 
Project, 2005). The following benefits are argued to be achievable through a feedback 
system (Stoner et al., 1995; Hibbard et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2008): 
￿  The gap between the perceptions of the authorities (directorate) and those of the 
hospitals in this programme would reduce; 
￿  The problems and the areas for improvement in the accreditation system would be 
identified; 
￿  The results of accreditation would be easily accepted by the hospitals and they 
would be more enthusiastic about taking corrective actions; 
￿  More feedback and collaborations from the hospitals might minimise the negative 
and dysfunctional response to the NAPH; 
￿  Being kept abreast of executives’ and hospital managers’ views regarding the 
accreditation’s problems would enable the NAPH’s directorate to make pertinent 
policies and decisions  based on the realities and status quo;                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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￿  The current centralised evaluation system would be set to improve. 
 
2.  Update of the standards 
It emerged that the repetitive and static nature of the standards over a long period of time 
had taken the trust of the hospitals’ members away from this programme. As the data 
showed, such a nature has created a mentality among the members that the NAPH is only a 
superficial supervisory system, not an improvement programme, enabling the MoH to stay 
abreast of the overall status of the hospitals. The subjective, vague and judgmental nature 
of the standards was fiercely criticised, with requests for its update and replacement by 
more objective standards. APs are urged to facilitate progress towards evidence-based and 
scientific evaluation (Mays, 2004). In addition, Kennerley and Neely (2002) have argued 
that if not updated, the PMSs are likely to lose their ability to differentiate between poor 
and good performance over time. A need for regular update of the standards is recently 
also expressed by the authorities in the MoH with a plan to supplant current evaluation 
system by an updated accreditation programme in next few years (Anonymous, 2011b). 
 
3.  Removing the bias of the accreditation process 
Since the NAPH was similar for all types of hospitals, the members of the private and 
institutional hospitals expressed their dissatisfaction with the system in two ways. First, 
their hospital was assessed by similar standards used for (advanced) teaching hospitals. 
Second, they had no representative in either the development or the implementation team 
of the NAPH. Redressing the latter deficiency could, as Mays (2004) argues, guarantee 
responsiveness, fairness, credibility and a balanced perspective on the AP.  
 
4.  Reorientation towards process and outcome 
One of the reasons why the hospitals did not perceive the NAPH to be related to the 
quality of care was because they did not see its standards focusing on the processes and 
outcomes of the care. This has also been noticed by the authorities of this programme, who 
introduced a new set of quality-oriented indicators with focus on the process and outcome 
of care in 2004, to be continued every year (MoH, 2004). However, this change has not 
been maintained since then (Sadaghiani and Zare, 2005). These indicators only constituted 
a tiny percentage of the whole score of the AP. A balanced inclusion of process and                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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outcome measures is highly advised (Jacobs et al., 2007), along with the structural 
indicators.  
In the current case, the hospitals mostly argued that the NAPH should put more focus on 
assessing their processes and outcomes and set a licensing procedure for checking their 
structural aspects (i.e. physical layout, equipment, etc.) in the early years of establishing a 
hospital and regularly every few (i.e. five) years.  
 
5.  Tailoring the evaluation to the current capabilities of the hospitals 
As explained under the disproportionate evaluation of the NAPH, the members of the 
hospitals were complaining that they are assessed based on things over which they have no 
control (e.g. human resources). Powell et al. (2009) argue that, for a successful 
implementation of quality improvement programmes, it is critical that organisations also 
have sufficient means for dealing with their requirements.  
Such a situation in the hospitals had created a sense of ‘indifference’ – even, in a few 
cases, outrage - among the members of the hospitals, since they thought they were being 
penalised for things for which they were not responsible. This is while, as Powell et al. 
(2009) put it, the standards should be relevant and actual reflectors of the hospitals’ 
performance, to be effective.  
 
6.  Disclosure of the grades and strengths of the hospitals 
There is evidence in the literature that disclosing performance data could improve the 
quality of care (e.g. Ito and Sugawara, 2005; Hibbard et al., 2005; Fung et al., 2008). 
Publishing and disseminating the results is considered an important feature for effective 
PMSs in health care (Hibbard et al., 2003). Although it was part of the regulations of the 
NAPH that the hospitals should display their grades on notice boards in busy parts of the 
hospitals, their managers did not seem to be aware of this requirement. One reason that 
why the authorities did not want to announce the results of the accreditation publicly, as 
appeared in the interviews with the hospitals’ staff and also was approved by a recent 
study (Aryankhesal, 2011), was apparently that they did not want to raise the public 
expectations from the hospitals, especially teaching (public) ones. That is, the public 
would expect the highest quality from a highest grade hospital.                                                                          s            l s        H s    ls  
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The majority of the hospitals’ members indicated that the NAPH should also highlight 
their strengths as well as uncover their weaknesses and mistakes. Similar evidence was 
found by Pomey et al. (2010). The formal communication of the strengths of the hospitals 
by the NAPH could create an opportunity for other hospitals to identify and emulate those 
which have received the highest ranking in accreditation. It was realised that the hospitals 
in the current case were only receiving a simple list of the scores related to their activities 
without any explanation of their weaknesses or strengths.   
 
7.  A clear and formal reward and punishment system for the hospitals in specific relation 
to the NAPH  
Incentives for seeking and maintaining accreditation status are argued to be essential  to 
the viability and success of APs (Mays, 2004). Despite the financial incentives of earning a 
higher grade for the entire hospitals, the members did not see any sign of tangible change 
in their situation as a result of their grade. Similarly, Reiter et al. (2006) argue that 
increased financial incentives for hospitals might not reach those individuals expected to 
improve their efforts. This injected a sense of apathy among the members about making an 
effort to improve for this AP, as they indicated. While Harris (1977) argues that, a link 
between the performance and incentives in HCOs could create a better cooperation 
between managers and physicians and also better performance of the organisations. As 
such, the establishment of a punishment mechanism specifically for the managers of those 
hospitals failing to achieve higher results was indeterminate. 
This point regarding the incentives should be clarified in that, while acknowledging the 
importance of incentives for enhancing the effect of PMSs, it should be argued that they 
could not supersede the credibility of these mechanisms for the target organisations in the 
long term. 
 
8.  Training programme for the surveyors 
Training of the surveyors is strongly recommended by professional organisations in the 
accreditation area (Shaw, 2004c; 2007). Surveyors are envisaged as the ‘eyes, ears and 
hands’ of any APs (Greenfield et al., 2008, p. 1). There were claims by the hospitals’ 
members concerning the incapability and unfamiliarity of the surveyors with the hospitals. 
Therefore, a detailed, formal training programme for surveyors along with the setting of                                                                         s            l s        H s    ls  
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surveyor selection criteria could enhance the reliability and acceptability of the NAPH 
(Greenfield et al., 2009). The training programme could/should also guide the surveyors in 
detecting gaming in the hospitals (Pickering, 1995). 
In addition, given the long-time presence of the surveyors at the same hospitals, as 
explained before, an informal relationship was created between the hospitals and the 
surveyors which allegedly influenced their assessment; this aspect should be considered in 
their training. 
 
9.  Combination of the announced and unannounced modes of on-site survey 
It emerged from the data that the gaming in the hospitals also occurred because the 
hospitals were largely (formally or informally) aware of the date when they were to be 
evaluated. This was expressed by both the surveyors and the members of the hospitals. The 
best mode of evaluation, as the members advised, was a mixture of announced and 
unannounced on-site visits. An unannounced visit was also conducted in the current 
system but it was both very limited and without a relevant score. Thus, it was not taken 
seriously by the hospitals because it had no effect on the overall grade. 
 
  
 
Chapter 8 - Review and Discussion of the Findings 
 
 
 
 
8.1. Introduction  
As initially stated in chapter one, this study aimed to evaluate Iran’s current hospital 
evaluation and accreditation system by focusing on its contextual effects in the selected 
hospitals. The analysis of the data was conducted through the framework approach (as 
explained in chapter 5). The thematic framework developed under this approach by 
drawing on prior theoretical models adopted in this research (i.e. Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2005) was applied through the NVivo software to all empirical data. All the themes 
identified through this process were explained in chapters six and seven. In this chapter, 
the researcher has reflected on the key findings and discussed the results in the light of 
relevant theoretical frameworks and prior literature.  
The findings represented a wide variety of views and perceptions from the hospitals’ 
members on the current accreditation system (i.e. the NAPH) and its impact on these 
organisations. Despite their variation, a number of common themes and issues have 
emerged, which are explained in this chapter.  
 
8.2. Constitutive nature of the NAPH 
Analysis of the empirical findings revealed that the NAPH was perceived as a constitutive 
steering mechanism from the organisational perspectives. Theoretical and empirical 
interpretations behind this nature are presented at the following. 
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8.2.1. Theoretical interpretation  
The features associated with the NAPH, as a societal steering mechanism in the country’s 
healthcare system, indicate that this AP, in accord with Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) 
theoretical model, expresses the attributes of a ‘constitutive’ rather than ‘regulative’ 
steering mechanism. Constitutive mechanisms, in the main, are not consultatively-driven 
but coercive and imposed on the organisations under their purview and evaluation 
(Lawrence and Sharma, 2002). These attributes of the NAPH were all explained in 
previous chapters. For example, it was shown that the NAPH was a compulsory evaluation 
programme imposed on all types of hospitals across the country. The history of the NAPH, 
discussed in chapter two, shows that the development of its standards has not been 
achieved through a discursive, consensual-based process among the different stakeholders 
of this programme. As a result, there was some contention over the standards and the mode 
of implementation of this AP raised by the hospitals under the evaluation. Despite some 
inconsistency in the type of attributes (e.g. whether it was a freedom 
guaranteeing/reducing mechanism), the features of the NAPH seemingly qualify this PMS 
as a constitutive steering mechanism (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005), from the 
perspectives of the hospitals. The constitutive nature of the NAPH was further 
substantiated by another group of attributes perceivably resulted from this nature, such as 
the disproportionate evaluation of the hospitals (discussed later under the empirical 
interpretation).  
 
8.2.2. Empirical interpretation  
In connection with the aforementioned - theoretically grounded - attributes of the NAPH 
(e.g. its non-consensual nature), another group of (empirically drawn) features were also 
found to be contributing to the constitutive nature of this AP. That is, as a result of these 
features, the hospitals seemed to perceive that the NAPH is unable to render a ‘valid and 
reliable’ evaluation of their performance as a result of these features. Mannion et al. (2005) 
report similar evidence in their investigation of the perceptions of the hospitals towards the 
NHS star-rating system. The NHS hospitals questioned different aspects of the current 
evaluation programme such as its coverage of the measures and sensitivity to local and 
organisational factors.                                                                                                                          D s  ss                                       
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Most of the perceived empirical features were linked with the current structure and 
implementation of the programme. For instance, the static and repetitive status of the 
standards without any updating as well as their focus on structures vis-à-vis processes and 
outcomes were frequently questioned. Evaluation standards (i.e. the measures based on 
which PMSs assess the performance of HCOs) are the core of APs (Scrivens, 1997b). 
While existing well-established programmes such as JCAHO issue a regular update of the 
standards, those of the NAPH have been unchanged since its inception. In JCAHO, the 
standards are reviewed every year for hospitals, and ACI reviews its standards every two 
years (Shaw, 2004c; Nicklin and Dickson, 2009). The standards’ dominant focus on the 
structure (physical appearance) of the hospitals concurs with Shaw (2003a) that, in 
developing countries, the emphasis is on facilities and environmental aspects of HCOs, 
given their tangible and measurable nature. This has also been echoed in relation to 
accreditation systems in other countries. For instance, although the well-known 
programmes such as JCAHO and NCQA in the USA and TSHAS
39 in the UK have 
realised the importance of outcome measures, they have also been criticised for their 
excessive concentration on the structure and process measures (Hurst, 1997; Griffith et al., 
2002; Beaulieu et al., 2003). Both anecdotal and empirical literature (elaborated in chapter 
three) has underlined the significance of outcome measures as the determinant of ultimate 
impact of APs on HCOs (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2007; de Walcque et al., 2008). Similar stress 
on patient-related outcome indicators has been reflected by Zende (2006) and El-Jardali et 
al. (2008). A more balanced approach, nevertheless, seemed to involve the inclusion of all 
aspects of structure, process, outcome and stakeholders in the assessment of healthcare 
quality (Øvretveit, 1998; Donabedian, 2005).  
The low sensitivity of the NAPH to the organisational factors of the hospitals was also 
argued by the members. The MoH has been seeking to conduct an equitable evaluation, by 
applying a uniform AP (MoH, 1997a). However, the hospitals did not express the same 
perceptions of this intention of the NAPH, as the findings revealed. In fact, the careful 
consideration of local circumstances of HCOs is argued to be crucial in developing tailored 
quality improvement models (Powell et al., 2009), and merits further exploration as 
regards the NAPH, given the varying geographical, cultural, etc. factors in Iran. Moreover, 
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PMSs could be more effective in improving clinical outcomes when they are owned by 
professions and also attend to the context the systems operate (Goddard et al., 2002b). 
The hospitals also had concerns over the NAPH’s limited coverage of the hospitals’ 
activities. A number of dangers are associated with incomprehensive coverage of PMSs of 
organisations’ activities. There might be a risk that the organisational efforts and attention 
are only drawn to the aspects covered by the measurement systems, leaving the other 
activities unattended (Ganz et al., 2007). Consequently, these limited measures are 
considered as representative of the performance of the entire hospitals and the evaluation 
of those aspects which are vital for the functioning of the hospitals might be ignored and 
excluded (Bevan and Hood, 2006b). Furthermore, the hospitals could be driven to 
concentrate more on those activities that were measurable but presumably not in need of 
quality improvement, from their perspective (Smith, 1995; Brennan, 1998). Consistently, 
some of the hospitals echoed that their newly developed activities - seemingly important to 
them - were not covered by the NAPH. Accordingly, advocating the application of a multi-
method approach, Hariharan et al. (2004) argue that measuring the performance of 
healthcare services is overly difficult using just a single method given the complexity of 
healthcare. Similarly, the analysis showed that the hospitals in this study, as indicated in 
chapter six, were trying to adopt complementary quality measurement and improvement 
methods to compensate for the inability of this evaluation programme to cover all their 
practices.  
 
8.2.3. Possible justification for the NAPH’s constitutive nature 
The constitutive nature of the NAPH might be argued as somehow congruent with the 
circumstances dominant in the area of health care. Given the criticality of the outcomes 
(Gauld, 2005) and information asymmetry between providers and consumers in health care 
(Montagu, 2003), governments are seen as the main stewards of public interest in this 
sector (Broadbent et al., 2010a). They are hence more amenable to dominating and 
regulating the organisations involved in this sensitive area. The term ‘regulation’- an 
inseparable task of governments - which is defined as a ‘sustained and focused control 
exercised by a public agency over activities which are valued by a community’ (Walshe, 
2002, p. 967) also reflects both the criticality of health care and the role of governments in 
this public good (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). This is why the government-owned                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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accreditation systems (e.g. the NAPH) are increasingly being developed and used to fulfil 
these regulatory intentions (Scrivens, 2002), as governments always reserve the right to 
regulate this area. As such, the MoH, as the official representative of the government in the 
healthcare sector, played a key role in supervising and controlling the hospitals’ activities 
by setting up the NAPH, without giving serious consideration to the perspectives of those 
under its evaluation, as the findings revealed. This might be seen as an explanation of why 
the standards are set in the MoH and the hospitals were only served with the evaluation 
checklists to observe in their practices (Sadaghiani and Zare, 2005).  
However, there is an extensive body of literature which has criticised such a centralised 
approach and strongly highlighted the effects of the views and feedback of those under the 
evaluation of PMSs (e.g. the NAPH) in their success. Goddard et al. (2002b) strongly 
advocate the development of the PMSs consensually and through those whose behaviour 
affects or is influenced by the measures of the systems (Murray and Evans, 2003). Barker 
et al. (2004) argue that the mechanisms for judging the delivery of a service must have the 
confidence of those being judged. Loeb (2004), Walburg et al. (2006) and Zende (2006) 
underline the importance of the contribution and cooperation of those under evaluation in 
the process of performance measurement. Similarly, Kravchuk and Schack (1996) and 
Moullin (2004) suggest that, in developing and operationalising performance measurement 
and improvement practices, it is vital that  the feedback and values of different 
stakeholders are considered. A possible reason might be that, ultimately, such 
organisations and people will be applying the requirements of the PMSs and ensuring their 
success. Moreover, the unintended effects of forgoing the feedback are also to some degree 
reflected in the literature. Loeb (2004) warns that the lack of attention to this issue could 
run the risk of evoking considerable anxiety and frustration, which concurs with the 
findings of this study (explained under ‘unintended consequences’). Similarly, O'Leary 
(2000) explains that performance measures perceived as irrelevant, unrealistic or unfair by 
the accreditees, as in the current study, would be more counterproductive than useful in 
assessing the performance of HCOs. Scrivens (1997a) also underscores the importance of 
organisational satisfaction with APs in assessing their effectiveness. As such, from a 
theoretical perspective, Laughlin (2007) argues that the rejection of stakeholders’ views 
and commitments, as explained, could drive a steering mechanism (e.g. the NAPH) away 
from being ‘regulative and ASJ’.  
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8.3. Repercussions of the NAPH 
PMSs are argued to also precipitate dysfunctional effects in the targeted organisations, 
besides their desired results (Smith, 1995; de Bruijn, 2002; 2007). The extent of the 
unintended effects generated by quality improvement initiatives have been worrying for 
the policy-makers (Ganz et al., 2007). Birnberg et al. (1983) identify several categories of 
dysfunctional behaviours in organisations triggered by MCSs and PMSs, including; 
smoothing, biasing, focusing, gaming, filtering and illegal acts. They argue that not always 
these behaviours could be dysfunctional, but de facto their potential for generating 
dysfunctional effects is greater than beneficial.  
The NHS has been the subject of various studies underlining these effects in the literature 
(e.g. Bevan, 2006; Bevan and Hood, 2006a; Bevan and Hood, 2006b; Goddard et al., 2000; 
Kelman and Friedman, 2009). Consistent with the existing literature, the current case-
study also found evidence of unwanted effects in connection with the NAPH in the 
hospitals. They arguably occurred mostly because of the constitutive nature and the 
associated attributes (e.g. non-consensual base) of the NAPH. The way in which these 
unintended and dysfunctional effects were found to be developing in the hospitals could be 
likened to a domino effect. For instance, the constitutive attributes such as the perceived 
partial attitude of the NAPH towards the NTHs seemed to prompt the feeling that it 
conducts a biased performance evaluation of the hospitals. This perception (or, e.g., the 
static nature of the NAPH) in turn caused the unintended effects such as anxiety, outrage 
and disillusionment among the members of the hospitals, because of their permanence.  
These results of the study regarding unwanted effects of the NAPH are supported by 
Walshe et al. (2001), arguing that external review systems, such as accreditation, may 
divert attention from other important concerns of a HCO (e.g. dealing with patients). They 
also side with Mannion et al. (2005) on their emphasis on similar unintended effects 
caused by national PMSs in HCOs. Moreover, the study also identifies further unwanted 
effects such as the hospitals’ distrust of the current AP. No evidence was, nonetheless, 
found of Mannion et al.’s (2005) ghettoisation, in that staff could be attracted by higher-
grade hospitals. Since the hospitals did not have the authority to recruit new staff 
independently, such an effect did not appear in the hospitals. Moreover, the results might 
to some extent contradict the study by Mays (2004) who dismissed unintended and adverse 
effects on service providers by APs. This contrast might be somewhat justified by their                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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different contextual factors including the difference between the patterns of programmes 
(i.e. voluntary/compulsory); furthermore, the context in which they are operating should be 
recognised.  
 
8.3.1. Gaming: Dysfunctional effect of the NAPH 
8.3.1.1. Types of gaming  
Gaming was the main perceived dysfunction found to be caused by the NAPH in the 
hospitals. The majority of the cases of gaming found in the hospitals were in the form of 
fabrication and data falsification (Kelman and Friedman, 2009; Bevan and Hamblin, 
2009). Aworski and Young (1992, p. 19) similarly point to ‘strategic information 
manipulation’ in which subordinates alter the natural flow of information and report only 
those aspects of an information set that is in their best interest.  
The findings presented evidence of symbolic compliance (concealing non-conformity) 
with the NAPH’s requirements by the hospitals. This gaming was mostly seen in structural 
forms: for example, not abiding by the requirements of the NAPH to buy or use specific 
pieces of medical equipment in their practices or in a specific ward or unit. The high 
frequency (existence) of this form of gaming may have been specifically due to the 
NAPH’s dominant focus on the structural aspects (e.g. medical and non-medical 
equipment) of the hospitals (Moghimi, 2004) and hence the high cost of their procurement 
for the hospitals.   
The gaming also took the form of preparing spurious documents related to the ‘quality-
oriented’ guidelines of the NAPH (e.g. for the evaluation of the patients’ waiting times in 
the EDs). This instruction introduced a few numerical target-based indicators for assessing 
the performance of the hospitals (see section 3.4.7, chapter 3).  
In addition, there were also cases of hospitals deploying their nurses and physicians from 
other wards in their EDs to meet their performance targets in this department, mostly at the 
busiest times for the EDs. These efforts to some extent represent another type of gaming 
which is called ‘effort substitution’ and alludes to an un/conscious decision to exclude 
other performance measures or use  resources for measurable elements, mostly because the 
latter are considered by the PMSs (Kelman and Friedman, 2009, p. 922). A similar 
argument is posed by ACSQHC (2003a) in that accreditation could potentially divert the                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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hospitals’ resources from strategies aimed at directly addressing quality and safety 
concerns. Casalino (1999) refers to a tendency (among managers) to spend time and 
money ensuring their hospitals score highly on measures used by accrediting bodies and 
not on those which benefit the patients. With the persistence of this gaming, there is a 
danger that the members of hospitals will begin to equate high quality simply with high 
scores in quality measures (Casalino, 1999).  
The findings revealed that the gaming was more noticeable in relation to the EDs of the 
hospitals and also to the newly-introduced ‘quality-oriented’ indicators. Given the crucial 
nature of the services provided in the EDs, the MoH has put too much emphasis on the 
performance of these departments (MoH, 1997b; 1997c). Therefore, their successful 
accreditation status was considered a prerequisite for the evaluation of whole hospitals, 
according to the guidelines of the NAPH (MoH, 1997a, Moghimi, 2004). Unless they are 
able to obtain an accreditation grade, the hospitals will not be qualified for accreditation. 
Accordingly, the hospitals have to pay more attention to their EDs. Apparently this special 
attention was one reason why the EDs were unsurprisingly seen to be in a better position in 
terms of their physical layout and appearance in comparison with the hospitals as a whole. 
However, this issue, as indicated in chapter six, was also to some extent a cause of 
discontent in the hospitals. For example, some complained that this isomorphism-oriented 
policy of the MoH was imposing a high cost on them, despite their low rate of emergency 
admissions. Moreover, they argued that the real merits of their hospital could be 
overshadowed by the status of their EDs. The quality-oriented indicators had also recently 
been given a high priority by the NAPH in that the hospitals could not in any case ignore 
them (MoH, 2006), despite the fact that they contributed only a small proportion of the 
hospitals’ score (see the sections 3.4.5. and 3.4.7, chapter 3). The target-based nature of 
these indicators also facilitated the extent of the gaming in relation to these indicators. This 
is in line with the existing literature that gaming is largely attributed to target-based 
measurement systems, such as those in the NHS (Bevan and Hood, 2006a; 2006b; Bevan, 
2006; Hood, 2006; 2007). Therefore, overall the hospitals seemed to show more concern 
with their EDs and the quality indicators, which seemingly led them towards gaming.  
The extent of gaming also varied between teaching hospitals and the NTHs, with more 
cases in the latter. It was thought that the teaching hospitals did not take the NAPH as 
seriously as the NTHs, as the findings showed, since they were government-owned 
organisations. This concurs with Bevan and Hamblin (2009) that an important reason for                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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the extensive gaming in the NHS in relation to its star-rating system was because the 
hospitals have taken the system very seriously.   
 
8.3.1.2. Rationales behind gaming 
Various elements, both extrinsic and intrinsic to the hospitals, seemingly prompted gaming 
(i.e. symbolic compliance) by the hospitals. The effects of these factors were found to be 
interrelated in creating such reactions by the hospitals and were intensified in relation to 
one another.  
The main rationale appeared to be the inability of the hospitals to meet the requirements of 
the NAPH. Greenwood and Hinings (1996, p. 1032) have referred to this as the ‘capacity 
for action’ and accentuated its importance in organisations’ conformity with institutional 
requirements. As the requirements of the NAPH exceeded the capability of the hospitals 
and were found to be disproportionate, the hospitals were drawn towards gaming 
(symbolic compliance) to avoid losing their accreditation status. The expectations set by 
the NAPH for some major aspects of the hospitals such as physical layout and structure 
and the standards of human resources did not perceivably match the current status of the 
hospitals. As such, the financial problems of the hospitals and non-cooperative attitudes of 
internal groups (i.e. physicians) reduced their ability to meet the requirements. The fact 
that any considerable modification to their structural aspects (i.e. human resources and 
physical layout) was beyond their control and should be supported and funded centrally by 
the higher authorities has drawn teaching hospitals towards concealing their non-
conformity with these requirements.  
The clear focus of the NAPH’s standards on the structures vis-à-vis processes and 
outcomes of the hospitals appeared to aggravate their problem of complying with the 
evaluation requirements. The structural factors relating to the capacity and establishment 
of the hospitals were costly for the hospitals to fulfil. 
Another reason for the gaming was that the hospitals perceived some aspects of the 
NAPH’s requirements (as indicated in chapter six) to be irrelevant to their processes of 
service delivery and not effective in providing quality care. For instance, as mentioned, 
some medical equipment was removed and the documents were not properly prepared, 
because the members did not perceive (and could not justify) them as a priority for their 
hospital. The constitutive features of the NAPH apparently reinforced such perceptions                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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among the members of the hospitals (Broadbent et al., 1991). Since the NAPH was 
developed on a non-consensual base and no feedback was sought from the hospitals on 
accommodating and updating the system, this perspective may have been inevitable. The 
perceived lack of sensitivity of NAPH’s standards to organisational factors of the NTHs 
and the biased approach of the NAPH to the evaluation of these hospitals and their 
permanence had further created a situation conducive to gaming by these hospitals. 
Overall, these features had created an impression of the ‘perceived incapability’ of the 
NAPH to improve the quality in the hospitals.  
In fact, the main intention behind establishing the NAPH has been to promote the quality 
of services rendered by the hospitals (Moghimi, 2004; MoH, 2008). However, the NAPH 
was, in the main, recognised by the hospitals as a routine checking system and a means to 
earn more money. The ability of the NAPH to improve quality was hardly mentioned in 
their discourse (Laughlin et al., 1994a). Similar results were found by Aryankhesal and 
Sheldon (2010) regarding the GPs’ attitudes about the perceived inability of the NAPH to 
impact on the quality of the hospitals. This finding is also in accord with the previous 
studies on performance of the NAPH (e.g. Baghebanian, 2001; Arab et al., 2005; Raisi, 
2006). Relevant literature on a wider scale, as explained in chapter three, provides mixed 
results. Some support the effect of accreditation on quality (e.g. Chen et al., 2003; Devers 
et al., 2004; Sunol et al., 2009) while others did not show any evidence of this 
improvement (e.g. Beaulieu and Epstein, 2002; Miller et al., 2005; Snyder and Anderson, 
2005).  
Given such perceptions, the natural reluctance of the members to spend their resources 
(e.g. time, money) on preparing for this programme seemed unavoidable and they hence 
felt justified for exhibiting symbolic compliance, as they needed the evaluation score. 
However, given the external (e.g. the legal coercion) and internal (from their managers) 
pressures the avoidance seemed impractical.  
 
8.3.1.3. Theoretical interpretation of the gaming 
Gaming is argued to lower the organisational performance and diminish the quality of 
services because of the inappropriate decisions taken by those involved (Kelman and 
Friedman, 2009). Although this study was not able to establish the direct adverse effects of 
these dysfunctions (i.e. the gaming) on the patients and on the quality of care, it did                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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conceptualise the possibility of the occurrence of such malfunctions in the hospitals as a 
result of the NAPH. In addition, as the facial expressions of the interviewees (particularly 
managers) showed during the discourse with the researcher, they were reluctant to disclose 
the gaming, due to it being unacceptable or a sign of hospitals violating the rules and 
requirements of the NAPH. Therefore, it is possible that not all the forms of gaming were 
disclosed to the researcher.  
From a theoretical perspective (i.e. the Habermasian model adopted), the gaming 
represents those efforts and reactions by organisational systems (i.e. the hospitals) that are 
not apparently aligned with the societal healthcare lifeworld (Broadbent et al., 2001). 
Therefore, the foregoing malfunctions were labelled as gaming, by judging based on the 
requirements of the NAPH, which is the tangible manifestation of societal lifeworld in an 
ideal fashion (Broadbent, 1992; Broadbent et al., 2001). However, as the word ‘ideal’ 
conveys, a regulative mechanism is expected to reflect the lifeworld values (Broadbent et 
al., 1991), whilst the NAPH tended to feature constitutive attributes. The perceived 
rationales for the gaming indicated by the members also implied that they perceived the 
NAPH as not contributing to quality improvement practices in the hospitals. Such 
perceptions seemingly represent the situation predicted by Broadbent et al. (2001) where, 
from organisations’ perspectives, steering mechanisms (i.e. the NAPH) have moved away 
from expressing the societal lifeworld, whereas the organisations (i.e. the hospitals) 
remained in concert with the related lifeworld. Basing this assumption on the perceptions 
of the hospitals might seem partial and one-sided, as the hospitals might naturally criticise 
this external PMS imposed on them (Mannion et al., 2005). However, the perceived 
constitutive qualities of the NAPH arguably increase the propriety of such an assumption 
in relation to this AP. Although the views of the authorities of the NAPH might contradict 
this finding, the hospitals are arguably in a better position to decide on the provision of 
quality services, in view of their direct involvement and contact with patients (Berwick, 
2008). Scott (2009) found that clinician/patient-driven quality improvement practices 
showed stronger evidence of efficacy than manager/policy-maker-driven practices. As 
such, according to Casey (2010), valid performance measures are formulated based on the 
recommendations of frontline people. Therefore, the hospitals’ perceptions of the nature of 
the NAPH seemed justifiable. This is also in accord with Laughlin (2007), who based a 
meaningful evaluation of external PMSs on the perceptions of the organisations under 
evaluation. Theoretically, these organisational (hospital) members are seen as the active                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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members of a society and capable of judging the merits of societal steering mechanisms – 
e.g. the NAPH (Broadbent et al., 1991). They are de facto both members of society and 
also directly affected by the mechanism.  
As the above debate might imply, there could be seen a discrepancy in the perceptions of 
the hospitals’ members and the authorities of the NAPH towards the ways of delivering 
and evaluating hospital services. This is also indicated by Jaworski and Young (1992) that 
the lack of goal congruency and information asymmetry between subordinates and their 
superiors could trigger dysfunctional behaviours among the former.   
 
 
8.3.1.4. Causes of gaming 
While the occurrence of gaming in the hospitals was the result of different elements, 
discussed above, the main causes of this phenomenon were found to be the attributes 
associated with the NAPH, which mainly included legal coercion, financial dependency 
and legitimisation. That is, the existence of these elements, when coupled with the 
abovementioned rationales of the hospitals, created a situation conducive to gaming in 
these organisations. They were the main reasons for hospitals’ compliance with the NAPH, 
in accord with the findings of Pomey et al. (2010). However, unlike their study, which 
found different rationales in relation to various hospitals, the rationales of the compliance 
in the current research were observed in all the hospitals, albeit with varying levels of 
intensity in the different hospitals (e.g. teaching and NTHs). These elements were found to 
weaken the opportunity and ability of the hospitals to question and resist the very nature of 
this imposed steering mechanism (Dillard and Smith, 1999; Brennan, 1998). Oliver (1991) 
similarly attributes the same features to imposed institutional pressures requiring 
unreserved compliance from organisations. 
 
8.3.1.4.1. Legal coercion 
In the public sector, governments are believed to have a coercive power (i.e. legal 
mandate) over local organisations such as hospitals (Brignall and Modell, 2000; Modell, 
2001) . Habermas (1996, cited in Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005) emphasises the power 
and effect of law in steering organisations in the public sector. As such, the power of law                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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to command a wide-ranging compliance from organisations has been recognised by 
institutional studies (Scott, 2008b). 
The imposition of the NAPH on hospitals, as its compulsory nature implies, was found to 
be an important cause of gaming (symbolic compliance) in the hospitals. The hospitals’ 
inability or reluctance to comply with the NAPH, in the face of legal force behind this 
evaluation programme, drew the hospitals towards gaming. The findings uncovered 
various occasions when the hospitals were forced to show conformity merely because of 
their legal obligation to the NAPH’s requirements. As documentary analysis revealed 
(MoH, 2004), the legal force behind the NAPH had created a situation conducive to 
coercive isomorphism, by forcing the hospitals towards a set of uniform rules and 
standards (Hassan, 2005). 
Similar evidence has highlighted the effect of law and regulations on the reaction of 
organisations in the public sector, as follows. Regulative elements (including law) are 
recognised as fast-moving institutions (Roland, 2004) and hence easy to manipulate, which 
are highly likely to cause gaming and decoupling (Scott, 2008a). Modell (2002) found that 
the coercively imposed cost allocation techniques by governmental bodies encountered 
implementation problems. In addition, as Broadbent et al. (2010a) point out, the imposed 
regulatory mechanisms, leaving no choice for organisations, are more likely to precipitate 
resistance and gaming in organisations. As to accreditation, as the majority of existing 
programmes are of voluntary status (de Walcque et al., 2008), the literature is lacking 
evidence on the adverse effects associated with their compulsory nature.  
The above discussion could be challenged by the necessity of governments’ regulatory role 
in health care, given the critical importance of the services provided in this area and the 
prevention of possible malfunctions (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993; Gauld, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the PMSs employed by the governments, as Broadbent et al. (1991) and 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) maintain, ought to have regulative attributes (e.g. 
consensually-based) if they are to have intended, rather than dysfunctional, effects on the 
organisations under their evaluation. The key factor is that the process of developing a 
PMS should undergo a discursive process (i.e. with mutual understanding) in Habermasian 
language. The importance of this point is that, as Broadbent et al. (2010a) put it, to an 
extent even PMSs could be compulsory, provided that their mandatory status is justified 
and agreed upon by the stakeholders (mainly the organisations under evaluation).  
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8.3.1.4.2. Financial dependencies  
Another key factor which seemed to play an important part in causing gaming was the 
hospitals’ financial dependency on the NAPH (and ultimately on the government). Davis 
et al. (2009) also found financial incentives overly influential in hospitals’ participation in 
accreditation. The importance and effect of financial resources for HCOs are extensively 
recognised in the literature (Custers et al., 2007), and their positive effects on the 
achievement of organisational goals is echoed by various studies (e.g. Locke and Latham, 
2002; Custers et al., 2007). Organisations are argued to show different responses and 
reactions towards the determinants of their requisite resources, given their critical 
importance for them (Reiter et al., 2006). The concept of pay for performance (P4P), 
introduced in the USA,  encapsulates the implications of financial incentives for 
organisations’ performance (Duckett et al., 2008). As such, it is argued that performance-
based payment (PBP) is increasingly applied more in developing countries (Eldridge and 
Palmer, 2009).  
According to resource dependence literature, organisations are more likely to comply with 
those on whom they are dependent for their resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). 
Broadbent et al. (2010b) similarly contend that the actions of the recipient organisations 
could be conditioned by the providers of their funds and resources. 
Despite the impact of financial incentives on the promotion of  quality care, unintended 
effects have also been attributed to this initiative in the literature (Goldman, 2006; Smith et 
al., 2008) which are specifically discussed here. For instance, it is argued that PMSs 
backed by high-powered incentives for their success and failure are highly likely to result 
in gaming (Bevan and Hamblin, 2009). This is similarly echoed in relation to health care 
by Smith (1995). In the current case-study, the hospitals under study were directly 
dependent on the NAPH for their financial resources, as the role of strong incentives for 
seeking and maintaining accreditation by HCOs is clarified (Mays, 2004). This 
dependence was more crucial because of the hospitals’ perceived financial problems. 
Therefore, when the circumstances of non-compliance materialised (i.e. they were not 
able/willing to meet the requirements of the NAPH), while recognising the importance of 
obtaining higher grades for their (financial) survivability, they were highly likely to be 
drawn towards superficial preparation (i.e. gaming).                                                                                                                          D s  ss                                       
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Alternatively, the effectiveness of financial incentives in improving performance is said to 
be low if the requirements appear unacceptable to organisations (Kelman and Friedman, 
2009). Consistently, the evidence from this case-study showed that the unacceptability of 
the NAPH’s requirements to the members led to gaming (not improvement), since the 
hospitals needed the financial support.  
Some dysfunctional effects have been associated with the use of financial incentives. 
Although the introduction of these spurs was initially intended to trigger performance 
improvements in organisations (Ferreira and Otley, 2009), Locke and Latham (2002) argue 
that they might also somehow damage performance. That is, when organisations receive 
lower ratings, their goal commitment and performance decline as a result of poor financial 
status and reduced staff morale (Mannion et al., 2005; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009). A 
similar pitfall could be predicted for the NAPH in this sense (i.e. providing financial 
incentives for higher grades). When the hospitals earned lower grades, their financial 
situation automatically worsened, indicated as a punitive effect of APs (Davis et al., 2009). 
This could create a vicious cycle (Figure 8.1) in that a poor financial status might 
jeopardise quality improvement efforts in the hospitals and, accordingly, a low grade 
might follow. Since, according to the quality improvement officer of one hospital, the 
quality-related practices were perceived as second-class activities by the hospital 
authorities, there was a high possibility that a lower income for the hospitals leads to a 
reduction in the rate of investment in quality improvement. Consistent with this discussion, 
it was stated by some members (e.g. a member of a quality improvement office of one 
hospital) that the main reason for the abandonment of quality improvement efforts in the 
hospitals was the lack of financial support. This is echoed by Broadbent et al. (2010a) as 
the limiting power of the money, meaning that its shortage might influence the reflection 
of the lifeworld demands by organisations. 
No evidence of reduced morale was, nevertheless, found as a result of the NAPH in the 
hospitals. One reason might be that there was no tangible link between the accreditation 
grade of the hospitals and changes in the financial status of individuals in the hospitals. 
Another issue associated with financial incentives is their possible effect of diverting the 
hospitals from unmeasured practices to ones that would help them obtain the money, 
discussed earlier as tunnel vision (Custers et al., 2007; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009).                                                                                                                          D s  ss                                       
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Moreover, the use of financial grounds for regulatory purposes is also questioned from a 
different perspective by Habermas (1987). He has argued (cited in Broadbent et al., 2010a) 
that using money as the focus in regulating organisations might run the risk of non-
compliance by the recipients (i.e. the hospitals). That is, the recipient organisations could 
use the money for purposes other than reflecting societal lifeworld values, as requested by 
steering media. Dodd (1994) has expressed similar concerns about the reuse of money by 
organisations. Therefore, while the money’s strength in enabling the change efforts should 
be also acknowledged (Broadbent et al., 2010b), the problem with the reuse of the 
financial resources might nullify this advantage in the hospitals, because of their mentality 
towards quality, as mentioned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 The relation of the effect of financial incentives on the quality improvement (QI) in the 
hospitals 
 
These unwanted consequences might be a reason for Mays’ (2004) recommendation that 
the financial incentives should be gradually phased out over time to evade adverse effects 
associated with short-term shifts in resources by organisations.  
 
8.3.1.4.3. Legitimacy 
The rationale of legitimisation, in the sense that public sector organisations might show 
compliance with the imposed institutional pressures to earn legitimacy, has been widely 
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discussed in the literature (e.g. Oliver, 1991; Chang, 2006). Ruef and Scott (1998) even 
place more importance on legitimacy in health care. They argue that, since the outcomes 
are often uncertain and difficult to assess in health care, the source of legitimacy could 
play a prominent role in enhancing public trust in HCOs. Legitimacy is defined according 
to Suchman (1995, p. 574) as ‘… a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity (i.e. a hospital) are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs’. In Habermasian language, legitimacy is 
ideally obtained through compliance with the societal steering mechanisms that are 
supposed to be a manifestation of the societal lifeworld (Broadbent et al., 2001). 
In the health system of the country the government was the guardian of the public interest 
in society. It has thus set up the NAPH, as a supposedly tangible manifestation of public 
norms and values in health care, to ensure the hospitals’ actions are within socially 
constructed norms (i.e. legitimised). However, whether the NAPH represented the public 
interests in health care remained in doubt, as the findings implied. The hospitals sought 
this legitimacy through complying with the requirements and earning an accreditation 
grade (see table 3.2, chapter three). Legitimacy here meant ‘the authorisation of the 
hospitals to provide quality services to the society as a hospital’. The efforts of the 
hospitals to avoid being downgraded to a ‘minor surgery centre/clinic’ (MoH, 1997a) 
underscore the importance of legitimacy for the hospitals. However, since the process of 
demoting a hospital to a clinic was a fairly lengthy and rare procedure, even more unlikely 
in the case of teaching hospitals, as the findings exhibited, the sensitivity of this factor in 
driving the hospitals towards gaming was lower in comparison with the previous factors, 
despite its apparent importance.  
The NAPH was the main source of legitimacy for the hospitals; this is considered 
regulative legitimacy (Scott, 2008b). Other types of legitimacy (i.e. normative and 
cultural-cognitive legitimacy) were not apparent in the context. In fact, all three types were 
integrated in the regulative legitimacy represented by the NAPH. Therefore, Habermas’s 
interpretation of the legitimacy was found to be more suitable for the investigation of the 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour of the hospitals, because he recognises the regulative 
legitimacy (steering mechanism) as a manifestation of the normative legitimacy - i.e. 
lifeworld (Broadbent, 1992; Broadbent et al., 2001).  
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In summary, these three factors remove the possibility of ignoring the compliance, despite 
the perceived inability of this evaluatory mechanism to achieve quality improvement and 
that of the hospitals to meet its requirements. This finding is consistent with Chang (2006) 
on contradicting Oliver’s (1991) assumption that local organisations’ managers would be 
reluctant to conform to those requirements that are incompatible with the goals of their 
organisations. However, the results showed that, despite this perceived incongruence, other 
rationales forced the hospital managers to consider complying (either properly or 
symbolically) with the requirements of the NAPH. 
 
8.4. Positive grounds for compliance  
Apart from the above-mentioned elements which had the potential to drive the hospitals 
towards gaming, other factors were also found to play a part in stimulating and convincing 
the hospitals’ members to consider (non-symbolic) compliance with the NAPH, without 
causing gaming. They included ‘beneficial consequences’ of the NAPH, the effects of 
‘religious values and altruism’ and ‘technical nature of the NAPH’s requirements’. They 
were mostly seen among the frontline members who were more concerned with the care of 
patients. 
 
8.4.1. Beneficial consequences 
The dominant rationales for the hospitals’ conformity with the NAPH were those 
explained as ‘colonising features’ of the NAPH. However, the perceived benefits of the 
NAPH were also said to be effective in encouraging the hospitals to comply with this AP. 
Although the existence of both positive and adverse effects associated with the NAPH 
might seem contradictory, steering mechanisms are argued to exhibit the characteristics of 
both regulative and constitutive mechanisms (Dillard and Smith, 1999; Broadbent et al., 
2010a). These dual features of the NAPH are supported by the findings of Mannion et al. 
(2005), pointing to some perceived benefits of the NHS Star-rating system, despite its 
downsides. For example, they found that the poorly-performing trusts used the ratings to 
guide the development of their new performance management and reporting systems or as 
a mechanism for transmitting important priorities from central government (Mannion et 
al., 2005). These consequences were also supported by existing literature. For instance, the 
role of APs in identifying the problems of the hospitals was also found by Pomey et al.                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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(2010). As such, the NAPH also encouraged the coordination and communication in the 
hospitals during the stage of preparation for the survey and for making the corrective 
actions (Pomey et al., 2004).  
 
8.4.2. Religious values 
The effect of religious values and altruism was also seen to encourage compliance with the 
NAPH among the hospitals’ members in the sense that it could assist them to accelerate 
and improve the process of curing the patients. Traditionally, there has been a religious 
and humane facet attached to curing patients (George, 2003). This was, to some extent, the 
case in the context of the current research (MoH, 1997b). The members tended to comply 
with the NAPH on the grounds that it could improve the quality of care and consequently 
accelerate the treatment of their patients, which seemed religiously rewarding for them. 
Given the religious context of the country, it was usually advised that the related actions be 
justified from a religious perspective and be in harmony with religious teachings. As such, 
a number of spiritual precepts regarding healing and helping patients to recover were 
displayed on the hospitals’ notice boards and could be seen in the different instructions 
(e.g. MoH, 1997a, 1997b). These efforts were understood as very rewarding and 
motivational for the hospitals’ practices. Moreover, more than nine per cent of the entire 
set of the NAPH standards was related to the observation of ‘religious and ethical values’ 
by the hospitals (see table 3.1 chapter 3). With this in mind, such a rationale might not 
seem surprising. This debate is generally consistent with Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen 
(2009) whose study found religious spirit as an integral and important part of 
accountability in non-western societies.  
As the findings showed, this rationale was mostly raised by those in direct contact with 
patients (e.g. head nurses). Similar evidence is reflected in the literature by Hamblin (2008, 
p. 292), emphasising the importance of ‘altruism’ as a reason why healthcare providers 
might consider reacting to PMSs’ demands. Aryankhesal (2010, p. 265) similarly found 
that some head nurses in the hospitals raised ‘the increased patient satisfaction’ as their 
incentive for obtaining a good accreditation grade. Furthermore, the religious values were 
also found to have another effect on the compliance of the hospitals. The findings showed 
that the reaction of the hospitals’ members towards religious-related standards tended to be 
largely passive, i.e. receptive. They manifested less objection to and criticism of these 
standards. The high scores by the hospitals for this item also provided a confirmatory sign                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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for this assumption (stated by the surveyors). Furthermore, the high proportion of the total 
score allocated by the authorities to these values could signal their critical importance for 
the government. The reason, as expressed, was the spiritual nature of these values as well 
as the government’s sensitivity about them. A theoretical justification for this compliance 
might be the alignment of these values with the religious orientation of the hospitals’ 
members. It might be called goal congruency (Oliver, 1991), or structural coupling 
between the ISs of the hospitals’ members and related societal lifeworld in Habermasian 
language (Broadbent et al., 1991).  
 
8.4.3. Scientific and technical nature of the requirements 
The scientific and technical nature of some standards of the NAPH also apparently reduced 
the extent of the resistance in relation to which the hospitals gamed. As it appeared, some 
standards were developed based on scientific and up-to-date evidence; when 
communicated to the hospitals, these standards boosted their compliance and triggered 
positive attitudes and reactions towards those requirements. Similar evidence by Hassan 
(2008) showed that technical boost in the knowledge of organisational members triggered 
by specific requirements facilitated their adoption by the organisations. The hospitals were 
informed about the process of the development of the standards and of their basis in 
scientific evidence. These reactions were mostly associated with the recent modifications 
in the standards of the NAPH and the addition of a new set of ‘quality-oriented’ standards 
(MoH, 2004). The majority were developed based on scientific evidence and had a purely 
technical content, as their guidelines explicitly asserted. They were related to practices 
such as prescription of specific medicine for patients.  
 
8.5. Perspectives on the professionals’ position in the HCOs 
A wide range of studies has highlighted the critical role and importance of professionals in 
the healthcare area. For example, Abernethy et al. (2007) point to the existence of multiple 
points of power and decision-making in HCOs. Campanale et al. (2010) argue that 
management and decision-making processes in hospitals are strongly influenced by 
professionals and their autonomy. Mintzberg  (1979, cited in Aidemark and Funck, 2009) 
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ineffective for controlling the work of professionals in healthcare, since they might not be 
able to represent the complexity in their tasks. Accordingly, Abernethy and Stoelwinder 
(1990) and Touati and Pomey (2009) indicate that professionals will accept a standard-
based system (e.g. accreditation) if they agree upon and if it originates from their expertise. 
Funck (2010) stresses on the significance of professional values and norms for control of 
HCOs as opposed to performance measurements focusing on controlling behaviour or 
output.  
This case-study also found that the physicians were known as an influential group in the 
hospitals by the managers and other departments, and their non-cooperative behaviour was 
considered a noticeable cause of low efficiency of internal MCSs (i.e. DAs) in the 
hospitals. Consistent with Pomey et al. (2010), this study also found that the physicians 
were failing to comply with the requirements of the NAPH. In fact, the NAPH was 
interpreted by the clinicians as an administrative rather than a clinical improvement 
initiative which should be operationalised by administrative members, concurring with the 
studies such as Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1990) and Pomey et al. (2010) in this sense. 
Such a perception by the physicians might be a sign that they mostly showed an inertial 
response to the NAPH (Larrinaga-González et al., 2001).  
 
8.6. The NAPH as an external disturbance 
In the existing literature (e.g. Laughlin, 1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998; Broadbent et 
al., 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2010a), the word 
disturbance implies that the requested change or requirement is not considered as desirable 
for the subject organisation. It is argued that the external PMSs, aiming to correct and 
improve the activities of organisations, could also be considered as a disturbance (Gray et 
al., 1995; Greenwood et al., 2002). This is largely, as Laughlin (1991) and Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2005) note, because organisations are naturally predisposed to inertia. On this 
reasoning, this section elaborates on the perceived features of the NAPH as an external 
PMS, rendering this evaluatory mechanism as a ‘disturbance’ for the hospitals (Laughlin, 
1991, p. 209).  
Most of the studies utilising the regulative and constitutive concepts (Broadbent et al., 
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societal steering mechanisms with the values of targeted areas (e.g. education or health) or 
organisations. Relying on such a rationale, they have recognised the mechanisms as 
constitutive (see e.g. Lawrence, 1999; Lawrence and Sharma, 2002; Dillard and Yuthas, 
2006). In accordance with the language of communicative action
40 (Habermas, 1984, 
1987), which is the origin of the adopted theoretical models (i.e. Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2005), the main determinants of a regulative (vis-à-vis constitutive) mechanism are 
virtually the principal features such as being consensually-based, chosen, and 
understandable to those under its evaluation, as discussed in chapter five (Broadbent et al., 
1991; Broadbent et al., 2010a; Broadbent et al., 2010b). As such, Broadbent (1998) makes 
plain that agreement on and acceptance of the mechanisms by stakeholders are essential 
for a regulative mechanism in the light of communicative action. As argued, insofar as a 
steering mechanism such as the NAPH is developed or adopted based on these features of 
communicative action (Broadbent et al., 2010a), it is more likely to represent a regulative 
mechanism. Broadbent et al. (2010a) affirmatively stress that if a compulsory (imposed) 
mechanism, potentially constitutive, is agreed upon and chosen to be mandatory by its 
stakeholders, it could be assumed to be a regulative mechanism. This statement 
emphasises the importance of these key features for judging the merits of societal steering 
mechanisms. Broadbent et al. (2001) further predict the possibility of diversion of steering 
mechanisms from the lifeworld.  
APs (e.g. the NAPH), unlike other quality measurement and improvement systems such as 
TQM, ISO and EFQM, are formulated inside health care (Shaw, 2000). However, as the 
findings from the current case-study showed, the mode by which the NAPH had been 
developed and implemented did perceivably qualify this steering mechanism as a 
constitutive mechanism. The NAPH did not apparently have the features of a regulative 
mechanism. In fact, the shortage of related characteristics and specific defects associated 
with them (see 6.4, chapter 6) was a substantive factor which caused this mechanism to 
appear as a disturbance to the hospitals. The NAPH also had a different set of requirements 
(Table 3.1, chapter two). Consequently, given their nature, the varying reactions and 
rationales could have been anticipated from the hospitals.  
 
                                                   
40. Communicative action is defined as an action motivated by communcation aimed at mutual understanding 
(David, 2007).  
                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
  
251 
8.7. Reactions and rationales of the hospitals towards the NAPH 
The reliance on the reactions representing the changes in the hospitals was another 
alternative pursued by this study to assess the performance of the NAPH. As elucidated in 
chapter four, different reactions (e.g. rejection) de facto represented the various changes in 
three main elements of the hospitals (i.e. ISs, DAs and subsystems) while they attempted 
to meet the requirements of the NAPH. The changes triggered by APs in HCOs are 
evidenced in the literature (Nicklin and Barton, 2007; Pichoir-Drew, 2005; Pomey et al., 
2004; Pomey et al., 2010; Braithwaite et al., 2010; Sunol et al., 2009b). A majority of 
these studies are, nonetheless, conducted in developed countries (e.g. mainly in Canada). 
They have not further uncovered the effects of these programmes separately on the 
hospitals’ values, internal PMSs and workings, as this study was allowed to do in the light 
of its adopted theoretical framework. However, the findings of this research are consistent 
with these studies in that the changes instigated by APs mostly happen in preparation and 
also post-accreditation stages as a result of remedial recommendations offered by the 
programmes (Pomey et al., 2010; Braithwaite et al., 2010). The reactions and underlying 
rationales are, in turn, discussed below. 
 
8.7.1. The reactions of the hospitals 
The reactions of the hospitals to the NAPH took different forms, as explained in chapter 
six. Obviously there was no possibility of the hospitals ignoring the requirements of the 
NAPH, implying that the inertia could not be seen in the context (Larrinaga-González et 
al., 2001). 
 
8.7.1.1. Rejection  
The rejection of the requirements was to some extent present among the hospitals, despite 
the fact that the NAPH was a compulsory regulatory mechanism. This reaction by the 
hospitals took place after the on-site survey, seemingly due to the lack of a comprehensive 
unannounced visit by the surveyors (Aryankhesal, 2010). This also concurs with Nicholas 
(1999) who argued that HCOs might only comply with standards at the time of the 
accreditation survey. Pickering (1995) has similarly acknowledged the inability of APs to 
detect wilful fraud by hospitals. Although the rejection of the requirements happened in                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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accord with Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), it did not happen in an explicit way, but 
through gaming (i.e. showing symbolic compliance). This was because, as Gray et al. 
(1995) also argue, the hospitals could not afford to directly rebut the NAPH’s 
requirements. This reaction is further in agreement with Scott (2008a) who recognises the 
possibility that a regulative institutional element (i.e. backed by law) might give rise to 
non-conformity by organisations. In contrast, it contradicts the perspectives of classic 
institutional theorists, predicting mere compliance towards regulative institutional 
pressures (e.g. Selznick, 1949; Meyer and Rowan, 1977, cited in Scott, 2008a). The 
gaming that occurred in the hospitals, as explained before, was seen as a reaction by the 
hospitals to the NAPH. The occurrence of gaming is not recognised in the model of 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) during the rebuttal reaction. The hospitals could reject 
some requirements after a period of symbolic compliance (i.e. gaming) during the on-site 
survey, unlike the compulsory nature (strength and forcefulness) of the NAPH (Richardson 
et al., 1996).  
The findings also revealed that the hospitals showed different reactions to the various 
requirements, owing to the wide range of the NAPH’s requirements for the hospitals (see 
table 3.1, chapter 3). Unlike what has been argued by Laughlin (1991), the reaction of 
rejection did not turn into the absorption; rather, these reactions existed alongside each 
other depending on the nature of the requirements (i.e. some requirements were rejected 
and some absorbed). In addition, the changes under this reaction took place in both DAs 
and subsystems, not just in the DAs as Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) predict. In fact, 
only the changes occurring in the subsystems were declined while the changes in the DAs 
remained untouched (see section 7.2.4.1). In view of these features, the given reaction did 
not match either of Laughlin’s and might be placed somewhere between the rebuttal and 
reorientation pathways of Laughlin (1991), in terms of the changes in the hospitals’ 
different aspects.  
 
8.7.1.2. Absorption  
The dominant reaction was, nevertheless, the absorption (i.e. reorientation) of the 
perceivably unwanted requirements of the NAPH (Larrinaga-González et al., 2001). The 
fact that the most frequently raised reason by the hospitals for compliance with the NAPH 
was perceivably its economic gains could to a large extent confirm the existence of this                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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reaction in the hospitals (Agrizzi, 2008). This reaction de facto implies that the respective 
requirements were not perceived as desirable by the hospitals, yet were absorbed 
reluctantly to avoid the possible resultant punitive consequences for the hospitals in the 
event of rejection. A refusal to implement the requirements by any given hospital could 
result in  the hospital being branded as substandard, which would have major financial and 
non-financial implications (i.e. legitimacy issues) for the hospitals, such as a change in 
their status (becoming a clinic) as well as in their income. In fact, it seemed the value of 
the rejection, as claimed, was a great deal less than absorption for the hospitals in relation 
to the requirements in this stage and, by containing the requirements, the hospitals’ 
survivability could be assured (Larrinaga-González et al., 2001). 
While this finding concurs with Laughlin (1991) and Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) 
emphasising that safeguarding their status (i.e. legitimacy with public and government) led 
to the absorption of the unwanted demands, it also identifies other rationales (e.g. financial 
grounds), because of which the hospitals decided to internalise the requirements. In fact, as 
the findings revealed, the effect of financial gains was more prominent in showing such a 
reaction by the hospitals as it seemed more tangible and influential in the hospitals’ daily 
activities, given their financial problems. In this sense (i.e. the compliance of organisations 
with external pressures to earn economic benefit and legitimacy), this finding is further in 
line with institutional theory literature (e.g. Scott and Meyer, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Chang, 
2006). Besides those rationales, the impossibility of refusing the requirements (i.e. the 
transition towards reorientation) also stemmed from the nature of some of the NAPH’s 
demands, which could not be rejected. That is, the findings indicated that they were 
extensive, critical and highly-monitored demands. As Laughlin (1991, p. 218) similarly 
emphasises: ‘…ideally the disturbance [the unwanted requirements of the NAPH] should 
be rebutted but, to the extent that it is impossible, the next best thing is to internalise …’ 
The changes in this stage involved both the DAs and subsystems of the hospitals (Dumay 
and Guthrie, 2007). The findings showed that the hospital committees were developed 
under the requirements of the NAPH to diffuse the requirements across the workings of all 
departments; inter alia, a bespoke committee for evaluation and supervisory activities in 
the hospitals was specifically created in relation to the NAPH. Similar studies found the 
absorption of the imposed changes by the GP practices in the NHS (e.g. Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 1998; Broadbent et al., 2001). Nonetheless, in the current study the hospitals                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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tried to absorb the unwanted changes for a different reason than those of GP practices, 
which was, in the main, the incompatibility with their professional values.  
A distinction could be made between the absorption reaction in the current study and one 
suggested by Laughlin (1991) and Broadbent and Laughlin (2005). Similar to their 
argument, the findings showed that the hospitals absorbed, reluctantly, the unwanted 
requirements, when they were not able to reject them. However, the difference lies in that, 
according to their statement, the requirements are absorbed until their repercussions for the 
core values of organisations are restrained. Conversely, in the case of the current study, the 
absorption was assumed because the hospitals tended to benefit from the advantages (e.g. 
economic gain and legitimacy) resulting from this reaction (Gray et al., 1995), as the 
rejection of the requirements could endanger their survivability as a hospital (i.e. 
legitimacy with the government). In fact, the absorption of those requirements was not 
perceived as damaging to the core values of the hospitals, as the findings showed (section 
7.2.4.2), and there emerged no fear of any change in their general identity and ethos caused 
by the absorption.  
 
8.7.1.3. Submission  
Another response to the environmental disturbance is argued to be submission 
(colonisation) in that the given organisation completely surrenders to the values exerted by 
the disturbance. That is, following the changes in subsystems and DAs (tangible and quasi-
tangible elements), the intangible parts of organisations will also be transformed 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). This reaction is assumed to be highly likely in response 
to an imposed disturbance (Laughlin, 1991). It embodies shifts in the ISs (e.g. values, 
beliefs) of organisational members and brings a new ethos and identity to the given 
organisation (Laughlin et al., 1994b).  
Evidence from the current study showed that the main values and mission of the hospitals 
remained largely unchanged. At the highest levels of the hospitals’ ISs, namely, metarules 
(Broadbent, 1992), the clinical dominance (conventional culture of HCOs) was preserved 
and the hospitals were still recognised generally as places for the provision of quality care. 
However, at lower levels of the ISs (Richardson et al., 1996), despite their belief in the 
importance of the external assessment of their hospital, they manifested different attitudes 
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programme. They believed it was not the capability and merits of the NAPH (as reflected 
in the ISs of the MoH) but rather its financial benefits (alternatively, the fear of losing 
them), legal coercion and the members’ fear of their managers that drove the hospitals 
towards compliance with the NAPH (Gray et al., 1995; Larrinaga-González et al., 2001). 
That is, the hospitals conceived the NAPH as a financial element rather than a performance 
assessment and improvement programme. The financial problems of the hospitals and their 
financial dependence on the NAPH seemingly facilitated and assisted with the formation 
of this mentality among the hospitals’ members.  
In fact, the hospitals’ main rationale for absorbing the unwanted requirements of the 
NAPH (i.e. grasping the financial gain) gradually created an environment oriented towards 
business culture (Dillard and Smith, 1999), particularly when it had the managers’ strong 
backing. Such culture was essentially against the overall ISs of the hospitals. The 
managers were the main incumbents and key decision-makers (Pettersen and Solstad, 
2007)
41 who had to ensure the requirements of the NAPH were met. Accordingly, when 
this responsibility was coupled with their administrative power and financial responsibility 
for the hospitals as well as with the beneficial consequences of the NAPH, a tendency to 
press the subordinates towards compliance (submission) became highly likely among the 
hospital managers. The strong power of the managers in instituting such alteration and 
deciding on the occurrence of the changes in the hospitals was recognisable (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996; Richardson et al., 1996). The key role of strong groups inside 
organisations in increasing the rate of changes is similarly also highlighted by various 
studies (e.g. Dumay and Guthrie, 2007; Gurd, 2008). These shifts in the attitudes of the 
members following the absorption of the requirements and under the influence of the 
managers is consistent with Laughlin (1991) and Broadbent and Laughlin (2005). 
The NAPH was also seen as a biased means of quality improvement by the hospitals. This 
impression, largely seen at inter-hospital level among the NTHs, was also against the ISs 
of the MoH (MoH, 1997a).  
These issues were found to be out of line with the values (i.e. the ISs of the MoH) behind 
the establishment of the NAPH (i.e. quality improvement), according to the existing 
                                                   
41. Key decision-makers are described as ‘those who exercise the power to decide on the use of resources 
and the performance of services’ (Pettersen and Solstad, 2007, p. 135) 
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documentation (Moghimi, 2004, MoH, 2004, 2008). Therefore, the aforementioned cases 
show that the hospitals have developed different internal attitudes and beliefs from those 
expected by the steering institution (i.e. MoH) towards this AP. These values might allude 
to some shifts in the attitudes of the hospitals’ members as a result of their evaluation by 
the NAPH over time. Relevant examples regarding these shifts were provided previously 
(see e.g. sections 6.4.3 and 6.5.3.2). However, as the findings suggested, the overall ethos 
of the hospitals was found to be fairly unchanged (i.e. their changed beliefs had not 
apparently affected the hospitals’ metarules and overall purposes). Therefore, the change 
could not be conceived as a second-order colonisation pathway in the sense of Broadbent 
and Laughlin (2005)’s model. Two possible justifications might be put forward for this 
assumption:  
First, the NAPH was grounded in the same values as the hospitals. As explained 
previously, the NAPH - as an AP - was developed in line with the overall features and 
guidelines of the healthcare system
42 (Shaw, 2000). The core of mission and targets set out 
originally for the NAPH (i.e. quality improvement) were aligned with the goals and values 
of the hospitals (MoH, 1997a). The NAPH was not meant to import new values into the 
hospitals. However, the way it was operationalised (developed and implemented) along 
with its features was not welcomed by the hospitals and they perceived that the NAPH was 
not able to improve quality. Accordingly, it could be argued that the main elements of its 
requirements were not chosen and embraced, but rejected or absorbed. 
The second factor was thought to be the presence of the physicians in the hospitals, who 
traditionally have the potential to create an ‘occupation imperialism’ (Laughlin et al., 
1994b, p. 122) and strong professionalism (Abernethy et al., 2007) in the hospitals. They 
were the most powerful group and the least influenced by the NAPH and the hospital 
managers, as the findings revealed. They seemed to act as an anchor for the hospitals, 
keeping their original values intact.  
To sum up, given the above discussions, the following insights could be provided into the 
argument presented by the model of Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) regarding the 
colonisation change pathway (i.e. submission reaction) in the light of evidence from the 
current study: 
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Firstly, despite the transitions in the beliefs and attitudes of the members, the hospitals’ ISs 
did not change into the completely different ones and there was no shift of the ISs in the 
sense Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) argue. Therefore, the changes could not be labelled 
as morphogenetic (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). They could instead, as pointed out by 
Gray et al. (1995), be morphostatic colonisation. Affirmatively, Levy (1986), Larrinaga-
González et al. (2001) and Tyrrall and Parker (2005) dismiss the idea that the changes in 
the beliefs (the lowest level of the ISs) of the organisational members could lead to a 
morphogenetic change.  
Secondly, unlike Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) colonisation pathway which arguably 
follows a change in the DAs and subsystems of organisations, the evidence from this study 
shows that the shifts in the attitudes of the hospitals’ members towards the NAPH were not 
affected and caused exclusively by its change effects on the hospitals’ DAs and workings 
(Gurd, 2008). They were instead formed, as Gray et al. (1995) also put it, by the people’s 
feelings and perceptions towards the features of this accreditation mechanism. For 
example, the perceptions of the NTHs of the biased evaluation of the NAPH or the 
members’ compliance through fear of their managers were influential in their changed 
values. The fact that the NAPH was a mechanism which was developed centrally and 
which ignored their feedback persistently (i.e. constitutive features) seemed to contribute, 
to a large degree, to the formation of such thoughts among the members.  
Thirdly, the issue of perceived fragmentation observed in the beliefs and cultural level 
(Broadbent, 1992) of the different groups in the hospitals is not reflected by Laughlin 
(1991) and Broadbent and Laughlin (2005). They have predicted shared values at all levels 
of the ISs. This discrepancy could also be compatible with the fact that hospitals are 
professionalised organisations composed of various groups with different culture- 
orientations and interests (Anderson and McDaniel Jr, 2000; Riley et al., 2009). In fact, the 
members’ reaction and response to the NAPH was determined by their values and beliefs 
(Zakus and Skinner, 2008). However, the integration at the hospitals’ metarule might be 
because it forms the hospitals’ overall picture at organisational level, which is beyond the 
individual orientations and interests of the members. In addition, the mission and values of 
the public hospitals were found to be largely formulated under the influence of the MoH 
and the HUMS (Tyrrall and Parker, 2005). As for the private hospitals, it seemed they 
needed to at least display such an image, albeit symbolically, to receive authorisation from 
the government.                                                                                                                          D s  ss                                       
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8.7.1.4. Adoption 
This pathway represents the situation in which organisations embrace the change 
requirements (Haigh and De Graaf, 2009). While the NAPH was an imposed mechanism, 
the evidence from the study showed that the hospitals adopted some parts of its 
requirements and benefited from their effects. The nature of the hospitals’ rationales for 
adopting the requirements was an important indicator for distinguishing this reaction from 
the absorption and submission (Larrinaga-González et al., 2001). The findings illustrated 
that the application of the requirements, as far as the adoption reaction was concerned, 
proceeded entirely because of the merits of the requirements, as perceived by the members 
at the time of their application. In contrast, in the case of other reactions such reasons as 
the financial benefits of the NAPH took priority for the hospitals. In fact, the beliefs and 
reasons behind the reactions of the hospitals to the requirements were crucial. That is, the 
reaction may have been a result of the hospitals’ fear of losing their legitimacy or financial 
benefits (as in the case of reorientation and colonisation) or their belief in the 
requirements’ ability to improve their practices through adding to their knowledge or 
because they were in line with their values, as seen in the current study (as to the 
evolution).  
A noticeable feature (i.e. newness and scientific nature) was attached to the requirements 
presented for adoption. Diverging from the argument of Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), 
this reaction (i.e. evolution pathway) was developed in the hospitals without any discursive 
process among the hospitals’ members (Gray et al. 1995). A boost in the knowledge level 
of the members as a result of the requirements seemed to facilitate the members’ 
acceptance of them. The scientific content somehow improved the level of the members’ 
knowledge, which could be envisaged as an allusion to some (intended) alterations in the 
members’ ISs (Hassan, 2008); this is consistent with the evolution pathway of Broadbent 
and Laughlin (2005).  
In addition, the requirements relating to the religious and ethical values were found to be 
adopted, as such, without undergoing any discursive process. The findings reported that a 
majority of the hospitals’ members did not conceive that they could or should challenge 
these requirements, regardless of the legal force behind them. Indeed, the spiritual and 
humane nature of the requirements was claimed as the main rationale for their adoption. 
The hospitals did not perceive these sorts of requirements as undesirable and, as such, their                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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rationale for compliance with them was found to be positive. As explained earlier in 
section 8.4.2., the spiritual nature of these demands seems to be compatible with the 
religious context of the country.  
As explained before, the NAPH was a programme imposed on the hospitals and no free 
discourse was possible on whether to accept or reject its requirements. Therefore, the 
change tracks resulting from these requirements which were accepted (welcomed) and 
thought to be for the good of the hospitals seem to be different from the evolution pathway 
of Broadbent and Laughlin (2005). They instead side more with the pathway of ‘positive 
inner colonisation’ by Laughlin (1987, p. 485) or ‘forced evolution’ by Dunphy and Stace 
(1988, cited in Tyrrall and Parker, 2005, p. 510). Laughlin (1987, 1991) has argued that, in 
the latter situation, the colonising challenges are welcomed or deemed to be for the good 
of the organisations. Therefore, it could be alleged that the evolution pathway, as in the 
sense of Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), has not occurred in the hospitals for a number of 
reasons. First, there was no free discourse in the hospitals about the requirements, as 
explained. Second, the embraced changes did not involve every part and the member of the 
hospitals. In fact, hospitals normally include a range of professionals with different areas 
of expertises and orientations (Pomey et al., 2010). Therefore, a discursive process among 
all of their members might be a challenging task, as Zakus and Skinner (2008) also point to 
the failure of Broadbent and Laughlin’s framework in attending to different needs and 
interests inside organisations. As such, achieving an organisation-wide consensus might 
seem practically difficult in such organisations. Therefore, the evolution pathway found in 
the current study might be labelled a morphostatic type of evolution pathway (Gray et al., 
1995).  
 
8.7.2. The rationales behind the hospitals’ reactions 
The reactions of the hospitals, as discussed in previous chapters, represented different 
change implications inside the hospitals. Overall, along with the constitutive features of 
the NAPH such as the failure to be a consultatively-driven (i.e. persistent ignorance of the 
hospitals’ feedback) and consensually-based evaluatory mechanism, some dissatisfaction 
surfaced with this external PMS among the majority of the hospitals’ members. This 
accordingly gave rise to the reactions such as rejection and absorption or dysfunctional 
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with different orientations and interests (Pomey et al., 2010), the varying rationales for the 
reactions might be inevitable. The reasons the hospitals react in such ways are discussed 
briefly as follows. 
•  The rebuttal reaction  
The main reason why the hospitals manifested the reaction of rejection was the fact that 
the members did not perceive the specific requirements as a priority for their hospitals. In 
fact, the basis of such a perception was partly the clinical judgement of the members (e.g. 
heads of EDs) in that they did not believe that their non-conformity would reduce the 
quality of the care or damage their patients. In addition, this reaction was also reinforced 
by the managers, because of the inability of their hospitals in terms of their financial and 
human resources (intra-organisational factors) to fulfil those requirements (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996). They acted as a deterrent factor which made conformity with the 
(justified) requirements of NAPH a complicated matter. This incompetence was a further 
rationale for rejection itself. The findings identified the situations in which the (teaching) 
hospitals rejected some requirements only because they were not able to meet them. The 
findings showed that there was a feeling of apathy among these hospitals toward meeting 
the requirements. 
•  The reorientation reaction 
There were different reasons for the hospitals being dragged towards absorbing the 
perceivably unwanted requirements. The apparent reason for absorbing the unwanted 
requirements was because the hospitals could not reject them, given their nature (e.g. the 
strength and forcefulness). However, the underlying rationale for such a reaction, as 
realised, was the tendency of the hospitals to earn economic gains as well as sustaining 
their survivability and legitimacy to remain as hospitals (Gray et al., 1995). In addition, 
some beneficial consequences of the NAPH were also influential in the hospitals’ reaction 
(e.g. ‘being a lever to exert pressure on the higher-up authorities’ to consider the problems 
of the hospitals or allocate higher fixed budgets), as discussed before (see section 6.6.2, 
chapter 6). This rationale showed that, while the hospitals were not able to reject the 
NAPH’s requirements, they tried to take the greatest advantage from absorbing the 
requirements. They applied the requirements reluctantly, until they could earn other 
benefits.  
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The main rationale behind the submission of the hospitals to the requirements of the 
NAPH, similarly to the absorption reaction, was their overall fear of losing its benefits 
(e.g. legitimacy and financial gains). However, as discussed earlier, when such fear was 
fuelled by the pressure from the hospital managers to comply with the NAPH, the principal 
factor in effecting changes in the beliefs of the hospitals’ members materialised. 
•  The adoption reaction  
Although the merits of the NAPH were not prominently mentioned as a reason for non-
symbolic compliance by the hospitals with this mechanism, evidence was found of some 
requirements which were embraced by the hospitals. The rationales of the hospitals’ 
reaction to this group of requirements appeared to be different from other reactions, as the 
findings illustrate. Two main features of these requirements which were influential in their 
adoption included their technical (scientific) and religious natures. The beneficial effects 
of the NAPH could also be considered as further rationales for the adoption reaction of the 
hospitals. 
 
8.7.3. The implications of studying the rationales  
The study of the grounds underlying the reactions of the hospitals to the NAPH was 
important in the sense that they could guide the researcher towards the contextual aspects 
associated with the NAPH which prompt these specific reactions. They could further 
clarify whether the conformity of the hospitals to the NAPH has been exclusively because 
of its quality improvement capabilities. This is of critical importance, since quality 
measurement and improvement have been the main preset objectives of the NAPH, 
according to the relevant policy documents (Moghimi, 2004; MoH, 1997a; 2008). 
Therefore, the rationales could help judge the merits and performance of the NAPH based 
on the views of the hospitals’ members, arguably the group whose perspectives are the 
most reliable for assessing the programme’s effectiveness (Barker et al., 2004, Laughlin 
2007, Casey, 2010).  
The most notable rationale of the hospitals according to the empirical findings was 
‘increased tariffs for the hospitals’ services’ as a result of the accreditation award. This 
was more crucial because of the hospitals’ financial dependence on the HUMS and 
ultimately on the MoH. Findings overall showed that the rationale of ‘economic gains’ was                                                                                                                         D s  ss                                       
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more important than other rationales for the hospitals, which seemed unsurprising, given 
the hospitals’ frequent references to the ‘financial issues’ as their foremost problem.  
Even though the legal coercion and financial benefits were set by the authorities to 
encourage the hospitals to comply with the NAPH (MoH, 1997a; Majlis, 1987), these 
rationales were not to be the main drivers behind the hospitals’ compliance with the NAPH 
as the societal lifeworld indicates; reflected in the policy documents of societal steering 
medium and mechanisms (i.e. the MoH and NAPH). Instead, the quality improvement 
power of the NAPH has been set to be the main reason for the hospitals to comply, while it 
was not seen to be as effective as other grounds in practice. In fact, considering the 
importance order of the rationales in the hospitals’ compliance, the occurrence of gaming 
could be predictable, since the hospitals were keen to achieve the financial benefits. 
Therefore, this insight could be a clear indication to the policy-makers to revisit the 
effectiveness of this AP and consider ways to minimise the repercussions of the NAPH.  
Hamblin (2008) points out that an intelligent design of measurement schemes could 
discourage perverse responses by organisations. According to the results of this study, the 
main feature which apparently needs to be considered for the intelligent design of the 
NAPH is the frequent consideration of the hospitals’ feedback in different stages of the 
initiation, development and improvement of this accreditation programme. The findings 
revealed that the permanent ignorance of their feedback as well as the unchanged status of 
the NAPH over the years seemed to be the root cause of most unintended and 
dysfunctional behaviours on behalf of the hospitals in relation to the NAPH.  
In addition, the authorities could recognise the real merits of the NAPH and strengthen the 
positive and beneficial effects of the NAPH under the hospitals’ critical eye. 
In summary, as discussed earlier, the rationales were extensive and interrelated. They 
varied among different groups of staff. For instance, (senior) managerial people were 
mostly inclined towards economic gains as their rationale for compliance, which seemed 
natural because of their responsibilities, while clinical and frontline staff members were 
largely in favour of quality improvement as their motives, as explained earlier. Despite 
their own motive, the clinical people also thought that the main rationale of hospitals’ 
managers was the financial benefits of the NAPH for the hospitals.  
Chapter 9 - Final Considerations: Concluding Discussion, 
Research Implications and Limitations 
 
 
 
 
9.1. Introduction  
This final chapter aims to present an overview of the main issues addressed in this study. 
Accordingly, it firstly outlines the steps taken in the study and highlights and reflects on its 
key findings in order for illuminating its contribution to the literature in concluding 
discussion. Then, the theoretical insights and implications are explained in the light of the 
study’s empirical investigation and theoretical frameworks. Next, the policy implications 
are explained and suggested for the improvement of the current accreditation system. 
Thereafter, the limitations of the study and the research avenues for further research are 
outlined followed, by final consideration of the research. 
 
9.2. Concluding discussion 
This study has sought to develop an understanding of the micro effects of macro 
performance control and evaluation mechanisms (i.e. MCSs/PMSs), based on the evidence 
from the critically-known area of health care and rarely-explored context of a developing 
country. It is a problem-oriented study (see chapter one) whose main motivation has been 
to explore and analyse the perceptions and reactions of local hospitals towards the 
implications of Iran’s national accreditation programme, identified as a ‘macro steering 
mechanism’ in the light of Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) refinement of Habermas’s 
model of societal development. This is to show how local organisations (e.g. the hospitals) 
react to the actions of the macro steering mechanisms (e.g. the NAPH) seeking to control 
and evaluate their performance on behalf of societal steering institutions (e.g. the MoH). 
                                                                                                                            l s                                       
  
264 
The steps taken in this study commenced by conducting an extensive literature review 
upon the measurement of performance in the public sector (particularly, health care). This 
process culminated in the identification of a gap in the literature regarding a shortage of 
studies on the performance measurement in the healthcare area in developing and 
underdeveloped countries. Any effort to fill such a gap could be argued to be justifiable 
given the importance of contextual factors. In fact, this research intended to contribute to 
the wider literature of performance measurement and management (PMSs/MCSs) in 
developing countries considering their contextual distinctiveness and shortage of similar 
studies. Iran, as a developing country, was selected in the next step and the NAPH, a 
national and sole PMS in the country’s health system, was chosen to be the subject of the 
study. This selection was mostly because of its crucial position in the country’s health 
system, a lack of related studies on its performance and its perceived deficiencies, 
according to the researcher’s primary investigation and the existing scant literature.  
Then, the philosophical perspective of the study and appropriate theoretical frameworks to 
address the phenomenon under study were clarified. Following decision on the research 
design and data collection methods in the light of the adopted theoretical frameworks, the 
data collection stage began, taking around six months. The data analysis was undertaken 
next, followed by the final stage which was to set out the results and discuss their 
theoretical and practical implications.  
Overall, several key issues emerged from analysing the empirical findings of the study (see 
chapters six and seven) of which those with deeper significance are explained underneath 
to clarify the contribution of the current study to the public performance measurement and 
management control literature. 
 
9.2.1. The perceived nature of the NAPH 
As elucidated in chapter six, the theoretical notions of ‘constitutive and regulative’ 
(Lawrence and Sharma, 2002; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005) were invoked to judge the 
merits of the NAPH on the basis of the perceptions of the selected hospitals’ members and 
the relevant policy documents. The evidence from the empirical investigation of this 
programme suggests that the NAPH is increasingly perceived by the hospitals to display 
the characteristics of a constitutive mechanism legitimised only through legal and financial 
procedure (Broadbent et al., 2010a). In fact, it was also understood that the NAPH’s ends                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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and ways of evaluating the hospitals (means) have not been in practice set through the 
consensus of its stakeholders (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009). 
Both theoretical and empirical evidence was accordingly found in support of the 
constitutive nature of the NAPH (see chapter 6, sections 6.3 and 6.4). For example, the 
hospitals did not envisage the NAPH as their chosen programme and, further, they 
attributed a range of structural and functional deficiencies to this evaluatory system. As 
such, the current accreditation programme did not seem to be able to command a wide-
ranging consensus towards its performance inside the hospitals. The hospitals perceive the 
NAPH not as a system which is developed through a consensual process, but a top-down 
system with no consideration of hospital reactions and complexities. Such a PMS is argued 
to lack a legitimate right, power and authority to direct he behaviour of organisations, in 
the sense of the communicative action principles (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009). In 
addition, this perception of the hospital members towards the NAPH, had created the 
mentality that this PMS could not generate an intended change in the hospitals, which 
should follow after a wide range of communications among the stakeholders leading to a 
unanimous consensus to conduct specific actions such as performance measurement 
(Habermas, 1984; 1987; cited in Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005; Davis, 2007). As such, as 
indicated earlier, the members also referred to a number of problems such as its biased 
approach to evaluation of the hospitals, in relation to the NAPH, which as revealed, were 
seemingly caused by its non-consensual nature.  
At the following sections, three main implications of the foregoing nature of the NAPH are 
explained, which are thought to have new insights for the literature.  
 
9.2.1.1. The significance of feedback  
A key effort to operationalise the theoretical principle of ‘communicative action’ is to 
consider frequent feedback from those under evaluation in the different stages of 
development and modification of a PMS (Moullin, 2004; Barker et al., 2004; Laughlin, 
2007; Baker, 2008). Despite the bottom-up feedback from the hospitals and the UMSs’ 
surveyors regarding the performance and functionality of the NAPH; from the perspectives 
of the hospitals’ members, it has not changed since its inception and the perceived 
problems have mostly remained thus far; except for recent limited modifications to its 
structure and standards. It was stated by both the hospitals’ members and the surveyors                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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that their feedback has not been in practice considered by the authorities to modify the 
NAPH. Some reasons could be given by this research for such behaviour from the 
authorities:  
As also emerged in the interviews, since the hospitals were associated with different 
organisations such as the MoH and various insurance organisations, it appeared to be 
challenging for all of them to gather, ponder, and discourse (i.e. the basis of 
communicative action) on common evaluation methods and standards for assessing the 
hospitals’ performance. For instance, there have been always some related and even state-
commissioned studies (e.g. Sadaghiani and Zare, 2005) offering the establishment of an 
independent organisation including all stakeholders for the NAPH. However, these ideas 
have never put into practice given the existing practicalities and there still remains a 
conflict of interests among the NAPH surveyors, hospitals, the surveyors of insurance 
organisations and even the directorates towards the evaluation of the hospitals. It could be 
understood from this situation that various expectations of stakeholders could be one of the 
challenges for operationalising communicative action and reaching a consensual 
agreement through discourse process (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997; Laughlin, 2004). 
 
The CHAS, governing body inside the MoH, as the main entity in charge of the NAPH 
seemed to be lacking sufficient expert (expertise) and information system infrastructure to 
conduct and coordinate comprehensive research projects on developing and modifying this 
evaluation programme (also stated by one of its members). There was a few staff working 
in the CHAS mostly busy with administrative tasks of, for instance, communicating with 
the UMSs’ evaluation offices and investigating the complaints, as found out. Therefore, it 
seems that the authorities are not able to fulfil the expectations of the hospitals in relation 
to the performance/functionality of the NAPH, given their own limited resources and 
capabilities. 
Therefore, it might be argued that given the abovementioned barriers and shortage of 
appropriate resources, the authorities were not willing to raise the hospitals’ expectations 
of the NAPH by considering their regular feedback, as similarly echoed by Aryankhesal 
(2010). This could be subject of further investigation. 
Ignorance of feedback from subordinate organisations, which is against the principles of 
communicative action, might be to some extent justifiable, where requirements are                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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imposed on organisations under evaluation in a specific context, because they are thought 
to be for the good of whole society (Broadbent et al, 1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). 
Thus, the organizations are urged to change, although against their participants’ wishes 
(Agrizzi, 2003). Given the sensitivity of healthcare services (Gauld, 2005), it might be 
considered such an area within which some requirements could be imposed on the 
hospitals with not certainly considering their perspectives. However, this study argues that 
this imposition could be defensible only in the case of inspection, which ensures the 
implementation of basic health and safety standards in the hospitals (Shaw, 2003b) with no 
need for the contribution and cooperation from those inside the hospitals. In the case of 
quality improvement programmes, such as the NAPH, which the participation and 
feedback of subordinate organisations are highly recommended for the success of the 
programmes (Moullin, 2004; Barker et al., 2004; Laughlin, 2007) such ignorance might 
have no explanation. Therefore, overlooking the tenets of communicative action might not 
be justified in the case of the NAPH. 
 
In summary, the aforementioned points try to highlight this fact that the implementation of 
‘communicative action’ process in any context demands some requirements without which 
it might be futile. Such conditions (e.g. the willingness of all stakeholders, especially those 
with more power, to discourse and their sufficient capabilities) seemed to be less likely to 
be practical in the context under study. In fact, ‘communicative action’ achieved through 
‘ideal speech situation’ (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997, p. 628; Broadbent, 1998), 
apparently was found to be to some extent ‘idealistic’ currently for given context as a 
developing country as the findings implied (e.g. the fairly long period of ignoring the 
hospitals’ feedback), because of abovementioned practicalities. 
 
9.2.1.2. The relevance of Dysfunctional effects 
Given the overall constitutive nature of the NAPH, it was highly likely to precipitate 
dysfunctional and unwanted consequences in the hospitals. From the adopted theoretical 
perspective, these behaviours represent those efforts and reactions by the hospitals that 
were not apparently aligned with (i.e. decoupled/disintegrated from) the societal healthcare 
lifeworld (Teubner, 1987; Broadbent et al., 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). In an 
ideal fashion, it is argued that this lifeworld is tangibly manifested by steering institutions                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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(i.e. the MoH) and consequently their steering mechanisms (i.e. the NAPH) (Broadbent et 
al., 2001; Broadbent et al, 2010a). Therefore, the dysfunctional behaviours such as gaming 
emerged when the requirements of the NAPH, the tangible manifestation of the country’s 
healthcare lifeworld, were violated by the hospitals.  
However, as the word ‘ideal’ indicates, a regulative, and not constitutive, steering 
mechanism, which is developed based on communicative action, is expected to 
reflect/manifest the lifeworld values (Broadbent et al., 2010a), whilst the NAPH tended to 
feature constitutive attributes. Therefore, the gaming occurred could not certainly be 
labelled as dysfunctional, as the hospitals gamed, because they believed the NAPH is not 
expressing the societal healthcare lifeworld. 
The perceived rationales for the gaming indicated by the hospitals (chapter six, section 
6.5.2.) also implied that they perceived the NAPH as not contributing to quality 
improvement practices in the hospitals, which was consistent with exiting literature (e.g. 
Raisi, 2006; Aryankhesal, 2010). Such perceptions seemingly represent the situation 
predicted by Broadbent et al. (2001) and Broadbent et al. (2010a) where, from the 
hospitals’ perspectives, the NAPH has moved away from expressing the healthcare 
societal lifeworld (e.g. quality promotion), whereas they themselves have remained in 
concert with the related lifeworld. Although the authorities of the NAPH might contradict 
this finding, in the light of current evidence (e.g. Berwick, 2008; Scott, 2009; Casey, 
2010), it could be said that the hospitals are arguably in a better position to decide on the 
provision of quality services, in view of their direct involvement and contact with patients 
and given that valid performance measures are formulated based on the recommendations 
of frontline people. 
PMSs are all discussed to precipitate some degree of dysfunctional effects along with their 
beneficial outcomes (Ridgway, 1956; Ashton, 1976; de Bruijn, 2007; Ganz et al., 2007). 
The key point with regard to dysfunctional behaviours is to explore and analyse the 
rationales behind such behaviours in order to both assess the nature of dysfunctional 
behaviours and alleviate their adverse effects to organisations. Although these behaviours 
might not be always detrimental to organisations, their potential for generating 
dysfunctional is argued to be greater than beneficial effects (Birnberg et al., 1983). 
Organisational members might, for instance, game to increase their individual or 
organisational benefits (Jaworski and Young, 1992). Alternatively, they might be dragged                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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towards this conduct because of incongruence and inconsistency between their objectives 
and those of the imposed MCSs/PMSs. The latter case was seen mostly in this study in that 
the majority of hospital members did not perceive that the NAPH is able to improve the 
quality of health care in the hospitals.  
In fact, two main rationales of the hospitals for gaming, namely, ‘inability to fulfil the 
NAPH’s requirements’ and ‘discrepancy between the hospitals’ expectations and the 
requirements of the NAPH’ have somehow their roots in ignoring the feedback of the 
hospitals’ members by the NAPH over the years of implementing this system.  
 
As the above debate, especially the rationales behind the hospitals’ dysfunctional 
behaviours, could suggest, the results of the study indicated that the gaming observed in 
the majority of hospitals could not be labelled as ‘detrimental’ or ’dysfunctional’ since 
they de facto gamed to relieve (in response to) the perceived deficiencies of the evaluation 
system to these organisations. This result mostly disagrees with mainstream literature on 
gaming and dysfunctional behaviours (e.g. Birnberg et al., 1983; Smith, 1995; Bevan and 
Hood, 2006a; Kelman and Freidman, 2009), which predominantly recognise these 
actions/reactions disadvantageous to subject organisations. 
 
9.2.1.3. The role of financial grounds in the hospitals’ conformity 
As discussed in chapter eight (section 8.3.1.4.), several factors were identified behind 
conformity of the hospitals towards accreditation programme. The findings revealed that 
the main rationale for conformity of the hospitals towards the NAPH was ‘financial 
grounds’. As emerged, the perceived deficiencies associated with the NAPH which were 
largely persistent for a fairly long period, have gradually lessened the trust and belief of 
the hospitals’ members in the quality improvement merits of this system. Nevertheless, 
they were not able to clearly disobey its requirements, because of its economic gains and 
compulsory nature.  
In fact, a financial incentive was attached to the accreditation system by the MoH to 
encourage the hospitals to comply with the requirements of the NAPH. However, as 
asserted in the related policy documents, this spur was not supposed to serve as the main 
rationale for the hospitals’ compliance with the requirements, but the quality improvement                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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merits of the NAPH (Moghimi, 2004). While in reality, as the findings indicated, majority 
of the hospitals’ members referred to financial benefits as their rationale for conformity.  
Some contextual elements linked to the hospitals appeared to be highly influential in 
development of such a mentality (i.e. money-oriented micro lifeworld/interpretive 
schemes) inside these organisations (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005, Broadbent et al., 
2010b). The relative autonomy of the hospitals, which was mostly associated with 
financial aspects of the hospitals (Ghafari, 2009; Anonymous, 2011a) made these bodies, 
especially their authorities, to always be concerned with their financial arrangements. Such 
a situation was apparently aggravated considering the power of the managers in these 
organisations as the main incumbents who were liable to press the hospitals’ members to 
conform to the NAPH’s requirements. In addition, the perceived financial problems of the 
hospitals which were clear in their discourse and were repeated many times seemed to 
contribute to the formulation of such perceptions in these organisations.  
Therefore, despite other factors such as legal coercion and perceived advantages (see 
sections 8.3.1.4. and 8.4.), the main factor stimulating the conformity was found to be 
financial grounds attached to the NAPH, as repeatedly raised in the interviews. As such, 
because of the effectiveness of financial grounds, and not quality improvement merits, the 
‘absorption’ reaction was perceivably more dominant in the hospitals towards the 
requirements of the NAPH as opposed to ‘adoption’ (section 8.7).  
This finding indicates that solely setting financial incentives might not certainly guarantee 
organisations’ (non-symbolic) conformity towards a PMS, but initially there should be a 
consensus on the merits of the PMS (Laughlin, 2007; Kelman and Friedman, 2009). Only 
in that case, these incentives might encourage organisational compliance. In fact, financial 
incentives should serve as facilitator rather than enabler of the conformity.  
This study identifies two distinctive roles for ‘financial incentives’ that are ‘enabler’ and 
‘facilitator’, of them the latter should be considered for financial incentives. It also argues 
that those applying such encouragements for increasing the possibility of compliance to 
given PMSs should be cautious of assuming the ‘enabler role’ by this incentive. 
Otherwise, it is likely that subject organisations might take any action (e.g. gaming) to 
obtain the monetary gains, as in the case of present case study. 
Some studies (e.g. Mays, 2004) have even taken a more extreme position in regard to 
financial incentives and argued that they should be gradually phased out over time to                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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evade adverse effects associated with reuse of money (Habermas, 1987; cited in Broadbent 
et al., 2010; Dodd, 1994), as was the case in current study (section 8.3.1.4.2), by 
organisations. For example, an important side effect associated with the financial 
incentives in current study was their limiting effects on the internal PMSs (DAs) of the 
hospitals. That is, the hospitals were drawn to align their internal measurement systems 
with the NAPH, despite their lack of belief in its merits, in order to achieve the financial 
benefits (section 7.2.4.). 
 
9.2.2. The importance of religious elements 
Given the emphasis of the current research on ‘contextual factors’ in the effectiveness of 
PMSs/MCSs, a key contextual aspect emerged in present study was ‘the effect of religious 
elements’ on the hospitals' perceptions and reactions towards the NAPH. By and large this 
is consistent with the fact that, traditionally, there has been always a religious and humane 
facet attached to health care, especially treating patients (George, 2003). 
This factor might be equated with ‘altruism’ in general literature. For instance, Hamblin 
(2008) emphasises on the importance of ‘altruism’ as a reason why healthcare providers 
might consider reacting possitively to PMSs’ demands. However, unlike the humane 
acitivies which are of a personal nature and believed to be mostly unrelated to religion in 
western societies, the altruistic grounds seen in this research context seemed to be under 
the influence and guidance and as a part of religious values (i.e. with a raligious nature). 
This situation did not sound unusual given the religious context and ruling system of the 
country (i.e. Islamic Republic). Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen (2009) also similarly found 
religious spirit as an integral and important part of accountability in non-western societies.  
Given the religious context of the country, it is usually advised that the related actions be 
justified from a religious perspective and be in harmony with religious teachings. In health 
care, a number of spiritual precepts regarding healing and helping patients to recover were 
displayed on the hospitals’ notice boards and, more importantly, could be seen in the 
different instructions of hospital evaluation (e.g. in their introduction section) (e.g. MoH, 
1997a, 1997b). These efforts were understood as very rewarding and motivational for the 
hospitals’ practices. As such, approximately ten per cent of the hospital evaluation 
standards of the NAPH were directly related to religious aspects in the hospitals.                                                                                                                             l s                                       
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In fact, this contextual aspect somehow facilitated the acceptance of current PMS by some 
groups (especially frontline staff) in the hospitals. That is, they were more amenable to 
conform to the NAPH’s requirements, because of religious reasons and being spiritually 
rewarding. The evidence that the hospitals agreed easily to the religious requirements was 
approved by both the surveyors and hospital members. In addition, the higher scores of the 
hospitals in these standards also was a confirmatory sign of this assumption.  
The known effect of religious values in the easier/better acceptance of accreditation 
requirements, from the theoretical perspective, signifies the alignment (structural coupling) 
of micro lifeworld (ISs) of the hospitals’ members with overall societal (i.e. religious) 
lifeworld dominant in the country (society). Consistently, ‘the increased patient 
satisfaction’ was also seen as an incentive important for some hospital members for 
complaince with the NAPH (Aryankhesal, 2011, p. 265).  
Highlighting such a key finding, this case-study strongly concurs with studies such as 
Modell (2009) and Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) in emphasising the effect of contextual 
factors on the overall design, implementation and effectiveness of PMSs/MCSs. As such, 
it is one of the first studies recognising clearly the effect of religious elements on the 
functionality of PMSs/MCSs. Therefore, as a practical insight, it should be stated that 
careful consideration of contextual elements could provide invaluable insights for 
developing effective PMSs/MCSs. 
 
9.3. Research implications for theory 
This work has drawn on Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) to approach the performance 
analysis of Iranian hospital accreditation and evaluation system. The application of their 
model for the investigation of the NAPH proved helpful in locating this steering 
mechanism in a societal context, examining its merits from an organisational perspective, 
and ultimately analysing its change implications (i.e. various changes as a result of the 
NAPH) in different elements of the hospitals following their reactions towards this PMS. 
Notwithstanding this fact, as the empirical investigation uncovered some issues surfaced 
out of line with the theoretical assumptions suggested by this model, which are the base of 
developments and extension of Broadbent and Laughlin’s model, in the light of current 
research findings.                                                                                                                             l s                                       
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To remind us from chapter four (section 4.5.4) and clarify the suggested developments, 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) propose four change pathways of rebuttal, reorientation, 
colonisation and evolution which might develop in organisations subject to external 
steering (performance measurement) mechanisms. This study equates these pathways with 
the reactions of rejection, absorption, submission and adoption, respectively, in view of 
their nature, shown by the organisations towards steering mechanisms. All these four 
reactions were observed, though at varying scales, in the hospitals under study in response 
to the effects of the NAPH, in consistent with the adopted model. However, the following 
differences emerged in the context of current study illuminating the theoretical 
contributions of the research: 
 
First, although occurrence of the rejection in the hospitals was in accord with Broadbent 
and Laughlin's (2005) model, it did not happen in an explicit way, as their model assumes, 
but through gaming (i.e. showing symbolic compliance). This was because, as Gray et al. 
(1995) also argue, the hospitals could not afford to directly rebut the NAPH’s 
requirements. The incidence of any type of gaming is not recognised by their model during 
the rebuttal reaction. In fact, the hospitals could reject some requirements after a period of 
symbolic compliance (i.e. gaming) during their on-site evaluation survey, unlike the 
compulsory nature (strength and forcefulness) of the NAPH. This point concurs with 
Nicholas (1999) who argued that HCOs might only comply with standards at the time of 
the accreditation survey. This reaction by the hospitals after the on-site survey took place 
seemingly due to the lack of comprehensive unannounced and follow-up visits by the 
surveyors as also echoed by Aryankhesal (2010). 
The findings showed that the alterations in the different elements of the hospitals induced 
by the NAPH’s requirements during the rebuttal pathway (rejection), involved both the 
hospitals’ DAs and subsystems and not just the DAs, as claimed by Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2005). In fact, both rejection and absorption of the demands were found to be 
contemporaneous in the hospitals, contradicting their assumption that there should be a 
transition from rejection to absorption as a result of external disturbances. This situation 
was seemingly created because of the nature of the NAPH's requirements, of which some 
were refused and some absorbed simultaneously. 
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Second, consistent with similar studies (e.g. Larrinaga-González et al., 2001; Agrizzi, 
2008), 'absorption' was the most dominant reaction exhibited by the hospitals towards the 
requirements of the NAPH. As the findings indicated, the hospitals absorbed the unwanted 
requirements, not only to safeguard their status as a hospital, as argued by Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2005), but, more importantly, to obtain the financial gains resulting from the 
conformity to the NAPH’s requirements. Given the impact of these financial benefits on 
the survivability of the hospitals, they were found to be pre-eminent among the hospitals’ 
rationales for compliance. Therefore, in addition to 'forcefulness of the requirements', this 
study also identified 'financial benefits' as another rationale for internalising (absorbing) 
the perceivably unwanted requirements by subject organisations. The absorption was 
assumed because the hospitals tended to benefit from the advantages (e.g. economic gain) 
resulting from this reaction (Gray et al., 1995), and not because they perceived such a 
reaction to be damaging to their core values, as Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) have 
stated.  
This behavior from the (especially public) hospitals could be argued that was possibly 
because they were to a large extent certain that the MoH will not close down them as this 
could mean an extra cost to the government and a blunder for the government itself. As 
such, some contextual factors such as ‘uneven distribution of hospital beds’ in the country 
(Aryankhesal, 2010) have left no option for the MoH to give up on accurate 
implementation of the NAPH. In other words, in some regions because of the existence of 
only one hospital, even in the case of their poor performance the MoH could not close the 
hospital because of its societal legitimacy. Therefore, the hospitals were not concerned 
about the closure; instead, they were keen to grasp the financial advantages resulted from 
this opportunity.  
 
Third, the only intended change pathway indicated by Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) is 
'evolution' in which the organisations adopt requirements of external PMSs/MCSs. The 
key prerequisite for this reaction is the operationalisation of a comprehensive discursive 
process by all stakeholders on the requirements which leads to their adoption (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 1997; Laughlin, 2004; Haigh and De Graaf, 2009).  
The results displayed that despite the NAPH’s compulsory nature, some of its 
requirements were embraced, and not absorbed, by the hospitals. The nature of the                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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hospitals’ rationales for adopting the requirements was an important indicator for 
distinguishing this reaction from those of absorption and submission (Larrinaga-González 
et al., 2001). That is, the hospitals have applied these requirements exclusively because of 
their merits, as emerged in the interviews; whilst in case of other requirements, which were 
mostly absorbed; other rationales such as a fear of losing financial benefits played the 
main part.  
Key fact concerning these groups of requirements was that their adoption by the hospitals 
was not followed by them being subject to any free discourse among hospitals’ members, 
which is a key prerequisite of the evolution pathway in the sense of Broadbent and 
Laughlin’s (2005) framework. This process revealed an important differentiation between 
the findings of current study and the assumptions of the model. Further analysis of the 
empirical data revealed that two distinctive contextual features were connected with the 
adopted requirements: Their newness and scientific nature as well as religious nature 
The novelty and scientific nature which boosted the knowledge of the hospital members, 
was a key feature associated with these types of requirements. Seemingly, a boost in the 
knowledge level of the members as a result of the requirements facilitated their acceptance 
by the hospitals' members. In fact, majority of these requirements were newly developed 
(updated) and explicitly based on new evidence of knowledge. In addition, the hospitals 
members were informed of the process of their development (MoH, 2004) and the 
requirements also had the approval of the members' professional associations. The findings 
showed that the enhancement in the level of the members’ knowledge and their awareness 
of the development process of these requirements apparently resulted in some (intended) 
alterations in the members’ ISs (Hassan, 2008), which made the situation conductive to the 
acceptance of those requirements by the hospitals.  
Similarly, in the case of the religious requirements of the NAPH, the hospitals embraced 
them without discursive process. The (spiritual) nature of these requirements seemed be 
the main reason for their adoption. In fact, the majority of the hospitals’ members did not 
conceive that they could or should challenge the religious requirements, regardless of the 
legal force behind them. In fact, the spiritual nature of these demands seems to be 
compatible with the religious context of the country and consequently, the attitudes of the 
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The evidence from this study suggest that these two characteristics (i.e. the knowledge-
enhancing and religious nature of the requirements), forwent a need for discursive process, 
which is a crucial part of evolution pathway, on the adoption of these requirements by the 
hospitals. That is, the hospitals’ members accepted such requirements without challenging 
them and expecting their consensus to be sought. This finding has not been raised by 
(seems new to) Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) model. 
 
Fourth, any variation in the ISs of organisational members is considered as second-order 
change (i.e. colonisation and evolution) by Broadbent and Laughlin (2005). However, 
notwithstanding the shifts in the ISs of the hospitals’ members as a result of the NAPH’s 
effects, these changes could not be envisaged as second-order, because the overall identity 
of the hospitals remained unchanged. That is, some changes in the values and perceptions 
of the hospitals members towards the NAPH could be noticed (section 7.2.5.). However, 
they still strongly believed in the role of the hospitals as an entity for providing quality 
health care. Therefore, the evidence from this study on these shifts is more in sympathy 
with Gray et al. (1995); this is called morphostatic, rather than morphogenetic, 
colonisation. The rationales of the members for conformity with the external requirements 
of the NAPH were assumed as a sign for the type of alterations in the beliefs of the 
members (Gray et al., 1995).  
 
Fifth, the order asserted by Broadbent and Laughlin’s model for the change in DAs, 
subsystems and ISs were to some extent contradicted in this study. There was evidence 
that some alterations in the ISs of the hospitals in the colonisation pathway happened 
regardless of (without) any shift in their DAs and subsystems. The attitudes of the 
members towards the NAPH were changed in relation to the NAPH’s overall structure 
(e.g. unfair combination of the surveyors) or features (its financial and legal attributes) 
instead.  
 
In addition to the above theoretical insights, the following consistency was seen between 
the result of current study and those of existing literature concerning the Broadbent and 
Laughlin's (2005) model:                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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1.  The power of the hospital managers in pressing the hospitals’ members to conform to 
the NAPH was recognised. The role of organisational participants who might facilitate 
the transition from absorption (reorientation pathway) to submission (colonisation 
pathway) in organisations is somewhat recognised by Broadbent and Laughlin (2005). 
However, as Soin (1996) and Gurd (2008) have also emphasised, they fail to elaborate 
on the importance of this power in their theoretical framework. This power was found 
to be overly influential in increasing the absorption reaction in the hospitals as the 
managers exerted on the other members of their organisation. 
2.  The possibility of fragmentation in the ISs of the hospitals’ members, which is not 
acknowledged by Laughlin (1991), was observed in the current study. There were 
discrepancies in the beliefs of the members towards the NAPH. Accordingly, this study 
endorses the research results of Broadbent (1992), Soin (1996) and Agrizzi (2003).  
 
9.3.1. Limitations of Broadbent and Laughlin's framework 
The strengths of the adopted models (i.e. Broadbent et al., 1991; Laughlin, 1991; 
Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005) were discussed in chapter four of this thesis (section 4.5.5). 
The frameworks allowed the evaluation of the NAPH from the hospitals’ perspectives, and 
to conceive of the hospitals as organisations composed of distinct structural elements, 
which permitted the investigation of the NAPH’s effects on their different elements. 
Despite the aforesaid advantages, while Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) and Laughlin 
(2007) speak about the utility of relying on the perceptions of organisational members for 
judging the merits of the societal steering mechanisms (e.g. the NAPH), their model 
arguably fails to address some possibilities which are explicated here as the limitations and 
practicalities of applying these models in the light of insights from current study.  
♦  The discrepancies among the beliefs and attitudes of different organisational members, 
because of their nature of work and different knowledge level of the phenomenon 
under study (e.g. the NAPH) might complicate the achievement of a conclusive and 
consensual evaluation of the steering media and their mechanisms, which is overly 
crucial according to this model. This framework assumes a more societal and macro 
approach to organisations; therefore, it pays little attention to differences at individual 
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♦  Merely utilising the perceptions of the organisational (e.g. hospital) members to 
evaluate a societal steering mechanism (i.e. the NAPH), as in this model, seems to 
ignore the possibility of decoupling the hospitals from societal values (i.e. lifeworld) 
and focuses mostly on the deviation of steering mechanisms. According to their model, 
the merits of the steering mechanisms are examined by drawing on the perceptions and 
reactions of the organisational members. Given the existence and importance of safety 
issues in the area of health care as stressed by Barach and Berwick (2003) and 
Hutchinson et al. (2006), the authorities might retain a legitimate right to allow less 
freedom in the specific practices of the hospitals. This situation, which is also referred 
to by Gray et al. (1995) as the right to colonise by steering media, was not recognised 
by Broadbent and Laughlin’s framework. 
♦  Identifying the ISs of the hospitals and distinguishing their different levels (i.e. 
splitting them into metarules and beliefs) was a fairly complex task, given their 
intangible nature. For example, consideration of the hospitals’ members, physically, as 
subsystems and their attitudes and beliefs as ISs, as by Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), 
might be challenging. The researcher relied largely on the documentation to identify 
the ISs of the hospitals. 
♦  The situation for change predicted by Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) seems to be 
somehow simplistic and idealistic. The linear and continuum-base trend for 
organisations’ change was not fully endorsed by the current study. Evidence shows that 
change pathways may happen in parallel and/or at different rates. For example, both 
rebuttal and reorientations pathways were simultaneously observed in the hospitals. In 
addition, organisations’ DAs as the mere point of their exposure to the environment 
were not supported, because the hospitals’ views (constituting their ISs) seemed to be 
changing under the influence of external pressures. 
♦  The evidence from this study revealed that the change pathways presented by 
Broadbent and Laughlin’s model did not apparently represent the changes requested by 
an impetus composed of a range of requirements. Different pathways were de facto 
triggered in the hospitals at the same time because of the various requirements of the 
NAPH.  
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9.4. Research implications for policy and practice 
Drawing on the findings of this study, the following implications could be provided for 
practice and policy-making in relation to Iran’s current healthcare accreditation system; in 
addition to the recommendations supplied in chapter seven (section 7.3.): 
 
9.4.1. Careful attention to the reactions and rationales of the hospitals 
The reactions of the hospitals towards the NAPH could generate insightful implications for 
its improvement.  
The existence of the rejection reaction despite the compulsory nature of the NAPH could 
convey two points: First, as the rationales of the hospitals for this reaction imply, unless 
the hospitals are content with the merits of the requirements and their internal capacity and 
ability are adjusted to meet the demands, they will scarcely show intended conformity to 
the NAPH just because of its mandatory nature. Second, an appropriate mechanism is 
chosen simultaneously to prevent the possibility of rejection by conducting unannounced 
on-site and follow-up surveys of the hospitals and integrating their scores in the main score 
of the hospitals.  
Financial incentives for the conformity of the hospitals to the NAPH were found to be 
influential, albeit to a large extent superficially, because of the hospitals’ financial 
problems and, thus, their dependency on this programme. As the absorption reaction was 
the most common reaction of the hospitals and these incentives constituted the main 
rationale for this reaction, some doubt could be cast on the quality improvement merits of 
the NAPH and proper use of this incentive. This insight could provide a crucial warning 
for the authorities to consider reorienting the approach of the NAPH. 
In addition, since financial benefits were allocated on an organisational basis, the hospital 
members, particularly those in the frontline, were not found to be individually encouraged 
by these incentives. Therefore, a procedure should be developed to make those groups take 
more advantage of these incentives and be clearly encouraged. 
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9.4.2. Realising the dysfunctional consequences associated with the NAPH 
Most PMSs are often have some sort of unwanted consequences along with their dominant 
intended effects in organisations (Goddard et al., 2002b; 2002a). The dysfunctional effects 
of the NAPH, unexplored prior to present research, provide first-class information about 
the real-life effects of the NAPH on the hospitals for the policy-makers. They could guide 
the authorities directly to the root causes of the programme’s problems and contribute to 
identification of pertinent corrective solutions. 
As indicated in chapter six, it was stated (mostly by the authorities of the NAPH) that more 
hospitals could currently obtain a high evaluation grade, implying that the NAPH has 
made an impact on the quality of the hospitals. However, this assumption might be 
contradicted in a couple of aspects. First, the gaming identified in the hospitals by this 
case-study means the compliance could be superficial. Second, as the rationales underlying 
the hospitals’ reactions (i.e. the absorption of the requirements) indicated, the hospitals’ 
conformity was largely propelled by the financial benefits, and not by the quality 
improvement capacity, of the NAPH. Therefore, sole reliance on the results of this 
programme for judging the quality of services might seem fairly simplistic.  
 
9.4.3. Engagement of physicians  
The physicians, as frequently noted, are the most influential and powerful group in the 
hospitals in Iran’s healthcare system, as is the case almost globally (Flood and Fennell, 
1995). A specific justification for this situation could be the fact that they have the most 
senior positions in the overall governance structure of the health sector in the country (i.e. 
in the MoH). Regardless of this, the criticality of their job at organisational level in the 
HCOs was also recognisable (Abernethy et al., 2007).  Moreover, there were problems 
mentioned by the hospitals’ members that arose specifically because of the physicians’ 
non-cooperative behaviour (see chapter 6).  
Involvement of this group in the hospital evaluation might enhance their cooperation and 
consequently raise the success rate of this programme (Powell et al., 2009). This process 
could be operationalised in two modes: First, by developing more related standards of the 
NAPH to the clinical processes and practices of this group, as they were somehow lacking 
in the current system; second, by increasing their evaluation-related knowledge, skills and,                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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more importantly, incentives, which make physicians more appreciative of the values of 
quality management and performance measurement in the hospitals (Jacobs et al., 2007). 
The participation of professionals, as argued, could ease the implementation of intended 
changes recommended by quality improvement programmes in the HCOs (Weiner et al., 
2006). In addition, given their strong value system, Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995) 
indicate that their involvement could promote self-control in hospitals, where 
administrative and formal control mechanisms might seem impractical and bound to fail. 
Given the importance of this involvement, some advise to include raising the awareness as 
to the necessity of professionals’ participation in quality improvement practices of HCOs 
as a part of their education and training (Kips and Rademakers, 2010). 
 
9.4.5. Learning from changes implications of the NAPH 
It was explained in chapter seven that most of the changes occurring as a result of the 
NAPH in the hospitals took place in the early years of the NAPH or when new standards 
were added (section 7.2.1). Their novelty and learning insights for the hospitals appeared 
to be the main reasons for these changes. Years after the inception of the NAPH, since the 
standards were static and repetitive with no updates or innovations for the hospitals, the 
intended changes of this programme have dwindled.  Therefore, the standards should be 
updated regularly and enriched scientifically (evidence-based) to enable this programme to 
make positive changes.  
As explained in chapter three, the MoH has made some modifications, extensions in fact, 
to the structure of this evaluatory mechanism, which explicitly indicates that the authorities 
have also realised the deficiencies of the current programme and its failure to encourage 
quality improvement in the hospitals (Moghimi, 2004). However, despite this being a 
positive step, they have not attentively addressed existing defects of the NAPH, which is 
highly required, if the authorities intend to enhance the effectiveness of this evaluation 
system. 
 
9.4.6. Rectifying faulty communication system 
The hospitals’ awareness of the NAPH was also found to be suffering from some 
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there were some important cases where the hospitals did not have the correct information 
about their regulations. For example, it was mandatory for the hospitals to display their last 
grade in a few busy places inside the hospitals in the public domain. However, even the 
managers of the hospitals, when asked, were not definitely aware of this imperative 
regulation.  
Another case was related to the use of different checklists of standards for the evaluation 
of single-specialty and general hospitals. While the researcher could never obtain the 
checklists for single-specialty hospitals, the members of these hospitals were also unaware 
of this important difference.  
Since the first prerequisite for fulfilling the requirements is to be fully aware of them, 
reinforcing the informative side of the NAPH also needs to be heeded by the authorities of 
this evaluatory mechanism. 
  
9.5. Limitations of the study  
This study also labours under some limitations, as with any other research. It adopted a 
case-study design, and hence a small-scale one, and explored the impact of the NAPH over 
a relatively short timescale. It demonstrates only the views and perceptions of those who 
participated in this study. Since qualitative research requires an in-depth, longitudinal 
study to capture the richness inherent in an empirical context, the limited time and access 
constraints of the researcher in the field may have endangered the required quality of the 
collected data.  
In addition, although the members of the survey teams in the HUMS were also included in 
the target group of this study, its focus was largely on a local level (i.e. the views of 
hospitals’ members), and it was unable to triangulate their views with those from the 
directorate of the NAPH in the MoH on the phenomena reported. Therefore, this 
possibility remains that the canvassed perspectives provide a slightly one-sided picture of 
the NAPH’s performance.  
The study strived to include at least one example from all the types of hospital currently 
working in the country, to provide a fairly complete range of their views towards the 
NAPH. However, as a case-study, this research has only covered the hospitals from one                                                                                                                            l s                                       
  
283 
province. Therefore, given its qualitative and perceptual nature, the findings should be 
generalised cautiously to the whole country or other similar contexts. 
The evaluation results of this study of the NAPH’s performance are based on the hospitals’ 
perceptions and judgements and the researcher was not in a position to establish the 
technical and practical effect of this programme on the practices of the hospitals 
themselves. Furthermore, the evaluation of the NAPH was based on the perceptions of the 
selected interviewees. Although they are the most relevant part of a big society in relation 
to the NAPH, their views towards the NAPH could not be taken with certainty as those of 
the whole society.  
 
9.6. Directions for future research 
The following avenues can be identified and recommended for further research in the 
related and similar areas:  
￿  Similar case-studies in other provinces of the country, considering the differences in 
the size and the advancement level of the hospitals, might provide confirmatory or 
contradictory evidence for this research. As such, this could cautiously be also applied 
to other developing countries with similar accreditation arrangements. 
 
￿  The current research only focused on the views of the hospitals’ members and the 
university surveyors, as the direct stakeholders of the NAPH, in order to judge its 
performance. The next step could be to consider the perspectives of indirect 
stakeholders such as patients and third-party organisations for assessing the 
performance of the programme. The latter was not covered by current research because 
of its time and access limitations. 
￿  Application of a mixed-method research approach might provide more extensive 
results in this regard. A survey could investigate the whole range of hospitals’ 
reactions to the NAPH using a statistically sound sample from the whole country 
(quantitative part), followed by a multiple case-study for exploring the hospitals’ 
rationales for exhibiting such reactions (qualitative part). The results in this case could 
be easily generalisable.                                                                                                                             l s                                       
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￿  A prospective longitudinal case-study in a single hospital might provide more 
profound and in-depth understanding of the change processes caused by this AP in the 
hospitals, utilising Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) model of change. Given the time 
and access constraints of the current study, an internally-based (i.e. inside country) 
study is expected to be able to carry out such a research project.  
 
￿  The current study could be replicated for examining the performance of accreditation 
programme in education sector or for evaluating similar PMSs in other sectors. 
 
￿  Investigation of the reactions of the hospitals towards the NAPH could also be 
explored through other perspectives. Given its focus on the performance of AP as a 
regulative institutional element, the current study did not involve other institutional 
factors (normative and cognitive) external to the hospitals which might have an effect 
on their reactions to this programme. Hospitals operate in a society and are accountable 
to their patients (cognitive). They also include various specialised groups which are per 
se related to their own professional associations (normative). Adopting an institutional 
perspective might be helpful in addressing these elements and their influence on 
formation of hospitals’ reactions to the external regulative pressures.  
 
￿  Different quantitative studies could also be hypothesised in relation to the impact of 
this programme on the hospitals. For example, future studies could try to examine the 
relationship between the hospitals’ accreditation grade, their ownership (teaching or 
private) and nature (general or single specialty) and their reactions to the NAPH.  
 
9.7. Final remarks 
Selection of the certain research paradigm (i.e. MRT) and theoretical frameworks for this 
study all were intended to allow and assist the research to fulfil its main goal which is a 
contextual assessment of Iranian national hospital evaluation and accreditation system. In 
fact, the main focus of this case study has been on the effects of ‘contextual factors’ on the 
impact of this macro PMS/MCSs on their subject organisations (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2009). The MRT research approach and Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) model 
(elaborated in the chapter four) provided a workable language to operationalise this 
intention in view of their attention to empirical complexities and the hospitals’ reactions                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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and perceptions (Laughlin, 2007; Berry et al., 2009). This study could be assumed as a 
modest effort to offer an example of how Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) framework 
could be extended from their mainly accounting context to analysing the changes and 
reactions prompted by a healthcare accreditation and evaluation programme (i.e. the 
NAPH) in a developing country.  
Regardless of the real merits of the NAPH as a quality assessment and improvement 
programme, it was clearly noticeable that the hospitals have lost to a large degree their 
trust in the virtues of this programme. They did not have a compelling motivation to make 
efforts to improve themselves in line with the requirements of this programme. This fact 
that the hospitals viewed the NAPH as basically unchanged since its introduction has also 
instilled this mentality to the hospitals that the MoH has been unsuccessful in pursuing 
quality improvement inside these organisations. Another substantive point which seemed 
relatively discouraging for the hospitals was the persistent ignorance of their feedback by 
the authorities. This failure has seemingly diminished any enthusiasm or caring for the 
success of the programme inside the hospitals.  
Therefore, the MoH should first focus on changing the mindset (interpretive schemes) 
developed in the hospitals towards this programme, as changes in the attitudes and beliefs 
are assumed to be the first step in making an intended change in any organisation 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). It could be also acknowledged that, given the critical 
circumstances of health care, the existence of the NAPH as a governmental tool is 
justifiable in order to regulate this area of the public sector and have a positive impact on 
the hospitals, provided that its current features change considerably and the feedback of 
the hospitals are included regularly. As current evidence shows that a consensually-based 
AP could catalyse quality improvement, enhance accountability and improve the 
credibility of accredited organisations (Halverson et al., 1998). 
Another noteworthy point is that, although the NAPH was not perceived as an appealing 
mechanism from the hospitals’ perspective, as evidence from this case-study showed, the 
managerial members still agreed that they were happy to be evaluated by the current 
system, when they were asked. Even though the beneficial effects of the NAPH influenced 
their answers somewhat, the main reason appeared to be the point made by some members 
implying that ‘having a poorly-performing evaluation system is much better than having 
nothing’. Apparently, since they could not imagine any situation other than the NAPH,                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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they still approved of this programme. In addition, their incumbency of the hospitals and 
also the free subscription of the programme were thought to be effective.  
It might be also argued that it is natural for the hospitals under the evaluation of this 
mechanism to be critical of its nature (Mannion et al, 2005). As such, the authorities of the 
NAPH might contradict what has been said by the hospitals because they regard them as 
partial and one-sided. In response, it should be clarified that, in addition to the inclusion of 
the surveyors’ views by the study, who were themselves a part of the NAPH; the important 
point is whether the hospitals have belief in the ability and intention of the NAPH to effect 
improvement. This is because they are assumed to be the main players in health care who 
satisfy the wishes of the MoH in providing quality care and are directly involved in 
delivering the services (Berwick, 2008; Casey, 2010). Accordingly, their distrust in the 
capability of the NAPH might give rise to the development of dysfunctional consequences 
(e.g. gaming) and hinder the whole process of quality improvement by the programme. A 
primary signal for judging the merits of an evaluatory mechanism is arguably that whether 
it is able to command a wide-ranging consensual support among those being regulated 
(Laughlin, 2007).  
 
Overall, given the all above discussions and explanations, the following contributions to 
the literature were briefly made by this study, in addition to its theoretical contributions 
(see section 9.3.): 
First, the study found that the tenet of ‘communicative action’ needs a number of 
prerequisites to be practical in any organisation and context, which they might not be 
always available. For example, health care is an area that because of its sensitive (life-
attached) services (Gauld, 2005; Broadbent et al., 2010a), governments might dismiss 
various aspects of this guideline (e.g. ignoring the local organisations’ feedback), as in the 
current case. However, acknowledging such an action in the case of inspection of basic 
health and safety standards in HCOs, the study stresses on the importance of applying 
communicative action for the success of quality improvement programmes such as the 
NAPH.  
Second, it could establish that dysfunctional behaviours on behalf of organisations should 
not be always envisaged as detrimental. This study argues that the rationales and reasons 
behind such behaviours are crucial for assessing their nature. In addition, the possibility of                                                                                                                            l s                                       
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appraising the organisational rationales (interpretive schemes) in comparison with the 
societal lifeworld also proves to be a key indicator for ascertaining their essence. 
Third, the study identifies two distinctive roles for ‘financial incentives’, attached to 
PMSs/MCS (i.e. ‘enabler’ and ‘facilitator’). It suggests that this group of encouragement 
tools should serve as facilitator rather than enabler to ensure their effects, because as the 
former, financial incentives might precipitate dysfunctional and unintended effects in 
organisations. That is, it should be the merits of the PMSs that attract given organisations’ 
conformity at the first place and not improvement of their financial status. Therefore those 
applying such incentives for increasing the possibility of compliance with given 
PMSs/MCSs should be cautious of assuming the ‘enabler role’ by this mechanism. 
Otherwise, it is likely that subject organisations take any action (e.g. gaming) to obtain the 
monetary (economic) gains, as in the case of present case study. 
Fourth, the importance of contextual aspects was approved by present case study. As one 
of the first efforts, this study brought to the fore the element of ‘religious values’ as an 
influential contextual factor in facilitating the impact and implementation of the 
PMSs/MCSs, in the public sector performance measurement literature. 
 
As the final thought, it should be clarified that, despite the dysfunctional effects of the 
NAPH, this study does not discredit all the merits of the NAPH, since it was not in a 
position to establish the following issues: 
First, the exact impact of this programme, as Kelman and Freidman (2009) argue, could be 
judged when a comparison between an organisation under its evaluation and one with no 
evaluation is made, which was impossible in the current case.  
Second, the compulsory nature of the NAPH, according to Habermas (1987, cited in 
Dillard and Smith, 1999) might be justified if the costs to the hospitals result in an overall 
benefit for the larger society. This means that, even though this programme was not 
effective from the selected hospitals’ viewpoint, it might practically (and not based on 
what is asserted in the related policy documents) still satisfy the intentions of the MoH. 
Future studies could cast more light on this claim.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: Introductory information on the profile of the country 
Islamic Republic of Iran (I.R.I.), the sixteenth largest country of the world and the second 
largest one in the Middle East, is bordered by the Caspian Sea, Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan in the north; Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman in the south; Iraq, Turkey in the 
west; and Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east (Figure 2.1). This relatively vast country is 
located in both the northern and eastern hemispheres of Asia in a recognized geographical 
region of the south-western Asia called the Middle East. 
 
 
Figure 1- Map of Iran - Source (Anonymous, 2007d) 
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The area it covers is 1,648,194 square kilometers and, topographically, it has a diverse 
landscape and climate; over half of the area is mountainous; a quarter is desert, and only 
less than one fourth is habitable land. Iran has administratively divided into 30 provinces, 
336 districts, 676 cities and over 66,000 villages. According to the last national census of 
year 2006 (Anonymous, 2007c), the population of the country is approximately 
70,472,846, of which 68.4% live in the urban and 31.6% in the rural areas. From this 
population women constitute 49.1% and men 50.9%. Tehran, capital of Iran, accounts for 
about 19% of this population by itself, that is, 13,413,000.  
The official language of the country is Farsi (Persian) and religion is Islam with a majority 
of Shiites (89%). Some of the Iran’s healthcare indicators have been illustrated in the table 
2.1. 
 
                     Table 1- Selected Indicators of Iran’s health status- Source: WHO (2006) 
Indicator  Rate 
(2006) 
Life expectancy at birth (years)  71 
Child mortality under 5 years (per 1000)  35 
Total health expenditure per capita ($)  788 
Total health expenditure as % of GDP  7.8 
Population annual growth rate %  1.6 
General government expenditure on health as a percentage 
of total expenditure on health  
55.6 
Private expenditure on health as percentage of total 
expenditure on health  
44.4 
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Appendix B: Interview Topic Guide 
(English version) 
 [The sentences in Italic are further explanation and not part of the questions] 
 
Introduction  
(Icebreaking stage) 
[In the day of interview] Thank you for meeting me today. [The researcher once again 
checked whether the respondents were still happy to participate in the research and 
emphsised the following points to them]: 
•  I would like to record the interviews, if it is okay [Showing the voice recorder].  That 
would help me remember more accurately what we talk about today.  It also means I 
don’t have to make loads of notes whilst we are talking. [Reassuring them] the 
recordings will be confidential and used only for research purposes and I won’t be 
playing the recordings back to anyone else, only I will hear them [they were also 
provided with participation information sheet (PIS) and consent form few days before 
than interview takes place (see Appendix C for PIS version)].   
•  I will anonymise all the materials and no real name of you or your hospital will appear 
in the context of my research.  
•  We can stop whenever you like. Please just let me know and we can finish the session.  
[Either of verbal or written consent was sought from the participants (see the Appendix D 
for the written version of consent form)] 
 
Interview with hospital staff  
(Including mostly senior and mid-level positions) 
A) Assessing the awareness (all respondents) 
1.  Are you familiar with the current AP (i.e. the NAPH)? Where did you get the 
information from? 
2.  How (from where?) and when do you get access to the evaluation checklists?  
3.  Are you aware of the way the checklists have been developed?   
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4.  Is the on-site survey a pre-arranged or unannounced process for you? 
5.  Do you prepare your hospital (department) for the survey? If yes, how? 
 
B) Main body of the guide (all respondents) 
1.  How do you overall perceive this AP?  
2.  What do you think of the main intentions of this programme?  
3.  Do you think the NAPH is generally leading to any improvement in the services’ 
quality in this hospital? 
4.  Is your feedback considered in any stage of the development, implementation or 
improvement of this programme and its standards by the MoH (i.e. consultatively 
driven)?  
5.  Do you think the standards of the NAPH are relevant to your daily activities in the 
hospital? 
6.  Are the standards comprehensible to you? 
7.  Do you feel the NAPH is constraining your normal freedom of practice? 
8.  What do you think about the current governance (the UMSs) of the NAPH? 
9.  What do you think about the combination of the surveying team? 
10. Do the surveyors provide you with advices for improvements in the hospitals? 
 
11. What unintended and dysfunctional effects (e.g. tunnel vision, intimidation, 
gaming, misrepresentation, etc.) would you associate with this programme? 
12. What benefits (e.g. quality improvement, financial support, learning, etc.) would 
you attribute to this programme?  
13. On what grounds you base your assumptions about the merits of this system? 
14. What do you think are the main reasons of the hospital for conforming to the 
NAPH (e.g. compulsory nature, economic gains, etc. of the NAPH)?  
15. What is your personal motivation for compliance with the requirements of the 
NAPH (e.g. its reputational effects, helping patients, financial incentives, 
competition with other hospitals, etc.)? 
16. Have you tried to ignore or reject the requirements of the NAPH? If yes, how? 
Why? 
 
17. How much obtaining a higher grade is important for you? Why?   
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18. Can you identify any tangible benefit for yourself as a result of a higher 
accreditation grade for your hospital? (Mid-level and junior staff) 
19. What features of the NAPH will make you to adopt its requirements freely? 
20. Have you noticed any conflict between the requirements of the NAPH and your 
individual or organisational values? If yes, how do you react? 
21. How do you resolve the possible conflicts between the requirements of the NAPH 
and values of different groups in the hospital? (Senior managers) 
 
22. What, do you think, are the main goal, mission, vision and values of the hospitals? 
23. Do you have strategic planning (SP) in your hospital? (Senior managers) 
24. How do you develop your SP (bottom-up or top-down)? 
25. Can you identify any change different elements of your (department) hospital 
resulted from this AP? How do you react if the changes are undesirable from your 
perspective? 
26. Have your values ever changed as a result of the requirements of the programmes? 
27. What type of internal PMSs do you use in this hospital? How are they developed or 
adopted? (Senior managers) 
28. How do you perceive these PMSs? (Mid-level and junior staff) 
29. How does the NAPH impact (support or overlap) on these PMSs? (High and mid-
level staff)  
 
C) Seeking for the respondents’ suggestions for improvement (All staff) 
1.  Do the surveyors provide you with advices for improvements in the hospitals? 
2.  What recommendation can you provide for improving the programme? What facets 
of the NAPH need to be improved? How? 
3.  Do you still participate in the NAPH, if it was a voluntary programme? 
 
D) Interview with the surveyors: 
1.  Do you send the evaluation checklists to the hospitals? If yes, when? 
2.  Do you inform the hospitals of the date and time of the on-site survey? 
3.  Do you ask for the feedback of the hospitals during the evaluation of the hospitals?   
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4.  What methods do you use for the assessment of the hospitals (interview, 
observation, etc.)? 
5.  Do you have the authority to make any change in the checklists or procedure of the 
evaluation of the hospitals? 
6.  Do you pay any unannounced visit to the hospitals, apart from the main survey? 
7.  Are you involved in developing the evaluation standards of the NAPH with the 
MoH? Is your feedback asked for any modification or improvement of the NAPH? 
8.  Have the standards of the NAPH changed since its introduction? 
9.  What do you think are the hospitals reasons for compliance with the requirements 
of the NAPH? 
10. What types of requirements are more accepted/rejected overall? 
11. Are the hospitals able to complain about the results of the evaluation? 
 
D) Closing the interview  
The researcher: 
•  Thanked the respondents  
•  Provided his contact details to the respondent for any possible questions  
•  Sought their approval to contact them again to chase up any queries and validate 
their interpretation of the information provided, and also check the summary of key 
points raised in the interview 
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Appendix C: Participant Information Sheet (PIS) 
(English version) 
 
Study Title: 
Contextual approach to the performance analysis of Iran’s national AP for healthcare 
organisations 
 
Researcher:  
Ebrahim Jaafaripooyan 
 
Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this research. If you 
are happy to participate you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
 
What is the research about? 
Given the importance of healthcare accreditation system for ensuring the quality and safety 
of health care, there has been an extensive call for the assessment of this external 
evaluatory system in the literature. This study as such aims to analyse the performance of 
Iran’s national healthcare AP using selected theoretical models. It seeks to enhance our 
understanding of what impacts this national AP has on local hospitals and how the 
hospitals react to this evaluation system. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
Hospitals’ senior administrative and clinical staff are the most involved and 
knowledgeable people in the hospitals towards this AP whom seem to be suitable for this 
research.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
This study will probably take around five/six months and you will be involved in a few 
face-to-face or telephone interviews conducted by researcher. A short introductory session 
will include explanation of the plan of the interviews and ask about the extent of your 
involvement in the accreditation of your hospital. At most two follow-up interviews will 
be undertaken to understand the interaction of the AP with your hospital. Each interview 
will last about 45 minutes.  
 
Are there any benefits in my taking part?   
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There is no tangible benefit for your participation; however a report including the results 
of this research could be finally given to your hospital, if requested, to help improve your 
hospital advantage of this evaluation process. Moreover, the experience of participating in 
the research process might be useful for you. 
 
Are there any risks involved? 
There is no risk involved in this research process for you (even in the case of a lengthening 
the interview time, it can be carried on at your convenience). 
 
Will my participation be confidential? 
The gathered data will be kept strictly confidential. Your name and your hospital name 
will be immediately coded and anonymised when each interview is transcribed. Your ID 
will not be mentioned in the interview by other participants. The audio recordings, if you 
agree, will be kept only with the researcher in the password protected computers and will 
be destroyed in compliance with the Data Protection Act and University of Southampton 
policy, after the end of current research. Only the researcher will have the access to data 
collected during the course of the research.  
 
What happens if I change my mind? 
You are completely free to withdraw yourself from the participants of this study whenever 
you want without your legal rights are affected.  
 
What happens if something goes wrong? 
In the case of any concern you can contact either of the following numbers: 
 
University of Hamedan Hospital Evaluation office:  
(0098)- 08112524940 
School of Management, University of Southampton: 
0044-2380598979 
  
Where can I get more information? 
Contact details: 
Ebrahim Jaafaripooyan  
University of Hamedan  
Hamedan 
Tel: xxxx 
Mob: xxx 
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Appendix D: Consent Form  
(English Version) 
 
Study title: Contextual approach to the performance analysis of Iran’s national AP for 
healthcare organisations 
 
Researcher name: Ebrahim Jaafaripooyan 
 
Please initial the box (es) if you agree with the statement(s):   
 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet and have had the  
opportunity to ask questions about the study 
 
 
 
I agree to take part in this research project and agree for my data to be  
used for the purpose of this study 
 
 
I understand my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any 
time without my legal rights being affected  
 
 
Name of participant (print name)…………………………………………………… 
Signature of participant…………………………………………………………….. 
Name of Researcher (print name) …………………………………………………… 
Signature of Researcher…………………………………………………………….. 
Date…………………………………………………………………………………    
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Appendix E: Research sponsor letter  
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Appendix F: Policy Documents 
(English version) 
 
 
 
 
1) The MoH’s introduction letter to the potential participant organisation (i.e. the 
UMS) 
(English version) 
 
 
                Islamic Republic of Iran 
22.July.2010                        Ministry of Health and Medical Education 
 
 
Dear Dr. A. 
Chancellor of the HUMS, 
 
Hereby Mr. Ebrahim Jaafaripooyan, our sponsored PhD student in the University of 
Southampton, the UK, is introduced for conducting his empirical research. Please 
facilitate his access to your hospitals for this purpose. Data will be collected via 
interviews, questionnaires, or observation. I appreciate any help you/your 
organisation can give him. Please feel free to contact the MoH if there is any help 
we can give you in this issue. 
 
Kind regards, 
Dr. X Y 
The Head of MoH’s Education Services 
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2) MoH’s responsibilities  
(Majlis, 1988a)  
 
(Continued in the next page) 
1  To develop and establish policies and plans for training necessary manpower for 
research, health services and medicine, social welfare and social security 
2   To provide public health and promote it through the implementation of health 
programmes, especially in the fields of environmental health, prevention of 
diseases, family and schools health, public health education, occupational health 
with emphasis on primary healthcare, and maternal and child health with 
cooperation of relevant agencies  
3   To create a coordinated system of health and medical education and expand 
integrated healthcare networks  
4   To define the required fields and levels of research and implement training 
programmes for medical manpower in order to achieving self-sufficiency  
5   To conduct basic and applied research in all medical disciplines and fields and 
create and expand medical research institutions and units and supervise and 
coordinate research programmes and medical research institutes  
6   To plan an appropriate and equitable distribution of manpower and other 
facilities (medical education and health care facilities) with an emphasis on 
primary health plans and priority of the deprived regions  
7   To provide facilities for public enjoyment of healthcare by establishing and 
expanding public health centres, improving their standard, and of cooperating 
with charities, private sector, and different medical insurance companies  
8   To finance through public funds, premiums, special revenues and public aid  
9   To provide the necessary services to the remediable physical, mental, or social 
handicaps  
10   To encourage the individuals and private institutions to support children under 
school age, elderly people and families, orphans, non-remediable physical, 
mental, and social handicaps and to provide such supports for the non-urgent   
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cases by public institutions  
11   To define the necessary standards for:  
  •  Health services, medication and rehabilitation  
  •  Food, hygienic, cosmetic, laboratory, medical equipments 
  •  Health and safety of involving institution in the above service 
12   To issue, extend or cancel the license of:  
  •  Medical, pharmaceutical, and welfare Institutions and workshops of food 
and drinking, and health and cosmetic products  
  •  Production of medicine and biological materials, food and drinking, health, 
and cosmetic products, and laboratory and rehabilitation equipment and 
instruments  
13   To monitor and control the quality of paragraph "B" of section 12 and define the 
necessary regulations for the cases mentioned in the paragraph "A" and "B" of 
section 12  
14   To license the medical and medical related occupations  
15   To define the principles of pricing the diagnostic and therapeutic, 
pharmaceutical, and social welfare services and charges in the public and non-
public sectors and determine the tuition fees of informal training programmes  
16   To define the principles of assessing, monitoring and controlling of healthcare 
institutions and to implement them  
17   To define the criteria of importation, manufacture, storage, issuance, use and 
disposal of raw materials of biological medicines, food and drinking, health, 
cosmetic, pharmaceutical products and laboratory and medical rehabilitation 
equipment and instruments and to evaluate, supervise and control these criteria  
18   To conduct research on traditional medicine and studies in the field of herbal  
medicines and to deliver proper education in the fields above and establish the 
appropriate centres for traditional medicine  
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3) The translation of MoH’s letter to the UMSs about the establishment of the hospital 
evaluation and accreditation system 
  
 
17.08.1997                                     Islamic Republic of Iran  
Index no: 5234                      Ministry of Health and Medical Education  
 
 
Dear Medical University/School Chancellor 
 
In line with strengthening the values in all medical affairs and in accordance with 
Article 8 of the Act of establishing the MoH and Article 1 of the MoH’s 
organisation and duties Act, enclosed “The instruction of standards and principles of 
evaluation of the general hospitals” is presented. These regulations are obligatory 
for all general hospitals including public, military, police, private and charity.  
The instruction should be provided to all hospitals, to obtain the necessary 
preparation for evaluation based on the criteria of these standards. All general 
hospitals should be evaluated based on these standards from 21.03.1998.  
Supervising and monitoring the implementation of the standards will be performed 
by the UMSs. All hospitals would be required, while studying the standards 
carefully and educating the relevant personnel, to facilitate achieving these 
standards by 21.03.1998.  
The Medicine and Treatment Deputy in the Ministry will be responsible for 
coordinating the implementation of the guidelines and delivering the practical 
evaluation forms. 
  
 
Signed by  
Dr Alireza Marandi  
The Minister of Health and Medical Education 
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4) The bylaw number 25337/2/S - 21/06/2008 to the hospitals 
(English version) 
 
 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
K. University of Medical Sciences 
 
 
To all hospitals, 
 
Given the fact that the main goal behind the evaluation of the hospitals is ‘to 
improve the quality of their services’, in line with this bylaw (21 June 2008- 
25337/2/S) of Ministry of Health and Medical Education, hereafter grade two will 
be considered as the lowest grade. Those hospitals that receive lower than this grade 
will be recognised as ‘substandard’ and consequently unauthorised to work. 
 
Kind regards, 
Dr. X Y 
Treatment and Clinical Deputy of the KUMS 
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5) Strategic plan of one of the hospitals  
(As an example) 
 
Mission  
The ‘hospital H’ has been established to facilitate public access to clinical and diagnostic 
services, help patients recover and prevent diseased-related physical and mental 
disabilities. It is determined to accomplish its mission through delivering extensive quality 
health services and enhancing patients’ satisfaction. We always see ourselves committed to 
the society, our customers and staff and government and try to satisfy their demands and 
include their feedback and participation.  
 
Vision 
We are aiming to be the best among the provincial hospitals in terms of abiding by quality 
standards as well as quality and diversity of our services in next five years. We aspire to 
apply the most efficient and cost-effective medical procedures and use highly qualified 
human resources in our hospital so that our staff take proud in their work for this centre.  
 
Values 
•  Our staff are the most valuable assets of the hospital and their empowerment to 
have enough autonomy and authority in their decision making and work is the main 
goal of this hospital. 
•  Observance of Islamic values and reverence for human being is of a high priority 
for us. 
•  We always support and welcome staff participation and involvement and know that 
a sign for the hospital’s puberty. 
•  Continuous quality improvement has been and is our permanent belief. 
•  Customer-oriented services are always in line with our mission. 
•  Proper management of the resources is crucial for the hospital’s financial stability. 
 
Objectives 
1.  Operationalising and furthering the economic and managerial reform of 
hospital structure (including, performance-based payment, preventive 
maintenance, operational budgeting, outsourcing of supportive services, 
information systems) 
2.  Instituting, developing and completing clinical and Para-clinical departments 
3.  Standardising the technical and medical equipment 
4.  Provision of quality services to the patients 
5.  Systematising the crisis management in the hospital 
6.  Improving the education and training of the staff and students 
7.  Standardising the physical layout of the departments 
8.  Facilitating the service provision through delivering supportive services  
 
   
305 
6) Policy guidelines of the ISO 9001:2008 in the hospitals 
 
1.  Observance of ethical and humane values and principles 
2.  Human resources development through ongoing training, motivation, participation 
and conducive work environment  
3.  Improving the productivity through optimal use of all available resources (human, 
information, financial and physical) 
4.  Continuous review and enhancement of processes and practices in order for 
internal and eternal customers 
5.  Application of scientific management and change and modification of the 
hospital’s managerial and economic structure  
6.  Responsiveness to and appropriate informative strategies for customers  
 
 
7) Hospitals’ rules and regulations 
 
1.  A need for full cooperation of patients and their companions with medical team 
2.  Trust in physicians and hospital staff and allowing them to deal with the work on 
priority 
3.  Adherence to patient visit schedule 
4.  Keeping the hospitals as a quiet place 
5.  Attention to Health and safety and hygienic principles by patients and visitors 
6.  Handing all the relevant documents to the medical team as soon as possible  
7.  Observance of Islamic values and patients’ privacy 
8.  Full payments of all hospitals’ cost because of their financial autonomy 
9.  Expectations of the hospitals are commensurate with their capability 
10. cooperation with the student given the teaching nature of the hospitals 
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Appendix G: Tables for the comparison of accreditation with similar PMSs and related concepts  
 
Table 1- A comparison of four main external assessment models (Shaw, 2000; 2003b; 2004a; 2004c; Bohigas et al., 1996; Bohigas and Heaton, 
2000; Donahue and VanOstenberg, 2000; Nabitz et al., 2000) 
Continued in next pages 
 
                     Models  
 
Features  
EFQM  ISO  Visitation 
Accreditation 
 
 
 
Origin 
and 
first applications 
of the systems 
 
Europe, 1988 
 
Initiated by the European 
Commission and 14 European 
multi-national organizations 
 
Re-launched in 1999 as the 
Excellence Model 
 
 
 
UK, 1947 
   
  As a British standard for 
quality management 
systems 
   
Designed for defence 
engineering and 
manufacturing industries  
 
 
The Netherlands, 1992  
 
Implemented by Dutch 
Medical Association as a 
peer review for 
registration of members 
and speciality medical 
training  
 
 
USA, 1917 
 
Set up first by American 
college of surgeon as a 
mechanism for 
recognition of training 
posts in surgery  
Then as Hospital 
Standardization 
Programme (HSP) 
 
 
- Inspired by Baldrige award 
(MBNQA), it has followed the 
Donabedian performance 
- ISO proliferation is due 
to rising enthusiasm for 
an internationally 
- External peer review 
programme 
- Healthcare-based (ie, 
originally initiated from   
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Important 
Features 
measurement framework 
(structure, process, outcome) 
 
- Some countries (eg, 
Scandinavia) have introduced 
their own national awards 
based on the EFQM 
 
- It can be used both as a self-
assessment tool and external 
review  
- Provide a graphic conceptual 
framework 
- Covers areas such as clinical 
results, patient satisfaction, 
administration, and staff 
management  
- It focuses on organizational 
development and continuous 
improvement more than the 
others.  
recognized healthcare 
quality standard 
 
- More suitable for 
individual departments 
and quality systems (eg, 
laboratory and radiology) 
 
- More related to 
administrative procedures 
rather than to clinical 
results  
- Not intended for 
organizational 
development  
 
- A revised version of 
ISO is moving closer to 
the EFQM and 
Accreditation 
  
- ISO appropriateness for 
healthcare sector is not 
universally accepted.  
 
- Focusing on how the 
 
- Firmly grounded in 
medical profession 
 
- Improving performance 
by focusing on the quality 
of individuals’ and 
clinical teams’ 
performance 
 
- Directs its attention to 
the appropriateness of 
service delivery provided 
by the medical 
practitioners  
 
- Focus on clinical 
practice, professional 
development, and service 
quality 
health care) 
 
- Developed primarily for 
whole organization 
 
- Reflects the origins of 
systematic assessment of 
hospital against explicit 
standards 
- assesses based on a 
interdisciplinary 
approach    
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institution’s stated 
objectives are achieved, 
rather than how the 
institution as a whole 
meets the needs of its 
patient. 
 
Evaluator 
terminology 
Assessor   Auditor or Lead assessor  Visitor   Surveyor  
Site visit  Assessment  Audit   Visit  Survey  
Basis 
Industry-based 
 
Healthcare-based 
 
Public disclosure 
It can be known for public ( it 
is usually used for 
professional prestige) 
It can be known for 
public ( it is used for 
professional prestige) 
Report are not available 
for public (strictly 
confidential) 
Public can be aware of 
the result most of the 
time 
Standards  Pre-established  sets of expectations, stated as standards or evaluation criteria 
Focus of standards  Management systems  Quality systems   Professional performance   Health service delivery 
Participation 
Voluntary 
 
Voluntary (exceptionally 
compulsory in some 
countries
43) or in some 
cases both
44modes  
 
                                                   
43.  France, Scotland, Iran  
44. Italy   
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Evaluation team
45 
    Mostly clinical and often 
uni-disciplinary  
Multi-disciplinary team 
of health professionals 
(including at least a 
senior executive 
physician, nurse and 
hospital administrator ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation team 
selection criteria 
Some academics and quality 
professionals; or  
Mainly experienced managers  
- Knowledge and 
experience of quality 
management; 
- Understanding of 
certification schemes 
- Relevant healthcare 
qualifications including 
medical, nursing and 
management; and 
seniority in health care 
sector. 
General criteria such as: 
- Maturity, judgement 
and understanding, 
analytical skills and 
management capabilities. 
Specifically: 
- At least four years 
fulltime appropriate 
A registered specialist 
with at least 5 years 
experience and 
Independent of the 
clinical staff being 
surveyed; 
 
- Experience in the 
healthcare sector within 
the defined professions of 
doctor, nurse and an 
administrator or chief 
executive with a 
minimum period of 
experience in senior 
managerial positions. 
 
Some example 
requirements of main 
accreditation bodies;  
-Holding a master degree 
in JCAHO;  
- Being employed in an 
accredited institution in 
CCHSA;  
- Knowledge of national 
                                                   
45.  All four models use trained team for evaluating the quality of service. The size of this team usually depends on the size, nature and complexity of the healthcare 
organization being surveyed    
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practical work place 
experience; 
- At least two years in 
quality assurance 
activities; 
At least 20 days and four 
audits as a trainee auditor 
healthcare system, good 
interpersonal skills and 
commitment in ACHS 
- Knowledge and 
experience in continuous 
quality improvement in 
NZCHS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Training 
  - ISO requires training 
and assessing by 
externally recognized 
training bodies and 
selection is contingent on 
having certification from 
those bodies (eg, 
International Register of 
Certificated Auditors-
IRCA); 
- According to IRCA, 
owning certain academic 
qualifications and 
experience in working 
quality and audit 
environment are 
requirement of 
certification. 
 - And , passing around 
40 hrs IRCA-approved 
courses: 
- Content: procedures 
- One day training; 
-  
Content: procedures, 
attitudes, and techniques 
 
- Monitored in first visit 
with specific personal 
feedback 
- Training at the 
beginning of their 
surveyor career (2-4 days 
of initial training. 
JCAHO, exceptionally 
requires 15 days of 
orientation and training); 
- Ongoing training 
updates thereafter, 
between 1 and 5 days per 
year; 
- Participatory 
methodologies; 
- The content of training 
are: standards knowledge, 
survey processes, 
communication, 
interviewing, and report 
writing  
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related to the audit of 
facilities, in the way of 
role-play, lectures, and 
some time a live audit.  
Auditors’ qualifications 
are judged by a panel 
(consisting of internal, 
and external customers 
and third parties audit 
member)  
- Selection process is 
under general guidelines 
of ISO 10011.   
Self-assessment
46 
Healthcare institution is asked 
to provide data about activities 
generally derived from their 
self-assessment. This 
information must be closely 
aligned with EFQM nine 
award assessment criteria
47  
The client institution is 
encouraged to show 
evidence of self 
preparation in some of 
the following ways: 
￿  Documentation 
￿  Internal audits 
￿  Management review 
Clinical departments are 
asked a self-assessment 
questionnaire prior to the 
visit, addressing the 
organizational aspects of 
professional performance, 
giving an opportunity to 
select and discuss key 
- Some APs use the 
institution’s self-
evaluation guide to the 
surveyors 
- The organization may 
be asked to state or grade 
its compliance to a set of 
explicit standards; the 
                                                   
46. “A comprehensive, systematic and regular review of an organization’s activities and results, which allows the organization to discern clearly its strengths and areas in 
which improvements can be made and culminate in planned improvement actions that are then monitored for progress” (Bohigas and Heaton, 2000, p. 233). All models 
suggest the institutions to undertake a self-assessment, albeit in different ways.  
47. Leadership, Policy and strategy, People, Partnership and resources, Processes, Customer Results, People results, Society results, Key performance results (Nabitz, 2000) 
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￿  Pre-audit by and 
external body 
This should include 
information on general 
features and resources of 
the institution, a copy of 
the institution’s quality 
manual, and general 
information on the 
quality systems 
quality issues   surveyors then verify 
those results and 
comment on the 
differences  
Agenda/Audit plan  Mainly identify the objectives, scope and duration of  evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey 
 
 
  Audit encompass; 
￿  Interviews 
￿  Examination of 
documentation and 
activities  
￿  Observation  
 
 
Peer reviews also 
include; 
￿  Documentation  
￿  Observations 
￿  Structured and non-
structured interviews  
Elements used in 
accreditation surveys 
usually include: 
￿  Review of 
documentation 
￿  Interviews 
￿  Sample of medical 
records and other 
types of record 
￿  Visits-observations 
 
Survey report 
content 
The report provides a list of 
strengths and areas for 
improvement under each 
criterion addressed in the 
application.  
Audit report comprises 
the details included in 
audit plan; documentation 
against which the 
assessment was made; 
observations of non-
conformities; and audit 
The report consists of  a 
description of clinical 
department, positive and 
negative findings and 
recommendations with 
suggestions for 
improvement 
Accrediting bodies’ 
report demonstrates 
compliance and non-
compliance with 
standards. It usually 
contains a text summary 
as well as numerical   
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team’s judgement of the 
level of compliance  
grading with appropriate 
comment, measured 
against the standards.   
Grading of 
standards 
EFQM assessors use a defined 
scoring process to allocate 
points to each assessment 
criteria.  
ISO non-compliance is 
graded minor or major, 
according to its impact on 
the quality of the final 
product or process 
In visitatie, consensus 
within the team is the 
first criterion for each 
formal conclusion or 
recommendation made. 
The second criterion is 
that judgement must be 
based on more than one 
argument mentioned in 
the report, and thirdly, a 
balance in positive 
conclusions and 
recommendations for 
improvement is 
necessary.    
Grading systems vary 
from accreditor to 
accreditor and may be 
numerical (eg, 1-5) or 
descriptive (eg, minimal, 
partial, substantial or 
non-compliance).  
Accreditees may even be 
asked to grade 
themselves, the surveyors 
checking these grades 
during the survey and 
commenting in cases of 
divergences  
 
Report writing 
  Report is prepared by the 
team under the direction 
of the lead auditor 
Report is written up by 
someone form main 
evaluation centre 
Accrediting bodies may 
use client managers or 
analysts employed to 
write report based on the 
surveyors notes and 
observations 
External evaluation 
result and span 
Award -   Certificate – 3 years            No award - 5 years   Accreditation – 3 years  
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Table 2- Definitions of accreditation, licensure and certification- Adapted from Roa and Rooney (1999) 
 
Process  Issuing organisation  Object of evaluation  Components/Requirements  Standards 
Accreditation 
(voluntary) 
Recognized tools, usually 
an NGO  Organization 
Compliance with 
published standards, on-
site evaluation compliance 
not required by law and/or 
regulations 
Set at a maximum 
achievable level to 
stimulate improvement 
over time 
Individual 
Regulations to ensure 
minimum standards, exam, 
or proof of 
education/competence  Licensure (compulsory)  Governmental  authority 
organization 
Regulations to ensure 
minimum standards, on-
site inspection 
Set at a minimum level to 
ensure an environment 
with minimum risk to 
health and safety 
Individual 
Evaluation of 
predetermined 
requirements, additional 
education/training, 
demonstrated competence 
in specialty area 
Set by national 
professional or specialty 
boards 
Certification (voluntary)  Authorized body, either 
government or NGO 
Organization or 
component 
Demonstration that the 
organization has additional 
services, technology, or 
capacity 
Industry standards (e.g. 
ISO 9000 standards) 
evaluate conformance to 
design specifications   
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Appendix H: Performance Measurement Systems  
 
Figure 1- The performance measurement matrix 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2- Results and determinants framework 
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Figure 3- Performance pyramid system  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4- Balance scorecard  
 
 
 
 
Source: Kaplan and Norton, 1992   
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Figure 5- Performance prism  
 
 
 
Source: Neely et al (2001) 
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Figure 6- Input, processes, outputs and outcomes framework  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7- EFQM Excellence Model 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nabtiz et al. (2000) 
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Figure 8- Kanji’s Business Excellence Measurement System (KBEMS)  
 
 
 
Source: Kanji & Sa, 2003. 
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Appendix I: Examples of NVivo nodes and further supportive quotations 
from the analysis 
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Supportive quotations 
 
 
Static 
‘We might not take that serious because it is static and is done in a short time.’  (Sister: 
Hospital F) 
‘It is a static and repetitive evaluation programme.’  (Third party surveyor) 
 
Focus on structures 
 
‘This evaluation programme normally does not assess processes, but mostly the structures 
...’ (Head Surveyor) 
 
 
Biased evaluation  
 
‘Standards are good in theory but hospitals do not have enough means to fulfil them as 
requested.’ (Matron: Hospital G) 
 
 
Gaming 
 
‘…they [the surveyors] for instance ask for the provision of a new service that it is not to 
the benefit of this hospital from cost perspective.’ (Manager: Hospital C)  
‘We are asked to buy some material or equipment that we don’t use them too often, as a 
result of which the hospital incurs costs. …for example, buying an LP set, which is rarely 
used in this ward.’ (Matron: Hospital F)  
 
 
‘…this hospital deserves more, but the surveyors are not recognising us properly; then we 
may sometimes try to prepare the hospital in a way to get a higher grade.’ (Manager: 
Hospital H) 
 
Gaming rationales: 
 
‘We are sometimes asked to do some thing like …buying new equipments, but since it is 
not a priority for the hospital…’ (Head of ED: Hospital F)   
324 
‘The [perceivably] irrational requirements of the NAPH when is coupled with our 
shortage of financial resources drive us to prepare superficially the hospital for the 
evaluation. We need its score.’ (Manager: Hospital H)                                                      
 
Legal coercion 
 
‘Our motive to compliance is compulsory nature of the NAPH ….’                                                                    
(Manager: Hospital B) 
‘High tariffs are the main motive of this hospital, as far as I know, for the compliance with 
the NAPH, although apparent reason is the compulsory nature of the programme (the 
NAPH).’ (Member of quality improvement office: Hospital F) 
 
ISO 
 
‘We adopted ISO to improve the quality of our services … preparing us for evaluation by 
the NAPH.’  (Manager: Hospital D) 
 
‘ISO can bring reputation and class to our hospital and...’ (Head of Para -clinic Dept.: 
Hospital B)  
 
‘We are trying to align our ISO indicators with the NAPH’s evaluation checklists; in order 
to both perform a self-assessment before its evaluation and raise the chance of getting 
high score.’ (Manager: Hospital H) 
 
 
Self-developed IQIPs 
 
‘Internal evaluation is based on some checklists extracted from the main standards to 
prepare and perform a self-evaluation of the hospital.’ (Matron: Hospital D) 
 
Hospital committees 
 
‘… We form a temporary committee [the CISE] to prepare the hospital for main 
evaluation. This committee gathers the head of different departments and hold some 
meetings and justify them for preparation for the evaluation. It also gives the checklists of 
NAPH to the departments to get prepared for evaluation.’ (Manager: Hospital H) 
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